Case Name in Social Security Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT CHATTANOOGA
DUSTIN W. MARTIN, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
) 	No. 1:25-cv-17-KAC-MJD
v. 	)
)
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, )
)
Defendant. 	)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Dustin W. Martin brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking
judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”)
denying him disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) and supplemental security income (“SSI”). Each
party has filed a brief seeking judgment in their favor pursuant to Rules 5, 6, and 7 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure Supplemental Rules for Social Security (“Supplemental Rules”) [Doc.
12; Doc. 14], and Plaintiff filed a reply pursuant to Rule 8 of the Supplemental Rules [Doc. 18].
This matter is ripe for the Court’s review.
For the reasons stated below, the Court will recommend that (1) Plaintiff’s request for relief
be denied; and (2) the Commissioner’s request to affirm his final decision denying benefits be
granted.
I. 	ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
According to the administrative record [Doc. 7 (“Tr.”)], Plaintiff filed his applications for
DIB and SSI on December 2, 2021, alleging disability beginning May 15, 2020 (Tr. 16). Plaintiff’s
claim was denied initially and on reconsideration at the agency level. Plaintiff requested a hearing
before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”), which was conducted by videoconference on October
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11, 2023. On January 19, 2024, the ALJ found Plaintiff had not been under a disability as defined
in the Social Security Act at any time between his alleged onset of disability date and the date of
the ALJ’s decision (Tr. 29). The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review, making
the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner (Tr. 1). Plaintiff timely filed the instant
action.
II. 	FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. 	Education and Employment Background
Plaintiff was born on March 22, 1987, making him 33 years old on his alleged onset of
disability date, which is considered a younger individual (Tr. 27). See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1563 &
416.963. He has at least a high school education and can communicate in English (Tr. 27). He has
no past relevant work (Tr. 27).
B. 	Medical Records
In his December 2021 Adult Disability Report, Plaintiff alleged disability due to (1)
arthritis, (2) knee injuries, (3) shoulder injuries, (4) carpal tunnel syndrome in both hands, and (5)
insomnia (Tr. 315). While there is no need to summarize all the medical records herein, the relevant
records have been reviewed.
C. 	Hearing Testimony
At the videoconference hearing held October 11, 2023, Plaintiff and a vocational expert
(“VE”) testified. Plaintiff was represented by counsel during the administrative hearing, although
a different attorney than currently represents him in these federal court proceedings. The Court has
carefully reviewed the transcript of the hearing (Tr. 35–60).
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III. ELIGIBILITY AND THE ALJ’S FINDINGS
A. 	Eligibility
“The Social Security Act defines a disability as the ‘inability to engage in any substantial
gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can
be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period
of not less than 12 months.’” Schmiedebusch v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 536 F. App’x 637, 646 (6th
Cir. 2013) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A)); see also Parks v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 413 F. App’x
856, 862 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A)). A claimant is disabled “only if his
physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do
his previous work, but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any
other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.” Parks, 413 F. App’x
at 862 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A)). The Social Security Administration (“SSA”)
determines eligibility for disability benefits by following a five-step process:
1) If the claimant is doing substantial gainful activity, the claimant is
not disabled.
2) If the claimant does not have a severe medically determinable
physical or mental impairment—i.e., an impairment that
significantly limits his or her physical or mental ability to do basic
work activities—the claimant is not disabled.
3) If the claimant has a severe impairment(s) that meets or equals one
of the listings in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of the regulations and
meets the duration requirement, the claimant is disabled.
4) If the claimant’s impairment does not prevent him or her from doing
his or her past relevant work, the claimant is not disabled.
5) If the claimant can make an adjustment to other work, the claimant
is not disabled.
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20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a) & 416.920(a); see also Rabbers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 582 F.3d 647,
652 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). The claimant bears the burden of showing the extent of
their impairment(s) in steps one through four, but at step five, the Commissioner bears the burden
of showing that, notwithstanding those impairments, there are jobs the claimant is capable of
performing. See Ealy v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 594 F.3d 504, 512–13 (6th Cir. 2010).
