Cooper et al v. City of Memphis et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
______________________________________________________________________________
WILLIAM COOPER, SR. and EWAYNA 	)
M. BROWN, 	)
)
Plaintiffs, 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 2:24-cv-02842-MSN-atc
)
CITY OF MEMPHIS, et al., 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
______________________________________________________________________________
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION AND
ORDER ON PENDING MOTIONS
_____________________________________________________________________________
Before the Court by order of reference1 are several pending motions:
• 	Pro se Plaintiff Ewayna M. Brown’s Motion to Substitute Party Under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 25(a)(1), filed August 8, 2025. (ECF No. 28.) Defendant City of
Memphis (the “City”) responded to the motion on October 16, 2025.2 (ECF No. 42.)
• 	Brown’s Notice of Defendant’s Non-Compliance and Motion to Compel, filed on
September 5, 2025. (ECF No. 32.) In response, the City filed a Motion for Extension of
Time to Comply with Order and/or Status Conference. (ECF No. 33.)
1 Pursuant to Administrative Order No. 2013-05, this case has been referred to the United States
Magistrate Judge for management and for all pretrial matters for determination and/or report and
recommendation as appropriate.
2 Brown filed a reply to the City’s Response on October 29, 2025. (ECF No. 44.) Pursuant to
Local Rule 7.2(c), “reply memoranda may be filed only upon court order granting a motion for
leave to reply.” Brown did not seek leave to file a reply. Given Brown’s pro se status, the Court
will consider her Reply herein, but Brown is warned that failure to comply with the Local Rules
in the future may result in her filings being disregarded.
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• 	Brown’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, filed
October 9, 2025.3 (ECF No. 38.) The City responded to the motion on October 27,
2025. (ECF No. 43.)
• 	The City’s Motion to Substitute Attorney, filed October 14, 2025. (ECF No. 40.) Brown
did not respond to the motion.
• 	Brown’s Motion for Protective Order and Preliminary Injunction, filed November 13,
2025. (ECF No. 47.) The City responded to the motion on December 1, 2025. (ECF No.
48.)
• 	Brown’s Motion to Move Case Forward and Request for Status Conference, filed
December 10, 2025. (ECF No. 50.) The City responded to the motion on December 27,
2025. (ECF No. 52.)
• 	Brown’s Motion for Service of Subpoena by United States Marshal, filed on December
16, 2025. (ECF No. 51.) The City did not respond to the motion.
• 	Brown’s Motion for Service of Process by the United States Marshal Service, filed
December 29, 2025. (ECF No. 53.) The City responded to the motion on January 12,
2024. (ECF No. 54.)
• 	Brown’s Motion for Service of Process by the United States Marshal Service, filed
January 13, 2025. (ECF No. 55.) The City did not respond to the motion.4
For the reasons set forth below, it is recommended that Brown’s Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction and Motion for Protective Order and Preliminary
Injunction be denied. Brown’s Motion to Substitute Party, Motion to Compel, and Motion for
Service of Subpoena are DENIED. Brown’s Motion to Move Case Forward and Motions for
Service of Process are DENIED as moot. The City’s Motion to Substitute Attorney is
GRANTED.
3 A motion for a preliminary injunction is considered a dispositive motion and thus requires
disposition by report and recommendation. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), (B); Vogel v. U.S. Off.
Prod. Co., 258 F.3d 509, 514 (6th Cir. 2001) (“Pretrial matters that a magistrate judge is
precluded from ‘determining’ pursuant to § 636(b)(1)(A) are called ‘dispositive’ because they
are ‘dispositive of a claim or defense of a party.’” (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 72)).
4 Because Brown’s motion requests essentially the same relief as her December 29th Motion for
Service, the Court will consider the two motions and the City’s prior response together.
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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. 	Proposed Findings of Fact
Plaintiffs William Cooper, Sr. and Ewayna M. Brown filed the Complaint on a Court-
supplied form, alleging claims under § 1983. (ECF No. 7.) They allege that, on or about May
11, 2024, “a call was made to 535-COPS for unauthorized use of Plaintiffs[’] vehicle.” (Id. at 2.)
