White v. Stover

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
S. RYAN WHITE,
Petitioner
v.
MICAH LAUREN STOVER,
Respondent.
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Case No. 3:25-cv-00556
JUDGE CAMPBELL
MAGISTRATE JUDGE HOLMES
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Petitioner S. Ryan White claims Respondent Micah Lauren Stover brought their sons
E.G.W. and A.S.W. to the United States for what was supposed to be a two-week trip and refused
to return them to their home in Puerto Vallarta, Jalisco, Mexico. Pending before the Court is
Petitioner’s Verified Complaint and Petition for Return of Child pursuant to the Convention on the
Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction and the International Child Abduction Remedies
Act seeking an order to return the child to Puerto Vallarta, Jalisco, Mexico for a custody
determination by the courts there. (Doc. No. 1).
Petitioner initiated this action on May 15, 2025. (Id.). After some difficulty serving the
Petition on Respondent (see Doc. No. 7), the summons was executed on July 31, 2025 (see Doc.
No. 13). After a period of time for the parties to conduct limited discovery, the Court held a hearing
on October 27, 2025, and November 2, 3, and 7, 2025. Following the hearing, the parties filed
post-hearing briefs. (Doc. Nos. 66, 67).
For the reasons stated herein, the Petition for return of E.G.W. and A.S.W. to Mexico is
GRANTED.
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I. 	FINDINGS OF FACT
White and Stover are married and are the parents of three minor children: sons E.G.W. (age
9) and A.S.W. (age 7), and daughter E.L.W. (age 1). The two oldest children were born in the
United States and are U.S. citizens. The youngest child was born in Mexico and is a Mexican
citizen.1 White and Stover are both U.S. citizens.
White, Stover and the sons moved from Portland, Oregon, to Puerto Vallarta, Jalisco,
Mexico, in June 2019, when the sons were three and one years old, respectively. They lived in
Mexico continuously until February 2025 when Stover and the sons traveled to Nashville,
Tennessee. White and the youngest child continue to reside in Mexico. The parties and the sons
have resided in Mexico on temporary visas.
The family did things one would expect to settle into life in a new place. They rented
houses,2 got a dog, enrolled the children in schools, made friends, obtained medical care when
necessary, and built a life in Mexico. The children had friends and nannies, participated in
organized sports, and went to birthday parties. Both children are bilingual. White and Stover
maintained ties with the United States; they traveled to the United States for work and family visits,
kept personal items in storage, paid taxes, and had drivers’ licenses, passports, and bank accounts
in the United States. Although White and Stover traveled to the United States, between their arrival
in Mexico in June 2019 until a trip to Portland, Oregon, for two weeks in December 2024 / January
2025, the sons never left Mexico.
1 	The couple is in the process of finalizing adoption of E.L.W. and are engaged in legal proceedings
in Mexico regarding E.L.W. The status of these proceedings is not entirely clear but is not dispositive of
any issue before the Court. Both parties have legal counsel in Mexico.
2 	During their time in Mexico, the parties lived in several different houses in Nayarit and Jalisco,
neighboring states on the west coast of Mexico.
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By the fall of 2024, White and Stover’s relationship had deteriorated. The sons were
struggling with anxiety, panic attacks, and bed wetting. Stover claims White was emotionally and
physically abusive – specifically that White screamed at them, made unkind remarks (he called
Stover a “bitch” and E.G.W. a “sociopath”), and, on separate occasions, threw the oldest son into
a bed and punched him in the arm leaving a mark. White describes the “punch” as “not a rage-
filled hit,” but rather a misguided attempt to startle E.G.W. into stopping his own aggressive
behavior. Some aspects of Stover’s recitation of events are undisputed and/or corroborated by text
messages between the parties, but White claims Stover’s telling of events is exaggerated. A next-
door neighbor testified that White was an active and caring father, that she never heard him yell at
the children, but that she heard Stover screaming at the children on multiple occasions. These
incidents peaked in November / December 2024. White and Stover separated in December 2024.
