Taylor v. Dudek

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
SHEILA T., )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) No. 25-cv-02390-TMP
)
FRANK BISIGNANO, )
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL )
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, )
)
Defendant. )
ORDER REVERSING AND REMANDING THE COMMISSIONER’S DECISION
On April 8, 2025, Sheila T. (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint
seeking judicial review of a Social Security decision.1 (ECF No.
1.) Plaintiff seeks to appeal the final decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying her
application for Title II disability and disability insurance
benefits. (ECF No. 6-2 at PageID 29.) For the following reasons,
the decision of the Commissioner is REVERSED AND REMANDED pursuant
to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
I. BACKGROUND
1After the parties consented to the jurisdiction of a United States
magistrate judge on May 30, 2025, this case was referred to the
undersigned to conduct all proceedings and order the entry of a
final judgment in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Fed. R.
Civ. P. 73. (ECF No. 16.)
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On May 30, 2021, Plaintiff filed an application for a period
of disability and disability insurance benefits under Title II of
the Social Security Act (“Act”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 404-434 (Id.) The
application, which alleged an onset date of March 31, 2016, was
denied initially as well as upon reconsideration. (Id.) Plaintiff
then requested a hearing, which was held before an Administrative
Law Judge (“ALJ”) via telephone on October 24, 2023. (Id.)
After considering the record and the testimony given at the
hearing, the ALJ used the five-step analysis to conclude that
Plaintiff was not disabled for the purposes of receiving Title II
benefits. (Id. at PageID 31.) The ALJ also noted Plaintiff last
met the insured status requirements of the Act on March 31, 2021.
(Id.) At the first step, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not
engaged in substantial gainful activity between the alleged onset
date of March 31, 2016, and her date last insured of March 31,
2021. (Id.) At the second step, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff
had the following severe impairments: “asthma, scoliosis,
degenerative disc disease, obesity, polyarthralgia,
osteoarthritis, and Sjogren’s syndrome (20 CFR 404.1520(c)).”
(Id.) The ALJ also concluded that Plaintiff had “non-severe
impairments” and “medically determinable mental impairments of
generalized anxiety, depression and post-traumatic stress
disorder” that “did not cause more than minimal limitation in
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[Plaintiff’s] ability to perform basic mental work activities and
were therefore nonsevere.” (Id.)
At the third step, the ALJ concluded that through the date
last insured, Plaintiff’s impairments did not meet or medically
equal, either alone or in the aggregate, the severity of one of
the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix
1. (Id. at PageID 32.) As to Plantiff’s spine impairment, the ALJ
found that
there is no evidence of impairment-related physical
limitation of musculoskeletal functioning that has
lasted, or is expected to last, for a continuous period
of at least 12 months, and medical documentation of at
least one of the following set forth in 1.15D: (1) a
documented medical need for a walker, bilateral canes or
crutches, or a wheeled and seated mobility device
involving the use of both hands, or (2) an inability to
use one upper extremity to independently initiate,
sustain, and complete work-related activities involving
fine and gross movements, and a documented medical need
for a one-handed, hand-held assistive device that
requires the use of the other upper extremity or a
wheeled and seated mobility device involving the use of
one hand, or (3) an inability to use both upper
extremities to the extent that neither can be used to
independently initiate, sustain, and complete work-
related activities involving fine and gross movements.
(Id. at PageID 33.) Plaintiff’s osteoarthritis was found not to
meet the listed impairments for the same reasons. (Id.) As to
Plaintiff’s asthma, she “has not required three hospitalizations
due to exacerbations or complications during the relevant period.”
(Id.) The ALJ noted there is no listing for obesity, but that
“Social Security Ruling 19-2 requires administrative law judges to
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consider obesity in determining whether claimants have medically
determinable impairments that are severe, whether those
impairments meet or equal any listing, and finally in determining
the residual functional capacity.” (Id.)
Accordingly, the ALJ then had to determine whether Plaintiff
retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform past
relevant work or could adjust to other work. The ALJ concluded
that Plaintiff
had the residual functional capacity to perform light
work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except the claimant
can climb ramps and stairs occasionally. She can climb
ladders, ropes, or scaffolds occasionally. She can
occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl.
She can occasionally work at unprotected height and
around moving mechanical parts.
(Id. at PageID 34.) Pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b), light
work
involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with
frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to
10 pounds. Even though the weight lifted may be very
little, a job is in this category when it requires a
good deal of walking or standing, or when it involves
sitting most of the time with some pushing and pulling
of arm or leg controls. To be considered capable of
performing a full or wide range of light work, you must
have the ability to do substantially all of these
activities.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b).