They then allege that “Officers Farrington, Smith, Guzman, Pippen, Morrow, Sgt Woods, Sgt
Mohammed (ISB)[,] Det. Nadia (Sheriff Dept)[, and] C/O Officer Jackson . . . came to 1316
Foxcroft St and kidnapped me then removed William E. Cooper from residence without his
permission.” (Id.) They assert causes of action for “deprivation of our rights,” “color of law,”
“illegal search & seizures,” “fundamental right,” and “retaliation.” (Id.) They seek
“compensatory damages, emotion distress, medical expenses, punitive damages for willful and
malicious conduct ‘under color of law,’ an apology from the Chief of Police, attorney fees, [and]
nominal damages pertaining to freedom of speech[] and unlawful arrest.” (Id. at 3.)
On January 17, 2025, the Court entered its Report and Recommendation for partial sua
sponte dismissal of Plaintiffs’ Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). (ECF No. 12.)
The Court recommended that all claims against Defendants St. Francis Hospital and MLGW be
dismissed with prejudice and that all claims against all Defendants, other than the claim of false
arrest and false imprisonment under § 1983, be dismissed with prejudice. (Id. at 6.) The Court
also ordered the Clerk to issue and effect service of process on the City of Memphis on
Plaintiffs’ remaining claim for false arrest and imprisonment. (Id. at 6–7.) Finally, the Court
noted that Plaintiffs had failed to provide full names for the remaining individual defendants or
indicate whether Plaintiffs’ claims are brought against them in their individual or official
capacities, and thus the Court indicated that service on those individual defendants would be
addressed at a later date. (Id.) The Report and Recommendation remains pending.
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The Court entered a second Report and Recommendation on July 23, 2025,
recommending dismissal of the City, Chief Davis, and Mayor Young from this case, that all
official-capacity claims against any Defendant be dismissed, and that all claims brought by
Plaintiff William Cooper, Sr. be dismissed. (ECF No. 25, at 7.) The Report and
Recommendation remains pending. On October 2, 2025, the Court held a status conference to
discuss the status of the City’s efforts to identify the individual officers to allow the United
States Marshal Service to effect service. (ECF No. 37.) The City subsequently, on October 15,
2025, filed its Notice identifying seven of the eight officers and advised that it would continue its
efforts to locate Officer Jackson, whose common last name made him difficult to identify. (ECF
No. 41, at 1.)
In her Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, Brown
alleges “a continuing pattern of unlawful detentions, excessive force, warrantless entries, and
kidnappings by law-enforcement officers who refused to identify themselves and remain active
on duty.” (ECF No. 38, at 1.) Specifically, in addition to the May 11, 2024 incident giving rise
to Plaintiffs’ claims, Brown alleges that on January 8, 2025, “[u]nnamed officers used a key to
unlawfully enter Plaintiff’s apartment, detained Plaintiff without warrant or probable cause, and
transported Plaintiff against her will.” (Id.) Then, on March 5, 2025, Brown asserts that,
“[a]round midnight, U.S. Marshals with the County Sheriff’s Department and a police dog
kicked in Plaintiff’s door, seized Plaintiff, and again detained and transported Plaintiff
unlawfully.” (Id. at 2.) In its Response, the City argues that Brown’s Motion is improper
because she merely cites facts that are the basis of her lawsuit, fails to identify any officers who
committed the alleged acts, and “seeks to enjoin individual[s] that are not before this [C]ourt.”
(ECF No. 43, at 2–3.)
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Similarly, in her Motion for Protective Order and Preliminary Injunction, Brown alleges
“a pattern of targeted harassment and intimidation by law enforcement officers and task force
members operating in Memphis and Shelby County.” (ECF No. 47, at 1.) Brown states that,
after she “relocated to a new residence on a dead-end street in Memphis,” she “began
experiencing an immediate and concerning pattern of law enforcement surveillance and
intimidation within weeks of moving in.” (Id.) Specifically, she contends that, between October
and November 2025, the Memphis Police Department and task force units have:
Conducted prolonged and unexplained police presence on Plaintiff’s dead-end
residential street that involved up to five squad cars and one unmarked red van.
Issued multiple unwarranted traffic citations under false pretenses; and [o]n
Veterans Day (November 11, 2025), blocked Plaintiff’s neighborhood during a
“Safe Task Force” operation involving MPD, U.S. Marshals, and I.C.E.,
threatening Plaintiff with arrest for recording and questioning the activity—
conduct protected under the First Amendment.