B. 	The ALJ’s Findings
The ALJ found Plaintiff met the insured status requirements through December 31, 2025
(Tr. 18). At step one of the five-step process, the ALJ found Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial
gainful activity at least since May 15, 2020, Plaintiff’s alleged onset of disability date (Tr. 18).
At step two, the ALJ found Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: (1)
osteoarthritis in the bilateral knees, status-post surgical repair; (2) bilateral CTS status-post release;
(3) left cubital tunnel syndrome status-post release; and (4) obesity (Tr. 19). The ALJ also noted
Plaintiff had been diagnosed with hyperlipidemia, asthma, leukocytosis, and cervical degenerative
disc disease, but she found these were non-severe impairments because “they have either resolved
with no persuasive allegations of continued limitation to the claimant’s activities, or the limitations
they do produce are either minor or infrequent.” (Tr. 19). The ALJ also noted Plaintiff “has alleged
difficulty holding [his] arms above his head due to his shoulders and low back pain.” (Tr. 20). The
ALJ found these conditions did not constitute medically determinable impairments because “there
is no current diagnosis or treatment evidence in the record to account for these symptoms.” (Tr.
20).
At step three, the ALJ found Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of
impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20
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C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (Tr. 20). Next, the ALJ found Plaintiff had the residual
functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b) and
416.967(b), with the following limitations:
 He can only stand and/or walk for up to four hours in an eight-hour
workday, and he must be allowed a sit/stand option in 30-minute intervals.
 He can never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, and he can never crawl.
 He can perform all other postural activities no more than occasionally.
 He can frequently handle and finger with the bilateral upper extremities.
 He can only occasionally reach overhead with the bilateral upper
extremities.
 He cannot have any exposure to workplace hazards.
(Tr. 20). At step four, the ALJ found Plaintiff did not have any past relevant work. At step five,
however, the ALJ found there were unskilled occupations with jobs existing in substantial numbers
in the national economy available to a person with Plaintiff’s RFC, including routing clerk, price
marker, and shipping and receiving weigher (Tr. 27–28).
These findings led to the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff was not under a disability as
defined in the Social Security Act at any time between Plaintiff’s alleged onset of disability date,
May 15, 2020, and the date of the ALJ’s decision, January 19, 2025 (Tr. 28).
IV. ANALYSIS
Plaintiff contends the ALJ’s decision should be vacated, and this matter remanded for
further administrative proceedings [Doc. 12 at Page ID # 1269]. He lists the following in his
“Statement of the Issues”:
1. 	The ALJ failed to adequately evaluate and sufficiently explain [her]
consideration of the opinion of Julana Monti, M.D., who performed the
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agency’s consultative physical examination. The ALJ’s analysis violates the
regulations at 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c, 416.920c, and the omission of
pertinent restrictions has resulted in an RFC that is not supported by
substantial evidence.
2. 	The ALJ’s RFC assessment is not supported by substantial evidence
because the ALJ used [her] own lay medical opinion to interpret raw
medical data and failed to build a logical bridge between the evidence and
the RFC.
[Doc. 12 at Page ID # 1256].
In response, the Commissioner argues the ALJ’s decision should not be disturbed because
the ALJ’s RFC assessment is supported by substantial evidence and the ALJ did not otherwise
improperly consider Dr. Monti’s opinion. [See Doc. 14].
A. 	Standard of Review
A court must affirm the Commissioner’s decision unless it rests on an incorrect legal
standard or is unsupported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); McClanahan v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., 474 F.3d 830, 833 (6th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). The United States Supreme
Court has explained that “‘substantial evidence’ is a ‘term of art,’” and “whatever the meaning of
‘substantial’ in other settings, the threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not high.” Biestek
v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 102–03 (2019) (citation omitted). Rather, substantial evidence “means—
and means only—‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion.’” Id. at 103 (citing Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)); see also
McClanahan, 474 F.3d at 833. Furthermore, the evidence must be “substantial” in light of the
record as a whole, “taking into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight.”
Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 388 (6th Cir. 1984) (citations omitted).
