Clear Imaging Research, LLC v. Lenovo Group Limited

2:25-cv-00240Txed31.03.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
MARSHALL DIVISION
CLEAR IMAGING RESEARCH LLC,
Plaintiff,
v.
LENOVO GROUP LTD.,
Defendant.
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CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:25-CV-00240-JRG
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant Lenovo Group Ltd.’s (“LGL”) Motion to Dismiss for Lack
of Personal Jurisdiction and Motion to Dismiss Direct, Willful, and Indirect Infringement Claims
(the “Motion”). (Dkt. No. 17.) Having considered the Motion, the subsequent briefing, and the
documents submitted in support thereof, the Court finds that the Motion should be DENIED.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Clear Imaging Research LLC (“Clear Imaging”) filed suit, accusing LGL of
infringing seven U.S. patents. 	(Dkt. No. 1.) 	The patents pertain to digital image processing
technologies that purportedly help correct or avoid blurred images and videos. (E.g., id. ¶¶ 1, 22,
30.) Clear Imaging asserts that Lenovo- and Motorola-branded laptops, smartphones, and tablets
infringe the asserted patents. (E.g., id. ¶ 31.)
Defendant LGL is incorporated in Hong Kong and is the parent of certain U.S. entities.
(See Dkt. No. 17-1 ¶ 2.) For instance, Lenovo (United States) Inc. (“Lenovo U.S.”) and Motorola
Mobility LLC (“Motorola”) are subsidiaries of LGL. 	(Id. ¶¶ 1–3; Dkt. No. 17 at 8, 16.) 	LGL
represents that Lenovo U.S. and Motorola have principal places of business in North Carolina and
Illinois, respectively. (Dkt. No. 17-1 ¶ 6.)
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II. 	LEGAL AUTHORITY
A. 	Personal Jurisdiction
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) requires a court to dismiss a claim if the court
does not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Cunningham v. CBC Conglomerate, LLC,
359 F. Supp. 3d 471, 476 (E.D. Tex. 2019). Personal jurisdiction exists over a defendant where a
forum state’s long-arm statute permits service of process and where assertion of personal
jurisdiction does not violate due process. NexLearn, LLC v. Allen Interactions, Inc., 859 F.3d 1371,
1375 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Texas’ long-arm statute is “coextensive with the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment” such that these two inquiries merge. Carmona v. Leo Ship Mgmt., Inc.,
924 F.3d 190, 193 (5th Cir. 2019).
To satisfy due process when exerting personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the defendant
must have “certain minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit
does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” 	Int’l Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (internal quotations omitted). A defendant has “minimum
contacts” with a forum if it “delivers its products into the stream of commerce with the expectation
that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum [s]tate.” Beverly Hills Fan Co. v. Royal
Sovereign Corp., 21 F.3d 1558, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297–98 (1980)). 	Stream-of-commerce-based personal jurisdiction
attaches where “defendants, acting in consort, placed the accused [product] in the stream of
commerce, they knew the likely destination of the products, and their conduct and connections
with the forum state were such that they should reasonably have anticipated being brought into
court there.” Id. at 1566. The existence of an “established distribution channel into the forum” is
a “significant factor” when evaluating the strength of a non-movant’s stream-of-commerce theory.
See id. at 1565 n.15.
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“When the district court’s determination of personal jurisdiction is based on affidavits and
other written materials, and no jurisdictional hearing is conducted, the plaintiff usually bears only
a prima facie burden.” Celgard, LLC v. SK Innovation Co., 792 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
To bear that burden, “[the plaintiff] need only demonstrate facts that, if true, would support
jurisdiction over the [d]efendant.” Campbell Pet Co. v. Miale, 542 F.3d 879, 888 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
That is, “[w]ithout discovery and a record on jurisdiction, this court must resolve all factual
disputes in the plaintiff’s favor.” Nuance Commc’ns, Inc. v. Abbyy Software House, 626 F.3d 1222,
1231 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Polar Electro Oy v. Suunto Oy, 829 F.3d 1343, 1347–48 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
In addition, a court may exercise jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2)
if “(1) the plaintiff’s claim arises under federal law, (2) the defendant is not subject to jurisdiction
in any state’s courts of general jurisdiction, and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction comports with due
process.” M-I Drilling Fluids UK Ltd. v. Dynamic Air Ltda., 890 F.3d 995, 999 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
(quoting Synthes (U.S.A.) v. G.M. Dos Reis Jr. Ind. Come de Equip. Medico, 563 F.3d 1285, 1293–
94 (Fed. Cir. 2009)). This rule “contemplates a defendant’s contacts with the entire United States,
as opposed to the state in which the district court sits.” Id. (quoting Synthes, 563 F.3d at 1295).