They continued to co-parent the children and began discussing the possibility of moving to
the United States. In mid-February, they signed a “Family Agreement” that included agreements
on financial arrangements, parenting time, and other matters. (White Ex. 10; Stover Ex. 44). The
Family Agreement referred to an “upcoming trip in February 2025.” It also states that “between
2/2025 & 6/2025: Micah to take boys on trips as needed” and “[a]fter end of school year → Micah
to take boys for the summer either to Nashville or Denver …[l]ocations determined by work
opportunities and cost analysis … [d]epending on how the summer goes and based on educational
opportunities available there is potential to spend one school year in US.” (Id.).
On February 20, 2025, Stover and the sons travelled to Nashville, Tennessee, to promote
Stover’s recently published book, Healing Psychedelics – Innovative Therapies for Trauma and
Transformation, and to visit family. White consented to the trip based on Stover’s representation
that it would last two weeks. Stover and the sons had return plane tickets for March 5, 2025. When
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the original return flight was cancelled due to weather, Stover initially said she would reschedule
the return flight for March 8, 2025, but then cancelled the flight and refused to return.
On or about March 17, 2025, the lease on Stover’s house in Mexico ended, so Stover
returned to Mexico without the sons to move out of the house. On or about the same date, she
signed a one-year lease on an apartment and enrolled the sons in school in Nashville. (Stover Ex.
57). On March 24, 2025, White expressly demanded she return to Mexico with the sons. (White
Ex. 3 at RWhite_8049). He wrote: “You left under the agreement you were returning on March
5th. You do not have my permission to stay in Nashville. You need to return the boys to Mexico
immediately.” (Id.). Stover responded, “I don’t need your permission to remain in Nashville.” (Id.).
Stover refused to tell White where she and the sons were living. (Id.). During her testimony, Stover
admitted that that White did not agree for the sons to remain in Nashville.
Initially, Stover allowed White to talk to the sons through telephone and video calls, but
eventually she cut off all communication. Since traveling to the United States with the sons in
February, Stover has returned to Mexico without the sons in March, May, and June. On May 15,
2025, White filed a petition seeking return of the sons to Mexico under the Convention on the Civil
Aspects of International Child Abduction.
White has since filed for divorce in Mexico. Stover has filed for divorce in Tennessee and
obtained a protective order against White in Mexico. Both parties have legal counsel in the United
States and in Mexico.
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II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
This matter arises under the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction (the “Hague Convention”) and the International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 22
U.S.C. § 9001, et seq. “The Hague Convention was adopted by the signatory nations ‘to protect
children internationally from the harmful effects of their wrongful removal or retention and to
establish procedures to ensure their prompt return to the State of their habitual residence, as well
as to secure protection for rights of access.’” March v. Levine, 249 F.3d 462, 465 (6th Cir.
2001) (quoting Hague Convention, Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89, 51 Fed.
Reg. 10,493, 10,498 (app. B) (March 26, 1986)). “It is the Convention’s core premise that ‘the
interests of children … in matters relating to their custody’ are best served when custody decisions
are made in the child’s country of ‘habitual residence.’” Monasky v. Taglieri, 589 U.S. 68, 71
(2020) (citing Hague Convention Preamble).
Mexico and the United States are signatories to the Hague Convention. (Joint Stipulation
¶ 3). Congress ratified and implemented the Hague Convention by enacting the International Child
Abduction Remedies Act (“ICARA”), 22 U.S.C. § 9001, et seq., which sets forth procedures for
implementation of the Convention in the United States and grants the United States District Courts
jurisdiction over actions arising under the Convention. 22 U.S.C. §§ 9001(b), 9003. ICARA
requires that the Petitioner establish that the child has been wrongfully removed from its place of
habitual residence within the meaning of the Convention by a preponderance of the evidence. 22
U.S.C. § 9003(e).
“[A] child wrongfully removed from [its] country of ‘habitual residence’ ordinarily must
be returned to that country” unless one of the narrow exceptions set forth in the Convention applies.
Monasky, 589 U.S. at 70-71. Three of these exceptions are relevant here. First and second, a court
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is not required to order the return of the children if the person who opposes return establishes by a
preponderance of the evidence that: (1) the petitioner “consented to or subsequently acquiesced in
the removal or retention”; or (2) “the child objects to being returned and has attained an age and
degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of its views.” Hague Convention, Art.
