Hodge v. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
TE’WANNA HODGE,
Petitioner,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY (DHS), et al.,
Respondents.
Civil No. 25-1286 (FAB)
MEMORANDUM 	AND 	ORDER
BESOSA, Senior District Judge.
Before 	the 	Court 	is 	respondent 	United 	States 	Customs 	and
Border 	Protection 	(“CBP”)’s 	motion 	to 	dismiss 	the 	complaint.
(Docket 	No. 	21.) 	For 	the 	following 	reasons, 	CBP’s 	motion 	to
dismiss is GRANTED.
I. 	Background
On September 19, 2024, CBP seized a 1968 Beechcraft Baron D55
aircraft 	at 	the 	airport 	in 	Ceiba, 	Puerto 	Rico. 	See 	Docket 	No. 	1
at pp. 1-2. 	CBP notified petitioner Te’Wanna Hodge (“Hodge”) about
the 	seizure 	after 	finding 	that 	Hodge 	was 	the 	purported 	owner 	of
the plane. 	Id. 	The rationale CBP gave Hodge for the seizure was
that 	the 	aircraft 	was 	being 	operated 	while 	its 	registration 	was
suspended 	or 	revoked. 	(Docket 	No. 	1-3 	at 	p. 	2.) 	The 	notice
provided 	Hodge 	with 	four 	options 	to 	proceed. 	First, 	she 	could
petition CBP for administrative review in accordance with 19 U.S.C.
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§ 	1618 	and 	19 	C.F.R. 	§§ 	171.1 	and 	171.2. 	Id. 	at 	p. 	3. 	Second,
she 	could 	file 	an 	offer 	in 	compromise 	to 	be 	considered 	by 	CBP.
Id. 	at 	pp. 	3-4. 	Third, 	she 	could 	abandon 	the 	property. 	Id. 	at
p. 4. 	Fourth, 	she 	could 	request 	that 	the 	matter 	be 	referred 	to
the 	U.S. 	Attorney’s 	Office 	for 	commencement 	of 	a 	judicial
forfeiture 	proceeding 	in 	federal 	court 	pursuant 	to 	18 	U.S.C.
§ 983(a)(3). 	Id.
Hodge 	elected 	to 	proceed 	under 	the 	first 	option 	and, 	on
October 	11, 	2024, 	sent 	a 	petition 	to 	CBP 	detailing 	her 	claims.
See 	Docket 	No. 	1-4. 	On 	November 	6, 	CBP 	denied 	her 	petition.
(Docket 	No. 	1-5.) 	On 	November 	12, 	Hodge 	sent 	a 	supplemental
petition 	to 	CBP, 	which 	the 	notice 	specified 	was 	her 	right 	in 	the
event 	her 	original 	petition 	was 	denied. 	See 	Docket 	No. 	1-6; 	19
C.F.R. 	§ 	171.61. 	On 	May 	27, 	2025, 	after 	waiting 	several 	months
without 	a 	decision, 	Hodge 	filed 	the 	complaint 	in 	this 	case.
(Docket No. 1.) 	Hodge seeks a court order compelling CBP to rule
on 	her 	supplemental 	petition, 	asserting 	that 	she 	is 	eligible 	for
this form of relief under both 28 U.S.C. § 1361, authorizing orders
of 	mandamus, 	and 	section 	706(1) 	of 	the 	Administrative 	Procedure
Act, 	5 	U.S.C. 	§ 	706(1) 	(the 	“APA”). 	(Docket 	No. 	1.) 	As 	of 	the
date 	of 	this 	memorandum, 	CBP 	has 	still 	not 	ruled 	on 	the
supplemental petition.
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Civil No. 25-1286 (FAB) 	3
CBP asks the Court to dismiss the complaint. 	(Docket No. 21).
CBP argues, somewhat circularly, that because it has not ruled on
Hodge’s 	supplemental 	petition, 	her 	request 	for 	a 	court 	order 	is
premature. 	Id. 	at 	p. 	1. 	CBP 	also 	argues 	that 	Hodge 	could 	still
elect 	to 	initiate 	a 	judicial 	forfeiture 	proceeding 	before 	the
supplemental 	decision 	is 	issued, 	which 	renders 	her 	ineligible 	to
request 	mandamus 	or 	APA 	relief. 	Id. 	at 	p. 	2. 	Hodge 	opposes 	to
CBP’s motion to dismiss, arguing that CBP is obligated to respond
to the supplemental petition and that the option to pursue judicial
forfeiture is not an adequate alternative remedy disqualifying her
from mandamus or APA relief. 	See Docket No. 23 at pp. 1-3.