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If there is substantial evidence to support the Commissioner’s findings, they should be
affirmed, even if the court might have decided facts differently, or if substantial evidence would
also have supported other findings. Smith v. Chater, 99 F.3d 780, 782 (6th Cir. 1996) (citations
omitted); Ross v. Richardson, 440 F.2d 690, 691 (6th Cir. 1971) (citation omitted). The court may
not re-weigh evidence, resolve conflicts in evidence, or decide questions of credibility. Garner,
745 F.2d at 387. The substantial evidence standard allows considerable latitude to administrative
decision makers because it presupposes “there is a ‘zone of choice’ within which the
Commissioner can act, without the fear of court interference.” McClanahan, 474 F.3d at 833
(quoting Buxton v. Halter, 246 F.3d 762, 772 (6th Cir. 2001)).
The court may consider any evidence in the record, regardless of whether it has been cited
by the ALJ. Heston v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 245 F.3d 528, 535 (6th Cir. 2001). The court may not,
however, consider any evidence which was not before the ALJ for purposes of substantial evidence
review under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Foster v. Halter, 279 F.3d 348, 357 (6th Cir.
2001). Furthermore, the court is under no obligation to scour the record for errors not identified by
the claimant, Howington v. Astrue, No. 2:08-CV-189, 2009 WL 2579620, at *6 (E.D. Tenn. Aug.
18, 2009) (stating that assignments of error not made by claimant were waived), and arguments
not raised and supported in more than a perfunctory manner may be deemed waived, Woods v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:08-CV-651, 2009 WL 3153153, at *7 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 29, 2009)
(citing McPherson v. Kelsey, 125 F.3d 989, 995–96 (6th Cir. 1997)) (noting that conclusory claims
of error without further argument or authority may be considered waived).
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B. 	The ALJ’s Consideration of Dr. Monti’s Opinion
The parties’ arguments focus on the ALJ’s consideration of Dr. Monti’s opinion. At the
request of the SSA, Dr. Monti performed a one-time consultative exam (“CE”) related to Plaintiff’s
physical impairments on October 4, 2022, and produced a written report detailing her opinion (Tr.
671–77). Regarding Dr. Monti’s opinion, the ALJ found:
As for medical opinion(s) and prior administrative medical finding(s), I cannot
defer or give any specific evidentiary weight, including controlling weight, to any
prior administrative medical finding(s) or medical opinion(s), including those from
medical sources. I have fully considered the medical opinions and prior
administrative medical findings as follows:
. . . .
Julana Monti, M.D. examined the claimant during a consultative physical
examination on October 4, 2022. The claimant was in no acute distress. He was
able to walk into the room and place himself on the exam table without assistance
or assistive device (Exhibit 4F, p. 3). Musculoskeletal examination revealed the left
wrist is swollen. There is no effusion, heat, or erythema of any joint. There are no
structural deformities and no point tenderness. The claimant demonstrated negative
straight leg test; painful range of motion of the bilateral shoulders and knees; and
positive Phalen’s on the left. Strength revealed bilateral knee flexion 2/5 and
extension 3/5. Sensory examination revealed decreased sensation in the right foot.
Sensation was intact to light touch, pain, and vibration throughout. Grip strength
was 4/5 on the right and 4/5 on the left. Dexterity was intact. The claimant
demonstrated antalgic gait and stable station. He was unable to squat and able to
bend at the waist from the standing position. He could stand on his tiptoes, but not
on his heels and had difficulty walking heel to toe without assistance (Exhibit 4F,
p. 4). Strength was 5/5 except for the bilateral knees and hands. Range of motion
was reduced in backward elevation in the bilateral shoulders and bilateral flexion
in the knees (Exhibit 4F, pp. 4–5).
Dr. Monti assessed Bilateral knee meniscal tears, status-post meniscectomy without
relief of pain, swelling, and locking symptoms; Bilateral shoulder rotator cuff tears,
status post-repairs, with continued chronic shoulder pain; carpal tunnel syndrome,
bilateral, status-post carpal tunnel release without relief of symptoms, continued
numbness, swelling and pain; cubital tunnel syndrome, bilateral, status-post cubital
tunnel release with symptom relief; hypertension, nothing prescribed by primary
care; history of left peroneal neuropathy, status-post peroneal nerve release; and
likely right peroneal neuropathy (Exhibit 4F, p. 5).