13; 22 U.S.C. § 9003(e)(2)(B). Third, a Court is not required to return wrongfully removed children
to the place of habitual residence if “there is a grave risk that [their] return would expose the
child[ren] to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child[ren] in an intolerable
situation.” Hague Convention, Art. 13(b); see also Salame v. Tescari, 29 F.4th 763, 767 (6th Cir.
2022). The party seeking to avoid removal must demonstrate this exception applies “by clear and
convincing evidence.” 22 U.S.C. § 9003(e)(2)(A).
III. 	ANALYSIS
A. Wrongful Removal from the Place of Habitual Residence
Petitioner must establish that the children were wrongfully removed or retained from their
place of habitual residence within the meaning of the Convention by a preponderance of the
evidence. 22 U.S.C. § 9003(e).
Under the Hague Convention, the removal or retention of a child is wrongful when:
a) 	it is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a person, an institution or
any other body, either jointly or alone, under the law of the State in which the
child was habitually resident immediately before the removal or retention;
and
b) 	at the time of removal or retention those rights were actually exercised,
either jointly or alone, or would have been so exercised but for the removal
or retention.
Hague Convention, Art. 3.
Unsurprisingly, “[t]he most important determination that a court makes when resolving a
petition brought pursuant to the Hague Child Abduction Convention is that related to a child’s
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place of habitual residence.” Rodrigues Dos Santos Argueta v. Argueta-Ugalde, No. 23-1107, 2023
WL 4635901 at *3 (6th Cir. Jul. 20, 2023). Accordingly, the Court begins there.
“Habitual residence” is not defined by the Convention. Instead, the Court must engage in
a fact-driven inquiry to determine the place where the child is “at home” at the time of the retention
or removal. Monasky, 589 U.S. at 77 (citing Karkkanien v. Kovalchuk, 445 F.3d 280, 291 (3d Cir.
2006)). As the Supreme Court recently explained:
[b]ecause locating a child’s home is a fact-driven inquiry, courts must be
“sensitive to the unique circumstances of the case and informed by common
sense.” For older children capable of acclimating to their surroundings, courts
have long recognized, facts indicating acclimatization will be highly relevant.
Because children, 	especially those too young 	or otherwise unable to
acclimate, 	depend 	on 	their 	parents 	as 	caregivers, 	the 	intentions 	and
circumstances of caregiving parents are relevant considerations. No single
fact, however, is dispositive across all cases. Common sense suggests that
some cases will be straightforward: Where a child has lived in one place with
her family indefinitely, that place is likely to be her habitual residence. But
suppose, for instance, that an infant lived in a country only because a
caregiving 	parent 	had 	been 	coerced 	into 	remaining 	there. 	Those
circumstances should figure in the calculus.
Id. at 78 (internal citations omitted). A child’s residence in a particular country is “habitual” only
if it is more than transitory. Id. at 76. It is not dependent on agreement between the child’s parents,
but “‘mere physical presence’ … is not a dispositive indicator of an infant’s habitual residence.”
Id. at 77, 81. Instead, the Court looks to “a wide range of facts other than an actual agreement,
including facts indicating that the parents have made their home in a particular place” to determine
whether an infant’s residence in that place has the quality of being habitual. Id. at 81. Ultimately,
the goal is “to ensure that custody is adjudicated in what is presumptively the most appropriate
forum – the country where the child is at home.” Id. at 79.
Habitual residence is determined at the time immediately prior to the wrongful removal or
retention. Here, the evidence shows that the sons were expected to return to Mexico from what
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was to be a two-week trip with Stover in early March. Instead, they remained in the United States.
The date of retention is, therefore, approximately March 8, 2025, the date they were scheduled to
return to Mexico (taking into account weather delays) and did not do so.