II. 	Legal Standard
Pursuant 	to 	Federal 	Rule 	of 	Civil 	Procedure 	12(b)(1)
(“Rule 12(b)(1)”), 	a 	defendant 	may 	move 	to 	dismiss 	an 	action 	for
lack 	of 	subject 	matter 	jurisdiction. 	In 	evaluating 	a 	motion 	to
dismiss 	under 	Rule 	12(b)(1), 	a 	court 	“accept[s] 	as 	true 	the
complaint’s 	well-pleaded 	factual 	allegations 	and 	draw[s] 	all
reasonable 	inferences 	in 	the 	[petitioner’s] 	favor.” 	Cangrejeros
de 	Santurce 	Baseball 	Club, 	LLC 	v. 	Liga 	de 	Béisbol 	Profesional 	de
P.R., Inc., 146 F.4th 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2025). 	A court must disregard
“statements 	in 	the 	complaint 	that 	simply 	offer 	legal 	labels 	and
conclusions 	or 	merely 	rehash 	cause-of-action 	elements, 	and
consider[s] 	whether 	the 	non-conclusory, 	non-speculative 	facts
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Civil No. 25-1286 (FAB) 	4
support 	the 	existence 	of 	subject 	matter 	jurisdiction.” 	Id.
(quoting 	Lyman 	v. 	Baker, 	954 	F.3d 	351, 	360 	(1st 	Cir. 	2020)
(alterations omitted). 	A court “may consider information attached
to or incorporated into the complaint, along with facts subject to
judicial notice.” 	Id.
Pursuant 	to 	Federal 	Rule 	of 	Civil 	Procedure 	12(b)(6)
(“Rule 12(b)(6)”), 	a 	defendant 	may 	move 	to 	dismiss 	an 	action 	for
failure 	to 	state 	a 	claim 	upon 	which 	relief 	can 	be 	granted. 	See
Fed. 	R. 	Civ. 	P. 	12(b)(6). 	“Although 	dismissals 	under
Rules 12(b)(1) 	and 	12(b)(6) 	are 	conceptually 	distinct, 	the 	same
basic principles apply in both situations.” 	Cangrejeros, 146 F.4th
at 11 (quoting Lyman, 954 F.3d at 359) (alterations omitted). 	To
survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must contain sufficient
factual 	matter 	“to 	state 	a 	claim 	to 	relief 	that 	is 	plausible 	on
its face.” 	Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
A 	court 	must 	decide 	whether 	the 	complaint 	alleges 	facts 	which
“raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” 	Id. at 555.
In 	doing 	so, 	a 	court 	is 	“obligated 	to 	view 	the 	facts 	of 	the
complaint 	in 	the 	light 	most 	favorable 	to 	the 	plaintiffs, 	and 	to
resolve 	any 	ambiguities 	in 	their 	favor.” 	Ocasio-Hernández 	v.
Fortuño-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 2011).
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Civil No. 25-1286 (FAB) 	5
III. Discussion
Hodge 	claims 	that 	the 	Court 	has 	jurisdiction 	pursuant 	to 	28
U.S.C. 	§ 	1361, 	which 	provides 	the 	district 	courts 	with 	“original
jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an
officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to
perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.” 	See Docket No. 1 at p. 2.
She also claims federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 with respect to her APA claim. 	See id. 	Section 706(1) of
the 	APA 	authorizes 	district 	courts 	to 	“compel 	agency 	action
unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed[.]” 	5 U.S.C. § 706(1).
“A 	writ 	of 	mandamus 	is 	an 	extraordinary 	remedy 	that 	is
available 	only 	when 	certain 	conditions 	are 	met[.]” 	Marasco 	&
Nesselbush, 	LLP 	v. 	Collins, 	6 	F.4th 	150, 	167 	(1st 	Cir. 	2021)
(quoting In re Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R., 985 F.3d 122,
127 (1st Cir. 2021)). 	To qualify for mandamus relief, Hodge must
show that she “has a clear right to the relief sought, has no other
adequate remedy, and that there is a clearly defined and peremptory
duty on the part of [CBP] to do the act in question.” 	Georges v.
Quinn, 853 F.2d 994, 995 (1st Cir. 1988). 	Similarly, the APA only
provides 	for 	judicial 	review 	of 	a 	“final 	agency 	action 	for 	which
there 	is 	no 	other 	adequate 	remedy 	in 	a 	court.” 	5 	U.S.C. 	§ 	704;
see Harper v. Werfel, 118 F.4th 100, 116 (1st Cir. 2024).