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Dr. Monti opined the claimant should be able to sit in 2 hour increments for 8 hours,
stand for 2 hours, and walk in 30 minute increments for 2 hours per workday
without an assistive device. He would have difficulty being able to lift items from
the ground. He would not be able to perform duties that require kneeling. He can
carry objects weighing up to 15 pounds. He can perform fine motor tasks but would
have difficulty performing tasks that require prolonged or repetitive grasping
(Exhibit 4F, p. 5).
I find this opinion minimally persuasive. I note that Dr. Monti personally examined
the claimant during an in-person examination and relied on the examination results
to support her findings. However, Dr. Monti’s opinion that the claimant “should be
able” to sit in 2 hour increments for 8 hours, stand for two hours, and walk in 30
minute increments for 2 hours per workday without an assistive device is vague and
unsupported by her own examination findings. Specifically, I note the claimant was
able to walk into the room and place himself on the exam table without assistance
or assistive device (Exhibit 4F, p. 3). The claimant demonstrated antalgic gait and
stable station. He could stand on his tiptoes, but not on his heels and had difficulty
walking heel to toe without assistance (Exhibit 4F, p. 4). While I find a degree of
limitation is supported based on these findings and the record as a whole, I do not
find to the extent as opined by Dr. Monti. Specifically, I note the limitations as
opined are “disproved by the ability to toe stand” (Exhibit 1A). Therefore, I find
the claimant could perform light work, stand and/or walk for 4 hours in an 8 hour
day, which would allow for a sit/stand option at 30 minute intervals; no climbing
ladders, ropes, and scaffolds or crawling; other postural activities occasionally; and
no exposure to workplace hazards.
In addition, her opinion that the claimant “would have difficulty” being able to lift
items from the ground and “would have difficulty performing tasks that require
prolonged or repetitive grasping” are not in vocationally specific terms, as
“difficulty” is not defined. Based on the totality of the medical evidence, I find the
claimant limited to no climbing ladders, ropes, and scaffolds or crawling; other
postural activities occasionally; frequently handle and finger with the bilateral
upper extremities; and occasionally reach overhead with the bilateral upper
extremities. Thus, Dr. Monti’s findings are only minimally consistent with the
record as a whole, and I find them minimally persuasive.
(Tr. 25–27 (some paragraph breaks added)).
As set forth above, Plaintiff contends the ALJ failed to comply with applicable regulations
for assessing medical opinion evidence, 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c & 416.920c, and “failed to fulfill
her duty to correct a report that she deemed to be inadequate.” [Doc. 12 at Page ID # 1265].
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1. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c & 416.920c
Under 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c & 416.920c, an ALJ is required to consider multiple factors
in evaluating medical opinion evidence, including (1) supportability, (2) consistency, (3) a source’s
relationship with the claimant, (4) specialization, and (5) other supporting or contradicting
factors. This rule, which applies only to claims filed on or after March 27, 2017, “notably reduces
the articulation standards required for ALJs in assessing medical source opinions” from the
standards applicable to earlier-filed claims. Gourley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:21-CV-99, 2022
WL 4546376, at *5 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 28, 2022) (cleaned up and citation omitted). “Supportability
and consistency will be the most important factors, and usually the only factors the ALJ is required
to articulate.” Jones v. Berryhill, 392 F. Supp. 3d 831, 839 (M.D. Tenn. 2019) (citation
omitted). While the ALJ is required to consider the relevant factors, the ALJ is not required to
explain their consideration of all such factors in the written decision. 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520c(b)(2); 416.920c(b)(2). Nevertheless, as Plaintiff points out, ALJs are still required to
“provide a coherent explanation of their reasoning, clearly explain their consideration of the
opinion and identify the evidence supporting their conclusions, and otherwise explain how they
considered the supportability and consistency factors as to each medical opinion.” Jones v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:23-cv-10, 2023 WL 9503739, at *5 (E.D. Tenn. Dec. 12, 2023)
(citations omitted).