B. 	Failure to State a Patent Infringement Claim
“A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain,” inter alia, “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
Defendants may “test[] the sufficiency of the pleadings” against this standard by moving under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). To survive such a test, a complaint must state enough
facts such that the claim to relief is plausible on its face. Thompson v. City of Waco, 764 F.3d 500,
502 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 	Regional
circuit law governs a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), and in the Fifth Circuit such motions
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are viewed with disfavor and are rarely granted. Lormand v. US Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 232
(5th Cir. 2009); AlexSam, Inc. v. Aetna, Inc., 119 F.4th 27, 34–35 (Fed. Cir. 2024).
A complaint must place the alleged patent infringer on notice of what activity is being
accused of infringement. Lifetime Indus., Inc. v. Trim-Lok, Inc., 869 F.3d 1372, 1379 (Fed. Cir.
2017). However, the plaintiff is not required to prove its case at the pleading stage. Id. Assessing
the sufficiency of pleadings is a context-specific task; simpler technologies may require less
detailed pleadings, while more complex technologies may demand more. Disc Disease Solutions
Inc. v. VGH Solutions, Inc., 888 F.3d 1256, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Alleging pre-suit knowledge of asserted patents may sufficiently support a claim for willful
infringement at the pleading stage. 	See Raytheon Co. v. Cray, Inc., No. 2:16-CV-00423-JRG-
RSP, 2017 WL 1362700, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 12, 2017). The intent necessary to support a claim
of induced infringement “can be found where there is evidence of active steps taken to encourage
direct infringement . . . . [such as by] ‘advertising an infringing use.’” Dialect, LLC v. Bank of
Am., N.A., No. 2:24-CV-00207-JRG, 2024 WL 4980794, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 4, 2024) (cleaned
up). 	An allegation that accused products “‘are designed for a use that is both patented and
infringing, and that has no substantial non-infringing use’ . . . . is sufficient to support a plausible
claim [of contributory infringement].” Barkan Wireless IP Holdings, L.P. v. T-Mobile US, Inc.,
2021 WL 12310942, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 18, 2021) (citation omitted).
III. 	ANALYSIS
A. 	The Court Has Personal Jurisdiction over LGL
This Court recently considered whether it has personal jurisdiction over LGL under (1) a
“stream of commerce” personal jurisdiction theory and (2) Rule 4(k)(2) in Eirog, Truesight,
Universal Connectivity Technologies, and AX Wireless. In those cases, the Court found that the
plaintiffs sufficiently “allege[d] that LGL at least acts in concert with its wholly owned subsidiaries
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to deliver the accused products into the Texas market under a stream of commerce theory.” Eirog
Innovations Ltd. v. Lenovo Grp. Ltd., No. 2:24-CV-00239-JRG, 2024 WL 4519763, at *4 (E.D.
Tex. Oct. 17, 2024); Truesight Commc’ns LLC v. Lenovo Grp. Ltd., No. 2:24-CV-00031-JRG, 2024
WL 5110057, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 13, 2024); Universal Connectivity Techs. Inc. v. Lenovo Grp.
Ltd., No. 2:23-CV-00449-JRG, 2024 WL 4519760, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 17, 2024); see also AX
Wireless LLC v. Lenovo Grp. Ltd., No. 2:22-CV-00280-RWS-RSP, 2023 WL 7105701, at *3 (E.D.