In reaching the RFC determination, the ALJ discussed
Plaintiff’s testimony and the medical evidence in the record.
Plaintiff alleged
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disability due to a range of physical impairments
including osteoarthritis and Sjrogens’ syndrome. Her
conditions would have precluded light duty work due to
difficulty with lifting and standing. She also has
asthma. She had pain in her back, legs, and neck. It was
hard for her to even sit at her computer. She required
multiple breaks throughout the day to relieve her
pain/stiffness.
(ECF No. 6-2 at PageID 34.) The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s
“medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected
to cause the alleged symptoms; however, [Plaintiff]’s statements
concerning intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these
symptoms were not entirely consistent with the medical evidence
and other evidence in the record for the reasons explained in this
decision.” (Id.)
As to her physical impairments, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff
“has a history of treatment prior to the alleged onset date for
lumbar scoliosis/spondylosis, knee osteoarthritis and
polyarthralgia/fibromyalgia.” (Id.) The ALJ cited a 2017
evaluation that found
[Plaintiff] had intact motor strength without deficit
and symmetrical for bilateral deltoids, biceps, triceps,
wrist flexors, wrist extensors and intrinsic hand
musculature. Intact motor strength and symmetrical for
bilateral hip flexor, quadriceps, hamstrings, tibialis,
anterior, gastrocnemius, soleus, extensor hallucis
longus and flexor hallucis longus muscle groups without
deficit. The claimant had no tenderness over the
cervical and cervicothoracic junction. The claimant had
full range of motion of the neck without pain . . .
Examination of the bilateral upper extremities revealed
the claimant had diffuse tenderness at and distal to the
arm. She was also tender over the lateral epicondyle.
She had mild pain with tennis elbow test. Most of the
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tenderness appeared to be diffuse in nature without
localization. She had no triggering, locking or other
mechanical symptoms. Examination of the back reveals she
had tenderness diffusely along her back and left greater
than right hips. On examination of the bilateral lower
extremities[,] she had some snapping to the left hip
mainly along the iliopsoas tendon. She had tenderness
over the trochanteric bursa mild in nature as well as
mild tenderness diffusely throughout the bilateral lower
extremities without mobilization . . . She has
functional range of motion of the hip, knee, ankle and
foot bilaterally without deficit.
(Id. at PageID 35 (internal citations omitted).) Between 2016 and
2018, spine imaging “revealed degenerative changes but no
significant compression[,]” and treatment records from 2017 to
January 2018 showed “improvement of her back/hip pain with epidural
injections . . . and improvement with physical therapy.” (Id.)
Throughout 2019 and 2020, Plaintiff complained of knee pain;
“[h]owever, her knees were considered stable with 5/5 strength in
the lower extremities. Her gait was considered normal. [Plaintiff]
underwent a partial meniscectomy/chondroplasty on November 19,
2020. At a follow up in December 2020 the claimant exhibited
functional left knee range of motion without deficit and only mild
tenderness.” (Id.) Finally, the ALJ determined that
[t]reatment records throughout 2019 and 2020 show that
[Plaintiff] generally reported that her pain symptoms
were managed. She reported improvement in her Sjogren’s
with medication. She reported flares of symptoms at
times. However, even on these occasions physical exams
were grossly normal. In April 2020 the claimant reported
improvement in her pain with higher doses of medication.
At a rheumatology follow up in February 2021 the claimant
reported continued joint pain; however, her physical
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exam noted full range of motion without pain in all
joints.
(Id. (internal citations omitted).)
At step four, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was capable of
performing her past relevant work as a bookkeeper because this
work “did not require the performance of work-related activities
precluded by [her] residual functional capacity.” (Id. at PageID
36.) The ALJ found that Plaintiff was able to perform the work
with the physical and mental demands as it is generally performed.
However, the ALJ also made alternative findings under step five to
determine whether a successful adjustment to other work can be
made based on Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and
RFC. (Id. at PageID 37.) A vocational expert testified that, based
on Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and RFC, she could
perform the jobs “office helper,” “ticket taker,” and “mail clerk,”
for which there were 45,000, 33,000, and 45,000 jobs available in
the national economy, respectively. (Id.) Thus, the ALJ concluded
that Plaintiff could make a successful adjustment to other work
existing in significant numbers in the national economy, and that
Plaintiff was not disabled. (Id. at PageID 38.)
On March 6, 2024, the ALJ issued a decision detailing the
findings summarized above. The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s
request for review. (Id. at PageID 14.) Plaintiff now seeks
judicial review of the ALJ’s decision, which stands as the final
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decision of the Commissioner under § 1631(c)(3) of the Act. On
appeal, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ overlooked her diagnosis of
fibromyalgia, found a functional capacity inconsistent with
substantial evidence because the ALJ misstated the record, and
failed to account for her mental restrictions. (ECF No. 19 at
PageID 2633, 2655.)