Regarding supportability, the “more relevant the objective medical evidence and
supporting explanations presented by a medical source are to support his or her medical opinion(s)
or prior administrative medical finding(s), the more persuasive the medical opinions or prior
administrative medical finding(s) will be.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(c)(1); 416.920c(c)(1).
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Regarding consistency, the “more consistent a medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical
finding(s) is with the evidence from other medical sources and nonmedical sources in the claim,
the more persuasive the medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s) will be.” 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(c)(2); 416.920c(c)(2).
Plaintiff argues the “restrictions assessed by Dr. Monti were supported by her evaluation,”
emphasizing that during the examination, Plaintiff “complained of continued numbness and hand
weakness with prolonged gripping as well as dropping and cramping in his hands.” [Doc. 12 at
Page ID # 1266]. Plaintiff also emphasizes Dr. Monti “observed a swollen left wrist” and “reduced
grip strength,” and that Dr. Monti “performed a Phalen’s test that yielded a positive result.” [Id.].
As for the ALJ’s consistency analysis, Plaintiff argues: “In the case at bar, the ALJ stated nothing
beyond a conclusion that the ‘record as a whole’ supports other findings, and this unadorned
reason—with no meat on its bones—fails to satisfy the regulatory requirement that the ALJ address
the factor of consistency.” [Id.]. Plaintiff contends the ALJ’s alleged error is not harmless because,
“[h]ad Dr. Monti’s restrictions been adopted in full,” the jobs identified by the ALJ at step five
“would not have remained available.” [Id. at Page ID # 1268].
Regarding supportability, Plaintiff cites evidence regarding Dr. Monti’s examination
pertaining to his wrists, i.e., his swollen left wrist, reduced grip strength, and left positive Phalen’s
test. The Court finds the evidence Plaintiff cites does not undermine the ALJ’s reasoning. The ALJ
specifically acknowledged each of these findings from Dr. Monti’s examination and opinion. The
ALJ also noted Plaintiff’s dexterity remained intact, and that while his left wrist was swollen, there
was “no effusion, heat, or erythema of any joint,” no “structural deformities and no point
tenderness.” (Tr. 26). While Dr. Monti may have observed swelling and a positive Phalen’s test in
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one of Plaintiff’s wrists, “disability is determined by the functional limitations imposed by a
condition, not the mere diagnosis of it.” Hill v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 560 F. App’x 547, 551 (6th
Cir. 2014); see also Eastwood v. Berryhill, No. 5:18-CV-00177-LLK, 2019 WL 2997391, at *3
(W.D. Ky. July 9, 2019) (explaining that Phalen’s test is a “method[] of diagnosing active carpal
tunnel syndrome” (citation omitted)). The ALJ also noted that Plaintiff experienced a limited range
of motion only in his “backward elevation in the bilateral shoulders and bilateral flexion in the
knees.” (Tr. 26). Dr. Monti’s examination records confirm Plaintiff had full range of motion in his
wrists (Tr. 677). Plaintiff further complains about the ALJ’s finding that Dr. Monti’s opinion
regarding Plaintiff’s ability to “lift items from the ground” and “perform[ing] tasks that require
prolonged or repetitive grasping” was “not in vocationally specific terms, as ‘difficulty’ is not
defined.” (Tr. 27). However, several other courts within the Sixth Circuit agree that similarly
phrased medical opinions are properly rejected or not fully credited on the grounds that they are
vague or imprecise. See Amber S. v. Kijakazi, No. 1:23-cv-00018-LLK, 2023 WL 8027581, at *4
(W.D. Ky. Nov. 20, 2023); Turner v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:22-cv-877, 2023 WL 5620705,
at *7 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 31, 2023); Templeton v. Social Security Admin., No. 2:16-cv-00061, 2018
WL 1661877, at *6 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 20, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL
1661628 (M.D. Tenn. Apr. 5, 2018); Bischoff v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:16-cv-404, 2017 WL
1324875, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 11, 2017); see also Misty K. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:21-
cv-548, 2022 WL 4376229, at *6 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 22, 2022) (“[T]he Court agrees with the
Magistrate Judge that the ALJ adequately discussed the supportability and consistency factors. As
for supportability, the ALJ is correct in describing Dr. Cooperrider’s opinion as vague.”).