(Id.) Brown asks the Court to issue a protective order and preliminary injunction enjoining the
City of Memphis, the Memphis Police Department, and any agents, officers, or affiliates of the
Memphis “SAFE” Task Force, including U.S. Marshals and I.C.E., from “[c]onducting
retaliatory or pretextual traffic stops,” “[h]arassing, intimidating, or surveilling Plaintiff,”
“[r]etaliating for Plaintiff’s ongoing federal litigation,” and “[i]nterfering with Plaintiff’s First
Amendment right to record and question public officials performing their duties.” (Id. at 2.) In
its response, the City contends that the relief that Brown seeks cannot be granted by a motion for
protective order because protective orders are a discovery tool under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26. (ECF No. 48, at 2.) Further, the City reiterates that Brown failed to identify any
specific individual involved and that her “encounters with police officers were the result of her
violating the law or routine police activity and not harassment.” (Id. at 4.) The City
characterizes Brown’s Motion as an attempt “to terminate any police activity in her
neighborhood under the guise of harassment.” (Id.) Finally, the City states that, because “[t]he
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City of Memphis has been dismissed and the U.S. Marshals or the Immigration and Customs
Enforcement are entities that are not litigants in this cause of action,” there is no one before the
Court to enjoin.5 (Id.)
II. 	Proposed Conclusions of Law
“A preliminary injunction is an ‘extraordinary remedy,’ not a matter of right.” Patel v.
Glenn, No. 21-3499, 2022 WL 16647974, at *3 (6th Cir. Nov. 3, 2022) (citing Winter v. Nat.
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008)). “The purpose of a preliminary injunction is
merely to preserve the relative positions of the parties until a trial on the merits can be held.”
Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981). “Preliminary injunctions that alter the
status quo are specifically disfavored.” Eads v. Tennessee, No. 1:18-cv-00042, 2019 WL
2443125, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. June 12, 2019) (citing Schrier v. Univ. of Colo., 427 F.3d 1253,
1259 (10th Cir. 2005)).
“To secure a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff ‘must establish that he is likely to succeed
on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that
the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.’” EOG
Res., Inc. v. Lucky Land Mgmt., LLC, 134 F.4th 868, 874 (6th Cir. Apr. 14, 2025) (quoting
Winter, 555 U.S. at 20). “Because a preliminary injunction ‘is an extraordinary equitable remedy
that is never awarded as of right,’ the plaintiff must make a ‘clear showing’ that these factors
favor him.” Id. (quoting Starbucks Corp. v. McKinney, 602 U.S. 339, 345–46 (2024)); see also
Leary v. Daeschner, 228 F.3d 729, 739 (6th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he proof required for the plaintiff to
obtain a preliminary injunction is much more stringent than the proof required to survive a
5 The Court notes that its July 23, 2025 Report and Recommendation for dismissal of the City
has not yet been adopted by Judge Norris, and, as such, the City remains a party to this action.
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summary judgment motion, for example.”). The factors are balanced against each other, and
proving all four is not necessary to secure a preliminary injunction. United Food & Com.
Workers Union, Loc. 1099 v. Sw. Ohio Reg’l Transit Auth., 163 F.3d 341, 347 (6th Cir. 1998)).
Notwithstanding that balancing, “a finding that there is simply no likelihood of success on the
merits is usually fatal.” Gonzales v. Nat’l Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 225 F.3d 620, 625 (6th Cir.
2000) (citing Mich. St. AFL-CIO v. Miller, 103 F.3d 1240, 1249 (6th Cir. 1997)). “The Sixth
Circuit has stated that the district court need not ‘make specific findings concerning each of the
four factors used in determining a motion for preliminary injunction if fewer factors are
dispositive of the issue.’” Doe v. Rhodes Coll., No. 2:16-cv-02308-JTF-tmp, 2016 WL
11611619, at *4 (W.D. Tenn. Oct. 25, 2016) (quoting Jones v. City of Monroe, Mich., 341 F.3d
474, 476 (6th Cir. 2003)).
“[W]here facts are bitterly contested and credibility determinations must be made to
decide whether injunctive relief should issue, an evidentiary hearing must be held. [However,]
where material facts are not in dispute, or where facts in dispute are not material to the
preliminary injunction sought, district courts generally need not hold an evidentiary hearing.”
Certified Restoration Dry Cleaning Network, L.L.C. v. Tenke Corp., 511 F.3d 535, 553 (6th Cir.
