EireOg Innovations Ltd. v. Cisco Systems Inc.

2:24-cv-00224Txed15.04.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
MARSHALL DIVISION
EIREOG INNOVATIONS LTD.,
Plaintiff,
v.
CISCO SYSTEMS INC.,
Defendant.
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Case No. 2:24-cv-00224-RWS-RSP
(Lead Case)
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Before the Court are Plaintiff EireOg Innovations Ltd.’s Motion to Strike In Part John C.
Ale's Expert Report (Dkt. No. 199); Defendant Cisco Systems Inc.’s Motion to Exclude the
Improper Opinion and Testimony of Eric Chaffee (Dkt. No. 202); and Cisco’s Motion to Exclude
the Improper Opinion and Testimony of Mark Chandler (Dkt. No. 203). In the Motions, the Parties
seek to strike portions of the respective expert reports that purport to improperly offer opinions of
law.
At the final pre-trial conference, the Plaintiff stipulated it will not call Eric Chaffee at trial.
See Dkt. No. 452 at 5:25-6:7. Therefore, the Court DENIES AS MOOT Defendant’s Motion to
Strike Eric Chaffee (Dkt. No. 202). The Court requested the Parties to narrow the remaining
disputed paragraphs of the expert reports, in light of the Court’s Report and Recommendation,
which narrowed the contract interpretation dispute to three questions. See Dkt. No. 435 at 10.1
Because the Parties’ “revenue sharing,” Daingean, “affiliate” and “alter ego” arguments are no
longer at issue, the Court GRANTS both motions as to the paragraphs of Mr. Ale and Mr.
1 The remaining three issues are: (1) “Whether infringement litigation, like these suits, is within the scope of EireOg’s
‘ordinary course of business,’” (2) “To what extent did EireOg exercise control over the seconded AIP IE employees,
through promulgated regulations, or the ‘request and direction’ of their direct report, or any other means to direct the
employees,” and (3) “whether the asserted patents were directly or indirectly owned, controlled, licensable or in any
way enforceable by AIP IE.”
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Chandler’s reports that pertain to these arguments.2 As discussed below, the Court GRANTS IN
PART certain portions of Parties’ Motions and they are otherwise DENIED.
I. 	BACKGROUND
In the instant Case, EireOg has accused products of Cisco that contain certain Intel chips
of infringing U.S. Patent No. 8,504,777 (“the ’777 patent”). See generally Dkt. No. 444.
Defendants argue that Intel’s membership in RPX grants them a license to use the ’777 patent as
to the products containing Intel chips, because of EireOg’s relationship with its parent companies
Atlantic IP US and Atlantic IP Ireland. Dkt. No. 210 at 1.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
An expert witness may provide opinion testimony if “(a) the expert’s scientific, technical,
or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine
a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the product
of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and
methods to the facts of the case.” Fed. R. Evid. 702.
Rule 702 requires a district court to make a preliminary determination, when requested, as
to whether the requirements of the rule are satisfied with regard to a particular expert’s proposed
testimony. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 149 (1999); Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-93 (1993). District courts are accorded broad discretion in making
Rule 702 determinations of admissibility. Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152 (“the trial judge must have
considerable leeway in deciding in a particular case how to go about determining whether
particular expert testimony is reliable”). Although the Fifth Circuit and other courts have identified
various factors that the district court may consider in determining whether an expert’s testimony
2 As ordered in the final pretrial conference, the Parties each filed stipulations (Dkt. Nos. 448, 453) that listed which
expert report paragraphs were withdrawn in light of the Court’s Report and Recommendation (Dkt. No. 435).
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should be admitted, the nature of the factors that are appropriate for the court to consider is dictated
by the ultimate inquiry—whether the expert’s testimony is sufficiently reliable and relevant to be
helpful to the finder of fact and thus to warrant admission at trial. United States v. Valencia, 600
F.3d 389, 424 (5th Cir. 2010).
Importantly, in a jury trial setting, the Court’s role under Daubert is not to weigh the expert
testimony to the point of supplanting the jury’s fact-finding role; instead, the Court’s role is limited
to that of a gatekeeper, ensuring that the evidence in dispute is at least sufficiently reliable and
relevant to the issue before the jury that it is appropriate for the jury’s consideration. See Micro
Chem., Inc. v. Lextron, Inc., 317 F.3d 1387, 1391-92 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (applying Fifth Circuit law)
(“When, as here, the parties’ experts rely on conflicting sets of facts, it is not the role of the trial
court to evaluate the correctness of facts underlying one expert’s testimony.”); Pipitone v.