II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), a claimant may obtain judicial
review of any final decision made by the Commissioner after a
hearing to which they were a party. “The court shall have power to
enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment
affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the
cause for a rehearing.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Judicial review of the
Commissioner’s decision is limited to whether there is substantial
evidence to support the decision and whether the Commissioner used
the proper legal criteria in making the decision. Id.; Cardew v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 896 F.3d 742, 745 (6th Cir. 2018); Cole v.
Astrue, 661 F.3d 931, 937 (6th Cir. 2011); Rollins v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., No. 24-1180, 2025 WL 2710577, at *3 (W.D. Tenn. Sept.
23, 2025). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla of
evidence but less than a preponderance and is “such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
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a conclusion.” Kirk v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 667 F.2d
524, 535 (6th Cir. 1981) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S.
389 (1971)); see also Moats v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 42 F.4th 558,
561 (6th Cir. 2022).
In determining whether substantial evidence exists, the
reviewing court must examine the evidence in the record as a whole
and “must ‘take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts
from its weight.’” Abbott v. Sullivan, 905 F.2d 918, 923 (6th Cir.
1990) (quoting Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 388 (6th Cir.
1984)); Foltz obo R.B.K.F. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 23-3362,
2023 WL 7391701, at *3 (6th Cir. Nov. 8, 2023). If substantial
evidence is found to support the Commissioner’s decision, however,
the court must affirm that decision and “may not even inquire
whether the record could support a decision the other way.” Barker
v. Shalala, 40 F.3d 789, 794 (6th Cir. 1994) (quoting Smith v.
Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 893 F.2d 106, 108 (6th Cir. 1989));
see also Marquitta B. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 23-cv-
1276, 2025 WL 959946, at *8 (W.D. Tenn. Mar. 31, 2025). Similarly,
the court may not try the case de novo, resolve conflicts in the
evidence, or decide questions of credibility. Ulman v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., 693 F.3d 709, 713 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Bass v.
McMahon, 499 F.3d 506, 509 (6th Cir. 2007)); Floyd v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., No. 23-2036, 2024 WL 3103757, at *1 (6th Cir. June 24,
2024). Instead, the Commissioner, not the court or external medical
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providers, is charged with the duty to weigh the evidence, to make
credibility determinations, and to resolve material conflicts in
the testimony. Walters v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 528
(6th Cir. 1997); Crum v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 642, 644 (6th Cir.
1990); see also Robbins v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 24-3201, 2024
WL 4603964, at *4 (6th Cir. Oct. 29, 2024).
B. The Five-Step Analysis
The Act defines disability as the “inability to engage in any
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected
to result in death, or which has lasted or can be expected to last
for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §
423(d)(1). Additionally, section 423(d)(2) of the Act states that:
An individual shall be determined to be under a
disability only if his physical or mental impairment or
impairments are of such severity that he is not only
unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering
his age, education, and work experience, engage in any
other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in
the national economy, regardless of whether such work
exists in the immediate area in which he lives, or
whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or whether
he would be hired if he applied for work. For purposes
of the preceding sentence (with respect to any
individual), “work which exists in the national economy”
means work which exists in significant numbers either in
the region where such individual lives or in several
regions of the country.
Id. § 423(d)(2). Under the Act, the claimant bears the ultimate
burden of establishing an entitlement to benefits. Oliver v. Comm’r
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of Soc. Sec., 415 F. App’x 681, 682 (6th Cir. 2011); Dameon W. v.
O’Malley, 24-cv-1072, 2025 WL 880255, at *5 (W.D. Tenn. Mar. 21,
2025). The initial burden is on the claimant to prove she has a
disability as defined by the Act. Napier v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
127 F.4th 1000, 1003 (6th Cir. 2025) (citing Walters, 127 F.3d at
529); see also Born v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 923 F.2d
1168, 1173 (6th Cir. 1990). If the claimant is able to do so, the
burden then shifts to the Commissioner to demonstrate the existence
of available employment compatible with the claimant’s disability
and background. Napier, 127 F.4th at 1003; Born, 923 F.2d at 1173;
see also Griffith v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 582 F. App’x 555, 559
(6th Cir. 2014).
Entitlement to social security benefits is determined by a
five-step sequential analysis set forth in the Social Security
Regulations. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. First, the
claimant must not be engaged in substantial gainful activity. See
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). Next, a finding must be made
that the claimant suffers from a severe impairment. 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(5)(ii). Third, the ALJ determines
whether the impairment meets or equals the severity criteria set
forth in the Listing of Impairments contained in the Social
Security Regulations. See id. §§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526.
