USA v. Sepulveda et al

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
)

v. ‘ No. 95-CR-75-08-JJM-PAS
GIOVANNI LARA, )
Defendant. )
)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JOHN J. MCCONNELL, JR., United States District Court Chief Judge.

A jury convicted Giovanni Lara, an eighteen-year-old youth at the time, of
carjacking in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2119(8), and witness intimidation in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3).!. Lara v. United States, C.A. No. 00-554-ML, 2008 WL
608323, at *1 (D.R.I. Mar. 4, 2008) [hereinafter Postconviction Order V]. Although
“[t]here were conflicting accounts of Lara’s participation in the carjacking,” the
criminal conduct resulted in the death of Temujin Vandergroen. United States v.
Lara, 181 F.3d 183, 201 (1st Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 979 (1999). Following
the United States Sentencing Guidelines, which were mandatory at the time, the
Court sentenced Mr. Lara to life imprisonment. Postconviction Order V at *1.

Mr. Lara now seeks a sentence reduction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A),

asserting that his youthfulness at the time he committed the crime, the fact that he

1 The jury found Mr. Lara not guilty on four other counts: Count 1 (Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”)—including for the murder of
Temujin Vandergroen), Count 2 (Conspiracy to Commit Racketeering), Count 3
(Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering), and Count 10 (Drug Distribution). ECF

No. 731.

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was not the trigger person, the severity of a life-without-parole sentence, and his
extraordinary rehabilitation combine to meet the statutory criteria. See ECF
No. 1320 at 1-4. He then argues that this Court should find that his twenty-eight
years of imprisonment is sufficient to accomplish the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing
factors. Jd. The Court agrees with Mr. Lara and GRANTS his Motion for a Sentence
Reduction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Za.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Mr. Lara is one of several defendants who were convicted in 1997 of multiple
crimes arising out of their involvement in the Latin Kings? local chapter. See Lara,
181 F.8d at 190. Mr. Lara’s part in the criminal conduct involved a carjacking offense
that resulted in the death of Temujin Vandergroen. Postconviction Order V at *1. In
one of the postconviction opinions by the trial judge, she succinctly explained the facts
underlying this case:
The evidence at trial pertinent to the carjacking offense showed that the
victim, Temujin Vandergroen, inadvertently precipitated the incident by
playing with a knife in front of the children of co-defendant George
Perry. Perry interpreted this as a sign of disrespect, intolerable to a
Latin King. He asked Lara to accompany him while he robbed
Vandergroen of his Ford Escort, which vehicle had tire rims that Perry
coveted. On September 6, 1994 the two men asked Vandergroen to take
a ride with them. When he agreed, Perry (who had brought along a
sawed-off shotgun) sat behind Vandergroen in the car, while Lara sat in

the front passenger seat. At Perry’s request, Vandergroen drove to a
deserted neighborhood. Perry then told Vandergroen to slow or stop the

2“The Latin Kings originated in Chicago in the 1940s. Over time, the street
gang's influence spread to other venues. The movement migrated east to Providence
in the early 1990s. Though some chapters of the Latin Kings, called Charter Nations,
require Hispanic descent as a condition of membership, others (like the Providence
chapter) allow persons of all races and ethnicities to join.” United States v. Lara, 181

F.3d 183, 190 (1999).

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vehicle, and when Vandergroen complied, Perry shot him at close range
in the back of the head. Perry and Lara shoved Vandergroen’s body into
the street and returned to a Latin King hangout, where they were seen
with blood and brain matter on their clothing. The two later burned and
abandoned Vandergroen’s car.
Id. After the trial, the Court sentenced Mr. Lara to life in prison followed by three
years of supervised release.? Postconviction Order V at *1. The United States Court

of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed Mr. Lara’s conviction on direct appeal. Lara,

181 F.3d at 206.
II. PROCEDURAL POSTURE
After losing his direct appeal, Mr. Lara challenged his conviction in a series of
postconviction relief actions over the next two decades, filing motions both here and
in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, where he

was then incarcerated.4 No court granted any of Mr. Lara’s requested relief.

3 The Court imposed the sentence for the carjacking offense under § 2B3.1
(robbery) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines. Postconviction Order V at *1.
This guideline provided that, “[i]f a victim was killed under circumstances that would
constitute murder under 18 U.S.C. § 1111,” a sentencing court had to apply the first-
degree murder guideline. U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(c)(1). The Court found that U.S.S.G. § 2
A. 1.1 (first degree murder) applied and imposed life imprisonment. Postconviction
Order V at *1.

4Mr. Lara moved to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, but the Court
denied relief. Lara v. United States, No. 00-554—ML (D.R.I. Dec. 4, 2001) (slip op.).
The First Circuit affirmed. See Lara v. United States, No. 01-2745, Judgment (1st
Cir. May 28, 2002). Mr. Lara then moved to reduce his sentence under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(2), but the Court also denied that motion, and the denial was affirmed on
appeal. See United States v. Lara, No. 03-2689, Judgment (1st Cir. June 21, 2004).
Mr. Lara later filed a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) for relief from the judgment
that denied his § 2255 motion, and the Court denied that motion. See Lara v. United
States, No. 00-—cv-554—ML. Then Mr. Lara filed a Coram Nobis Petition, which the
Court also denied. Lara v. United States, No. 05-287—ML, 2006 WL 161599, at *1

(D.R.I. Jan. 20, 2006).

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Now, twenty-eight years after the incident, Mr. Lara argues that a combination
of factors call for a reduction in sentence to time served. Specifically, Mr. Lara cites
to his youth at the time of the offense, the time that he has spent incarcerated, that
a life sentence for someone who did not commit the murder is inappropriate, and his
record of rehabilitation. See ECF No. 1320 at 1-4. In Mr. Lara’s view, these factors,
when viewed as a whole, represent extraordinary and compelling reasons on which
the Court should release him from his life-without-parole sentence. /d.

The Government opposes Mr. Lara’s release on these grounds:

[Mr.] Lara’s disciplinary record is not reliably “clean;” he has not
proven he can extrapolate Challenge [Plrogram skills to a less
structured setting; his honesty is questionable; and his expressions of
remorse and responsibility, as well as his rehabilitation, are incomplete.

In short, when evaluated in context, none of the reasons [Mr.] Lara
offers is either extraordinary or compelling. Given the severity of [Mr.]

Lara’s crime and his failure to adequately show true remorse or
complete rehabilitation, his sentence is just and should not be reduced.

ECF No. 1335 at 6.

The Court first reviews the standard for a sentence reduction pursuant to the
statute. The Court then considers whether the facts of Mr. Lara’s case meet that
statutory standard for a sentence reduction.

Before beginning the analysis, the Court offers a preliminary thought on the
language of the statute as it relates to the Court’s role. While the informal name of
this statutory process, “compassionate release,” has become common parlance among
the courts (and has been used in congressional records), it does not actually appear
in the statute. See id. § 3582. The statute speaks of a sentence “reduction.” This

phrasing is more accurate because granting a motion may result in a reduced

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sentence rather than outright release. See United States v. Brooker, 976 F.3d 228,
237 (2d Cir. 2020) (“It bears remembering that compassionate release is a misnomer.
[The statute] in fact speaks of sentence reductions. A district court could, for
instance, reduce but not eliminate a defendant’s prison sentence, or end the term of
imprisonment but impose a significant term of probation or supervised release in its
place.”). Further, terming the grant of a sentence-reduction motion “compassionate”
may suggest to some that a judge is making a moral decision driven by conscience
rather than a legal decision governed by statute. While it is true that the statute
allows a judge significant discretion in this area, the decision is nonetheless
constrained by the text and relevant precedent. When ruling on a sentence-reduction
motion, the Court is still applying law to facts. For these reasons, the Court refrains

from using the term “compassionate release” in the rest of its opinion.

