USA v. Mendez-Rodriguez

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28 	1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
JEREMY ARIS MÉNDEZ-RODRÍGUEZ
Defendant.
CRIMINAL NO. 24-402 (GMM)(HRV)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. 	I NTRODUCTION
On October 8, 2024, the defendant Jeremy Aris Méndez-Rodríguez (hereinafter
“Méndez” or “Defendant”) was arrested during a police intervention at La Perla Ward in
San Juan. The Grand Jury has returned a six-count Indictment charging him with
possession with intent to distribute cocaine, cocaine base, and marijuana in violation of
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (Counts Four, Five and Six); as well as possession of a machinegun
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) (Count One); possession of a firearm in furtherance of
a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (Count Two); and
possession of a machinegun in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 924(c)(1(B)(ii) (Count Three). (Docket No. 11). Méndez moves to suppress the
evidence seized. (Docket No. 50). The Government opposes. (Docket No. 55).
The 	presiding 	District 	Judge 	referred 	the 	matter 	to 	me 	for 	report 	and
recommendation. (Docket No. 51). I held an evidentiary hearing on August 15, 2025.
Case 3:24-cr-00402-GMM-HRV Document 75 Filed 10/22/25 Page 1 of 25

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28 	2
(Docket No. 67). For the reasons outlined below, I recommend that the motion to
suppress be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
II. 	PROCEDURAL B ACKGROUND
The Government carries the burden of proof because the searches that led to the
seizure of the firearm and the controlled substances at issue were warrantless. See United
States v. Delgado-Perez, 867 F.3d 244, 250 (1st Cir. 2017). During the suppression
hearing, the Government presented the testimonies of four witnesses: Agent Henry Villa-
González (hereinafter “Villa-González”), Sergeant Manuel Torres-Ramírez (hereinafter
“Torres-Ramírez”), Agent Kevin Cardé-Rosado (hereinafter “Cardé-Rosado”) and Agent
Manuel Pagán-Rojas (hereinafter “Pagán-Rojas”), all from the Puerto Rico Police Bureau.
The parties stipulated several exhibits, including photographs taken by the
Government of the locations where the Defendant was allegedly pursued on foot and the
abandoned structure where he was subsequently arrested in. (Docket No. 71). The photos
were not taken on the day of the events but months after, on July 14, 2025. According to
Villa-González and Torres-Ramírez, the police usually does not take pictures of the area
when they conduct arrests and for safety reasons. (Suppression Hearing Transcript “Tr.”,
Docket No. 70 at 80, 120).
Before beginning the presentation of evidence, I addressed a motion in limine
filed by the Government during the morning hours on the day of the hearing regarding
impeachment. (Docket No. 60). I ruled that it was premature to make a ruling and that I
would consider the issue as it surfaced during the hearing. Subsequently, I mooted the
motion in limine. (Docket No. 63).
Case 3:24-cr-00402-GMM-HRV Document 75 Filed 10/22/25 Page 2 of 25

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28 	3
During the hearing, the defense raised an issue with respect to Fed. R. Crim. P.
26.2 materials. Defense counsel argued that they had not received notes that Agent Villa-
González took on his cell phone. However, the notes were later produced. I ordered that
Agent Villa-González continue to be under the rules of the Court should the need to recall
him as a witness arose regarding the content of the notes. However, the defense did not
request to recall agent Villa-González. (See Docket Nos. 61, 62). At the conclusion of the
hearing, I granted the parties a term of 20 days after receipt of the transcript, to submit
post-hearing memoranda. They have complied (Docket Nos. 72 and 73).
After considering the written submissions of the parties, the evidence presented
at the suppression hearing, and the post-hearing memoranda filed, I know propose that
Court adopt the following
III. 	FINDINGS OF FACT
1. 	Agent Villa-González has been a PRPD agent for 4 and a half years. (Tr. 16).
He was initially assigned to the Loiza Street precinct and then moved to the San
Juan Intelligence Unit about a year ago. (Tr. 17). He investigates all types of crimes,
such as assault, fraud, domestic violence and threats and has received extensive
training. (Id.).
2. 	As an intelligence officer, he handles confidential investigations for
controlled substances and firearms. (Tr. 18). In addition to his own cases, he has
assisted fellow officers in around 15 to 20 other cases. (Id.). However, this was his
first time participating in a case as a plain clothes officer for the intelligence
division. (Tr. 43).
3. 	On 	October 	8, 	2024, 	Villa-González 	started 	service 	at 	the 	general
headquarters in the intelligence division. (Tr. 19). Torres-Ramírez, his supervisor,
gave instructions regarding a work plan relaying that they were going impact high
criminal incidence areas, such as La Perla Ward. (Id.). The work plan was verbally
communicated by Torres-Ramírez. (Id.). As was customary, the work plan was
only communicated verbally at first. Only if an arrest was made, or drugs were
seized, would the agents get a printed out copy of the work plan. (Tr. 117).
Case 3:24-cr-00402-GMM-HRV Document 75 Filed 10/22/25 Page 3 of 25