Biomatrix, Inc., 288 F.3d 239, 249-50 (5th Cir. 2002) (“‘[t]he trial court’s role as gatekeeper [under
Daubert] is not intended to serve as a replacement for the adversary system.’ . . . Thus, while
exercising its role as a gate-keeper, a trial court must take care not to transform a Daubert hearing
into a trial on the merits,” quoting Fed. R. Evid. 702 advisory committee note). As the Supreme
Court explained in Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596, “Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of
contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate
means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.” See Mathis v. Exxon Corp., 302 F.3d 448, 461
(5th Cir. 2002).
III. 	ANALYSIS
A. 	Conclusions of Law
In his report, Mr. Ale lists two canons of contract interpretation under Delaware law: (1)
that interpretation is a question of law “to be resolved by the court,” and that “unambiguous”
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contract language should “be interpreted based on the plain meaning of the language contained in
the contract.” Dkt. No. 199-2 at ⁋⁋ 21-22.
Both portions present unacceptable statements that are within the Court’s sole province.
“Lawyers may testify as to legal matters when those matters involve questions of fact.” Askanase
v. Fatjo, 130 F.3d 657, 672 (5th Cir. 1997). Here, no facts are present here. Therefore, the Court
STRIKES ⁋⁋ 21-22 of Mr. Ale’s report. Furthermore, both Parties are ORDERED to not offer
expert testimony that provides direct recitations of law at trial.
B. 	Hypothetical Question of Law
In his report, Mr. Ale opines to the question of “Whether a company can delegate the
authority to control, grant rights over, or enforce its rights in specific property to others via
contract.” See Dkt. No. 199-2 at ⁋ 3. In its Motion, Plaintiff argues that while Mr. Ale’s report
opines to general contract law, his “conclusions clearly map to the RPX License and the ultimate
issues for the jury,” and are thus improper. Dkt. No. 199 at 4. For “delegation,” Mr. Ale concludes:
These transactions do not transfer ownership of the property, real or intangible, which
remains in the owner. But depending on the scope, they can provide the entity to which
these powers are granted very real control, including the power to enforce rights in the
property and to grant others rights to use the property. If the authority granted is broad,
then in every real sense of the words, the property is “controlled,” rights in it are
“enforceable,” and the ability to use is “licensable” or “leasable” (depending on the type
of property) by the non-owner company granted that authority.” Dkt. No. 199-2 at ⁋ 120.
For “outsourcing,” Mr. Ale concludes:
As noted above, however, a company is free to delegate broader powers, including the
power to control a company’s core business. In my experience, such an arrangement would
be unusual. Nevertheless, if a company were to delegate authority to conduct its core
business activities, including use of and enforcement of rights regarding key assets, that
would mean that the company to which authority has been delegated would have the power
to control the core business activities and the related assets, all depending on the contractual
language. Dkt. No. 199-2 at ⁋ 123.
Plaintiff argues that because they implicitly relate to EireOg, these opinions amount to an improper
legal conclusion on contract interpretation. Dkt. No. 199 at 4.
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Defendant argues that Plaintiff cites no authority to support its positions that an expert
cannot opine to “parallel factual issues” relevant to the case. Dkt. No. 252 at 6. Instead, Defendant
argues that Mr. Ale’s testimony applies “his own experience and expertise to help the jury resolve
factual issues.” Id. Defendant notes that the preceding paragraphs Mr. Ale relied upon to reach the
challenged conclusion were unchallenged. Dkt. No. 339 at 2.
In Askanase the Fifth Circuit found inadmissible expert opinions that opined to the ultimate
legal issue – whether a fiduciary duty was breached. Askanase, 130 F.3d at 672. The Circuit
contrasted Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, where the Circuit found admissible a lawyer-
expert’s testimony, because it spoke to the effect of contract language on the parties, rather than
the meaning of the language itself. 640 F.2d 534, 552 (5th Cir. 1981). Furthermore, an expert may
“espouse his opinion on the facts of the case.” Est. of Sowell v. United States, 198 F.3d 169, 172
(5th Cir. 1999).
The Court finds that Mr. Ale’s report improperly answers hypothetical questions about the
application of law to facts very similar to those in suit. Like Askanase, Mr. Ale’s testimony reaches
the ultimate issue in the case – whether contract law allows such delegation and outsourcing. Such
a conclusion is legal, rather than factual, and under the proper purview of the Court, rather than
any expert or the jury. The Court notes that such legal conclusions are not helpful to the jury and
may often invite confusion. Given the Court’s role to instruct on the law, expert testimony – aimed
at the jury – that speaks to what the law is, is improper. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s
Motion should be GRANTED as to Mr. Ale’s “delegation” and “outsourcing” opinions.