III. STANDARD FOR A SENTENCE REDUCTION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(1)(A)

Mr. Lara seeks a reduction of his term of imprisonment under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(1)(A) (“Modification of an Imposed Term of Imprisonment”).5 The statute
allows courts to reduce the term of imprisonment, after considering the Section

3553(a) sentencing factors, “if it finds that extraordinary and compelling reasons

warrant such a reduction.”6 Jd.

5 Mr. Lara has met all the administrative remedies and timeliness
requirements of the statute before filing his motion. Jd.

6 The Court need not recount here the legal analysis of whether the definition
of “extraordinary and compelling” is constrained by the United States Sentencing
Guidelines when the sentence-reduction motion is filed by a prisoner, because the
First Circuit has recently answered that much litigated question. United States v.

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The first question for the Court in analyzing Mr. Lara’s motion is: what
constitutes “extraordinary and compelling” reasons to reduce a sentence? The First
Circuit very recently gave insight into the answer to this question by counseling that
the district court “enjoy[s] broad discretion,” and that it should “conduct a holistic
review to determine whether the individualized circumstances, taken in the
aggregate, present an ‘extraordinary and compelling’ reason to grant” a sentence
reduction. United States v. Trenkler, 47 F.4th 42, 47 (1st Cir. 2022). The First
Circuit also noted that “the whole may be greater than the sum of its parts, and
reasons that might not do the trick on their own may combine to constitute
circumstances that warrant a finding that the reasons proposed are, in the aggregate,
extraordinary and compelling.” /d. at 49.

The Court “may consider any complex of circumstances raised by a defendant
as forming an extraordinary and compelling reason warranting relief.” Jd. at 47
(emphasis added) (quoting Ruvalcaba, 26 F.4th at 28 (1st Cir. 2022)). “To serve as a
safety valve, section 3582(c)(1)(A) must encompass an individualized review of a
defendant’s circumstances and permit a sentence reduction—in the district court’s
sound discretion—based on any combination of factors.” Jd. at 48 (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Ruvalcaba, 26 F.4th at 26). “[T]he only limitation on what

can be considered an extraordinary and compelling reason to grant a prisoner-

Ruvalcaba, 26 F.4th 14, 21 (1st Cir. 2022) (rejecting the notion that policy guidelines
apply to prisoner-initiated motions).

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initiated motion is rehabilitation [alone].” Jd at 48 (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Ruvalcaba, 26 F.4th at 25-26).

When Congress established this mechanism for sentence reductions in the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (“1984 Act”), the legislative history shows that it
wanted courts to be able to reduce “unusually long sentencels],” and to reduce
sentences where amended guidelines suggest a shorter sentence. The Senate report

noted:

The Committee believes that there may be unusual cases in which an
eventual reduction in the length of a term of imprisonment is justified
by changed circumstances. These would include cases of severe illness,
cases in which other extraordinary and compelling circumstances justify
a reduction of an unusually long sentence, and some cases in which the
sentencing guidelines for the offense of which the defender was
convicted have been later amended to provide a shorter term of
imprisonment.

S. Rep. 98-225, at 55-56 (1983-1984).

Congress explained that sentence modifications would be proper when
“extraordinary and compelling circumstances justify a reduction of an unusually long
sentence, and some cases in which the Sentencing Guidelines for the offense of which
the defendant was convicted have been later amended to provide a shorter term of
imprisonment.” Jd, The 1984 Act was thus intended to provide “safety valves” for
modification of sentences. Jd. at 121; see also United States v. Vigneau, 473 F. Supp.

3d 31, 36 (D.R.I. 2020) (confirming this legislative history).

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IV. APPLICATION OF THE LAW TO THE FACTS
The Court walks through the statute’s requirements in two steps. It first
considers what constitutes an “extraordinary and compelling” reason and whether

such reasons are present in Mr. Lara’s case. The Court then turns to a renewed

analysis of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors.

A. Extraordinary and Compelling Reasons
The First Circuit has provided the Court with a helpful introduction to the

plain meaning of the phrase “extraordinary and compelling” in the statute.

The plain meaning of “extraordinary” suggests that a qualifying reason
must be a reason that is beyond the mine-run either in fact or in degree.
See Websters Third New International Dictionary of the English
Language Unabridged 807 (1981) (defining “extraordinary” as “going
beyond what is usual, regular, common, or customary”); see also United
States v. Hunter, 12 F.4th 555, 562 (6th Cir. 2021) (suggesting that such
reason must be “most unusual,” “far from common,” or “havle] little or
no precedent”). By the same token, the plain meaning of “compelling”
suggests that a qualifying reason must be a reason that is both powerful
and convincing. See Webster's Third, supra at 462 (defining
“compelling” as “forcing, impelling, [or] driving [cireumstance]” and as
“tending to convince or convert by or as if by forcefulness of evidence”);
see also Hunter, 12 F.4th at 562.

United States v. Canales-Ramos, 19 F.4th 561, 566-67 (1st Cir. 2021) (alteration in
original). The Court will use this explication to analyze the reasons that Mr. Lara
claims are extraordinary and compelling, justifying his release; specifically, he cites
his youthfulness at the time of the crime, his subordinate role in the crime, a change
from mandatory to discretionary Sentencing Guidelines, and an excessively long

sentence given his involvement in the crime. See ECF No. 1320 at 1-4.

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1, Youthful Offender

When Mr. Lara committed the crime for which the Court sentenced him to life
without parole,? he was a teenager—just eighteen years old. ECF No. 1320 at 5.
Chief Justice Earl Warren’s command from over sixty years ago, made about the
Eighth Amendment,’ rings true here: sentencing courts must consider “the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” Trop v. Dulles,
356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). The sentence necessary to carry out the goals of sentencing—
as set forth by Congress—for a youthful offender has evolved considerably over the
quarter of a century that Mr. Lara has been incarcerated.

While there is no Supreme Court precedent that examines emerging adults
(age eighteen to early twenties®) specifically, there is caselaw surrounding sentencing
emerging adults that acts as a helpful start. The Supreme Court has reminded us
that “[tlhe qualities that distinguish juveniles from adults do not disappear when an

individual turns 18.”!° Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005). “The [Supreme]

7 Under the 1984 Act, Congress ended parole for defendants convicted of
federal crimes committed after November 1, 1987. Pub. L. 100-182, § 2(a), 101 Stat.
1266, 1266. Therefore, his “life-sentence” had the effect of being a “life-without-
parole” sentence.

8 To be clear, the Court is not analyzing whether the life-without-parole
sentence for an eighteen-year-old is unconstitutional in any way. It is merely
reviewing the caselaw to find what the courts have said over time about the
comparative culpability of youthful offenders.

9 See, e.g., Clare Ryan, The Law of Emerging Adults, 97 Wash. U. L. Rev. 11381,
1136-42 (2020) (characterizing emerging adults).

10 “[YJoung adult offenders aged 18-24 are more similar to juveniles than to
adults with respect to their offending, maturation, and life circumstances.” Rolf
Loeber, David P. Farrington & David Petechuk, Bulletin 1: From Juvenile
Delinquency to Young Adult Offending, NAT'L INST. JUST., at 20 (2018), available at
https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles 1/nij/grants/242931.pdf.