Tex. Sept. 6, 2023). The Court further examined and found jurisdiction under Rule 4(k)(2). Eirog,
2024 WL 4519763, at *6–7; Universal Connectivity Techs., 2024 WL 4519760, at *5–6; Truesight,
2024 WL 5110057, at *2; AX Wireless, 2023 WL 7105701, at *4–5.
Clear Imaging’s allegations regarding personal jurisdiction are substantially similar to
those addressed in the Court’s recent LGL cases. As in those cases, Clear Imaging alleges that
LGL, “directly and/or through subsidiaries,” makes, uses, imports, offers to sell, and/or sells
“products that infringe the Asserted Patents.” (Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 17.) Clear Imaging likewise asserts
that LCL facilitates “placing such products into the stream of commerce via established
distribution channels knowing or understanding that such products would be sold and used . . . in
the Eastern District of Texas.” (Id. ¶ 4.) LGL also allegedly “directs the Accused Products into
established distribution channels within this District and the U.S. nationally” via its website,
Lenovo.com. (Id.)
The Court finds that LGL’s motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2) should be denied for the
same reasons as those given in its prior Orders. 	Eirog, 2024 WL 4519763, at *4–7; Universal
Connectivity Techs., 2024 WL 4519760, at *3–6; Truesight, 2024 WL 5110057, at *1–2; AX
Wireless, 2023 WL 7105701, at *4–5. Regardless of whether factual disputes remain as to whether
LGL created, controls, or directs its subsidiaries to place the allegedly infringing products into
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such a stream of commerce, Clear Imaging has sufficiently alleged that LGL at least acts in concert
with its subsidiaries to deliver the accused products into this district or the United States under a
stream-of-commerce theory. (Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 3–17.) Accepting Clear Imaging’s allegations as true
and viewing factual conflicts in favor of Clear Imaging given the procedural posture of the Motion,
Clear Imaging has made a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction over LGL based on its
specific contacts with the forum, and, alternatively, under Rule 4(k)(2) based on LGL’s contacts
with the United States as a whole. See Celgard, LLC v. SK Innovation Co., 792 F.3d 1373, 1378
(Fed. Cir. 2015).1
Despite the Court’s previous holdings, LGL argues that it has not directed any business
activities at Texas, that LGL has no role in any stream of commerce, that exercising specific
jurisdiction over LGL would be unreasonable, and that Rule 4(k)(2) does not provide an alternative
basis for personal jurisdiction. 	(Dkt. No. 17.) 	However, LGL’s arguments were substantively
considered and rejected by the Court in Eirog, Truesight, Universal Connectivity Technologies,
and AX Wireless. The Court declines LGL’s invitation to revisit such analysis.
LGL’s revised declaration regarding personal jurisdiction issues does not change the
calculus. 	LGL contends that its Motion should be granted because “each allegation in [the]
complaint is directly contradicted by a declaration from Mr. Adrian Chim.” (Dkt. No. 17 at 1–2.)
However, that declaration confirms that LGL disputes Clear Imaging’s facts alleging that the Court
has personal jurisdiction, and the Court “must resolve all factual disputes in [Clear Imaging]’s
1 Here, the Federal Circuit declined to take up review of this Court’s previous similar
determinations of jurisdiction over LGL, at least given the initial stage of the case. 	See In re
Lenovo Group Ltd., Nos. 2025-111, -112, 2025 WL 685914 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 4, 2025).
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favor” in this case. Nuance Commc’ns, Inc. v. Abbyy Software House, 626 F.3d 1222, 1231 (Fed.
Cir. 2010) (emphasis added).
B. 	Clear Imaging’s Complaint Sufficiently Pled Patent Infringement Claims
Beyond personal jurisdiction issues, LGL argues that Clear Imaging fails to sufficiently
allege that LGL directly, willfully, and indirectly infringes the asserted patents. (Dkt. No. 17 at
22–28.) As explained below, the Court finds that Clear Imaging sufficiently alleges infringement
under each of these theories.
i. 	Clear Imaging’s Complaint sufficiently alleged direct infringement.
