Doyle v. Harrison

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
DERRICK DEON DOYLE,
Petitioner,
)
)
)
)
)	v. 	No. 2:25-cv-03026-SHL-atc
)
WARDEN FNU HARRISON,
Respondent.
)
)
)
ORDER DIRECTING CLERK TO MODIFY DOCKET, GRANTING RESPONDENT’S
MOTION TO DISMISS (ECF NO. 8), DISMISSING § 2241 PETITION, CERTIFYING
THAT AN APPEAL WOULD NOT BE TAKEN IN GOOD FAITH, AND DENYING
LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS ON APPEAL
Before the Court is the pro se Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 (ECF No. 1, “§ 2241 Petition”) of Petitioner Derrick Deon Doyle, Bureau of Prisons
(“BOP”) register number 64239-510.1 Respondent Warden Harrison filed a Motion to Dismiss
on December 12, 2025. (ECF No. 8.) Doyle has not filed a response, and the time for him to do
so has expired. (See ECF No. 6.) For the reasons that follow, Harrison’s Motion to Dismiss is
GRANTED, and the § 2241 Petition is DISMISSED.
1 When Doyle filed his § 2241 Petition, he was incarcerated at the Federal Correctional
Institution in Memphis, Tennessee (“FCI Memphis”). However, the BOP’s Inmate Locator
reflects that he is now incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution in Lewisburg,
Pennsylvania (“FCI Lewisburg”). See bop.gov/inmateloc/ (click “Find By Number”; type
“64239-510”; then click “Search”) (last accessed Jan. 22, 2026). The Clerk is DIRECTED to
modify the docket to reflect Doyle’s current address.
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I. 	BACKGROUND
On April 1, 2024, Doyle pleaded guilty in the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Alabama to one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute fifty grams or
more of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and one count of distribution of fifty
grams or more of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). See United States v.
Doyle, No. 1:23-cr-00177-ECF-CWB, Plea Agreement, ECF No. 180 (M.D. Ala. Apr. 1, 2024).
The court sentenced Doyle to 235 months of incarceration, to be followed by a five-year term of
supervised release. See id., ECF No. 234 (Aug. 1, 2024). He appealed, and the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit granted the Government’s motion to dismiss the appeal
based on the appeal waiver contained in Doyle’s plea agreement. See id., ECF No. 302 (May 14,
2025). Doyle did not file a § 2255 motion challenging his convictions and sentence.
II. 	THE PETITION
Doyle filed the instant § 2241 Petition on November 7, 2025. (ECF No. 1.) He
challenges the BOP’s failure to process and grant his request for a Public Safety Factor (“PSF”)
sentence-length waiver. (Id. at PageID 6.) Doyle contends that the BOP’s failure to do so
violates Program Statement 5100.08, as well as his Fifth Amendment due process rights. (Id.)
He also argues that the failure to process his PSF waiver request violates his Eighth Amendment
rights because it prohibits his transfer to a facility that could better address his obstructive sleep
apnea and that the failure to process the waiver has caused hardship to his family because he
cannot be transferred to a facility closer to his home in Alabama. (Id. at PageID 6–7.) Doyle
requests that the Court order the BOP to process his PSF waiver request and “reconsider [his]
custody classification without PSF restriction.” (Id. at PageID 7.)
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On December 12, 2025, Harrison filed a Motion to Dismiss the § 2241 Petition under
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 8 at PageID 49–50.)
Harrison’s motion is supported by the Declaration of Robin Eads, a BOP paralegal with access to
official records for BOP inmates, including Doyle’s SENTRY Public Information Inmate Data
Sheet, his SENTRY Male Custody Classification Form, and the file for his Administrative
Remedy No. 1245083. (ECF No. 8-1.) Harrison argues that the Court should dismiss the § 2241
Petition because Doyle is not entitled to habeas relief “regarding his request to have the PSF of
Sentence Length removed.” (ECF No. 8 at PageID 51.) Harrison asserts that Doyle has no
liberty interest in his security and custody classification, and that the BOP has discretion to apply
the PSF pursuant to Program Statement 5100.08. (Id. at PageID 52–53.) Harrison also argues
that Petitioner’s claim that the application of a PSF has affected an inmate’s placement and
conditions of confinement may only be asserted in a civil rights action. (Id. at PageID 53–54.)