If the impairment satisfies the criteria for a listed impairment,
the claimant is considered to be disabled. Id.
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On the other hand, if the claimant’s impairment does not meet
or equal a listed impairment, the ALJ must undertake the fourth
step in the analysis and determine whether the claimant has the
RFC to return to any past relevant work. See id. §§
404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 404.1520(e). If the ALJ determines that the
claimant can return to past relevant work, then a finding of “not
disabled” must be entered. Id. If, however, the ALJ finds the
claimant unable to perform past relevant work, then at the fifth
step the ALJ must determine whether the claimant can perform other
work existing in significant numbers in the national economy. See
id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 404.1520(g)(1), 416.960(c)(1)-(2).
Further review is not necessary if it is determined that an
individual is not disabled at any point in this sequential
analysis. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4).
C. Fibromyalgia
Plaintiff’s first argument is that the ALJ failed to consider
her fibromyalgia. Some context regarding fibromyalgia illuminates
the dispute. “Fibromyalgia, also called fibrositis, ‘is a medical
condition marked by chronic diffuse widespread aching and
stiffness of muscles and soft tissues.’” Kalmbach v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., 409 F. App’x 852, 860 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Stedman’s
Medical Dictionary for the Health Professions and Nursing at 541
(5th ed. 2005)). The illness has no known cause or cure. Minor v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 513 F. App’x 417, 434-35 (6th Cir. 2013).
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“[W]hen a claimant has a fibromyalgia diagnosis, objective medical
evidence of the condition is rare.” Gursky v. Colvin, No. 16-CV-
2654-TMP, 2017 WL 6493149, at *9 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 19, 2017).
“Rather, fibromyalgia patients manifest normal muscle strength and
neurological reactions and have a full range of motion.” Rogers v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 244 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal
citations and quotations omitted). As a result, evidence of the
severity of symptoms of fibromyalgia is almost entirely
subjective. Minor, 513 F. App’x at 434-35. The severity of
fibromyalgia symptoms can also vary significantly over time
because people with fibromyalgia have good days and bad days. See
Gursky, 2017 WL 6493149 at *9.
These unique features of fibromyalgia complicate the Social
Security disability evaluation process. See Cooper v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., No. 4:13-CV-11883, 2014 WL 4606010, at *15 (E.D. Mich.
June 17, 2014), report and recommendation adopted, 2014 WL 4607960
(E.D. Mich. Sept. 15, 2014). Usually, examining objective medical
evidence is a central part of how ALJs evaluate disability claims.
See id. Since people with fibromyalgia usually have normal clinical
results, objective medical evidence is “simply beside the point.”
Kalmbach, 409 F. App’x at 862. “[A]n ALJ errs when he or she
discounts a plaintiff’s complaints of fibromyalgia symptoms based
on a lack of objective evidence and/or benign physical exam
findings or test results.” Partlow v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No.
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2:18-CV-1702, 2019 WL 5257541, at *6 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 17, 2019),
report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 247336 (S.D. Ohio Jan.
16, 2020). Likewise, an ALJ errs in rejecting a medical opinion
about the severity of fibromyalgia because the objective medical
evidence is normal. Kalmbach, 409 F. App’x at 862. Despite this,
“a diagnosis of fibromyalgia does not equate to a finding of
disability or an entitlement to benefits.” Stankoski v. Astrue,
532 F. App’x 614, 619 (6th Cir. 2013). On more than one occasion,
the Sixth Circuit has quoted the Seventh Circuit’s important
observation that while “[s]ome people may have such a severe case
of fibromyalgia as to be totally disabled from working ... most do
not and the question is whether [the claimant in this case] is one
of the minority.” Sarchet v. Chater, 78 F.3d 305, 307 (7th Cir.
1996); see also Minor, 513 F. App’x at 434-35; Torres v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., 490 F. App’x 748, 754 (6th Cir. 2012); Vance v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., 260 Fed. App’x. 801, 806 (6th Cir. 2008).
Because of the disease’s unique features, the SSA has
promulgated a Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) regarding
fibromyalgia, SSR 12-2p. SSR 12-2p, 2012 WL 3104869, at *1; see
also Cabrera v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:20-CV-01947-JG, 2021 WL
8015645, at *8 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 21, 2021). SSR 12-2p establishes
special rules for how ALJs evaluate whether fibromyalgia is a
severe impairment at Step Two. Id. at *3. The ruling also provides
guidance about how to evaluate a claimant’s fibromyalgia at later
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steps in the disability evaluation process. Id. at *4-6. As
relevant here, it instructs that ALJs should be sensitive to the
reality that “the symptoms of [fibromyalgia] can wax and wane so
that a person may have ‘bad days and good days’” and that
“[w]idespread pain and other symptoms associated with
[fibromyalgia], such as fatigue, may result in exertional
limitations that prevent a person from doing the full range of
unskilled work in one or more of the exertional categories.” Id.
at *6.
