USA v. Germosen Reynoso

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
v.
CRISTIAN ALBERTO GERMOSEN
REYNOSO
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
C.R. No. 20-0015-MSM -LDA
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Mary S. McElroy, United States District Judge.
I. 	INTRODUCTION
Defendant Cristian 	Alberto Germosen Reynoso (“Germosen”), who is serving
a 	96-month 	prison 	sentence, 	seeks 	compassionate 	release 	under 	18 	U.S.C. 	§
3582(c)(1)(A), as recently amended by the First Step Act (FSA), Pub. L. No. 115-391,
§ 603(b), 132 Stat. 5194, 5239 (2018). 	(ECF Nos. 42 & 44.) 	Section 18 U.S.C.
3582(c)(1)(A) permits courts to reduce a term of imprisonment, once administrative
remedies are exhausted, if it finds that “extraordinary and compelling reasons
warrant such a reduction.”
	See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). 	Mr. Germosen has filed
two Motions that seek the same relief: a reduction in his sentence and release from
custody.1 The Government objects. In his initial filing Mr. Germosen asserted that
he had not submitted 	a request for compassionate release to the warden of the
1 	Mr. Germosen filed a “Motion for Retroactive Application of Sentencing
Guidelines under 18 U.S.C. 3582” (ECF No. 42) as well as an “Emergency Motion for
Release” (ECF No. 44.) Both seek relief pursuant to the First Step Act.
Case 1:20-cr-00015-MSM-LDA Document 53 Filed 02/14/23 Page 1 of 8 PageID #:
<pageID>

2
institution where he was housed. (ECF No. 42.) 	Because prisoners must show that
they have sought relief from the warden of the institution prior to seeking judicial
intervention, that would have been fatal to his claim. 	However, Mr. Germosen did
seek relief from his institution on March 3, 2022. The Facility Administrator’s letter
of response, dated March 18, 2022, was an exhibit to ECF No. 44. The government,
therefore, does not dispute that Mr. Germosen has exhausted his administrative
remedies. 	The Court may now consider both motions and determine whether
extraordinary and compelling reasons exist to warrant a sentence reduction and, if
so, if such a reduction would be consistent with applicable policy statements issued
by the Sentencing Commission. 	18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). 	“Put another way, the
district court must find that the defendant's situation constitutes the type of ‘extreme
hardship’ that the compassionate-release statute is designed to ameliorate.”
United
States v. Saccoccia, 10 F.4th 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2021) (quoting
United States v. Havener,
905 F.2d 3, 6 (1st Cir. 1990)). Finally, “the district court must consider any applicable
section 3553(a) factors and ‘determine whether, in its discretion, the reduction . . . is
warranted in whole or in part under the particular circumstances of the case.’”
United
States v. Texeira-Nieves, 23 F.4th 48, 52 (1st Cir. 2022) (quoting
Saccoccia, 10 F.4th
at 4 (alteration in original).
For the reasons state below, the Defendant’s motions are DENIED.
II. 	BACKGROUND
After 	entering 	a 	plea 	of 	guilty 	in 	September 	2020, 	Mr. 	Germosen 	was
sentenced, on February 4, 202, to a total of 96 months incarceration for charges of
Case 1:20-cr-00015-MSM-LDA Document 53 Filed 02/14/23 Page 2 of 8 PageID #:
<pageID>