In arguing the ALJ failed to address the consistency of the ALJ’s decision with the other
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evidence in the record, Plaintiff overlooks the rest of the ALJ’s written decision, which does
address Plaintiff’s medical history (including addressing his limitations and conditions other than
those related to carpal tunnel syndrome), the medical opinion evidence, and other relevant
evidence in the record. See Hernandez v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 644 F. App’x 468, 474 (6th Cir.
2016) (endorsing examination of ALJ’s entire decision when reviewing ALJ’s assessment of
opinion evidence); Crum v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 660 F. App’x 449, 457 (6th Cir. 2016) (“No
doubt, the ALJ did not reproduce the list of these treatment records a second time when she
explained why Dr. Bell’s opinion was inconsistent with this record. But it suffices that she listed
them elsewhere in her opinion.”). For example, the ALJ cited the “favorable prognosis” note in
October 2021 imaging studies (Tr. 24); the improvement Plaintiff experienced following his carpal
tunnel release surgeries in 2022 (Tr. 24); a May 2023 primary care visit where Plaintiff’s exam
revealed shoulder tenderness, but no motor weakness and a normal gait and coordination (Tr. 25);
and a July 2023 neurology appointment when Plaintiff presented with only mild symptoms in his
hands, as well as 5/5 motor strength in his lower extremities, normal muscle bulk, and normal
results from an EMG/NCS study (Tr. 25).
It is also worth noting that, even though the ALJ found Dr. Monti’s opinion “minimally
persuasive,” she did not reject it completely. Indeed, she ultimately assessed an RFC that is not
dramatically different from the functional limitations Dr. Monti found (Tr. 26). For example, the
ALJ assessed a sit/stand option in 30-minute intervals, consistent with Dr. Monti’s opinion (Tr.
26). Further, although the ALJ found the opinions from the state agency medical consultants were
generally supported by the evidence they cited, the ALJ did not fully credit their opinions. Instead,
consistent with Dr. Monti’s report, the ALJ found Plaintiff to be more limited. The Court also
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notes the ALJ explicitly acknowledged that Dr. Monti’s findings were based on her in-person
examination of Plaintiff, whereas the state agency consultants’ opinions were based on written
records alone (Tr. 26). See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(3) (identifying “Relationship with the
claimant” as a relevant factor to consider).
When the ALJ’s evaluation of Dr. Monti’s opinion is considered in the context of the entire
written decision, it is clear the ALJ adequately and properly considered relevant factors including
supportability and consistency. To the extent Plaintiff contends the ALJ’s decision should be
reversed and remanded for further proceedings based on the ALJ’s consideration of Dr. Monti’s
opinion and the applicable medical-opinion regulations (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c & 416.920c),
Plaintiff’s request for relief should be denied.
2. 	Development of the Administrative Record
Plaintiff also argues the ALJ “failed to follow the agency’s procedures for correcting an
incomplete consultative examination opinion.” [Doc. 12 at Page ID # 1264]. He refers to the ALJ’s
comments regarding Dr. Monti’s opinion that Plaintiff “‘would have difficulty’ being able to lift
items from the ground and ‘would have difficulty performing tasks that require prolonged or
repetitive grasping.’” [Id.]. Specifically, as noted above, at the end of her explanation for not fully
crediting Dr. Monti’s opinion, the ALJ stated these aspects of the opinion “are not in vocationally
specific terms, as ‘difficulty’ is not defined.” (Tr. 27). Plaintiff notes the state agency disability
consultants found a consultative exam was necessary and contends that, “if the ALJ found the CE
to be unsatisfactory, her duty to correct an inadequate consultative examination was invoked.”
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[Doc. 23 at Page ID # 1264]. Plaintiff cites HALLEX1 I-2-5-20 and HALLEX 1-2-5-14, and
“POMS2 at DI 22510.015(B).” [Id. at Page ID # 1265].