The court finds that the ALJ did not take into account the
unique features of fibromyalgia in evaluating Plaintiff’s claim
and thus ran afoul of SSR 12-2p. Indeed, SSR 12-2p is not cited
anywhere in the ALJ’s opinion, nor were its substantive
requirements applied.2 First, the ALJ relied extensively on
Plaintiff’s benign physical exam findings, including those related
to motor strength and range of motion, in finding Plaintiff’s
subjective symptom complaints inconsistent with the record. (ECF
No. 6-2 at PageID 34-35.) As discussed above, the Sixth Circuit
has held that citing benign physical exam results to discount the
2The government argues that the ALJ addressed Plaintiff’s
fibromyalgia despite not listing it as a severe impairment.
However, the court found no reference to this condition in the
ALJ’s opinion. There is only mention of “polyarthralgia” in the
list of severe impairments, referring to pain in two or more
joints, which Plaintiff argues the ALJ improperly conflates with
the condition of fibromyalgia. Nonetheless, mere labeling of the
symptom of polyarthralgia does not suffice under SSR 12-2p.
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severity of a claimant’s fibromyalgia symptoms reflects a
“fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of fibromyalgia.”
Kalmbach, 409 F. App’x at 861.
In addition, the ALJ did not follow SSR 12-2p’s instruction
to be sensitive to the reality that fibromyalgia can wax or wane
over time. Rather, the ALJ cited the fact that Plaintiff’s medical
records contained some doctor’s visits in which she showed some
improvement or did not complain of ongoing symptoms as evidence
that Plaintiff’s description of her symptom severity was not
consistent with the record. (ECF No. 6-2 at PageID 34.) It is
difficult to square this analysis with an appreciation of
fibromyalgia’s tendency to wax and wane over time, especially when
the ALJ concedes that Plaintiff reports “flares of symptoms at
times.” (Id. at PageID 35.) “[T]he ‘waxing and waning’ of
fibromyalgia should have been an explicit consideration in
exploring any disparity between particular points in the record
and [the claimant’s] account.” Riddle v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No.
17-10905, 2018 WL 822428, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 12, 2018).
Finally, although he states that “[Plaintiff’s] ability to perform
all or substantially all of the requirements of this level of work
was impeded by additional limitations[,]” the ALJ did not provide
any analysis as to how he considered these limitations based on
Plaintiff’s pain and fatigue.(ECF No. 6-2 at PageID 37.) In most
cases this would not be problematic; “Social Security regulations
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do not require the ALJ to provide a written function-by-function
analysis in his opinion unless such analysis is necessary for a
reviewing court to understand the bridge between the evidence and
result.” Storman v. Saul, No. 19-1152-TMP, 2020 WL 3542195, at *3
(W.D. Tenn. June 30, 2020) (internal citations, quotations, and
alterations omitted). However, SSR 12-2p requires ALJs to give
special attention to limitations related to pain and fatigue.
The government argues harmless error at step two. (ECF No. 22
at PageID 2662.) However, an ALJ’s failure to take into account
the unique features of fibromyalgia in accordance with SSR 12-2p
is not harmless. An error by an ALJ is not harmless if “the court
is in substantial doubt whether the administrative agency would
have made the same ultimate finding with the erroneous finding
removed from the picture[.]” Keeton v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 583 F.
App’x 515, 524 (6th Cir. 2014) (internal citations and quotations
omitted); see also Rabbers v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 582 F.3d
647, 654 (6th Cir. 2009) (remand for a legal error is appropriate
“if the claimant has been prejudiced on the merits or deprived of
substantial rights because of the agency’s procedural lapses.”).
It is difficult to say whether the ALJ’s ultimate conclusion would
have been the same in this case without the mistaken conclusions
described above. Thus, the court reverses and remands for failure
to apply SSR 12-2p.
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Because the court reverses and remands based on Plaintiff’s
SSR 12-2p argument, it does not reach her arguments regarding the
ALJ’s evaluations of her functional capacity and mental
restrictions.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons described above, the decision of the
Commissioner is REVERSED AND REMANDED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/Tu M. Pham
TU M. PHAM
Chief United States Magistrate Judge
January 12, 2026
Date
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