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Court affirmed its conclusion [from earlier Eighth Amendment cases] in Roper that
developmental differences in juveniles make them categorically less culpable than
adults. Specifically, it cited their lack of maturity and impulsiveness; limited control
over their environment; increased vulnerability to peer pressure; and unformed
character.” Mariko K. Shitama, Note, Bringing Our Children Back from the Land of
Nod: Why the Eighth Amendment Forbids Condemning Juveniles to Die in Prison for
Accessorial Felony Murder, 65 FLA. L. REV. 818, 815 (2013) (citation omitted). The
United States Supreme Court “requires thatl,] before sentencing a juvenile to life
without parole, the sentencing judge take into account ‘how children are different,
and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime
in prison.” Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 208 (2016) (as revised Jan. 27,
2016) (citing Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 480 (2012)).

Importantly, the Supreme Court has said that: “Life without parole is an
especially harsh punishment for a juvenile. Under this sentencel,] a juvenile offender
will on average serve more years and a greater percentage of his life in prison than
an adult offender.” Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 70 (2010) (as modified July 6,
2010).

From 2005 to 2016, the United States Supreme Court issued several decisions
banning adult sentences for youthful offenders. In Roper, the Supreme Court held

that the death penalty for a person under the age of eighteen violated the Eighth

10

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Amendment.!! 543 U.S. at 578 (reasoning that, because juveniles have lessened
culpability, they are less deserving of the most severe punishments). In so holding,

the Supreme Court explained the following:

Three general differences between juveniles under 18 and adults
demonstrate that juvenile offenders cannot with reliability be classified
‘among the worst offenders. First, as any parent knows and as the
scientific and sociological studies . . . tend to confirm, “[al lack of
maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility are found in
youth more often than in adults and are more understandable among
the young. These qualities often result in impetuous and ill-considered
actions and decisions.” It has been noted that “adolescents are
overrepresented statistically in virtually every category of reckless
behavior.” * * *

The second area of difference is that juveniles are more
vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures,
including peer pressure. * * * This is explained in part by the prevailing
circumstance that juveniles have less control, or less experience with
control, over their own environment. (“[A]ls legal minors, [juveniles] lack
the freedom that adults have to extricate themselves from a
criminogenic setting”).

The third broad difference is that the character of a juvenile is not
as well formed as that of an adult. The personality traits of juveniles
are more transitory, less fixed. * * * (“For most teens, [risky or
antisocial] behaviors are fleeting; they cease with maturity as individual
identity becomes settled. Only a relatively small proportion of
adolescents who experiment in risky or illegal activities develop
entrenched patterns of problem behavior that persist into adulthood”).

Roper, 543 U.S. at 569-70 (citations omitted).
Five years later, in Graham v. Florida, the Supreme Court banned a sentence

of life without parole for juveniles convicted of non-homicide crimes. 560 U.S. 48, 82

11 Karlier, in Thompson v. Oklahoma, the Supreme Court had concluded that
capital punishment for children under the age of sixteen violated the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments. 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988). Many factors explored in those
cases that separate adolescents from adults apply to emerging adults as well.

11

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(2010). In so holding, the Supreme Court clarified its thinking on sentencing

juveniles:

[Dlevelopments in psychology and brain science continue to show
fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds. For
example, parts of the brain involved in behavior control continue to
mature through late adolescence. Juveniles are more capable of change
than are adults, and their actions are less likely to be evidence of
‘irretrievably depraved character” than are the actions of adults. It
remains true that “[flrom a moral standpoint it would be misguided to
equate the failings of a minor with those of an adult, for a greater
possibility exists that a minor’s character deficiencies will be reformed.”
These matters relate to the status of the offenders in question; and it is
relevant to consider next the nature of the offenses to which this harsh

penalty might apply.

Td. at 68-69 (citations omitted).

And two years later in Miller v. Alabama, the Supreme Court banned
mandatory sentences of life without parole for juveniles convicted of homicide
crimes.!2 567 U.S. 460, 489 (2012). The Supreme Court reasoned that:

Most fundamentally, Graham insists that youth matters in determining

the appropriateness of a lifetime of incarceration without the possibility

of parole. In the circumstances there, juvenile status precluded a life-

without-parole sentence, even though an adult could receive it for a

similar crime. And in other contexts as well, the characteristics of

youth, and the way they weaken rationales for punishment, can render
a life-without-parole sentence disproportionate.

Id. at 473 (citation omitted).
In these cases, the Supreme Court relied on multidisciplinary scholarship to

conclude that juveniles who commit even the most serious or violent crimes can

12 Courts may still within their discretion sentence youth to life without parole
in homicide cases, but only after the sentencing court has determined, after a full
hearing, that the youth is permanently incorrigible and incapable of rehabilitation.

See id.

12

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change their behaviors. See, e.g., Graham, 560 U.S. at 68-69 (“[Dlevelopments in
psychology and brain science continue to show fundamental differences between
juvenile and adult minds.”); Roper, 543 U.S. at 569 (noting that, as “sociological
studies .. . tend to confirm, ‘[a] lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of
responsibility are found in youth more often than in adults and are more
understandable among the young”). Because of their developmental immaturity,
impetuousness, and susceptibility to negative peer influences, children who commit
serious crimes are often less culpable than adults, which should be reflected in how
they are sentenced. See, e.g., Roper, 548 U.S. at 569-70 (fleshing out this point). And
because these factors persist in young people generally, these considerations also
apply to an 18-year-old youth. See, e.g., id. (noting the same).

Other district courts have considered the youthful age of the offender as an
element of extraordinary and compelling reasons to grant a sentence reduction. Two
such cases also involved members of the Latin Kings. In United States v. Cruz, the
United States District Court for the District of Connecticut considered a motion for
sentence reduction based on a conviction for multiple Violent Crimes in Aid of
Racketeering and RICO. Crim. Case No. 3:94-CR-112 (JCH), 2021 WL 1326851, at
*1-2 (D. Conn. Apr. 9, 2021). Mr. Cruz was a member of the Latin Kings, who at
eighteen years old and under orders from a gang leader, shot a fellow Latin Kings
member twice in the head from the rear passenger seat of acar. /d. at *1. The court
considered the time served by Mr. Cruz thus far (about twenty-five years), his youth

at the time of the offense, and his extraordinary rehabilitation. /d. at *7-8. A

13

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psychological expert testified that late adolescents suffer from “problems with
impulse control and self-regulation and heightened sensation-seeking, which would
make them in those respects more similar to somewhat younger people than to older
people.” Jd. at *6 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted). “The
scientific evidence therefore demonstrates that 18-year-olds display -similar
characteristics of immaturity and impulsivity as juveniles under the age of 18.” Jd.
The court found that “because 18-year-olds are still developing in terms of maturity,
impulse control, ability to resist peer pressure, and character, they are less than fully
blameworthy for criminal conduct.” Jd. at *7. So, the court granted Mr. Cruz’s Motion
for a Sentence Reduction. /d. at *15.

In United States v. Rios, the court had sentenced Hector Luis Rios, a twenty-
seven-year-old member of the Latin Kings with six prior felony convictions, to three
concurrent terms of life imprisonment for a “cold-blooded murder.” Crim.
No. 3:94CR112 (JBA), 2020 WL 7246440, at *1, 3 (D. Conn. Dec. 8, 2020) (“Mr. Rios
planned this murder, acting not on impulse or on orders from others, but rather with
the hard heart of a calculated killer... .”). But the court later granted Mr. Rios’
motion for sentence reduction after he served twenty-six years of his life sentence.
Id. at *6. It found that his continued risk to the public, if released, appeared to be
markedly reduced given that recidivism declines with age. Jd. at *4. The court began
by pointing out that “the average sentence imposed for murder is 255 months [about

22 years].” Jd. The court then noted that “other defendants convicted of both capital

14

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and other violent crimes and sentenced to life have been released by district courts.” 18
Td. at *5.