III. 	ANALYSIS
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, this Court is authorized to issue writs of habeas corpus on
behalf of prisoners who are “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States.” However, Doyle’s § 2241 Petition does not allege a constitutional violation
because he has no protected liberty interest in being housed at a particular facility. See Olim v.
Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 245 (1983). Likewise, he has no protected liberty interest in a
particular security classification. See Ford v. Harvey, 106 F. App’x 397, 399 (6th Cir. 2004);
see also Marti v. Nash, 227 F. App’x 148, 150 (3d Cir. 2007) (affirming the dismissal of the §
2241 petition because the petitioner “ha[d] no due process right to any particular security
classification”).
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Doyle also fails to allege a violation of federal law in his § 2241 Petition. The law
delegates to the BOP the duty to “designate the place of the prisoner’s imprisonment.” See 18
U.S.C. § 3621(b). The BOP chooses that designation after considering various factors, including
“the prisoner’s security designation, the prisoner’s programmatic needs, the prisoner’s mental
and medical health needs, any request made by the prisoner related to faith-based needs,
recommendations of the sentencing court, and other security concerns of the Bureau of Prisons.”
Id. The BOP “may designate any available penal or correctional facility that meets minimum
standards of health and habitability . . . that the [BOP] determines to be appropriate and
suitable.” Id. Under § 3621(b), the BOP has broad discretion to determine a prisoner’s custody
classification and security designation. See Mays v. Paul, No. 5:23-00093-GFVT, 2023 WL
2905553, at *2 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 28, 2023) (noting that “the BOP’s authority to determine an
inmate’s security classification derives from 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b), and it possesses broad
discretion in making those determinations”); Embrey v. Sepenak, No. 0:11-CV-00119-HRW,
2012 WL 1205721, at *3 (E.D. Ky. Apr. 10, 2012) (noting that “Congress has given the BOP
complete authority to determine the custody classification and security levels of federal inmates,
direct their confinement in any available facility, and freely transfer them from one facility to
another”).
When a statute expressly delegates interpretive authority to an agency, courts defer to that
agency interpretation. Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024); Roussell v.
Harrison, No. 2:25-cv-02246-SHL-cgc, 2026 WL 147838, at *3 (W.D. Tenn. Jan. 20, 2026).
And as the Sixth Circuit has explained, a court’s “duty remains the same: to ‘independently
interpret the statute and effectuate the will of Congress . . . by fixing the boundaries of the
delegated authority,’ even if those boundaries continue to provide the agency with considerable
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discretion.” United States v. Bricker, 135 F.4th 427, 440–41 (6th Cir. 2025). Thus, the BOP’s
designation occurs as part of the delegation of authority from Congress.
Moreover, any assertion by Doyle that the BOP has misapplied Program Statement
5100.08 is not cognizable under § 2241. See Hutchins v. FMC Lexington, No. 5:08-393-JMH,
2008 WL 4534241, at *2 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 7, 2008). “The BOP’s Program Statements are not
‘laws’ within the meaning of the statute, because they do not constitute regulations promulgated
in compliance with the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act. Rather, they are
internal agency guidelines that are ‘akin to . . . interpretive rules.’” Id. (quoting Reno v. Koray,
515 U.S. 50, 61 (1995)). “[E]very court that has addressed the issue has found that PS 5100.08
did not alter well-settled law that an inmate has no protected liberty or due process interest in his
classification level or his assigned facility.” Gonzalez v. Doe, No. 3:09-CV-671-P ECF, 2009
WL 1704248, at *1 (N.D. Tex. June 15, 2009) (collecting cases); see also Smith v. Warden of
Duluth Prison Camp, No. 18-cv-2555 (WMW/LIB), 2019 WL 3325837, at *6 (D. Minn. Apr.
23, 2019) (noting that “BOP Program Statement 5100.08 [does not] create a cognizable liberty
interest in Petitioner being placed at any particular correctional facility”). Doyle would simply
not be entitled to relief even if the BOP misapplied Program Statement 5100.08.