The determination of habitual residence is not difficult in this case. The evidence
unequivocally shows that the sons’ place of habitual residence was Mexico. They lived in Mexico
for six years, which at their young ages of seven and nine is the vast majority of their lives. Indeed,
given their young ages and the length of time in Mexico, it is unlikely that the sons have memories
of their lives anywhere else. That they lived in various residences and attended various schools (all
of which were in the same general region of Mexico) has no bearing on the determination that their
habitual residence was Mexico. Similarly, the fact that the sons’ parents maintained connections
with the United States or one day planned to return to the United States has little to no impact on
whether the sons were “at home” in Mexico. Parental agreement or intent is most relevant when
considering the habitual residence of infants, which E.G.W. and A.S.W. are not. Even so, the
evidence suggests that White and Stover moved to Mexico with no fixed duration in mind. They
even considered applying for permanent residency several times during the six years they lived
there and made various inquiries about obtaining permanent residency status. Stover’s testimony
that she never intended to stay in Mexico as a single parent does not undermine the abundance of
connections the children had in Mexico or the conclusion that Mexico was their habitual residence
when they were retained in the United States.
The next consideration is whether the retention was “in breach of rights of custody
attributed to a person, an institution or any other body, either jointly or alone, under the law of the
State in which the child was habitually resident.” The Court takes judicial notice of the law under
the Civil Code for Jalisco, Mexico, as permitted by the Hague Convention, Article 14. Under
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Mexican law, both parents possess equal custody and decision-making rights under the doctrine of
patria potestad. (See Excerpt of Civil Code for the States of Jalisco, Mexico, Doc. No. 60-1
(Spanish), 60-2 (translation)); see also, March v. Levine, 136 F. Supp. 2d 831, 842 (M.D. Tenn.
2000) (“By law, the right to patria potestad belongs to both parents.”).
There are no custody orders regarding the sons, therefore the parties have equal custody
rights. Under the Convention, “rights of custody” include rights relating to the care of the child
and the right to determine the child’s place of residence. Hague Convention, Art. 5(b). Therefore,
Stover’s retention of the sons in the United States is in breach of White’s rights of custody. Finally,
there is no genuine dispute that White was exercising custody at the time of removal or retention.
White has established by a preponderance of the evidence that the sons’ place of habitual
residence is Mexico and that they were wrongfully retained from Mexico. Thus, those children
must be returned to Mexico unless the Respondent shows that one of the exceptions applies. Stover
asserts three exceptions: consent, the children’s objection, and grave risk of harm. The Court
considers each in turn.
B. Consent
Article 13 of the Hague Convention provides that the Court is not required to order the
return of the children to Mexico if White “consented to or subsequently acquiesced in the removal
or retention.” Hague Convention, Art. 13(a). 	Under the Hague Convention, the defense
of consent requires the respondent to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
petitioner agreed to the removal or retention of the child. 22 U.S.C. § 9003(e)(2)(B); Friedrich v.
Friedrich, 78 F.3d at 1060, 1067 (6th Cir. 1996). The Sixth Circuit has held that “acquiescence
under the Convention requires either: an act or statement with the requisite formality, such as
testimony in a judicial proceeding; a convincing written renunciation of rights; or a consistent
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attitude of acquiescence over a significant period of time.” Friedrich, 78 F.3d at 1070 (footnotes
omitted).
Stover points to evidence that she and White signed the Family Agreement, which, among
other things, memorialized the parties’ understanding regarding the sons’ trip to the United States
in February 2025. Stover argues that the Agreement is evidence of White’s consent for the sons to
relocate to the United States. The Court disagrees. First, the evidence shows that White consented
to the sons traveling to the United States for approximately two weeks. Stover and the children
had plane tickets for return to Mexico on March 5, 2025. Second, the Family Agreement does not
indicate agreement to relocation in the United States. It refers to the travel as a “trip,” and indicates
that although permanent relocation is something the parties were considering, they had not reached
agreement on that issue. (See Agreement, Stover Ex. 44). The Agreement provides that Stover and
the sons will take “trips as needed” between February and June 2025. The Agreement further
provides that Stover would take the sons to either Nashville or Denver “[a]fter end of school year”
and that “[d]epending on how the summer goes and based on educational opportunities available
→ there is potential to spend one school year in US.” The reference to a “potential move” at some
point in the future is not indicative of consent for the children to remain in the United States past
the original date of return. Nor does the consent to “trips as needed” during a specified period
indicate consent to a permanent move to the United States or even a months-long temporary
relocation. A “trip” does not typically involve a one-year lease and school enrollment in another
location.