LGL moves to dismiss Clear Imaging’s claims for direct infringement. It stresses that LGL
is a foreign holding company that “does no business in the United States” and that Clear Imaging
only offered conclusory allegations concerning “unidentified third parties.” 	(Dkt. No. 17 at 22
(emphasis in original).) To that effect, LGL identifies that direct infringement requires conduct
“within the United States” and that LGL is a Hong Kong holding company. (Id.)
Clear Imaging responds that LGL ignores its allegations that LGL itself committed acts of
direct infringement in the United States. 	(Dkt. No. 27 at 19–20.) 	It also contends that the
Complaint identifies that LGL is responsible for infringing acts by “Lenovo US, Lenovo Tech.,
and Motorola,” LGL’s subsidiaries. (Id.)
The Court finds that Clear Imaging has sufficiently alleged direct infringement. That LGL
denies repeated allegations that it directly infringes the asserted patents in the United States does
not sanction granting LGL’s Motion. (See, e.g., Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 3, 31 (“[Defendant] . . . continues
to . . . sell, and/or import certain products . . . including . . . the Moto Edge+ . . . and Lenovo Tab
P11 . . . that directly infringe . . . .”), 36 (“By . . . selling and/or importing into the United States
the Accused Products, [Defendant] . . . is liable for infringement . . . .”), 42, 47, 53, 58, 64, 69, 75,
80, 86, 91, 97, 102 (cited in Dkt. No. 27 at 19–20).) Clear Imaging, rather, has pled enough facts
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to state a claim that LGL itself directly infringes the asserted patents, which the Court accepts as
true at this juncture. See Arigna Tech. Ltd. v. Bayerische Motoren Werke AG, 697 F. Supp. 3d 635,
649 (E.D. Tex. 2023) (“While BMW denies that it conducts these activities in the United States, .
. . the complaint identifies that BMW ‘itself’ engages in these activities. . . . Accepting these well-
pled allegations as true, Arigna has pled enough facts to state a claim for infringement.”).
Similarly, there’s no mystery regarding “unidentified third parties” as LGL posits. Clear
Imaging instead specifically identified that LGL is responsible for direct infringing acts of LGL’s
“Lenovo US, Lenovo Tech., and Motorola” subsidiaries. 	(Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 3–17 (“‘[P]rincipal
activities’ for Lenovo US as ‘[d]istribution of IT products,’ the ‘principal activities’ for Lenovo
Tech. as ‘[p]rovision of IT services and distribution of IT products,’ and the ‘principal activities’
for Motorola as ‘[d]eveloper, owner, licensor and seller of communications hardware and
software.’ . . . At the direction and control of Lenovo, U.S.-based subsidiaries (including but not
limited to Lenovo US, Lenovo Tech., and Motorola) make, use, import, offer to sell, and/or sell
Lenovo-branded and Motorola-branded smartphones and tablets that infringe the Asserted Patents,
including in the State of Texas and this District.”) (citations omitted) (cited in Dkt. No. 27 at 19–
20).) The Court agrees with Clear Imaging that such allegations lead to a plausible inference that
the identified acts of LGL’s subsidiaries are attributable to LGL. See Arigna Tech., 697 F. Supp.
3d at 650 (“The Court, accepting the well-pled allegations as true, finds that Arigna has pled
enough to state a claim for infringement based on BMW’s control of its subsidiaries.”).
ii. 	Clear 	Imaging’s 	Complaint 	sufficiently 	alleged 	pre-suit 	willful
infringement.
LGL moves to dismiss Clear Imaging’s pre-suit willful-infringement claims. Alleging pre-
suit knowledge of the asserted patents may sufficiently support a claim for willful infringement at
the pleading stage. 	See Raytheon Co. v. Cray, Inc., No. 2:16-CV-00423-JRG-RSP, 2017 WL
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1362700, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 12, 2017) (“Because Raytheon’s allegations concerning knowledge
of the patents-in-suit are sufficient, a proper claim for willfulness has been made.”), report &
recommendation adopted, Raytheon Co. v. Cray, Inc., No. 2:16-CV-00423-JRG-RSP, 2017 WL
1344900, (E.D. Tex. Apr. 12, 2017); see also Signode Indus. Grp. LLC v. Samuel, Son & Co., No.