3
possession with intent to distribute 40 grams or more of fentanyl, in violation of 21
U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B), possession with intent to distribute 28 grams or
more of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B) and Possession
with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C).
The mandatory minimum sentence was sixty months and the advisory guideline
sentencing range was 108 to 135 months. Mr. Germosen did not appeal the sentence.
III. 	DISCUSSION
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), vests this Court with the authority to modify a
sentence of imprisonment if “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a
reduction.” “[O]nce a defendant shows that he has exhausted the Bureau of Prisons’
administrative process for compassionate release, or thirty days have lapsed without
a decision, whichever occurs first, a district court may reduce a defendant’s term of
imprisonment provided the court determines: (1) extraordinary and compelling
reason warrant the reduction; (2) the defendant will not be a danger to the safety of
any other person or the community; and (3) the sentencing factors outlined in 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) favor release.”
United States v. Saad, No. 16-cr-00035-JJM, 2022
WL 35806, *1 (D.R.I. Jan. 4, 2022) (internal citations omitted). The statute itself does
not define “extraordinary and compelling reasons” that justify a sentence reduction
or 	modification; 	therefore, 	any 	information 	the 	court 	finds 	relevant 	may 	be
considered, with the explicit exception of that related only to rehabilitation.
United
States v. Ruvalcaba, 26 F.4th 14, 25 (1st Cir. 2022). 	“[U]ntil the Sentencing
Commission speaks, the only limitation on what can be considered an extraordinary
Case 1:20-cr-00015-MSM-LDA Document 53 Filed 02/14/23 Page 3 of 8 PageID #:
<pageID>

4
and compelling reason to grant a prisoner initiated motion is rehabilitation.”
United
States v. Trenkler, 47 F.4th 42, 48 (1st. Cir. 2022).
a 	district 	court, 	reviewing 	a 	prisoner-initiated 	motion 	for
compassionate 	release 	in 	the 	absence 	of 	an 	applicable 	policy
statement, may consider any complex of circumstances raised by a
defendant 	as 	forming 	an 	extraordinary 	and 	compelling 	reason
warranting relief. It follows that a district court adjudicating such a
motion may consider the FSA's non-retroactive amendments to the
scope 	of 	the 	mandatory 	minimum 	penalties 	under 	section
841(b)(1)(A) on a case-by-case basis grounded in a defendant's
individualized 	circumstances 	to 	find 	an 	extraordinary 	and
compelling reason warranting compassionate release.
Id. at 47
Mr. Germosen seeks release for various reasons including the fact that he has
children, has an elderly mother who herself suffers from various health conditions
and requires assistance with the tasks of daily living, and that he suffers from
medical conditions which make him vulnerable to severe illness from Covid-19. The
records included with his second motion demonstrate that Mr. Germosen suffers from
an array of health conditions including high blood pressure and elevated cholesterol.
Further, while in state custody prior to his incarceration in this case, he underwent
a procedure to clear arterial blockages during which vascular stents were inserted.
These medical conditions have been treated with medication both while he was at the
Wyatt Detention facility and since his placement into the custody of the Bureau of
Prisons. 	It is clear from the records provided, 	that Mr. Germosen’s 	medical
conditions have been successfully managed while he has remained in federal custody.
He has been fully vaccinated against Covid-19.
Case 1:20-cr-00015-MSM-LDA Document 53 Filed 02/14/23 Page 4 of 8 PageID #:
<pageID>

5
Mr. Germosen argues that his medical conditions, combined with the ever-
present threat of Covid-19, constitute extraordinary and compelling reasons for early
release. 	“With COVID constantly changing, wave after wave, variant after variant
sweeps across the BOP and affiliated facilities causing harsh lockdowns, reduced
movement causing a harsher sentence than intended by this court. Each time COVID
breaks into walls of the prisons, this petitioner's life is at risk.” (ECF No. 44.)
However, the facility at which he is housed currently has a low level of Covid in the
institution 	and 	in 	the 	surrounding 	community.2 	Because 	he 	has 	been 	fully
vaccinated, his likelihood of serious illness has been reduced.
Mr. 	Germosen’s 	family 	situation 	and 	history 	were 	addressed 	in 	his
Presentence Report. (ECF No. 25.) 	From that report it appears that Mr. Germosen
has two daughters. 	His oldest child, who is now an adult, lived with him and his
partner at the time of his arrest while his younger child lived with her mother. Mr.
Germosen’s mother, who has herself suffered from health problems, does not reside
in Rhode Island where Mr. Germosen intends to remain if he is not deported after his
release from prison. 	As a result, he would not be available to care for his mother if
he were granted release.
This 	Court 	reviews 	Motions 	for 	Compassionate 	release 	holistically 	and
considers all asserted circumstances.
	United States v. Trenkler, 47 F.4th 42, 49-50
(1st Cir. 2022). Yet the Court is not vested with unlimited discretion in evaluating
2 BOP: COVID-19 Modified Operations Plan & Matrix
Case 1:20-cr-00015-MSM-LDA Document 53 Filed 02/14/23 Page 5 of 8 PageID #:
<pageID>