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28 	4
4. 	The work plan came about because there had been a murder at La Perla
and the PRPD wanted to gather intelligence at the known drug point located in
Lucila Silva Street. (Tr. 21).
5. 	Villa-González’s role that day was to conduct surveillance and perform
arrests at La Perla. He was assigned to an unmarked grey 2022 Jeep Compass and
rode with Pagán-Rojas and Torres-Ramírez. (Tr. 47-48). They were all in plain
clothes. (Tr. 48).
6. 	As part of the work plan, there were other officers in different vehicles. The
purpose of the intervention was to arrive undetected. (Tr. 49).
7. 	The written work plan does not mention Méndez and does not indicate that
there had been any specific confidential information regarding him. (Tr. 46).
8. 	Agent Villa-González testified that, at the time, he was not familiar with the
streets and alleyways of La Perla. (Tr. 85).
9. 	Soon after entering La Perla, the agents went down Callejón de los
Cuernos1 and reached Lucila Silva Street. (Tr. 51). At that point, Villa-González
heard on the radio: “Running, running” while he was still inside his car. (Tr. 22).
He stepped out of the car between Lucilla Silva Street and Matadero alley and
started walking towards the alley from east to west. (Tr. 23).
10. 	Although Villa-González was in plain clothes, he was wearing his Puerto
Rico Police issued identification around his neck. (Tr. 25). His firearm was
concealed inside his pants in a holster in his waist. (Tr. 48).
11. 	Shortly after, Villa-González observed a man about 20 feet away at Callejón
de los Cuernos running in his direction but slowing down. (Tr. 23). The agent
described the individual as olive skin, with black hair and beard, wearing a long
sleeve shirt with black shorts. (Id.). He identified Méndez in court as the
individual he saw that day. (Tr. 24).
12. 	Agent Villa-González’s testimony was that the Defendant was running
towards him with a Ziplock bag in his hand with what appeared to be a white
powder. (Id.).
13. 	He further testified that he does not recall seeing anyone else around. (Tr.
65-66). Pagán-Rojas, however, testified that there were two people running
1 Although Villa-González originally identified the alley as Callejon Matadero, he later corrected himself
and stated that it was in fact called Callejón de los Cuernos. (Tr. 51).
Case 3:24-cr-00402-GMM-HRV Document 75 Filed 10/22/25 Page 4 of 25