Further, Stover testified that after she was in the United States she attempted to
communicate with White her view that the sons needed to stay in the United States, but that he did
not agree to them staying. She testified, “He did not agree.” Indeed, once White learned Stover
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had rented an apartment in Nashville, he was unequivocal that he did not consent to the sons
remaining in the United States. On March 24, 2025, he wrote: “You do not have my permission to
stay in Nashville. You need to return the boys to Mexico immediately.” (White Ex. 3 at
RWhite_008049).
On this record, the Court has no trouble concluding that White did not consent to E.G.W.
and A.S.W. remaining in the United States beyond the duration of the planned trip with a slight
extension for unforeseen weather delays.
C. Mature Age
The Hague Convention authorizes a court to “refuse to order the return of the child if it
finds that the child objects to being returned and has attained an age and degree of maturity at
which it is appropriate to take account of its views.” Hague Convention, Art. 13. Dr. Allson
Bender, who testified as a forensic psychologist, and Stover testified that the boys object to
returning to Mexico. The question is whether E.G.W., who is nine years old, and A.S.W., who is
seven years old, are of sufficient age and maturity for the court to take account of their views. Dr.
Bender testified that they are “very bright children” and are “able to articulate their thoughts and
feelings consistently and in their own words.” The Court denied Stover’s request to conduct an in
camera interview of the children. The Court finds that regardless of maturity, seven and nine is
not a sufficient age for a child to determine where he will live.
The record also supports this conclusion. The sons, while very bright, have not attained
requisite maturity for their objection to be determinative. In fact, Dr. Bender describes their
maturity as “age-appropriate.” During interviews with Dr. Bender, E.G.W., the older of the two
boys, separated from his mother with “minor reluctance,” only separated from his brother with
“coaching and reassurance,” and during one of the sessions was accompanied by “therapist”
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Michelle Jones in an attempt to increase his comfort level.3 (Bender Forensic Evaluation,
Appendix B). A.S.W., the younger boy separated from his mother with “minimal distress.” (Id.).
Dr. Bender also observed that E.G.W.’s “responses about his father could have contained language
that has been influenced by others, particularly related to legal matters, as he appeared to be aware
of specific legal details about the custody situation.” (Id.). Given the sons’ young ages and that
they have been in the sole custody of their mother, with minimal contact with their father, since
February 2025, and considering Dr. Bender’s Report and interview notes, the Court has significant
concerns that the sons are impressionable, in part because of their age.
In summary, the Court concludes that E.G.W. and A.S.W. have not attained an age or
degree of maturity at which is appropriate to consider their views and to refuse to order their return
based on their preference for remaining in the United States with their mother.
D. Grave Risk of Harm or Intolerable Situation
The Hague Convention provides that the Court is not bound to order the return of the
children of the person opposing their return establishes that there is a “grave risk that his or her
return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an
intolerable situation.” Hague Convention, Art. 13(b). The Respondent must establish a “grave risk
of harm” by the heightened standard of clear and convincing evidence. 22 U.S.C. § 9003(e)(2)(A).
“The ‘grave risk’ exception is to be interpreted narrowly, lest it swallow the rule … that [c]hildren
who are wrongfully removed or retained within the meaning of the Convention are to be promptly
returned.’” Simcox v. Simcox, 511 F.3d 594, 604 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78
F.3d 1060, 1064 and 1067 (6th Cir. 1996)); see also 22 U.S.C. § 9001(a)(4) (“Children who are
3 	Although Respondent refers to Michele Jones as the children’s “therapist,” Ms. Jones is not a
licensed therapist. Respondent also requested the court allow Ms. Jones to accompany the children to
provide emotion support during any in camera interview. (See Doc. No. 29).