Therefore, the Court STRIKES ⁋⁋ 120 and 123 of Mr. Ale’s Report. Furthermore, both Parties
are ORDERED to not offer expert testimony that that opines as to disputed issues of law at trial.
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C. 	Effect of Contracts
As to whether EireOg’s Patents are “Controlled, Licensable, or Enforceable” by Atlantic
IP US or Atlantic IP Ireland, Mr. Ale opines that:
Because the initial shareholder(s) of EireOg effectively were nominees for Atlantic IP, and
Atlantic IP continued to manage EireOg, Atlantic IP was in a position to dictate the control,
licensing, and enforcement of EireOg’s patents even before the Secondment Service
Agreement was signed. Dkt. No. 199-2 at ⁋ 136.
A lawyer-expert may opine as to the effect of contract terms on the parties, but not as to the
meaning of the language itself. Huddleston, 640 F.2d at 552. Furthermore, an expert may “espouse
his opinion on the facts of the case.” Est. of Sowell v. United States, 198 F.3d 169, 172 (5th Cir.
1999).
Such opinions should not opine as to what contract law is. Instead, they should address the
effect of contract terms on the facts relating to the parties, to determine whether EireOg’s patents
were licensable by Atlantic IP US or Atlantic IP IE. While this factual testimony takes into account
the contract language, it must not opine as to the principles of contract law or contract
interpretation. The relevant legal principles must be set out in the Court’s jury instructions.
Therefore, the Court DENIES the Parties’ Motions to strike portions of its expert reports that
discuss the effects of the contract on the parties, relevant to the three remaining factual questions.
D. 	Subjective Intent
In its Motion, Plaintiff argues that Mr. Ale improperly opines to the “subjective intent” of
the RPX License Agreement Parties. Dkt. No. 199 at 10. To support its position, Plaintiff points
to several paragraphs of Mr. Ale’s report, where his opinions “provided subject matter beyond
[his] stated expertise.” Id. Additionally, Plaintiff argues that Mr. Ale’s opinions as to EireOg’s
Patent Office Power of attorney assignment to Atlantic IP are outside his expertise, because he has
“not given any indication that he is competent to testify” to this. Id.
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Defendant argues that these opinions “fall well within the scope of [Mr. Ale’s] undisputed
expertise.” Dkt. No. 252 at 11. Instead, Defendant contends that Mr. Ale seeks to analyze the
“implications of Atlantic IP’s stated motivations for forming EireOg.” Id. Defendant argues that
EireOg’s cited cases are distinguishable, because Mr. Ale makes no conclusion about Atlantic IP’s
specific behavior, and instead opines that Atlantic IP’s actions are “suggestive of [their] intent.”
Id. Finally, Defendant argues that Mr. Ale’s “power of attorney” opinions are proper, because he
stays within his expertise to opine that such an assignment is “unusual in these circumstances and
further supports his opinions regarding control.” Id. at 12.
The Court is not persuaded that Mr. Ale’s opinions speak beyond his expertise and cover
the contracting parties’ “subjective intent.” Plaintiff relies on Network-1 Techs., Inc. v. Alcatel-
Lucent USA, Inc., to argue that an expert may not opine to a party’s “subjective state of mind.”
While Network-1, prohibits “speculation” to a party’s state of mind, it permits a qualified expert
to testify to actions typically taken under certain factual circumstances, so long as it does not
“usurp the role of the factfinder.” 2017 WL 4173468, at *6 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 21, 2017). Network-1
notes, however, that an expert may “explain and point to the underlying factual record and other
evidence bearing on issues of intent and knowledge.” Id. While Mr. Ale is prohibited from offering
conclusory statements to any party’s subjective intent, Plaintiff’s cited paragraphs do not opine to
any Party’s state of mind, nor conclude to any subjective intent. Instead, they opine to the
agreement’s practical effects, and why a party would enter such agreements, or assign powers of
attorney. While this speaks to intent, it does not speak to the specific intent of any Party. The latter
is prohibited; the former is not. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike should
be DENIED as to Mr. Ale speaking beyond his expertise.
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E. 	Factual Background
1. 	Ale Report
In its Motion, Plaintiff argues that the Mr. Ale’s “Factual Background” section improperly
places an expert’s gloss on otherwise unhelpful facts. Dkt. No. 199 at 12. Plaintiff argues this
section is prejudicial, because it improperly provides expert endorsement to the testimony of non-
experts. Id.