6
whether the Defendant has put forward an extraordinary and compelling reason
justifying his release.
To determine whether the circumstances in any case are extraordinary and
compelling and warrant compassionate release, the Court relies on the plain meaning
of the words.
United States v. Canales-Ramos, 19 F.4th 561, 566 (1st. Cir. 2021).
The plain meaning of "extraordinary" suggests that a qualifying
reason must be a reason that is beyond the mine-run either in
fact or in degree. 	See Webster's Third New International Dictionary
of 	the 	English 	Language 	Unabridged 807 	(1981) 	(defining
"extraordinary" as "going beyond what is usual, regular, common, or
customary"); see also United States v. Hunter, 12 F.4th 555, 562 (6th
Cir. 2021) (suggesting that such reason must be "most unusual," "far
from common," or "hav[e] little or no precedent"). By the same token,
the plain meaning of "compelling" suggests that a qualifying reason
must be a reason that is both powerful and convincing. See Webster's
Third, supra at 462 (defining "compelling" as "forcing, impelling, [or]
driving [circumstance]" and as "tending to convince or convert by or as
if by forcefulness of evidence"); see also Hunter, 12 F.4th at 562.
Canales-Ramos, 19 F.4th at 566-67. Mr. Germosen has presented no circumstances
that could fairly be deemed to be extraordinary and compelling. His health conditions
are well managed within the bureau of prisons and are not so extraordinary that
continued care within the institution would be difficult or impossible. 	Covid-19 is a
much-reduced threat both within the institution where he is housed and because of
his vaccination status. 	Finally, Mr. Germosen’s family circumstances are not
extraordinary and constitute the type of family impact that incarceration causes to
all families.
The Court, having found that extraordinary and compelling circumstances do
not exist, is not required to go further in its analysis. However, mindful of the First
Case 1:20-cr-00015-MSM-LDA Document 53 Filed 02/14/23 Page 6 of 8 PageID #:
<pageID>

7
Circuit’s admonition that its job is made easier when “the district court takes the
additional step of making a section 3553(a) determination” a review of the sentencing
factors is appropriate at this time.
	United States v. Texeira-Nieves, 23 F.4th 48, 52
(1st Cir. 2022).
In this case, consideration of the 3553(a) factors also suggests that a reduction
in his sentence would be inappropriate for Mr. Germosen. 	The instant offense
involved the trafficking of large amounts of 	fentanyl and cocaine. 	This conduct
followed a prior federal drug conviction for which he served a 46-month sentence of
imprisonment. The sentence that Mr. Germosen received in this case was well below
the advisory guideline range and below that recommended by the government. 	It
also resulted from a plea agreement in which the government agreed to forgo
charging 	him with additional counts that carried significantly longer mandatory
minimum sentences.
The distribution of fentanyl presents a special danger to the community and
has contributed to the overdose crisis experienced in the district as well as around
the country. Mr. Germosen has not yet served half of his sentence. Notably he filed
the first of his motions after serving just 14 months of his 96-month sentence. 	A
reduction in sentence at this time would undermine the goals of punishment,
protection of the public and deterrence that underlay the sentence he received.
For these reasons Mr. Germosen’s Motion for Retroactive Application of
Sentencing Guidelines under 18 U.S.C. 3582 (ECF No. 42) as well as his Emergency
Motion for Release (ECF No. 44) are DENIED.
Case 1:20-cr-00015-MSM-LDA Document 53 Filed 02/14/23 Page 7 of 8 PageID #:
<pageID>

8
IT IS SO ORDERED.
_________________________________
Mary S. McElroy
United States District Judge
February 14, 2023
Case 1:20-cr-00015-MSM-LDA Document 53 Filed 02/14/23 Page 8 of 8 PageID #:
<pageID>