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wrongfully removed or retained within the meaning of the Convention are to be promptly returned
unless one of the narrow exceptions set forth in the Convention applies.”).
The Sixth Circuit has provided the following guidance for a court’s determination on the
grave risk of harm exception:
This provision was not intended to be used by defendants as a vehicle to
litigate (or relitigate) the child’s best interests. Only evidence directly
establishing the existence of a grave risk that would expose the child to
physical or emotional harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable
situation is material to the court’s determination. The person opposing the
child’s return must show that the risk to the child is grave, not merely serious.
A review of deliberations on the Convention reveals that “intolerable
situation” was not intended to encompass return to a home where money is
in short supply, or where educational or other opportunities are more limited
than in the requested State. An example of an “intolerable situation” is one in
which a custodial parent sexually abuses the child. If the other parent removes
or retains the child to safeguard it against further victimization, and the
abusive parent then petitions for the child’s return under the Convention, the
court may deny the petition. Such action would protect the child from being
returned to an “intolerable situation” and subjected to a grave risk of
psychological harm.
Friedrich, 78 F.3d at 1068–69 (quoting Public Notice 957, 51 Fed. Reg. 10494, 10510 (Mar. 26,
1986)). In Friedrich, the Sixth Circuit further found that a grave risk of harm can exist in two
situations. “First, there is a grave risk of harm when return of the child puts the child in imminent
danger prior to the resolution of the custody dispute—e.g., returning the child to a zone of war,
famine, or disease.” Id. at 1069. “Second, there is a grave risk of harm in cases of serious abuse or
neglect, or extraordinary emotional dependence, when the court in the country of habitual
residence, for whatever reason, may be incapable or unwilling to give the child adequate
protection.” Id. Only the second situation is at issue here.
In a Hague Convention case, our precedent establishes three broad categories
of abuse: minor, clearly grave, and cases in the middle, in which the abuse
“is substantially more than minor, but is less obviously intolerable.” Simcox,
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511 F.3d at 607–08. A case involving relatively minor abuse would likely not
pose a grave risk to the child nor place the child in an intolerable situation.
See id. at 607. In such cases, the district court has no discretion to refuse the
petition to return because the Article 13(b) threshold has not been met. Id. A
case in which the abuse is clearly grave typically involves “credible evidence
of sexual abuse, other similarly grave physical or psychological abuse, death
threats, or serious neglect.” Id. at 607–08. Cases in the middle category call
for a fact-intensive inquiry into “the nature and frequency of the abuse, the
likelihood 	of 	its 	recurrence, 	and 	whether 	there 	are 	any 	enforceable
undertakings that would sufficiently ameliorate the risk of harm to the child
caused by its return.” Id. at 608.
Salame v. Tescari, 29 F.4th 763, 767 (6th Cir. 2022).
Stover asserts that she and the sons were subjected to physical and psychological abuse
from White, and due to traumatic events in Mexico, the majority of which she contends were “at
the hands of [White],” they suffer PTSD symptoms such that their return to Mexico poses a grave
risk of psychological harm. (See Doc. No. 56 at ¶ 117, Doc. No. 67 at ¶ 18). Stover points to Dr.
Bender’s Forensic Report and testimony that the sons would face psychological harm if returned
to Mexico. Dr. Bender opined that E.G.W. “displays the full range of PTSD symptoms” and that
A.S.W. has “adjustment disorder with anxiety.” (Bender Report, Stover Ex. 113). Stover argues
that the past physical and psychological abuse, the professional diagnosis of PTSD, and the expert
opinion that repatriation would trigger a recurrence of trauma establish that return to Mexico would
place the sons in an intolerable situation. (Doc. No. 56 at ¶ 118).
White argues that Dr. Bender’s conclusions should be viewed critically because her
“conclusions regarding the children’s purported fear of Father and desire not to return appear
grounded 	primarily 	in 	Respondent’s 	self-generated 	accounts 	rather 	than 	in 	independent,
spontaneous statements by the children.” (Doc. No. 66 at 9). White adds that, to the extent Stover’s
concerns are justified, the courts in Mexico are competent to address any custody or safety
concerns. (Id.).