In any event, the BOP acted completely within its discretion with respect to the PSF used
to determine Doyle’s security level. With respect to PSFs, Program Statement 5100.08 states:
A [PSF] is relevant factual information regarding the inmate’s current offense,
sentence, criminal history or institutional behavior that requires additional security
measures be employed to ensure the safety and protection of the public. 	Public
Safety Factors are normally applied on the Inmate Load and Security Designation
Form (BP-337) prior to an inmate’s initial assignment to an institution, however,
additions or deletions may be made at any time there after via the Custody
Classification Form, (BP-338). 	A maximum of three PSFs may be applied,
however if more than three apply, those which would provide the greatest security
and public safety will be utilized.
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Program Statement 5100.08, Inmate Security Designation and Custody Classification Chapter 5,
Page 7 (last accessed Jan. 20, 2026). PSF Code I provides that a male inmate “with more than
ten years remaining to serve will be housed in at least a Low security level institution unless the
PSFT has been waived.” Id. at Page 9. A male inmate “with more than 20 years remaining to
serve will be housed in at least a Medium security level institution, unless the PSF has been
waived.” Id.
Here, Doyle’s estimated release date is October 6, 2039. See supra fn.1. He therefore,
has more than ten years remaining to serve on his sentence. In light of that fact, the BOP acted
within its discretion in applying the Sentence Length PSF to his custody and security
classification.
Finally, Doyle’s various challenges regarding the adverse effects the application of the
PSF Sentence Length factor have caused are not cognizable in a § 2241 petition. As set forth
above, Doyle suggests that the refusal of his request to waive the PSF Sentence Length factor
amounts to deliberate indifference to his medical needs. Specifically, he suggests that without
the PSF factor, he could be placed at a facility closer to his home in Alabama that could better
treat his obstructive sleep apnea and hypertension. Deliberate indifference claims, however, are
conditions of confinement claims that may only be raised in a civil rights action. See In re
Owens, 525 F. App’x 287, 290 (6th Cir. 2013); Hutton v. Entzel, No. 25-97-DLB, 2025 WL
3211546, at *2 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 22, 2025) (“Habeas corpus provides a vehicle to challenge the
actions of prison officials that directly affect the fact or duration of confinement; it may not be
used to challenge the conditions of confinement.”); Mays, 2023 WL 2905553, at *1 (“A
prisoner’s security classification is related to the conditions of the prisoner’s confinement, a
matter which must be challenged (if at all) in a civil rights action.”).). When an inmate attempts
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to raise such challenges in a § 2241 petition, the proper course is to dismiss or deny the petition
“so that the would-be Plaintiff can properly assert the claims in a civil rights action.” See
McCray v. Rios, No. 08-206-ART, 2009 WL 103602, at *4 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 14, 2009).
For the reasons set forth above, Doyle is not entitled to relief under § 2241. Accordingly,
Harrison’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 8) is GRANTED, and Doyle’s § 2241 Petition (ECF
No. 1) is DISMISSED. Judgment shall be entered for Harrison.
IV. 	APPELLATE ISSUES
Federal prisoners who file petitions under § 2241 challenging their federal custody need
not obtain certificates of appealability under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). See Witham v. United
States, 355 F.3d 501, 504 (6th Cir. 2004) (explaining that § 2253 “does not require a certificate
of appealability for appeals from denials of relief in cases properly brought under § 2241, where
detention is pursuant to federal process”).
A habeas petitioner seeking to appeal must pay the filing fee required by 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1913 and 1917. To appeal in forma pauperis in a habeas case under § 2241, the petitioner
must obtain pauper status pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a). Kincade v.
Sparkman, 117 F.3d 949, 952 (6th Cir. 1997). Rule 24(a) provides that a party seeking pauper
status on appeal must first file a motion in the district court, along with a supporting affidavit.
Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(1). But Rule 24(a) also provides that if the district court certifies that an
appeal would not be taken in good faith, or otherwise denies leave to appeal in forma pauperis,
the petitioner must file his motion to proceed in forma pauperis in the appellate court. See Fed.
R. App. P. 24(a)(4)–(5).
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For the reasons explained above, the Court finds that any appeal would not be taken in
good faith. The Court therefore CERTIFIES under Rule 24(a) that any appeal would not be
taken in good faith and DENIES Doyle leave to appeal in forma pauperis.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 26th day of January, 2026.
s/ Sheryl H. Lipman
SHERYL H. LIPMAN
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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