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28 	5
towards them when him and Villa-González saw the defendant for the first time.
(Tr. 173-74).
14. 	Initially, Villa-González did not mention that he was accompanied by
another officer. However, during cross examination, he stated that Pagán-Rojas
was with him in the alley when he first saw Méndez. (Tr. 87).
15. 	Villa-González identified himself as Police and told the Defendant to stop
but he kept running, turning left towards some stairs that lead to La Perla
boardwalk. (Tr. 24). After seeing that he ignored the halt order, Villa-González
kept following Méndez until he caught up to him at an abandoned house that had
no doors or windows. (Tr. 25).
16. 	The agent also said that you could see the transparent bag on Defendant’s
hand even as he was running. (Tr. 26).2
17. 	Villa-González identified the locations of the area where he first saw the
Defendant; the pursuit route; and the place where he was arrested through
Government Exhibits 1 through 11.
18. 	Pagán-Rojas 	arrived 	afterwards 	as 	Villa-González 	was 	placing 	the
Defendant under arrest. According to Villa-González, when 	he 	placed the
Defendant under arrest, he still had the bag in his hand. Méndez held the drugs
on a grip (Tr. 87), which he demonstrated during the hearing. He saw a bulge with
white powder that he believed to be cocaine. (Tr. 68).
19. 	Villa-González seized the clear bag and conducted a search incident to the
arrest after which he seized cash in Defendant’s right pocket. (Tr. 26). In his left
pocket, Defendant had a small black bag with containers holding pills, known as
“rolas” which are similar to LSD. (Id.). Government Ex. 12 is an inventory display
and specifically shows (12-B) the bag Méndez was allegedly carrying in his right
hand.
20. 	After 	he 	was 	placed 	under 	arrest, 	Méndez 	was 	transported 	to 	the
Metropolitan Drug Unit. (Tr. 26). He was read his rights and signed a form
attesting to his rights. (Tr. 27). Villa-González took custody of the evidence and
transported it to the Drug Unit. (Tr. 28).
2 The credibility of the agent regarding this statement is one of the main issues to be resolved by the Court.
As per his own testimony on cross-examination, and based on his training and experience, Agent Villa-
González knows that he “need[s] probable cause to arrest somebody.” (Tr. at 79). He further testified: “My
probable cause was the apparent bag of cocaine that this gentleman had in his hand.” (Id.).
Case 3:24-cr-00402-GMM-HRV Document 75 Filed 10/22/25 Page 5 of 25

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28 	6
21. 	An inventory of the seized property was carried out and field tests of the
drugs were conducted. The contents of the Ziplock tested positive to cocaine. (Id.).
Agent Villa-González was present during the field test, as was Méndez. (Tr. 28-
29).
22. 	In 	total, 	there 	were 	40 	cocaine 	baggies, 	and 	pill 	packs 	(cylinders)
containing 54 pills in different sizes and colors. Photographs were taken of the
seized items. (Tr. 28; Gov. Exhibits 12-13).
23. 	Villa-González drafted a report regarding the incident. The report does not
indicate that he received the “running, running” radio alert; nor does it mention
that Pagán-Rojas was with him when he saw the Defendant running down the
alley. (Tr. 56).
24. 	After processing the evidence seized, the case was consulted with ATF. (Tr.
29).
25. 	The second witness to testify was Sergeant Torres-Ramírez, who has been
an officer for 15 years and is now with the San Juan Intelligence Division. (Tr. 116).
His duties include being a supervisor in cases involving murder, drug trafficking,
weapons, and theft. (Id.). He has worked around 900 cases, both directly and
indirectly. (Id.).
26. 	On the day of the events, he was the supervisor at the San Juan Intelligence
Division. (Tr. 117). He confirmed that he prepared a work plan to lift intelligence
and carry out surveillance at La Perla because they were investigating a murder.
(Id.).
27. 	The morning of the events, he discussed the plan with his staff and assigned
about eight to ten agents to carry out the work plan. (Tr. 118-19). Several agents
were in plain clothes and unmarked vehicles and other agents were there on
marked police vehicles. (Tr. 123-24). They were armed and carried their IDs, but
not their badges. (Tr. 125). Torres-Ramírez, however, usually wears his metal
badge, even if he’s not in uniform. (Id.).
28. 	The work plan resulted in the arrest of one person and the seizure of
controlled substances and a firearm. (Tr. 119).
29. 	Torres-Ramírez indicated that he only saw Méndez after he was arrested.
(Tr. 126). He never saw him running or committing a crime and he was not
present at the time of his arrest or when the firearm was recovered. (Tr. 126, 128).
30. 	During the intervention, the Technical Services Unit was not called to take
pictures. (Tr. 120). As supervisor, Torres-Ramírez is the one who decides whether
to call Technical Services to take pictures during an intervention. (Id.). At the time,
Case 3:24-cr-00402-GMM-HRV Document 75 Filed 10/22/25 Page 6 of 25