The ALJ is responsible for fully developing the record and for ensuring that each claimant
receives a “full and fair hearing.” See Lashley v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 708 F.2d 1048,
1051 (6th Cir. 1983) (citations omitted). As the Commissioner notes in his response, however, in
fulfilling these obligations, the ALJ has the discretion to determine whether it is necessary to obtain
additional evidence. Foster, 279 F.3d at 355. Plaintiff seems to imply in her opening brief that the
ALJ abused her discretion in this case in part because the state agency consultants found a
consultative exam was necessary. This is confusing because a consultative examination was
performed (by Dr. Monti), and the ALJ discussed and analyzed the results of the examination.
Moreover, the ALJ undisputedly did not review the same record as did the state agency consultants,
who offered their opinions in December 2022 (initial review) and April 2023 (reconsideration)
(Tr. 61–102; Tr. 105–18), whereas the ALJ’s decision addresses additional records from May
2023, July 2023, and October 2023 (Tr. 24–25). While Plaintiff emphasizes that “a consultative
exam was found to be necessary by the State agency,” she does not provide any citation to where
this “finding” is reflected in the reconsideration opinion from April 2023 (see Tr. 108).
The ALJ did not, as Plaintiff contends, “deem[]” Dr. Monti’s opinion to be inadequate
[Doc. 12 at Page ID # 1265]. The ALJ considered the opinion, found it lacking in terms of
supportability and consistency, and concluded it was only “minimally” persuasive. In part, this
was based on the fact that certain aspects of the opinion did not clearly describe Plaintiff’s
1 Hearings, Appeals, and Litigation Law Manual
2 Program Operations Manual System
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functional abilities. In this regard, the ALJ’s analysis is consistent with the definition of RFC,
which the most a claimant can do, not the least. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545. But the ALJ also listed other
reasons for not fully crediting Dr. Monti’s opinion, and as discussed above, these reasons are
sufficiently articulated and supported by substantial evidence in the record.
Finally, there is substantial evidence in the record to support the ALJ’s assessed RFC,
including the ALJ’s decision not to assess additional limitations based on Dr. Monti’s opinion, and
neither the HALLEX nor the POMS documents Plaintiff cites compel the Court to conclude
otherwise. This substantial evidence includes, inter alia, the evidence discussed above, as well as
the state agency consultant’s opinions, which the Commissioner cites in his brief. Plaintiff’s reply
to the Commissioner’s point regarding the ALJ’s partial reliance on the state agency consultants’
opinions is respectfully not well-taken. [See Doc. 18 at Page ID # 1287 (“Somewhat confusingly,
the Commissioner attempts to justify the ALJ’s evaluation of Dr. Monti’s opinion by arguing it is
‘further supported by her consideration of the prior administrative medical findings.’ This is a
distraction from the ALJ’s regulatory obligations in evaluating each medical opinion.”)].
Plaintiff’s reply misses the mark. As the Court interprets it, the Commissioner’s point here is that
the record was not so devoid of evidence regarding Plaintiff’s manipulative, postural, or other
limitations that it was incumbent upon the ALJ to seek an additional consultative exam or else run
the risk of “playing doctor” with raw medical data. [See Doc. 14 at Page ID # 1279–80].
3. 	Requirement for Medical Opinion
Relatedly, Plaintiff argues the ALJ “used [her] own lay medical opinion to interpret raw
medical data,” and in doing so, “failed to build a logical bridge between the evidence and the
RFC.” [Doc. 12 at Page ID # 1268]. He contends that because the ALJ “rejected Dr. Monti’s
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postural and manipulative limitations,” and did not thereafter seek “further development,” the ALJ
“singlehandedly determined the frequency with which Plaintiff could reach, handle, and finger.”
[Id.]. To the extent Plaintiff is re-casting his argument about the ALJ’s responsibility to develop
the record, such argument is addressed above. To the extent Plaintiff is arguing the ALJ’s decision
should be reversed because there is no medical opinion that directly corresponds to every part of
the assessed RFC, the Sixth Circuit has said otherwise:
The responsibility for determining a claimant’s residual functional capacity rests
with the ALJ, not a physician. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1546(c), 416.946(c). Although
the ALJ may not substitute his opinion for that of a physician, he is not required to
recite the medical opinion of a physician verbatim in his residual functional
capacity finding. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(3), 416.945(a)(3). Moreover, an
ALJ does not improperly assume the role of a medical expert by assessing the
medical and non-medical evidence before rendering a residual functional capacity
finding. See Ford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 114 [F. App’x] 194, 197 (6th Cir. 2004).