2007) (quoting McDonald’s Corp. v. Robertson, 147 F.3d 1301, 1312–13 (11th Cir. 1998)); see
also Harris v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 2:18-cv-2400-JPM-dkv, 2018 WL 4896727, at *1
(W.D. Tenn. Oct. 9, 2018) (“A preliminary injunction may be granted based on less formal
procedures and on less extensive evidence than in a trial on the merits, but if there are genuine
issues of material fact raised in opposition to a motion for a preliminary injunction, an
evidentiary hearing is required.” (quoting Cobell v. Norton, 391 F.3d 251, 261 (D.C. Cir.
2004))).
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Brown’s requests do not meet this standard. At this stage of the proceedings, she has not
shown that her likelihood of success on the merits is any greater than the City’s likelihood of
success. More importantly, in both motions for injunctive relief, Brown has failed to show that
she will suffer irreparable future harm if the relief is not granted. Though she lists past incidents
of alleged harassment, “[p]ast exposure to illegal conduct does not itself show a present case or
controversy regarding injunctive relief . . . if unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse
effects.” Wilson v. Morgan, 477 F.3d 326, 342 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting City of Los Angeles v.
Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Further, as the City
correctly argues, Brown fails to identify any individuals involved in these alleged incidents, and
she seeks to enjoin entities that are not before this Court. Even if Brown satisfied the requisite
elements entitling her to injunctive relief, the Court cannot enjoin unnamed individuals or
entities who are not subject to its jurisdiction. Nor is this Court willing to enjoin routine police
practice in the absence of clear unconstitutional policies or practices. See Gale v. O’Donohue,
751 F. App’x 876, 885 (6th Cir. 2018) (finding that “the imposition of such an injunction would
dramatically disrupt—rather than preserve—the status quo by hampering defendants’ ability to
respond to and investigate complaints, resulting in tremendous hardship to defendants and, in all
likelihood, endangering civilians.”).
Finally, to the extent Brown seeks entry of a protective order to enjoin the City, the
Memphis Police Department, and “any agents, officers, or affiliates of the Memphis ‘Safe’ Task
Force” from engaging in certain conduct (ECF No. 47, at 2), the City is correct that protective
orders are governed by Rule 26(c) and are limited to matters arising in the context of discovery.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). Accordingly, the requested relief would not serve Brown’s stated
objective.
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Brown has not demonstrated that her requests for injunctive relief satisfy the essential
requirements for such relief, and it is therefore recommended that such relief be denied.
III. 	Recommendation
For the reasons set forth above, it is recommended that Brown’s Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction and Motion for Protective Order and Preliminary
Injunction be denied.
ORDER ON PENDING MOTIONS
I. 	Motion to Substitute Party
On January 21, 2025, Brown filed a Response and Answer that indicated Cooper passed
away on December 29, 2024. (ECF No. 14, at 3–4.) Accordingly, in its July 23rd Report and
Recommendation, the Court advised that “Brown as a non-attorney, cannot represent Cooper or
his interest” and recommended that all claims brought by Cooper be dismissed. (ECF No. 25, at
6–7 (citing Marshall v. Simpson, No. 3:06-cv-423, 2007 WL 403598, at *1 (W.D. Ky. Jan. 31,
2007)) (“[A] person who is not a lawyer may not represent another person in a legal
proceeding—not even to the minor extent of signing a pleading for a co- plaintiff.”).) Then, on
August 8, 2025, Brown filed the subject Motion seeking to “proceed as Plaintiff in this action on
behalf of the estate of William E. Cooper Sr.” (ECF No. 28, at 1.) In its response, the City
alleges that Brown’s Motion is time barred “as it was not filed within the 90 days after service of
a statement noting the death [of] Mr. Cooper.” (ECF No. 42, at 2.)
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(a)(1), a motion for substitution may be
made “by any party or by the decedent’s successor or representative” within ninety days after
service of a statement noting death. “If the motion is not made within 90 days after service of a
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statement noting death, the action by or against the decedent must be dismissed.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
25(a)(1).