In United States v. Ramsay, a jury convicted Mr. Ramsay of murder in aid of
racketeering for shooting into a crowd as part of a gang dispute. 538 F. Supp. 3d 407,
411-12 (S.D.N.Y. 2021). The United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York sentenced Mr. Ramsay—who was eighteen years old when he committed
the crime—to life in prison. Jd. at 409-11. But the court later considered the relative
immaturity, susceptibility, salvageability, and dependability of adolescent
defendants as part of the extraordinary and compelling reasons that called for a
sentence reduction. See id. at 417-23. Looking at dependability (.e., the ability to be
trustworthy or reliable), the court found that adolescents lack the autonomy granted

to adults. See id. at 422-23. Once teenagers reach legal adulthood at eighteen, most

13 The Court cited to the following extensive list of cases in support of its

decision:
See United States v. Fisher, 2020 WL 5992340 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 2020)
(reducing a life sentence for involvement with a violent narcotics ring to
time-served in light of defendant’s admirable rehabilitation and the
COVID-19 pandemic); United States v. Tidwell, No. CR 94-3538, 2020
WL 4504448, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 5, 2020) (releasing a man serving a
life sentence for, among other things, two counts of murder in
furtherance of a continuing criminal enterprise); United States v.
Curtis, 2020 WL 1935543, at *1 (D.D.C. April 22, 2020) (releasing
defendant under § 3582(c)(1)(A) despite his six concurrent terms of life
for operation of a sex-trafficking ring involving minors); United States
v. Williams, 2020 WL 1751545, at *3 (N.D. Fla. Apr. 1, 2020) (granting
release and reducing a life sentence for conviction of armed robbery
because defendant’s health concerns were serious enough that “an
outbreak of COVID-19 in [Defendant's] facility would likely have fatal
consequences for him.”

Id, at *5.

15

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emerging adults still rely on caregivers for financial and emotional support. See id.
And often they are still in high school. Turning to salvageability, the court
emphasized the evolving character of emerging adults leading to a higher likelihood
of reformation. Jd at 422. Likewise, most emerging adults who have committed
crimes tend to cease that behavior as they age. Jd The Court granted that
defendant’s motion for sentence reduction. Jd. at 429.

Over the last two decades, scientists, society, and the courts have all recognized
that youthful offenders have a different level of culpability than do adult offenders.
This realization is especially true when the youthful offender receives an irrevocable
sentence of life imprisonment. As the Tennessee Supreme Court reminded us in
striking down a sentence for a youthful offender, “[ylouth matters in sentencing,” and
“children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing.”

Tennessee v. Booker, 656 S.W.3d 49, 60, 63 (Tenn. 2022) (internal quotation marks

omitted) (citation omitted).

14 See also Michael T. Hamilton, Opening the Safety Valve: A Second Look at
Compassionate Release Under the First Step Act, 90 FORDHAM L. REV. 17438, 1766
(2022) (citations omitted)

At least three circuit courts—the Second, Fourth, and Tenth—have

indicated that a defendant’s relative youth at the time of an offense may

contribute to a finding of extraordinary and compelling circumstances.

District courts in a number of other circuits have reached the same

conclusion. Few courts, however, have addressed exactly how such a

factor should be considered. A recent decision from the Southern

District of New York offers perhaps the most in-depth analysis of how—

and why—an offender’s youth matters to the § 3582(c)(1)(A) inquiry. In

United States v. Ramsay, Judge Jed S. Rakoff found that the defendant’s

youth at the time of the offense, in combination with other reasons,

amounted to extraordinary and compelling reasons for release.

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Mr. Lara was eighteen years old when he committed the crime. ECF No. 1320
atl. In the past two decades, science, medicine, and legal thought have all
underscored that youthful offenders are less culpable than older adults because their
brains are less developed in critical areas. This new professional consensus and all
the reasons for which courts impose sentences for criminal behavior support a less-
than-life-sentence when it involves a youthful offender. Mr. Lara’s youth at the time
he committed the crime is an extraordinary and compelling reason to consider a
sentence reduction.

2. Non-Trigger Felony Murder

The jury acquitted Mr. Lara of both Count One (RICO, which included the
murder of Temujin Vandergroen) and Count Two (Conspiracy to Commit
Racketeering). See ECF Nos. 731, 904 at 1 (“The defendant has been found not guilty
on count(s) 1, 2, 3[,] and 10”). And on the Act of Racketeering One (which included
conspiracy to murder and rob Temujin Vandergroen), the jury found that the
Government did not prove that a racketeering act had occurred. ECF No. 781 at 1.

For the same reasons that the caselaw supports sentencing emerging adults
differently in general, courts should be doubly concerned with sentencing emerging
adults based on conduct that they did not commit—even though the law otherwise
allows such a practice. See, e.g., Nazgol Ghandnoosh, Emma Stammen & Connie
Budaci, Felony Murder: An On-Ramp for Extreme Sentencing, SENT’G PROJECT, at 14
(2022) (“Emerging adults experience continued psychosocial development, and have

many of the same cognitive vulnerabilities as minors that diminish their culpability.

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Based on these similarities, emerging adults should be included in measures that
seek to end or restrict the application of the felony murder rule to young people.”).

In Graham, the Supreme Court held that juvenile defendants who did not kill
or intend to kill have a “twice diminished moral culpability” (due to their age and not
having killed) and are therefore less deserving of extreme punishment. Graham, 560
U.S. at 69. The Supreme Court “recognized that defendants who do not kill, intend
to kill, or foresee that life will be taken are categorically less deserving of the most
serious forms of punishment than are murderers.” Jd. (citing Kennedy v. Louisiana,
554 U.S. 407, 419 (2008); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987); HEnmund v. Florida,
458 U.S. 782 (1982); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).

There are also many scholars—supported by ample caselaw from across the
country—who assert that felony-murder convictions should not result in a sentence
of life without parole.!5 Arrington v. State, 118 So. 3d 20, 26 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 2012),

review denied, 104 So. 3d 1087 (Fla. 2012) (“[S]tatutorily mandated life-without-

15 See also, e.g, Ghandnoosh, Stammen & Budaci, supra, at 8 (citations
omitted)

Foreign jurisdictions increasingly recognize felony murder laws
as violating the fundamental principles of justice and of proportionality.
The United Kingdom, where the felony murder rule originated and
subsequently spread to other Commonwealth countries and the United
States, abolished felony murder starting as early as 1957. Other
countries followed suit in the 1960s, including the Republic of Ireland,
Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, and Tuvalu. In 1990, the Canadian
Supreme Court also eliminated felony murder, underscoring “the
principle of fundamental justice that subjective foresight of death is
required before a conviction for murder can be sustained,” which, in the
Court’s opinion, is necessary to “maintain a proportionality between the
stigma and punishment attached to a murder conviction and the moral
blameworthiness of the offender.”

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parole sentence for felony murder may lead to grossly disproportionate sentences in
some cases.”); Kills On Top v. State, 928 P.2d 182 (Mont. 1996) (imposition of death
sentence based on felony murder in this defendant’s case was disproportionate);
Emily C. Keller, Constitutional Sentences for Juveniles Convicted of Felony Murder
In the Wake of Roper, Graham & J.D.B., 11 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 297, 302-06, 315-16
(2012); Shitama, supra, at 840-48 (2013); Richard W. Garnett, Depravity Thrice
Removed: Using the “Heinous, Cruel, or Depraved” Factor to Aggravate Convictions
of Nontriggermen Accomplices in Capital Cases, 103 Yale L.J. 2471, 2493-99 (1994);
Richard A. Rosen, Melony Murder and the Highth Amendment Jurisprudence of
Death, 31 B.C. L. REV. 1103, 1118-17 (1990); Lily Kling, Note, Constitutionalizing the
Death Penalty for Accomplices to Felony Murder, 26 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 468, 463-64,
482 (1988); Lynn D. Wittenbrink, Note, Overstepping Precedent? Tison v. Arizona
Imposes the Death Penalty on Felony Murder Accomplices, 66 N.C. L. REV. 817, 833-
36 (1988).