Poe v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 342 F. App’x 149, 157 (6th Cir. 2009).
As the Commissioner explains in detail in his brief, the Sixth Circuit more recently
reaffirmed its position on this issue, in Reinartz v. Commissioner of Social Security, 795 F. App’x
448, 449 (6th Cir. 2020) (rejecting the argument that an “ALJ may not make a work-capacity
finding without a medical opinion that reaches the same conclusion,” and finding that the “effect
of a claimant’s conditions on her ability to work . . . is a determination expressly reserved for the
ALJ”; further noting that “the premise of Reinartz’s argument—that the ALJ lacked the capacity
to make this determination—is wrong.” (citations omitted)); see also Geddings v. Kijakazi, 4:22-
CV-13-DCP, 2023 WL 2801177, at *10 (finding that “an ALJ is not limited to considering only
other medical opinion evidence when evaluating the persuasiveness of a medical opinion or
otherwise determining a Plaintiff’s RFC”). Plaintiff does not address this caselaw in his reply.
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B. 	Summary
The record and the ALJ’s decision indicate the ALJ properly assessed Plaintiff’s alleged
symptoms (which Plaintiff does not directly challenge), weighed the opinion evidence, and
considered all of the evidence in the record to arrive at a well-reasoned RFC. The written decision
reflects a “logical bridge between the evidence and the conclusion that the claimant is not
disabled.” Gilliam v. Astrue, No. 2:10-CV-017, 2010 WL 2837260, at *3 (E.D. Tenn. July 19,
2010) (citation omitted).
Because the ALJ had “the enormous task of making sense of the record, reconciling
conflicting medical opinions and evidence, and weighing the credibility of [Plaintiff’s] subjective
complaints,” Buxton v. Halter, 246 F.3d 762, 775 (6th Cir. 2001), this Court’s review is limited to
whether the ALJ relied on evidence that “a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Johnson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 21-1384, 2022 WL 740692, at *2 (6th Cir. Jan.
4, 2022) (quoting Biestek, 587 U.S. at 104). In assessing Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ explained the
evidence that supported her conclusion and why she considered certain evidence less persuasive,
and the Court finds the ALJ’s findings and conclusions are adequately supported. Although
Plaintiff cites to evidence that he contends supports his claim of disability, the ALJ’s decision is
“not subject to reversal merely because there exists in the record substantial evidence to support a
different conclusion.” See Schmiedebusch, 536 F. App’x at 646; McClanahan, 474 F.3d at 833.
The record in this case demonstrates the ALJ incorporated into the RFC the functional
limitations she found to be credible and supported by the record, provided adequate explanations
for her conclusions, did not abuse her discretion or otherwise rely on a deficient record, and
properly relied on the testimony of the VE at step five. Plaintiff has not demonstrated otherwise.
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V. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court RECOMMENDS3:
(1) Plaintiff’s request for relief [Doc. 12; Doc. 18] be DENIED; and
(2) the Commissioner’s request for affirmance of his final decision denying benefits
[Doc. 16] be GRANTED.
ENTER:
/s/
MIKE DUMITRU
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
3 Any objections to this report and recommendation must be served and filed within 14 days after
service of a copy of this recommended disposition on the objecting party. Such objections must
conform to the requirements of Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Failure to file
objections within the time specified waives the right to appeal the district court’s order. Thomas v.
Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 n.7 (1985). The district court need not provide de novo review where
objections to this report and recommendation are frivolous, conclusive, and general. Mira v.
Marshall, 806 F.2d 636, 637 (6th Cir. 1986). Only specific objections are reserved for appellate
review. Smith v. Detroit Fed’n of Teachers, 829 F.2d 1370, 1373 (6th Cir. 1987).
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