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28 	7
he believed that it was risky to have Technical Services there and that the risk was
not worth it. (Id.).
31. 	Torres-Ramírez further explained how the drug organization at La Perla
operates. (Tr. 120-122)) Users of controlled substance go down the stairs and
arrive on foot. They may also go down in a car, as if it was a fast food drive thru.
(Tr. 121). He explained that if one goes to the left of the bar “La Vergüenza”, going
down “La Boveda”, you get to Lucilla Silva Street, and about 1000 feet in, is the
drug point. (Id.). Sellers usually run towards the La Perla Boardwalk (Malecón)
when they are trying to escape. (Id.). They flee through the alleys and stash the
drugs in fishing tackle boxes or have them in Ziplock baggies. (Tr. 122).
32. 	As part of his duties and of the Puerto Rico Police reform, Torres-Ramírez
must determine whether an arrest complies with regulations and must fill out
Form 615.8. (Tr. 128). The process entails verifying the location where the arrest
took place. Torres-Ramírez stated that the Defendant was arrested in one of the
back alleys of Lucilla Silva Street. However, he could not provide a street name or
GPS coordinate. (Tr. 131-32).
33. 	Although they did not take pictures that day, the officers returned with the
prosecutors in July of 2025 and, on that day, they also recovered drugs and saw
members of the drug points running away. (Tr. 133).
34. 	The prosecution’s third witness was Cardé-Rosado. (Tr. 137). He has been
an officer for 14 years and has carried around 100 interventions in La Perla. (Id.).
35. 	On October 8, 2024, Cardé-Rosado was assigned to carry out surveillance
and arrests as per the work plan. (Tr. 138). He positioned himself on the main
street of the Malecón area, downhill, at the back of La Perla near the ocean. (Id.).
36. 	Once the rest of the agents went into the principal entrance, Cardé-Rosado
got out of the car and walked towards the back of Lucilla Silva Street. (Id.). Based
on his experience, that is the route that drug sellers use to run from the police. (Tr.
138-39). He was positioned to see if drug sellers or armed individuals came in his
direction because, in his experience, drug dealers throw firearms and drugs in the
alleyways. (Tr. 139).
37. 	As Cardé-Rosado went up some stairs, he saw a closed red bag (Exhibit 30)
among the waste, garbage and debris inside an open, abandoned structure in
ruins. (Tr. 143-44; Stipulated Exhibits 16, 20-21, 28-38). He was alone when he
spotted the backpack. There was no one around and no vehicles or motorcycles
nearby. (Tr. 144). The structure was only accessible via pedestrian access, and he
does not know who the owner is. (Tr. 151).
Case 3:24-cr-00402-GMM-HRV Document 75 Filed 10/22/25 Page 7 of 25

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28 	8
38. 	The 	sighting 	of 	the 	bag 	“intrigued” 	Cardé-Rosado 	and 	aroused 	his
suspicion because it is common to find discarded property in the area, such as
bags, fanny packs and transparent fish tackle boxes containing controlled
substances. (Tr. 144-45, 154). People usually leave contraband and return for it
later. (Tr. 150).
39. 	Agent Cardé-Rosado did not have to enter the remains of the abandoned
structure, because the bag was visible; he simply stretched his hand and grabbed
it. (Tr. 151).
40. 	Upon opening the bag, he saw, among other things, drugs, a firearm, a
social security card, a driver’s license, and passport belonging to Méndez. (Tr. 150).
41. 	Cardé-Rosado had not seen the Defendant before finding the bag. In fact,
he did not even know he had been arrested. (Tr. 155). It wasn’t until he went up to
the main street of La Perla after seizing the backpack that he learned someone had
been arrested. (Id.). He was also unaware at the time of the finding that the
backpack had been recovered on the route that Defendant took while running
from the police. (Tr. 160).
42. 	Cardé-Rosado did not take a picture of the bag when he found it because,
according to him, it was just a finding. (Tr. 152). He did not know what was inside
until after he opened it. (Tr. 155). He did not interview or speak to the Defendant
because Méndez was not his arrestee. (Tr. 156).
43. 	Afterwards, Cardé-Rosado notified his supervisor and drafted an Incident
Report. (Tr. 163). In the report, however, he did not mention the backpack
because according to him, only the contents are important. (Id.; Tr. 166; and
Defense Exhibit C).
44. 	ATF agents interviewed Cardé-Rosado, and he gave federal agents the
approximate coordinates of where he thought the bag was located. (Tr. 156-160).
However, he could not provide an exact street name or location because La Perla
alleys have no street names and no specific address. (Tr. 160).
45. 	The last witness called was Pagán-Rojas. He has been an agent for 15 years
and has conducted interventions in La Perla “an endless number of times.” (Tr.
169).
46. 	On the day of the events, he arrived in an unmarked vehicle with Villa-
González and Torres-Ramírez. (Tr. 170). He got out of the vehicle and went down
Matadero street towards an alley. (Id.). He ran behind fellow officer Villa-
González. (Id.).
Case 3:24-cr-00402-GMM-HRV Document 75 Filed 10/22/25 Page 8 of 25