In a felony-murder case, the law’s transfer of intent from the felony that was
committed by that defendant to the murder that was not committed by that defendant
is particularly inappropriate for a minor because “the ability to consider the full
consequences of a course of action and to adjust one’s conduct accordingly is precisely
what we know juveniles lack capacity to do effectively.” Miller, 567 U.S. at 492
(Breyer, J., concurring). As one scholar artfully phrased the issue:

Few legal doctrines have been as maligned and yet have shown as great

a resiliency as the felony-murder rule. Criticism of the rule constitutes

a lexicon of everything that scholars and jurists can find wrong with a
legal doctrine: it has been described as “astonishing” and “monstrous,”

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an unsupportable “legal fiction,” “an unsightly wart on the skin of the
criminal law,” and as an “anachronistic remnant” that has “no logical or

practical basis for existence in modern law.”

Nelson E. Roth & Scott E. Sundby, The Felony-Murder Rule: A Doctrine at
Constitutional Crossroads, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 446, 446 (1985) (citations omitted).

And as another commentator noted:

Because of its egregious disregard of some of the most basic principles
of criminal justice, it is an understatement to say that the felony-murder
rule “is a much-condemned doctrine.” Among its most
compelling criticisms are the arguments that both its deterrent and
retributive justifications fail, and that because it seeks to punish an
offender for harm he did not intend, it inevitably results in
disproportionate punishment. And yet almost every state prosecutes
both children and adults for felony murder.

Shitama, supra, at 843-844 (citations omitted).

Mr. Lara did not bring the gun into the car when George Perry shot and killed
Mr. Vandergroen. See Lara, 181 F.3d at 201 (noting that Mr. Perry brought the gun
into the car). And it is undisputed that Mr. Lara did not pull the trigger that killed
Mr. Vandergroen. See ECF No. 958 at 5-6. Mr. Perry was the shooter and trigger

person. Postconviction Order V at *1. The First Circuit described Mr. Lara and Mr.

Perry’s involvement as follows:

[Perry] asked Lara to accompany him while he relieved Vandergroen of
his Ford Escort (which was adorned with tire rims that Perry fancied).
** * The two men asked Vandergroen to take a ride with them. When
he agreed, Perry (who had brought along a sawed-off shotgun) sat
behind Vandergroen in the car, while Lara sat in the front passenger
seat. At Perry’s request, Vandergroen drove to a deserted neighborhood.
Perry then told Vandergroen to slow or stop the vehicle, and, when
Vandergroen complied, Perry shot him. Perry and Lara shoved
Vandergroen’s body into the street and returned to a Latin King
hangout, where they were seen with blood and brain matter on their
_ clothing. The two later burned and abandoned the car. * * * There were

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conflicting accounts of Lara’s participation in the carjacking, and the

jury was free to decide which, if any, to believe. * * * [Tlhe jury acquitted

Lara, but convicted Perry, on several counts, including the charge of

using or carrying a firearm during the Vandergroen carjacking.
Lara, 181 F.3d at 201-02.

Importantly, the jury found Mr. Lara not guilty of the murder of Mr.
Vandergroen and not guilty of any violent crime in aid of racketeering. See ECF
Nos. 731, 904. The Government conceded that “[Mr.] Lara was only in it for robbery.”
ECF No. 958 at 5-6.

The Court sentenced both Mr. Perry and Mr. Lara to life without parole despite
the differences in their culpability. See Zara, 181 F.3d at190. It is an
understatement to say that Mr. Perry and Mr. Lara have vastly distinct levels of
culpability for the murder of Temujin Vandergroen. This is a case in which a
“mandatory sentence of natural life in prison with no possibility of parole grossly
distorts the factual realities of thlis] case and does not accurately represent
defendant's personal culpability such that it shocks the moral sense of the
community.” Bear Cloud v. State, 334 P.3d 132, 146 n. 18 (Wyo. 2014) Gnternal
quotation marks omitted) (citing People v. Miller, 781 N.E.2d 300 (Ill. 2002)). That
Mr. Lara did not murder Mr. Vandergroen (and that he received the same sentence
as the person who did) is another extraordinary and compelling reason to consider a
sentence reduction.

3. Length of the Original Sentence

“Extreme sentences imprison people who have aged out of their crime-prone

years. The age-crime curve is a longstanding and well-tested concept in criminology,

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depicting the proportions of individuals in various age groups who are engaged in
criminalized activity.” Ghandnoosh, Stammen & Budaci, supra, at 7 (citing Rolf
Loeber & David Farrington, Age-Crime Curve, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIMINOLOGY
AND CRIM. JUST. 12-18 (Bruinsma & D. Weisburd Ed. 2014)). “Because people
generally age out of crime, those who have been imprisoned for violent crimes and

have served lengthy sentences are among the least likely to recidivate when released

from prison.” Jd.

Several commentators and scholars over time have criticized sentences of life
without parole both in the United States and abroad. To elucidate these criticisms,

consider these examples:

Norway is best known—in some circles notorious—for capping the
maximum sentence for any crime at twenty-one years. That includes
the case of Anders Breivik, convicted for the murder of sixty-nine young
people and eight others at a Workers’ Youth League summer camp in
2011. Germany outlawed LWOP [life without parole] in 1977. The
Federal Constitutional Court argued that “rehabilitation is
constitutionally required in any community that establishes human
dignity as its centerpiece’—which the German constitution does. Thus,
“a humane enforcement of life imprisonment is possible only when the
prisoner is given a concrete and realistically attainable chance to regain
his freedom....” In 2013, the European Court of Human Rights decided
that LWOP violated Article 3 of the European Convention of Human
Rights, which prohibits “inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment.”

Judith Lichtenberg, Against Life Without Parole, 11 WASH. U. JURIS. REV. 39, 48-44

(2018).
Long sentences also do not necessarily deter crime effectively. As Daniel
Nagin—a professor at Carnegie Mellon University and a leading national expert on

deterrence—has written: “Increases in already long prison sentences, say from 20

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years to life, do not have material deterrent effects on crime.” Daniel S. Nagin, Guest
Post: Reduce Prison Populations by Reducing Life Sentences, WASHINGTON Post
(Mar. 21, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/crime-law/2019/03/21/guest-post-
reduce-prison-populations-by-reducing:life-sentences/; see also Steven N. Durlauf &
Daniel S. Nagin, Jmprisonment and Crime: Can Both Be Reduced?, CRIMINOLOGY &
PuB. PoL’y, Vol 10(1), at 13-15 (2011) (concluding that “[t]he marginal deterrent effect
of increasing already lengthy prison sentences is modest at best”).

Additionally, courts in other districts have found that unusually long sentences
by today’s standards could be an “extraordinary and compelling” reason to reduce a
sentence. See, e.g., United States v. Urkevich, 8:08CR87, 2019 WL 6037391, at *2,
*4 (D. Neb. Nov. 14, 2019) (the sentence imposed is much longer than the sentence
he likely would have received under the law as it now exists); United States v. Cantu-
Rivera, Cr. No. H-89-204, 2019 WL 2578272, at *2 (S.D. Tex. June 24, 2019) (court
factored in the lower sentence under changed sentencing policy); United States v.
Brown, 411 F. Supp. 3d 446, 452 (S.D. Iowa 2019), amended on reconsideration, 457
F. Supp. 3d 691 (S.D. Iowa 2020) (defendant faced a sentence far longer than he would
ever receive under modern law).