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The evidence at trial indicates that the alleged abuse consists of White screaming at Stover
and the children (one time calling Stover a “bitch”), one event when White “punched” A.S.W. in
the arm, and one time when White threw or slung A.S.W. into the bed. Stover claims the physical
events left red marks, but she did not take photographs or report the incidents to the police. Stover
also testified that White showed preferential treatment of A.S.W. over E.G.W. leading the boys to
wonder why their father treated them differently. Stover stated that these incidents were the worst
of White’s conduct and that it peaked in November and December 2024 shortly before White
moved out of the family home. When asked why she allowed their daughter to stay with White,
she responded that she did not have concerns because White was affectionate and nurturing with
the daughter. The sons were also affected by bullying events at school involving E.G.W., the theft
of a backpack which occurred while E.G.W. was on an outing with White, and stress related to the
dissolution of the family.
Depending on whose version of the story is credited, these events are either minor or in the
middle on the scale of abuse. Even if the events occurred as Stover has described and fall in the
middle of the scale, the Court must examine whether there are any measures that would sufficiently
ameliorate the risk of harm to the sons caused by their return. The answer here is clearly “yes.”
Both parties are represented by counsel in Mexico, and Stover has demonstrated that she can obtain
a restraining order from the courts in Mexico, if necessary. In addition, the parties have previously
engaged the assistance of numerous professionals in Mexico to guide their parenting and custody
decisions. Continued engagement with these professionals will minimize psychological harm.
Moreover, an order returning the sons to Mexico is not a custody determination or an order that
the children must reside with White or even spend time with him; it is merely an order that a court
in Mexico, not the United States, must decide these issues.
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The Court reaches the same conclusion with regard to Dr. Bender’s recommendation that
the sons should not return to Mexico to prevent re-exposure to trauma.4 Ameliorative measures
will reduce the risk of psychological harm from a return to Mexico. Such measures include, but
are not limited to, treatment from the children’s therapists and other professionals in Mexico, the
use of the courts in Mexico to resolve custody and visitation issues, and, if necessary, the use of
the courts in Mexico to obtain a restraining order. Again, the Court notes that both parties are
represented by counsel in Mexico and that Stover’s attorney testified that it is possible to obtain a
protective order in absentia.
Because such ameliorative measures are available, the Court finds Stover has not shown
clear and convincing evidence of a grave risk that return to Mexico will expose the sons to physical
or psychological harm or otherwise place them in an intolerable situation.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, the Court finds that Petitioner has established that E.G.W. and
A.S.W. were wrongfully retained from their habitual residence in Puerto Vallarta, Jalisco, Mexico,
and that no exceptions apply. Those children must, therefore, be returned to Mexico immediately.
From the evidence admitted during the hearing, it appears the parties have the financial means to
arrange 	for 	the 	sons’ 	prompt 	return 	and 	for 	Stover 	to 	accompany 	them 	and 	arrange
accommodations in Mexico if she choses to do so. The Court’s order is limited to its jurisdiction
4 	The Court notes that Dr. Bender’s conclusions that the sons’ symptoms are attributable to White’s
conduct are largely based on Stover’s reporting. For example, Dr. Bender cites “the robber-hunt incident”
in which “Father took [E.G.W.] along to confront armed robbers,” but E.G.W. said only that some men
stole his father’s backpack. (Stover Ex. 113, Bender Report, Findings and Impressions at 10-11, and
Interview Summary of E.G.W. at 46). The characterization of this event appears to have come from Stover
and differs in important respects from White’s. Numerous other statements in Dr. Bender’s Report that are
attributed to the sons come not from the sons directly, but from Stover.
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under ICARA, ordering the prompt return of the children. E.G.W. and A.S.W. must be returned to
Mexico promptly within 30 days of the date of this Order. The parties shall meet and confer
regarding the details of return and no later than December 1, 2025, and file a Notice providing the
details of their return travel. Upon review of that notice, the Court will advise Respondent
concerning return of passports held by the Court pending this ruling.
It is so ORDERED.
______________________________________
WILLIAM L. CAMPBELL, JR.
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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