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28 	9
47. 	As he ran in the alleyway, he saw two people running towards them, both
being chased by fellow officer Xavier Rivera. (Tr. 176, 180). The Defendant was
one of the men who were running. (Tr. 172). Méndez turned left (which would be
to the right of the agents). (Tr. 174). The other person did not turn because Agent
Xavier Rivera caught up to and detained him. (Tr. 176).
48. 	Pagán-Rojas did not see anything in Méndez’s hands, but his visibility was
limited because Villa-González was in front of him. (Tr. 174).
49. 	The distance between where they were and where Méndez was when they
first saw him was over 60 feet. (Tr. 179).
50. 	He assisted Agent Xavier Rivera first and then followed Villa-González
down the alley. (Tr. 180). Pagán-Rojas eventually arrived at the structure full of
garbage where Méndez was “hiding” as he put it. (Tr. 173).
51. 	Pagán-Rojas looked inside the opening to the structure that is depicted in
Exhibit 28 (Tr. 181, 183) but did not see anything that called his attention. (Tr.
183). The purpose of looking into the hole was to see if fellow officer Villa was
there, but when he did not see Villa, he continued. (Tr. 184).
52. 	When he next saw Villa-González, the latter was holding Méndez and that’s
when he saw Méndez was holding a transparent sandwich bag with cocaine inside.
(Tr. 174). When Pagán-Rojas arrived at the location, Méndez was not handcuffed
yet. (Id.). Pagán-Rojas never saw Méndez with a backpack. (Tr. 182).
IV. 	A PPLICABLE L AW AND DISCUSSION
Méndez contends that the PRPD agent did not have reasonable suspicion to stop
him, nor probable cause to arrest him. In advancing this claim, he says that he is a
resident of La Perla Ward, that La Perla is not a high-crime area, and that he did not run
from the police. (Docket No. 50).3 Méndez further claims that he did not have anything
3 At the evidentiary hearing, Méndez abandoned most of these arguments. (Counsel Carrion asked: “Q.
And you would agree with me that La Perla is considered a high crime area.”, Tr. 153.). Also, during the
suppression hearing, Méndez did not attempt to controvert the version of the Government that he ran
from the police.
Case 3:24-cr-00402-GMM-HRV Document 75 Filed 10/22/25 Page 9 of 25

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28 	10
in his hands when a Puerto Rico police agent arrested him. He also argues that he did
not abandon his backpack and, thus, the police unlawfully seized it and searched it.4
The Government responds that the observations of agent Villa-González and his
reasonable belief that he had observed an illegal act of drug possession, gave rise to
probable cause to arrest Méndez and conduct a warrantless search of his person incident
to the arrest. The Government also posits that suppression of the contents of the
backpack is not warranted because Defendant abandoned his property.
A. 	Legal Standard
The Fourth Amendment protects against “unreasonable searches and seizures.”
U.S. Const. amend IV. A criminal defendant seeking to suppress evidence bears a
threshold burden of showing that a Fourth Amendment violation occurred, which in turn
encompasses the burden of establishing that he or she was subjected to a warrantless
search or seizure. See United States v. Young, 835 F.3d 13, 19 (1st Cir. 2016); see also
United States v. Fields, 823 F.3d 20, 25 (1st Cir. 2016). Once the defendant establishes
that a warrantless search or seizure occurred, the burden shifts to the Government to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that said search or seizure was lawful. United
States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177 n.14, 94 S. Ct. 988, 39 L. Ed. 2d 242 (1974); United
States v. Delgado-Perez, 867 F.3d at 250.
4 On this score, Defendant again adopted at the hearing a factual posture different from the one asserted
in his motion to suppress where he averred that he left his backpack on top of his motorcycle. (See Docket
No. 50-1, ¶7). There was nothing presented at the suppression hearing developing such version of events,
through cross-examination or otherwise.
Case 3:24-cr-00402-GMM-HRV Document 75 Filed 10/22/25 Page 10 of 25