In fiscal year 2021 (the most recent year for which this source provides data),
the median federal sentence for murder was 231 months (about nineteen years), and
in the First Circuit it was 194 months (about sixteen years). Distribution of Sentence
Length, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, https://iida.ussc.gov/analytics/saw.dll?Dashboard

(last accessed Feb. 10, 2023). Mr. Lara’s sentence of life is disproportionate to the

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median sentence for murder in this country and in this Circuit. Life without parole
is an extreme sentence—the harshest sentence a court can impose short of death. Mr.
Lara’s excessively long sentence is one more extraordinary and compelling reason to
consider a sentence reduction.
4, Changed Circumstances: Guidelines No Longer Mandatory

Consistent with the then-mandatory Sentencing Guidelines, the Court
sentenced Mr. Lara to life in 1997. Postconviction Order V at *1. In 2005, the United
States Supreme Court ruled that district courts are empowered, at their discretion,
to consider how a defendant’s circumstances may call for imposing a sentence either
above or below the guideline range. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 248-
538, 264-65 (2005). In other words, following Booker, the Sentencing Guidelines are
no longer mandatory. Jd (Although, a sentence must still follow any statutory
requirements.) See id. In sentencing Mr. Lara, the Court believed that it could not
have considered a sentence outside life. ECF No. 958 at 14-16 (denying Mr. Lara’s
motion to apply a downward departure under U.S.S.G. § 2 A. 1.1, Application Note
2(B)). It is now proper for the Court to consider the fact that the guidelines have
changed—from mandatory to discretionary—in deciding whether to grant Mr. Lara
a sentence reduction. S. Rep. No. 98-225 at 121 (noting the “the availability of specific
review and reduction of a term of imprisonment * * * and to respond to changes in
the guidelines.”). Changed Sentencing Guidelines serve as another extraordinary

and compelling reason to consider a sentence reduction.

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&. Rehabilitation

Rehabilitation alone cannot be a basis for granting a sentence reduction. 28
U.S.C. § 994(t) “Rehabilitation of the defendant alone shall not be considered an
extraordinary and compelling reason.”). But it can be an element that the Court
considers in its “holistic review to determine whether the individualized
circumstances, taken in the aggregate,” present extraordinary and compelling
reasons to grant a sentence reduction. 7renk/ler, 47 F.4th at 47.

Mr. Lara has made significant strides in bettering himself through education,
career development, and treatment. See, eg., ECF No. 1320 at 27-28 (bulleting
several of Mr. Lara’s key accomplishments). Mr. Lara has completed 9,000 hours of
Bureau of Prison (“BOP”) programming, including 8,000 hours of training as a dental
lab technician and an added 2,000 hours of work as a dental lab technician. ECF
No. 1320 at 42. He has worked for years in prison food services, where he has
received strong evaluations. Jd. Mr. Lara also has authored several books. His two
children’s books are titled: Long Live Larry the Lizard (ECF No. 1320-15) and The
Central Park Zoo (ECF No. 1320-16). His business-related book is titled: Momentum
Trading (ECF No. 1320-17). And his self-help book is titled: J Believe Therefore [Am
(ECF No. 1329-18), which recounts the paradigm shift that Mr. Lara underwent
while incarcerated.

Since 2019, Mr. Lara has been an active participant in the BOP’s “Challenge
Program” at United States Penitentiary Pollock, which serves as “a modified

therapeutic community” that “is intended for men interested in making positive

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lifestyle changes.” ECF No. 1320-20 at 1. He joined the program “to learn how to be
part of a community,” and “to work on sobriety as not to relapse.” Jd. at 1-2.

Mr. Lara also states that he has renounced his membership in the Latin Kings.
His brief notes:

Unlike many young men who join gangs upon entering prison, Mr. Lara

did the opposite—he renounced his Latin Kings membership 20 years

ago. He even went as far as to burn a Latin Kings tattoo off his forearm

with a scorching hot clothes iron (leaving an extensive scar) to prove to

all who questioned his status that he was no longer affiliated with the

_ Latin Kings. Doing so put him at great physical peril in the prison in

which he was held at the time because of its heavy Latin Kings presence.
ECF No. 1320 at 20 (citations omitted). Although the Government conveys some
skepticism of Mr. Lara’s renunciation, it does not dispute that there is no sign that
he has been involved in any Latin Kings activity while in prison in the last 20 years.

Over his twenty-eight years of incarceration, the Government describes Mr.
Lara’s behavior as “inconsistent,” pointing to nineteen disciplinary infractions over
twenty-three years, starting in 1995 and ending in 2018. ECF No. 1335 at 12. A
review of the disciplinary matters shows that most appear to have arisen from Mr.
Lara’s drug addiction and his initial difficulties acclimating to a life in prison. See
ECF No. 13840 at 19-20. Mr. Lara has been discipline-free since 2018, the date on

which he became sober. See id. at 20. And he readily admitted to his shortcomings

in many of the disciplinary hearings.!® See, eg. ECF No. 1832-1 at 4, 8, 11, 14

16 Other than the drug and alcohol issues, Mr. Lara’s disciplinary charges
included possession of an adapter for an MP3 player, possessing a hazardous tool,
“tattooing or self-mutilating,” and refusing to obey an order. See ECF No. 1882-1

at 3-7.

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(internal quotation marks omitted) (stating: “I did it [assaulted another inmate over
eight years ago]”; “I am an addict and I was using. I am guilty;” “Yes I had it, I messed
up;” and “Yes I messed up, it is mine. I was drinking a little to celebrate.”).

The Government further cites to a litany of conduct that shows that Mr. Lara
has not been rehabilitated. See ECF No. 1335 at 11-18 (detailing conduct). Among
others, the Government cites these examples: Mr. Lara has not gone through the
formal BOP process for exiting a gang; his evaluations from the Challenge Program
demonstrate that he would not have the social skills necessary for life outside prison;
he appears to have plagiarized an existing text on financial analysis in writing his
own financial advice book; and BOP has not, at any point, transferred him to a lower
security prison facility as a “reward” for his “rehabilitative progress.” Jd. In short,
the Government argues that Mr. Lara’s “rehabilitation is far from complete.” Jd. at 1.

But nowhere does the law require complete rehabilitation—if such a concept
even exists. Rehabilitation is a process that takes time and is often met with bumps
along the road. Mr. Lara is still human; prison has not made him perfect. Further,
many of the Government’s concerns have already been assuaged or mitigated by the
above evidence that Mr. Lara has proffered. Even considering the Government’s
contentions, the Court finds that the rehabilitation that Mr. Lara achieved in prison
is extraordinary and compelling (especially considering that Mr. Lara undertook
these rehabilitative efforts expecting that he would still be serving a life sentence).

Because rehabilitation is only one reason—and cannot be the only reason—the Court

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further finds that Mr. Lara’s rehabilitative efforts and successes contribute to the
extraordinary and compelling reasons that may justify reducing his sentence.
6. Conclusion on Extraordinary and Compelling Factors

Times have changed in how society and the law think about incarceration.
This change largely comes from the recent focus on the fact that the United States
maintains a grossly disproportionate percentage of the world’s incarcerated
population compared to its percentage of the world’s total population. See United
States v. Polouizzi, 760 F. Supp. 2d 284, 285-86 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (citing, inter alia,
Glenn C. Loury & Bruce Western, Zhe Challenge of Mass Incarceration in America,
in DAEDALUS: J. OF AM. ACAD. OF ARTS AND SCIS. (2010)) (‘With roughly 5 percent of
the world's population, the United States currently confines about 25 percent of the
world’s prison inmates.”).

