First Horizon Corporation et al v. Pinnacle Financial Partners

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
The Court has before it Non-Party Raymond James Financial Services, Inc.’s Motion to
Quash Subpoena Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45(d)(3). Doc. 110. For the following
reasons, the Motion is GRANTED IN PART.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs First Horizon Corporation, First Horizon Bank, and First Horizon Advisors, Inc.,
claim that Defendants Pinnacle Financial Partners and Pinnacle Bank improperly poached (or
“lifted out”) various teams of employees from Plaintiffs, and that Non-Party Raymond James
assisted, coordinated, or otherwise was involved in Defendants’ doing so. Doc. 23. Under the
current schedule:
• The deadline for non-expert depositions and requests for admissions is October 16, 2026;
• The deadline for disclosure of Plaintiffs’ experts is November 16, 2026;
• The deadline for completing all discovery is February 15, 2027; and
• Trial is scheduled for November 29, 2027.
FIRST HORIZON CORP.,
FIRST HORIZON BANK,
FIRST HORIZON ADVISORS, INC.
Plaintiff,
v.
PINNACLE FINANCIAL PARTNERS,
PINNACLE BANK
Defendants.
Civil Action No.: 2:22-cv-02671-BCL-cgc
ORDER GRANTING IN PART MOTION TO QUASH
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Doc. 95.
Plaintiff informally sent the Subpoena duces tecum at issue here to Raymond James on
September 3, 2026—well more than a month before the October 12, 2026, deposition date and the
October 16, 2026, deadline for non-expert depositions. Doc. 112-2. Raymond James accepted
service of the Subpoena on September 9, 2026—still more than a month before the deposition date
and the deadline for non-expert depositions. Doc. 110-1.
Raymond James sent an informal objection letter on September 23, in which it listed a few
non-“exhaustive” objections and stated that, while the current production and deposition dates
were “not feasible,” it would “certainly comply with the subpoena once the scope of the document
requests is finalized” and “welcome[d] further discussion … to address the timeframe and
logistics” of the production and deposition. Doc. 110-1. According to Plaintiffs’ Opposition to the
Motion, on September 25 began a series of discussions among the three stakeholders—Plaintiffs,
Raymond James, and Defendants—concerning the Subpoena, in which (1) Raymond James
purported not to be in a position to confer about the substance of the Subpoena, and (2) Raymond
James agreed to and then reneged on deposition dates intended to accommodate Raymond James’
claimed need for additional time in which to comply with the Subpoena. Doc. 112 at 4-5. Raymond
James served formal objections on September 30, 2026. Doc. 110-2.
Raymond James filed this Motion to Quash on October 9, 2026. Doc. 110.
ANALYSIS
A. Throughout the Motion, Raymond James seemingly faults Plaintiffs for not timely
seeking discovery from Raymond James. But under the scheduling order, the deadline for non-
expert depositions does not expire until October 16 (Doc. 95)—making the Subpoena timely. And
while Raymond James repeatedly references the case’s long pendency in a seeming attempt to
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argue something along the line of laches, Raymond James ignores that the case was effectively
stayed, with no scheduling order, during the roughly eighteen months in 2023 and 2024 in which
Defendants’ motion to dismiss sat pending.1 Doc. 27 (February 1, 2023 motion to dismiss); Doc.
45 (September 30, 2024, order denying motion to dismiss and denying as moot motion to stay
discovery); Doc. 51 (December 13, 2024, scheduling conference); Doc. 54 (December 13, 2024,
first scheduling order). And, in any event, Raymond James has not identified any authority as
supporting its contention that a non-party subpoena may be quashed because, though timely, it was
served too long after the party learned that the non-party would have relevant information.2 An
unsupported argument is not adequately presented and so cannot support quashal.
B. Raymond James also argues that the Subpoena does not allow Raymond James
sufficient time to comply—i.e., that there is not enough time between when the Subpoena was
received and the date for which the deposition was set. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(3)(A) (mandating
quashal or modification of subpoena that “fails to allow a reasonable time to comply”). This
argument fails because Plaintiffs served the Subpoena on September 9—33 days before the
deposition date and 26 days before the date for producing documents. Even assuming the
Subpoena’s request are as burdensome as Raymond James claims (see below), the Subpoena
allowed plenty of time for compliance (without even considering that Raymond James actually
received the Subpoena a week earlier). See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 223 F. Supp. 3d 697, 703
(N.D. Ohio 2016) (finding 25 days sufficient and noting courts often deem 14 days sufficient).
1 The case was originally assigned to Judge Mark S. Norris when it was filed in September 2022. Doc. 2. Judge Norris
transferred the case to the undersigned on March 25, 2026. Doc. 80.
2 If anything, Raymond James is the one who should fear a laches-type argument, having waited until just before the
scheduled deposition to file its Motion on a Friday, creating a purported “emergency” for all involved. If the Subpoena
was as objectionable as Raymond James claimed, surely it could have seen that earlier during the month-plus between
receiving the Subpoena and the deposition date.
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C. Raymond James also contends that the subpoena is overbroad and unduly
burdensome. Raymond James makes no persuasive argument on this issue, at least given the
context the Court currently has concerning the Parties’ theories of the case. Burden aside, the
Subpoena is not self-evidently overbroad, and Raymond James makes no effort to explain how the
material requested is not relevant to the dispute or proportional to the needs of the case. And while
Raymond James claims that it would be unduly burdensome to comply, (1) the arguments and
block quoted request in the Motion do not support that claim but instead seem to describe only a
fairly standard subpoena, and (2) Raymond James has offered no evidence—affidavits,
declarations, etc.—demonstrating that responding to the Subpoena would in fact impose any undue
burden. Therefore, based on the materials and arguments presented thus far, the Court must reject
the arguments of overbreadth and undue burden. (The objections might also be untimely, but given
all that has been said here, the Court need not further consider that argument,).
D. Based on what has been said so far, the Court has some inclination to deny the
Motion outright. But two factors counsel in favor of a partial grant of sorts. First, the discovery
only serves its purpose if Plaintiffs get the information they seek (subject to the Rules, any
applicable privileges, and all other governing law), and—reading between the lines—Raymond
James appears not to have diligently put itself into a position to comply with the Subpoena. More
time therefore is needed. Second, both Plaintiffs and Raymond James have put forward the idea of
allowing additional time for conferral and compliance with the Subpoena (perhaps as narrowed or
modified through conferral), and doing so will not impact the schedule in any way that would
prejudice any Party or other stakeholder. Accordingly, the Court will grant the Motion in part, as
described in the Conclusion.
CONCLUSION
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For the foregoing reasons, the Motion is GRANTED IN PART, as follows:
• The fact-witness deposition deadline is extended to November 20, 2026, solely for the
purpose of allowing Raymond James to comply with the Subpoena and for no other
purpose;
• The deadlines for expert witness disclosures and depositions, motions to exclude experts
(under Daubert or otherwise), and dispositive motions are each extended by three weeks
from their current dates;
• Plaintiffs and Raymond James are ordered to meet and confer in good faith concerning
the scope and scheduling of Raymond James’ document production and deposition.
The Court will enter a revised scheduling order reflecting the above adjustments. The Parties and
Raymond James are REMINDED of their obligation to participate in or comply with valid
discovery in good faith; by doing so, the Parties and Raymond James will minimize the need for
Court involvement and the risk of sanctions. Of course, the Court will resolve any disputes that do
occur.
IT IS SO ORDERED on this 11th day of October, 2026.
_s/Brian Lea_________________________
BRIAN C. LEA
U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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