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28 	11
Warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable unless they fall within
one of the “few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions” to the Fourth
Amendment warrant requirement. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S. Ct.
507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1967). The Fourth Amendment is enforced through the
exclusionary rule by prohibiting the Government from using at trial evidence that
constitutes the fruits of an unreasonable search or seizure. See Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-85, 83 S. Ct. 407, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1963).
B. 	Analysis
1. 	The 	testimony of 	Villa-González 	that 	he 	observed 	Méndez 	in
possession of controlled substances while fleeing is not credible.
A Fourth Amendment seizure occurs when the police “has in some way restrained
the liberty of a citizen” through “physical force or show of authority.” Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 19, n.16, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968); see also United States v. Sealy,
30 F.3d 7, 9 (1st Cir. 1994). Thus, “[t]he protections of the Fourth Amendment apply not
only to traditional arrests, but also to those brief investigatory stops generally known as
Terry stops.” United States v. Camacho, 661 F.3d 718, 724 (1st Cir. 2011).
Under Terry, an officer may stop and briefly detain a person if the officer has
reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts, and considering the totality of the
circumstances, that criminal activity is afoot. See United States v. Sanchez, 817 F.3d 38,
42 (1st Cir. 2016). Reasonable suspicion as a concept defies exact definition, but this
much we know: “it requires more than a hunch but less than probable cause.” United
States v. Pavao, 134 F.4th 649, 655 (1st Cir. 2025) (quoting United States v. Ruidiaz,
529 F.3d 25, 29 (1st Cir. 2008). “[A] finding of reasonable suspicion must be premised
Case 3:24-cr-00402-GMM-HRV Document 75 Filed 10/22/25 Page 11 of 25

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28 	12
upon a ‘particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of
criminal activity.’” United States v. Pontoo, 666 F.3d 20, 27-28 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18, 101 S. Ct. 690, 66 L. Ed. 621 (1981)).
While the police may not, without more, detain a suspect merely because he is
present in a neighborhood where violent crime or drug dealing is common, Illinois v.
Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 120 S. Ct. 673, 145 L. Ed. 2d 570 (2000), presence in a high-
crime area is a relevant contextual consideration in the Terry analysis when combined
with other factors. See United States v. Stroman, 500 F.3d 61, 64 (1st Cir. 2007) (noting
that the high-crime nature of the neighborhood is rationally relevant to the analysis
although sometimes debated on policy grounds); see also United States v. Harrington,
56 F.4th 195, 201-02 (1st Cir. 2022). So is unprovoked flight upon noticing the police.
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124; United States v. Wright, 582 F.3d 199, 210 (1st Cir.
2009).
If the Court finds that the initial interference with a defendant was justified, the
Court must then ask, “whether an ensuing search was ‘reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances which justified the officers’ initial interference.’” United States v. Ivery,
427 F.3d 69, 72 (1st Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Nee, 261 F.3d 79, 83 (1st Cir.
2001)). The reasonableness of a search following a Terry stop, in the form of a protective
frisk or pat-down for weapons, depends on whether the officer is justified in believing
that “the person is armed and dangerous to the officer or others.” United States v.
Camacho, 661 F.3d at 728 (quoting United States v. Romain, 393 F.3d 63, 71 (1st Cir.
2004)).
Case 3:24-cr-00402-GMM-HRV Document 75 Filed 10/22/25 Page 12 of 25