Mr. Lara’s case is replete with extraordinary and compelling reasons that
merit reduction of his 1997 life-without-parole sentence. Mr. Lara was a teenager
when he committed the crime, he was not the trigger person, his sentence was not
proportional to the others who were more culpable, his sentence was unusually long,
and he has shown commendable rehabilitation since being incarcerated. The unique
aspects of his life at the time the Court sentenced him and the changes in thought
that have taken place during the last quarter of a century in the law and society about
what is sufficient, but not more than necessary to accomplish the sentencing goals

compels the Court to grant the request to modify his sentence.

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The Court now turns to the sentencing factors to decide what the proper
sentence should be, considering Mr. Lara’s current circumstances.

B. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) Sentencing Factors

Once the Court finds extraordinary and compelling reasons to reduce a
sentence, it must then consider what the appropriate sentence is under the Section
35538(a) factors. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Congress has instructed the courts to
impose a sentence that is “sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to carry out the
purposes of sentencing. Jd. § 3553(a). The purposes of sentencing are familiar to all,
so the Court summarizes them as requiring a court to consider the following: the
“nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the
defendant;” respect for the law and punishment; individual and public deterrence;
rehabilitation;!’ and avoidance of unwanted discrepancies. Jd.

1. History and Characteristics of the Defendant

The Court begins with Mr. Lara’s history and characteristics. Mr. Lara did not
grow up in a supportive environment. See Presentence Investigation Report of
Giovanni Lara at 11-12. He had many adverse childhood experiences. See, e.g., id.
at 12 (“Because of the absence of his father, [Mr. Lara’s] mother worked two jobs to
support her only son.”). In eighth grade, Mr. Lara “had all failing grades.”18 Jd. At

seventeen, Mr. Lara’s behavior was so disruptive that his mother went to the police

17 Because the Court has already evaluated Mr. Lara’s rehabilitation, it need
not retread that ground here. See supra Part IV.A.5. Suffice it to say that Mr. Lara
has made extraordinary efforts toward rehabilitating himself.

18 Mr. Lara obtained his High School Equivalency Diploma while incarcerated.

ECF No. 1320 at 70.

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to file a disobedient petition. Jd. at 12. That year, Mr. Lara suffered trauma when
he was shot twice in his right calf, leaving his left ankle scarred. Jd. At an early age,
My. Lara began regularly smoking cannabis, and he often consumed large amounts
of alcohol. Jd. He never received treatment for his substance addictions. Jd. His
criminal activity began as early as fifteen when he stole a car, followed by a series of
petty larceny crimes. Jd. at 8-11. At age seventeen, he pleaded no/o contendere to
possession of a controlled substance, which was followed by pleading nolo contendere
to carrying a pistol without a license. Jd. at 9. And the next year he also pleaded nolo
contendere to vandalism. Jd. at 10. He received a jail sentence (of two years) for the
charge of carrying a pistol without a license. Jd. at 9.

With these facts as a backdrop, Mr. Lara joined the Latin Kings when he was
a teenager. /d. As one commentator has noted:

Today, a host of reasons push many young men of color toward
gang life. The most significant risk factor is socioeconomic status, which
often manifests in the form of almost complete joblessness.

K*K*

A variety of other factors also contribute to gang membership.
Youth not only face joblessness, but they also experience “family
disorganization and lack of parental figures in the home.” Specifically,
the environment in which these young people are socialized carries
many risk factors: presence of drugs and guns, homes broken by
parental separation and drug use, decreased educational drive, low self:
esteem and, perhaps most importantly, “inconsistency of policing
practices” that “create[s] ‘an atmosphere of danger on the streets.”
These risks are underscored by a lack of role models to help youth avoid
the pitfalls of gang life and, consequently, many turn to gangs to fill this
void.

Kathryn Kizer, Behind the Guise of Gang Membership: Ending the Unjust

Criminalization, 5 DEPAUL J. Soc. JUST. 333, 343-45 (2012) (citations omitted).

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And as the United States Department of Justice has described:
Youth reported the following reasons for joining a gang, in the order of
descending importance [citation omitted]: For protection. For fun. For
respect. For money. Because a friend was in the gang. These are the
typical gang attractions that youth acknowledge. Of these reasons,

youth most commonly join gangs for the safety they believe the gang
provides.

James C. Howell, Gang Prevention: An Overview of Research and Programs, OFF.
Juv. JUST. DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEp’T JuST., at 4 (Dec. 2010).

Mr. Lara was a troubled youth who had suffered from gun violence and had
begun on a path of addiction at the time he committed this crime. His decision to join
a gang at a youthful age, although foolhardy, also reflects societal forces much bigger
than him. Given what the scholarship reports and what the law dictates, nothing in
Mr. Lara’s history suggests a need for him to serve more than the 28 years he has
already been imprisoned.

2 Nature and Circumstances of the Crime

The Court next turns to the nature and the circumstances of the crime. As Mr.
Lara now recognizes, “the nature and circumstances of his offenses were objectively
deplorable and deserving of harsh condemnation.” ECF No. 1840 at 25. A young
person, Temujin Vandergroen, needlessly lost his life and his family will forever live
with the horrors of that tragedy. See ECF No. 1835 at 18-19 (describing the family’s
pain and suffering). However, the jury found Mr. Lara not guilty of the murder of
Mr. Vandergroen. See ECF Nos. 731, 904. It did find him guilty of carjacking, the
crime that resulted in the death of Mr. Vandergroen. Postconviction Order V at *1.

But the evidence at trial showed that Mr. Lara did not bring the gun into the car. See

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Lara, 181 F.3d at 201 (noting that it was Mr. Perry who had brought the gun into the
vehicle). There is no evidence that Mr. Lara knew Mr. Perry brought the gun into
the car. Mr. Lara did not pull the trigger. See zd. While he took part in the crime
that resulted in Mr. Vandergroen’s death, Mr. Lara did not perpetrate the murder
itself. See zd, Accordingly, Mr. Lara is not as culpable for an offense that the jury
found he did not commit. And as the Court explains in the following section, twenty-
eight years imprisonment is sufficient punishment for the crimes of which the jury
did find Mr. Lara guilty.

3. Respect for the Laws Punishment and Individual and Public
Deterrence

Twenty-eight years spent in high-security federal prisons is a severe
punishment, as it should be in this case. The evidence shows that twenty-eight years
in prison for Mr. Lara will have the necessary deterrent effect. First, as another
district court has noted, “[tlhe positive correlation between age and recidivlilsm is
impossible to deny.” United States v. Nellum, No. 2:04-CR-30-PS, 2005 WL 3000738,
at *3 (N.D. Ind. Feb. 3, 2005); see also Measuring Recidivism: The Criminal History
Computation of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, U.S. SENT’G COMMM’N, at 12
(2004) (“Recidivism rates decline relatively consistently as age increases.”). Mr. Lara
is now forty-seven years old. Additionally, as one scholar has noted,

one study shows that those released from life sentences were “less than

one-third as likely as all released offenders to be rearrested within three

years of release from prison.” The reason for this seemingly paradoxical

fact may be at least partly that those released had already served long

sentences and were no longer young. In any case, from the point of view
of both specific deterrence and incapacitation, LWOP sentences make

little sense.

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Lichtenberg, supra, at 48 (citations omitted). Although Mr. Lara’s disciplinary record
while incarcerated has not been perfect, his past “infractions are wholly inconsistent
with his character as reported by his family, fellow inmatesl,] and even the BOP staff
who wrote about his involvement with and growth because of his participation in the
‘Challenge Program.” ECF No. 13820 at 63.