Federal Rule of Evidence 703 grants experts a broad well of facts to form their opinions.
“Expert 	witness 	testimony 	is 	a widely-recognized 	exception 	to 	the 	rule against 	hearsay
testimony…An expert's opinion is derived not only from records and data, but from education and
from a lifetime of experience. Thus, when the expert witness has consulted numerous sources, and
uses that information, together with his own professional knowledge and experience, to arrive at
his opinion, that opinion is regarded as evidence in its own right and not as hearsay in disguise.
United States v. Williams, 447 F.2d 1285, 1290 (5th Cir. 1971). Otherwise inadmissible evidence
an expert relies upon may be disclosed to the jury “only if their probative value in helping the jury
evaluate the opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect.” Fed. R. Evid. 703.
Mr. Ale’s “factual background” section merely compiles the factual basis he relies upon to
form his ultimate opinions. Experts are free to rely on otherwise inadmissible evidence to form
their opinions – Rule 703 only applies when a party seeks to introduce the expert’s underlying
factual basis to the jury. Any dispute as to the factual soundness of an expert’s testimony speaks
to its weight, not relevance or admissibility. Therefore, the Court finds Plaintiff’s “factual
background” argument unpersuasive and DENIES this portion of Plaintiff’s Motion.
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2. 	Chandler Rebuttal
The same holds true for Mr. Chandler’s reliance on the Atlantic IP IE–RPX Agreement,
and Mr. Padian’s testimony. Defendant points to several distinctions between the at-issue Atlantic
IP US–RPX Agreement, and the Atlantic IP IE–RPX Agreement. Dkt. No. 203 at 6. While Mr.
Chandler is not a lawyer, he may rely on relevant contract language to reach his conclusions. Mr.
Chandler is not arguing that the Atlantic IP IE–RPX Agreement somehow replaces the Atlantic IP
US–RPX Agreement. Instead, he distinguishes the two to rebut Mr. Ale’s opinions. Such a rebuttal
is not improper.
Defendant argues that Mr. Chandler’s rote “recitation” of Gerald Padian’s testimony is
improper. Id. at 9. Defendant argues that because no additional analysis or facts were presented to
buttress Mr. Chandler’s “Control” definition, and because Mr. Padian is an interested party, Mr.
Chandler’s reliance is improper. Id.
In its reply, Plaintiff points to several facts Mr. Chandler relied on to form his “Control”
opinion, in addition to Mr. Padian’s testimony. Dkt. No. 243 at 7. Plaintiff adds that no evidence
was presented to dispute Mr. Padian’s testimony. Id. at 6.
The Court finds that Mr. Chandler did not exclusively rely on Mr. Padian’s testimony to
form his “Control” opinions. His reliance on the contract language and the record indicates that
his opinions were formed from his expertise, and that he did not just parrot Mr. Padian.
Any dispute Defendant may have as to this information speaks to the weight of Mr.
Chandler’s testimony, not its admissibility. Therefore, the Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion as
to Mr. Chandler’s reliance on the Atlantic IP IE–RPX Agreement and Mr. Padian’s testimony.
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F. 	Revenue Share,
Daingean, “Control” and “Alter Ego”
In the Report and Recommendation on the Parties’ license cross motions, the Court
recommended granting in part Plaintiff’s Motion, and found no license under the purported
“affiliate” and “alter ego” theories. See Dkt. No. 435. The Court also found Daingean inapplicable.
See Id. In light of this finding, Defendant withdrew the challenged portions of Mr. Ale’s report
that opine exclusively to these already-decided issues. See Dkt. No. 448 at 1. Plaintiff has likewise
withdrawn the challenged portions of Mr. Chandler’s report that opine exclusively to these
already-decided issues. See Dkt. No. 453-2. Therefore, the Court finds that these portions of each
Parties’ Motion to Strike should be GRANTED.
Additionally, in light of the Court’s Report and Recommendation finding moot the value
of EireOg’s patents for its license analysis (See Dkt. No. 435 at 9 n. 6), the Court GRANTS
Defendant’s Motion to Strike, as to any revenue sharing testimony.
G. 	Fiduciary Duties and Public Policy
1. 	Fiduciary Duties
Defendant argues that Mr. Chandler improperly opines to board members fiduciary duties
outside his expertise and not discussed in Mr. Ale’s report. Dkt. No. 203 at 10. Defendant argues
that these paragraphs are (1) improper legal conclusions, (2) “legally irrelevant to the issue of
control,” and (3) any probative value is outweighed by the risk of prejudice. Id. Defendant argues
fiduciary duties are not relevant to the issue of control, because Mr. Chandler admits there is “no
inconsistency between alleged fiduciary duties and Atlantic IP controlling EireOg.” Id. at 11.