Although Brown provided notice of Cooper’s death on January 21, 2025, she did not file
her Motion until August 8, 2025. (ECF No. 28.) Pursuant to Rule 25(a)(1), the Motion was
required to be filed no later than April 21, 2025—ninety days after the notice was filed. Brown
contends that the City waived its “procedural time argument” by failing to raise any objection to
the substitution “for over six months and despite new counsel entering the case long after the
substitution issue was first addressed.” (ECF No. 44, at 1.) Brown overlooks, however, that the
City’s obligation to respond was triggered only when Brown filed her Motion, and it did timely
respond following the October 2, 2025 status conference.6 Further, though Brown states that the
delay was due to excusable neglect pursuant to Rule 6(b), she raised this argument for the first
time in her unauthorized reply to the City’s Response. (ECF No. 44, at 2.) If Brown sought to
rely on Rule 6(b) to enlarge the deadline to file the Motion, she should have done so by filing a
motion for extension, rather than raising the issue in her unauthorized reply. Accordingly,
Brown’s Motion to Substitute is DENIED.
II. 	Brown’s Motion to Compel
Brown’s Motion to Compel, styled as a Notice of Defendant’s Non-Compliance and
Motion to Compel, asserts that the City failed to comply with the Court’s August 7, 2025 Order
(ECF No. 27), which required the City to file a notice identifying the full names of the individual
officers and to state whether it would accept service of process on their behalf (ECF No. 32, at
6 Although the City did not meet its original response deadline, following a change in counsel,
the Court granted the City an extension of time to respond at the October 2, 2025 status
conference. (ECF No. 37, at 2.) The City thereafter filed its response within its extended
deadline.
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1). Brown therefore seeks an order compelling compliance with the Court’s August 7th Order.
(Id.)
In lieu of a response, the City filed a Motion for Extension of Time to Comply with Order
and/or Status Conference. (ECF No. 33.) In its Motion for Extension, the City explained that it
had recently retained new counsel and requested an additional twenty days to comply with the
August 7th Order to allow new counsel time to become familiar with the case and to assess the
City’s role with respect to the individual officers. (Id. at 1.) The Court subsequently held a
status conference on October 2, 2025, to discuss the City’s efforts to identify the individual
officers. (ECF No. 37.) Following the status conference, the Court granted the City’s request for
an extension to file a notice, and the City timely filed its notice on October 16, 2025. (ECF 41.)
Accordingly, Brown’s Motion is DENIED as moot.
III. 	The City’s Motion to Substitute Attorney
In compliance with the Court’s October 2, 2025 Order Following Status Conference, new
counsel for the City filed its Motion to Substitute Attorney Thomas Branch for prior counsel for
the City. (ECF No. 40.) The City’s Motion is GRANTED, and Thomas Branch is now counsel
of record for the City.
IV. 	Brown’s Motion to Move Case Forward and Motions for Service of Process
Brown’s Motion to Move Case Forward (ECF No. 50) and Motions for Service of
Process (ECF Nos. 53, 55) ask the Court to expedite service on the individual officers identified
by the City. Upon entry of this Report and Recommendation and Order, the Court will
coordinate with the Marshals to consider effecting service in accordance with the City’s
suggestion “to meet the U.S. Marshal at a designated location and at a specific time whereby the
U.S. Marshal will be able to serve each defendant at a single location and specific time.” (ECF
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No. 41, at 2.) Accordingly, Brown’s Motion to Move Case Forward and Motions for Service of
Process are DENIED as moot.
V. 	Brown’s Motion for Service of Subpoena
Finally, Brown seeks an Order directing the U.S. Marshal to serve a Rule 45 subpoena on
the “City of Memphis Law Department, Custodian of Records, for the production of documents
and electronically stored information.” (ECF No. 51.) Brown’s Motion is premature. Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 26(d)(1) prohibits “discovery from any source before the parties have
conferred as required by Rule 26(f).” Brown’s Motion for Service of Subpoena is therefore
DENIED without prejudice. Brown may refile her motion once discovery commences.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that Brown’s Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction and Motion for Protective Order and Preliminary
Injunction be denied. Brown’s Motion to Substitute Party, Motion to Compel, and Motion for
Service of Subpoena are DENIED. Brown’s Motion to Move Case Forward and Motions for
Service of Process are DENIED as moot. The City’s Motion to Substitute Attorney is
GRANTED.
Respectfully submitted this 29th day of January, 2026.
s/Annie T. Christoff
ANNIE T. CHRISTOFF
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
NOTICE
Within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this report and recommendation
disposition, a party may serve and file written objections to the proposed findings and
recommendations. A party may respond to another party’s objections within fourteen (14) days
after being served with a copy. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file objections within
fourteen (14) days may constitute waiver/forfeiture of objections, exceptions, and further appeal.
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