Moreover, the Court need only find that Mr. Lara’s term of imprisonment to
date is sufficient (or determine that a sentence of a particular number of years would
be sufficient were it not to ultimately find that twenty-eight years is a sufficient
sentence for Mr. Lara). See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). And several cases that involve even
more serious crimes support this conclusion. See, e.g., United States v. Perez, Crim.
No. 3:02CR7 (JBA), 2021 WL 837425, at *1 (D. Conn. Mar. 4, 2021) (reducing a life
sentence to time served for a defendant whom the jury found guilty of four crimes
that related to a murder); United States v. Fisher, 493 F. Supp. 3d 231, 232-36
(S.D.N.Y. 2020) (reducing a life sentence to time served for a defendant whom the
jury convicted of four murders, among various other crimes); United States v. Tidwell,
A76 F. Supp. 3d 66, 68 (E.D. Pa. 2020) (reducing a life sentence to time served for a
defendant who pleaded guilty to two counts of murder, among various other crimes).
And as previously shown, two different federal judges in Connecticut released former
Latin King members after they served about twenty-five years in prison. See United

States v. Cruz and United States v. Rios, supra, Part IV.A.1.

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Based on the earlier cases and scholarship discussed, the Court finds that a
prison term of twenty-eight years in Mr. Lara’s case will engender respect for the law
and serve as sufficient deterrence for both Mr. Lara and the public.
4, Avoidance of Unwanted Discrepancies
When sentencing a defendant, a court must “avoid unwarranted sentence
disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of
similar conduct.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). Over the past couple of decades, the First
Circuit has considered the sentencing of defendants involved in carjackings that
precipitated deaths. The Court highlights a couple of examples here. In United
States v. Rodriguez-Adorno, the First Circuit upheld a 180-month (fifteen years)
sentence for a defendant who took part in a carjacking that precipitated a murder.
695 F.3d 32, 37 (1st Cir. 2012). In United States v. Ubiles-Rosario, the First Circuit
upheld a 365-month (almost thirty and a half years) sentence for a defendant who
committed a murder while taking part in a carjacking (although he did not
specifically plead guilty to a murder count). 867 F.3d 277, 280 (1st Cir. 2017).
Notably in Ubiles-Roasario, the other defendant (whose case was not at issue in the
appeal) who took part in the carjacking but did not commit the murder received a
much lower sentence of 144 months (twelve years). Jd. at 291.
Recent statistics confirm that these cited cases are not anomalies. As
mentioned, in fiscal year 2021, the median federal sentence for murder was 231
months (about nineteen years), and in the First Circuit it was 194 months (about

sixteen years). Distribution of Sentence Length, supra Part IV.A.4. Mr. Lara has

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thus already served more time in prison than the average federal murder sentence
from fiscal year 2021. And comparable First Circuit cases have upheld much more
lenient sentences. Given these similarly situated (and at least one not-so-similarly
situated) cases, the Court would be propagating a sentencing discrepancy by allowing
Mr. Lara to continue to serve the rest of his term of life imprisonment.

In response, the Government points to qualitative differences between this
case and others when the court chose a more lenient sentence and urges that this
Court refrain from relying too heavily on statistics. ECF No. 13835 at 19-22. But the
Court only uses statistics as one relevant source of information. And the Government
has provided no justification to disclaim any reliance on statistics. The Government’s
argument more so seems to focus on the fact that Mr. Lara did not plead guilty and
that Mr. Lara’s life sentence was not necessarily mandatory at the time that it was
handed down. /d. Even accepting arguendo that defendants who plead guilty should
be sentenced more leniently, the Court is troubled by the notion that an eighteen-
year-old defendant should be sentenced to die behind bars because that defendant
was not then ready to accept responsibility and exercised the Sixth Amendment right
to trial by jury. Otherwise, the biggest qualitative difference raised by the
Government appears to be a finding by the trial judge that Mr. Lara perjured himself.
ECF No. 1335 at 3 (citing ECF No. 955 at 3-5, 13-14). The Court reiterates that an
added act like committing perjury—although serious—is not significant enough in
this case to merit a sentence over twenty-eight years, and certainly not significant

enough to, even partially, justify a life sentence. As for the other qualitative

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differences that the Government highlights, the Court has discussed these issues at
length in earlier sections of this opinion and finds that none of them is significant
enough to warrant a life sentence. See supra Part IV.A. Accordingly, the Court
concludes that it would be propagating a sentencing disparity by allowing Mr. Lara
to continue to serve his sentence of life imprisonment.
&. Conclusion on the 18 U.S.C. § 8553(a) Sentencing Factors

All the Section 3553(a) sentencing factors support reducing Mr. Lara’s
sentence to the twenty-eight years that he has served. Mr. Lara’s background and
the nature and circumstances of the criminal conduct do not suggest a need for him
to serve further time in prison. Mr. Lara has shown growth and rehabilitation during
his time in prison. And given the current state of sentencing, the Court would be
creating a serious sentencing discrepancy by allowing Mr. Lara to continue to serve
his life sentence. The Court thus finds that a sentence of time served would
accomplish the statutory sentencing objectives in Mr. Lara’s case.

Vv. CONCLUSION

A life sentence without parole (predicated on felony murder) for a teenager
whom the jury acquitted of the murder is unwarranted by today’s standards. The
Court has “conductled] a holistic review to determine whether the individualized
circumstances, taken together, present an ‘extraordinary and compelling’ reason to
grant” the relief. United States v. Trenkler, 47 F.4th 42, 47 (1st Cir. 2022).

Extraordinary and compelling reasons support reducing Mr. Lara’s sentence.

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In considering this matter, the Court does not forget what acts were
committed in the past. It is not lost on the Court that a young person was
murdered in cold blood. This Court's only function here is to apply the law to the
facts. And this Court finds that the facts of Mr. Lara's case meet the legal standard
for a sentence reduction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(l)(A), nothing more.
The Court GRANTS Mr. Lara's Motion for a Sentence Reduction (ECF No.
1320) and reduces his sentence to time served on Count 8, to be followed by five years
of supervised release as to Count 8 and three years of supervised release as to Count
9, to run concurrent to the term of supervised release imposed as to Count 8.
In addition to the standard conditions of supervised release, the following
special conditions are also ordered. Mr. Lara shall:
(1) live at a Residential Reentry Center, preferably the Houston House in
Pawtucket, Rhode Island, for the first 6 months of supervised release.
While at the facility, Mr. Lara must comply with all its policies, procedures,
and regulations;
(2) participate in a program of mental health treatment, as directed and
approved by the Probation Office;
(3) participate in a program of substance use treatment (inpatient or
outpatient), as directed and approved by the Probation Office;
(4) participate in a program of substance use testing (up to 72 drug tests per
year), as directed and approved by the Probation Office;
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(5) participate in a manualized behavioral program, as directed by the
Probation Office. Such program may include group sessions led by a
counselor or participation in a program administered by the Probation
Office;

(6) contribute to the cost of all ordered treatment and testing based on his
ability to pay, as determined by the Probation Office;

(7) not communicate, associate, and/or be in the presence of any individual or
individuals known to be current or former members of the Latin Kings; and

(8) permit the Probation Officer(s), who may be accompanied by either local,
state, or federal law enforcement authorities, upon reasonable suspicion of
a violation of supervision by possessing firearms, to conduct a search Mr.
Lars’s residence, automobile, and any other property under his control or
ownership

The Court recommends strongly that Mr. Lara consider participation in the

H.O.P.E. Court program.

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This ORDER will go into effect on May 31, 2023, to allow the BOP time to

prepare Mr. Lara for reentry into society.

John J. MoCdneh Jt.
United States District Court Chief J “Indee

March 1, 2023

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