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Civil No. 25-1286 (FAB) 	6
The 	Court 	finds 	that 	Hodge’s 	requested 	order 	compelling 	CBP
to 	rule 	on 	her 	supplemental 	petition 	is 	unwarranted 	because 	she
has 	an 	adequate 	alternative 	remedy, 	namely, 	requesting 	judicial
forfeiture 	proceedings. 	Hodge 	argues 	that 	“[f]orcing 	a 	claimant
into 	forfeiture 	litigation 	to 	cure 	agency 	inaction 	is 	not 	an
adequate remedy.” 	(Docket No. 23 at p. 3.) 	She does not, however,
provide 	any 	basis 	for 	concluding 	that 	the 	process 	of 	judicial
forfeiture is an inadequate alternative remedy. 	Authority on this
question 	indicates 	that 	the 	option 	to 	pursue 	judicial 	forfeiture
instead 	of 	waiting 	for 	an 	administrative 	petition 	to 	be 	resolved
by CBP is an adequate alternative remedy. 	See Dealer Servs. Corp.
v. 	U.S. 	Immigr. 	& 	Customs 	Enf’t, 	No. 	SA 	CV 	12-1497 	DOC 	(JPRx),
2013 	U.S. 	Dist. 	LEXIS 	68596, 	at 	*6-8 	(C.D. 	Cal. 	May 	13, 	2013)
(finding 	that 	the 	option 	to 	pursue 	judicial 	forfeiture 	was 	an
adequate 	alternative 	remedy 	which 	defeated 	petitioner’s 	request
for a writ of mandamus against the CBP); LKQ Corp. v. Nielsen, 369
F. 	Supp. 	3d 	577, 	586 	(D. 	Del. 	2019) 	(same, 	with 	respect 	to 	the
APA). 	Accordingly, 	the 	Court 	rejects 	Hodge’s 	argument 	that
judicial forfeiture is not an adequate alternative remedy.
Although 	not 	completely 	clear 	based 	on 	the 	wording 	of 	the
notice of seizure, neither party disputes that Hodge still has the
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Civil No. 25-1286 (FAB) 	7
option 	to 	initiate 	judicial 	forfeiture 	proceedings.1 	The 	notice
of 	seizure 	states 	that 	“[a]t 	any 	point 	prior 	to 	the 	CBP 	issuing
its 	decision 	on 	your 	petition, 	you 	may 	request 	a 	referral 	to 	the
U.S. 	Attorney’s 	Office 	for 	judicial 	action.” 	(Docket 	No. 	1-3 	at
p. 3.) 	The Court reads this as allowing Hodge to request judicial
forfeiture prior to CBP’s decision on either the initial petition
or 	the 	supplemental 	petition. 	It 	would 	be 	illogical 	for 	a
petitioner 	to 	have 	recourse 	to 	judicial 	forfeiture 	while 	waiting
for 	the 	CBP’s 	response 	to 	the 	initial 	petition, 	but 	not 	while
waiting for a response to the supplemental petition. 	Accordingly,
because 	Hodge 	still 	has 	the 	option 	of 	judicial 	forfeiture, 	her
request 	for 	an 	order 	to 	compel 	the 	CBP 	to 	respond 	to 	her
supplemental petition is unwarranted.
IV. 	Conclusion
For the above reasons, the Court does not have subject matter
jurisdiction to consider Hodge's request for mandamus relief, and
she 	fails 	to 	state 	a 	claim 	upon 	which 	relief 	can 	be 	granted
pursuant 	to 	the 	APA. 	Accordingly, 	CBP’s 	motion 	to 	dismiss 	is
GRANTED, 	(Docket 	No. 	21) 	and 	this 	case 	is 	DISMISSED 	without
prejudice.
1 In its motion to dismiss, CBP states that, “[t]echnically, Petitioner could
initiate a judicial proceeding before CBP renders its supplemental decision,
under the section of Judicial Action (Box 4) [i.e., the judicial forfeiture
option].” 	(Docket No. 21 at p. 2.)
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Civil No. 25-1286 (FAB) 	8
Judgment shall be entered accordingly.
This case is now closed for statistical purposes.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
San Juan, Puerto Rico, January 23, 2026.
s/ Francisco A. Besosa
FRANCISCO A. BESOSA
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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