2:24-CV-00080-JRG, 2024 WL 3543408, at *2 (E.D. Tex. July 25, 2024) (“To sufficiently plead
pre-suit willful infringement, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that the defendant knew of an
asserted patent before the plaintiff filed the lawsuit.”).
LGL contends that Clear Imaging’s claims for pre-suit willful infringement should be
dismissed because, at best, Clear Imaging provided notice of infringement of asserted patents in a
letter to Lenovo U.S., not Defendant LGL, before filing the Complaint. (Dkt. No. 17 at 23–24.)
LGL also contends that Clear Imaging failed to plead facts showing culpable conduct as required
to support a willfulness claim. (Id.)
Clear Imaging responds that it adequately pled willful infringement, at least because LGL
received a notice of infringement letter dated May 20, 2021 that listed asserted patents years before
the Complaint was filed in 2025 and continued to infringe thereafter. (Dkt. No. 27 at 20–22.) It
cites another letter from 2023 that Clear Imaging allegedly sent to LGL that accuses LGL of
infringing all asserted patents. (Id. (citing Dkt. No. 1-18).)
The Court finds that Clear Imaging’s Complaint sufficiently pled willful infringement. In
its Complaint, Clear Imaging details that it sent LGL letters identifying various products and
functionality that infringed Clear Imaging’s patents. (Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 24–28.) The parties thereafter
allegedly had numerous discussions, and LGL allegedly continued to infringe after these several
discussions. (Id.) Such detailed notices and allegations support Clear Imaging’s willfulness claim
at this juncture. See Raytheon, 2017 WL 1362700, at *5.
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While it is unclear whether LGL or only another LGL subsidiary received notice of
infringement, the Court resolves such factual disputes in Clear Imaging’s favor; Clear Imaging has
provided sufficient allegations to support a theory of willful infringement. See Content Guard
Holdings, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 2:13-CV-1112-JRG, 2015 WL 1431946, at *5 (E.D. Tex.
Mar. 30, 2015) (“[T]aking all well-pleaded facts as true and viewing those facts in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, the Court finds that ContentGuard’s pleadings are sufficiently plausible
to plead a claim of willful infringement. ”).
iii. 	Clear Imaging’s Complaint sufficiently alleged induced infringement.
LGL also moves to dismiss Clear Imaging’s induced-infringement claims. 	Induced
infringement requires knowledge of the existence of a patent that is infringed. See Commil USA,
LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 575 U.S. 632, 640 (2015) (liability under Section 271(b) “can only attach
if the defendant knew of the patent and knew as well that ‘the induced acts constitute patent
infringement’”) (quoting Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 766 (2011)).
LGL argues that the Complaint neither alleged that LGL had pre-suit knowledge of asserted
patents nor showed LGL had a specific intent to induce infringement of the asserted patents. (Dkt.
No. 17 at 26).
As to pre-suit knowledge of the asserted patents, Clear Imaging’s Complaint sufficiently
alleged that LGL had pre-suit knowledge of the asserted patents for the same reasons noted above
with respect to willful infringement. Supra § III.B.ii.
As to whether Clear Imaging has sufficiently pled a specific intent to infringe the asserted
patents, LGL argues that Clear Imaging did not plead any facts showing that LGL had a specific
intent to induce any third party to infringe the Asserted Patents. (Dkt. No. 17 at 25.) It reasons
that Clear Imaging’s vague references to online instruction and technical support for the accused
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products from Lenovo U.S. or Motorola are not nearly enough to state a claim for inducement.
(Id. at 26.)
Clear Imaging, pointing to its Complaint, argues that LGL induced infringement by
“advertis[ing] that the Accused Products, such as the Moto Edge+, include video stabilization
functionality” and instructing users to infringe the asserted patents by teaching them “how to
record videos with video stabilization on Moto Edge+ smartphones.” 	(Dkt. No. 27 at 24.) 	It
advances similar allegations for HDR, night vision, and portrait mode accused features. (Id.)