Plaintiff argues that Mr. Chandler’s fiduciary opinions are proper, because they point out
a factor Defendant’s expert, Mr. Ale, failed to consider in his analysis. Dkt. No. 243 at 8. Plaintiff
argues such opinions are proper, because they are relevant when “EireOg’s interests differed” from
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Atlantic IP, and seconded employees are subject to both the secondment agreement to Atlantic IP,
and their fiduciary duties as EireOg board members. Id. at 10.
The Court finds Mr. Chandler’s fiduciary duty arguments allowable. Mr. Chandler is not
offering improper legal conclusions, instead, he identifies a legal duty that may exist. Plaintiff
argues that conflicting duties may arise between individuals both on EireOg’s board and seconded
to Atlantic IP. While Mr. Chandler’s testimony admits no conflict necessarily exists between
“alleged fiduciary duties and Atlantic IP controlling EireOg,” this testimony does not consider
whether any EireOg board members seconded to Atlantic IP face such conflicts. Contrary to
Defendant’s assertion, fiduciary duty is relevant to the “Control” inquiry. Therefore, the Court
DENIES Defendant’s Motion as to Mr. Chandler’s “fiduciary duty” arguments.
2. 	Public Policy
Defendant also argues that Mr. Chandler’s “industry” and “public policy” arguments are
irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial. Id. at 12. Defendant points to 8 pages of Mr. Chandler’s report
that purport to make public policy arguments in favor of the patent system and protecting inventors.
Id. at 13. Defendant argues such testimony is unfairly prejudicial, and even prohibited by other
courts, because it introduces issues not presented to the jury. Id. at 14.
Plaintiff argues that Mr. Ale’s testimony that discusses the structure and business model of
“patent assertion entities” opens the door to Mr. Chandler’s rebuttal. Id. at 11. Plaintiff argues that
this testimony serves to properly rebut Mr. Ale’s “broad, conclusory, and one sided” statements.
Id. Finally, Plaintiff finds Defendant’s cited caselaw inapplicable, because the expert testimony
was not offered on rebuttal.
The Court finds that both experts proffered “industry” testimony is overbroad, but not
entirely improper. Relevant to the license inquiry is EireOg general business structure, and its
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relationship with its parent. While the experts are permitted to opine, within their expertise, to
relevant functional aspects of the industry, EireOg, or related companies, they may not opine to
public policy arguments, or the economic effects of EireOg or similar companies. Such testimony
is unfairly prejudicial and may risk jury confusion.3 Therefore, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s
Motion as to any public policy or economic arguments by Mr. Chandler. The Court DENIES
Defendant’s Motion as to relevant functional aspects of the industry, EireOg, or related companies,
within Mr. Chandler’s expertise.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Having considered the Parties’ Motions, the Court DENIES AS MOOT Defendant’s
Motion to Strike Eric Chaffee (Dkt. No. 202) with respect to Defendant Cisco. Because the Parties’
“revenue sharing,” Daingean, “affiliate” and “alter ego” arguments are no longer at issue, the
Court GRANTS the paragraphs the Parties seek to strike of Mr. Ale and Mr. Chandler’s report the
pertain to these arguments. Finally, and as discussed above, the Court GRANTS the portions of
Parties’ Motions that seek to strike conclusions of law, answers to hypothetical questions of law,
public policy or economic policy arguments; the Motions are otherwise DENIED. The Parties are
ORDERED to limit their testimony from Mr. Ale and Mr. Chandler to the following topics, within
their stated expertise:
• 	Topics discussed in non-disputed paragraphs.
• 	EireOg and related companies’ underlying business model, corporate structure,
management and staffing.
3 The Court notes that EireOg’s Motion in Limine No. 8, granted by the Court “does not bar Defendants from
describing Plaintiff’s business as ‘asserting patents by licensing or litigation.’”
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• 	Background facts, and factual issues of contract terms that pertain to the underlying
license dispute, including the issue of “Control.” 	Provisions of applicable law
relevant to these issues should be requested as portions of the jury instructions.
• 	Typical and customary actions taken by entities for corporate governance and
business operations under specific, relevant, factual circumstances, so long as such
testimony does directly opine to any Party’s specific intent.
.
____________________________________
ROY S. PAYNE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
SIGNED this 3rd day of January, 2012.
SIGNED this 15th day of April, 2026.
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