The Court agrees with Clear Imaging that it has sufficiently pled a specific intent to infringe
the asserted patents. Indeed, the intent necessary for a claim of “inducement can be found where
there is evidence of active steps taken to encourage direct infringement . . . . [such as by]
‘advertising an infringing use.’” 	Dialect, LLC v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 2:24-CV-00207-JRG,
2024 WL 4980794, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 4, 2024) (cleaned up and citations omitted); see also
Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility LLC, 2017 WL 3721064, at *4 (E.D. Tex. May 15, 2017).
Here, Clear Imaging has done just that with respect to the accused products and the at-issue video
stabilization, HDR, night vision, and portrait mode features.
To require more would improperly force Clear Imaging to “prove its case at the pleading
stage.” In re Bill of Lading Transmission & Processing Sys. Pat. Litig., 681 F.3d 1323, 1340 (Fed.
Cir. 2012). Although it is unclear whether LGL or only another LGL subsidiary had a specific
intent to infringe the asserted patents, the Court resolves such factual disputes in Clear Imaging’s
favor at this early juncture. Accordingly, Clear Imaging has alleged sufficient facts to support a
theory of induced infringement.
iv. 	Clear Imaging’s Complaint sufficiently alleged contributory infringement.
To round out its Motion, LGL also moves to dismiss Clear Imaging’s contributory-
infringement claims. Contributory infringement occurs if a party “offers to sell or sells within the
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United States or imports into the United States a component . . . constituting a material part of [a
patented] invention, knowing the same to be especially made or especially adapted for use in an
infringement of such patent.” 35 U.S.C. § 271(c). The component cannot be “a staple article or
commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use.” Id.
LGL argues that the Complaint neither alleged pre-suit knowledge of asserted patents nor
showed facts that LGL does anything that would make it a contributory infringer. (Dkt. No. 17 at
26).
As to pre-suit knowledge of the asserted patents, Clear Imaging’s Complaint sufficiently
alleged that LGL had pre-suit knowledge of the asserted patents for the same reasons noted above
with respect to willful infringement. Supra § III.B.ii.
As to facts regarding LGL’s potential liability as a contributory infringer, LGL argues that
Clear Imaging’s contributory infringement claims are “[c]onclusory” and “boilerplate” and thus
warrant dismissal. (Dkt. No. 17 at 26–28.) Specifically, LGL insists that the Complaint recites
the legal elements of contributory infringement but fails to plead any facts supporting such a
theory. (Id.).
Clear Imaging disagrees, identifying that its Complaint recites that “the identified hardware
and/or software components and functionality in Lenovo’s Moto Edge+ smartphones with video
stabilization constitute a material part of the inventions claimed in the ’788 Patent, are especially
made or adapted to infringe the ’788 Patent, and are not staple articles or commodities of
commerce suitable for non-infringing use, as demonstrated by the evidence cited above and in
Exhibit 20.” 	(Dkt. No. 27 at 25–26.) 	Clear Imaging makes similar representations for each
asserted patent. (Id. (citing Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 35, 46, 57, 68, 79, 90, and 101).)
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Clear Imaging is correct, and the Court accordingly denies LGL’s Motion regarding
contributory infringement. An allegation that the accused products “‘are designed for a use that is
both patented and infringing, and that has no substantial non-infringing use’ . . . . is sufficient to
support a plausible claim [of contributory infringement].” Barkan Wireless IP Holdings, L.P. v. T-
Mobile US, Inc., 2021 WL 12310942, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 18, 2021) (citation omitted). Here,
Clear Imaging alleged just that. (Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 35, 46, 57, 68, 79, 90, and 101.) Although it is
unclear whether LGL or only another LGL subsidiary was a contributory infringer, the Court,
again, resolves such factual disputes in Clear Imaging’s favor at this early juncture.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above, the Court finds that the Motion (Dkt. No. 17) should be
and hereby is DENIED.
.
____________________________________
RODNEY GILSTRAP
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
So ORDERED and SIGNED this 31st day of March, 2026.
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