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28 	13
Furthermore, the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable seizures
require that formal arrests be based on probable cause. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85
S. Ct. 223, 13 L. Ed. 2d 142 (1964); United States v. McFarlane, 491 F.3d 53, 56 (1st Cir.
2007) (“An arrest does not contravene the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on
unreasonable seizures so long as the arrest is supported by probable cause.”). “Law
enforcement officers may effect warrantless arrests provided that they have probable
cause to believe that the suspect has committed or is committing a crime.” United States
v. Martinez-Molina, 64 F.3d 719, 726 (1st Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). “Probable cause
is a fluid concept -- turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual
contexts”, Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983),
and considering the totality of the circumstances. United States Jones, 432 F.3d 34, 41
(1st Cir. 2007). The inquiry focuses on what the officer knew at the time of the arrest.
United States v. Brown, 169 F.3d 89, 92 (1st Cir. 1999). “A Terry stop may lead to
probable cause for arrest when ‘the circumstances giving rise to reasonable suspicion’
are combined with ‘the developments that unfold[] during the Terry stop.’” United States
v. Dancy, 640 F.3d 455, 461 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Lee, 317 F.3d 26,
32 (1st Cir. 2003)).
As an initial matter, there appears to be little controversy that the lawfulness of
the intervention at issue here hinges on whether Villa-González had probable cause to
believe, based on his alleged observations, that the offense of possession of controlled
substances was committed by Méndez. In their filings, the parties cite Terry v. Ohio. But
no developed argumentation is put forth on the question of whether Méndez’ seizure was
justified at its inception by reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot.
Case 3:24-cr-00402-GMM-HRV Document 75 Filed 10/22/25 Page 13 of 25

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28 	14
Indeed, from the get-go, the Government argued that agent Villa-González went
after Méndez because he observed the latter running with a bag of drugs in his hand. And
in its post-hearing memorandum, the Government continues to assert that agent Villa-
González had probable cause to arrest the Defendant based on said observations. The
Government specifically contends that the agent observed the Defendant in possession
of substances “believed to be of an illicit nature.” (Docket No. 72 at 3).5
Similarly, the Defense has focused its efforts on challenging the credibility of the
agent with respect to the alleged observations giving rise to probable cause. In a one-
5 In its post-hearing memorandum, the Government briefly floated the alternative fallback theory of
reasonable suspicion justifying the intervention as lawful under Terry. The United States says that
notwithstanding a potential finding by the Court that the facts
known to PRPB Agent Villa when Méndez-Rodríguez was seized
did not constitute probable cause to arrest, reasonable suspicion
was all that would have been necessary to effect an initial
detention of the Defendant.
At the time of the defendant’s initial detention, officers had
enough facts to justify an investigatory detention based on
reasonable suspicion that the defendant had engaged in drug
trafficking. Upon that detention, Agent Villa would have come into
direct contact with the controlled substances held by the
defendant while he fled from the drug point. This would have
immediately morphed reasonable suspicion into probable cause
to arrest.
(Docket No. 72 at 8-9). This position is problematic for two main reasons. First, if the observation (Ziplock
bag full of cocaine in hand) giving rise to probable cause is eliminated from the equation, all that is left is
an individual running in a high-crime area (assuming without deciding that La Perla Ward qualifies as
such). As noted, unprovoked flight and presence in a high crime area are factors to be considered in the
reasonable suspicion analysis but are not by themselves sufficient to meet the first prong of Terry. Second,
even assuming favorably to the Government that those two factors justified a brief investigatory detention
of Méndez, the Government has failed to advance a persuasive argument that a search in the form of a
protective frisk or pat-down would have been warranted. No evidence was presented at the hearing to put
the Court in a position to find that Villa-González would have been justified in believing that Méndez was
armed and dangerous. United States v. McKoy, 428 F.3d 38, 39 (1st Cir. 2005) (“It is insufficient that the
stop itself is valid; there must be a separate analysis of whether the standard for pat-frisks has been met.
To assess the legality of a protective frisk, a court looks at the totality of the circumstances to see whether
the officer had a particularized, objective basis for his or her suspicion.”).
Case 3:24-cr-00402-GMM-HRV Document 75 Filed 10/22/25 Page 14 of 25

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28 	15
liner, the Defendant states: “In sum, the prosecution has not met its burden of
establishing that police [sic] had reasonable suspicion to detain Mr. Méndez and, a
fortiori, did not have probable cause to arrest and search him.” (Docket No. 73 at 6). In
view of the foregoing, I bypass any analysis that the warrantless seizure 6 of the
Defendant was justified under Terry v. Ohio. Therefore, my task is to determine, after
making an assessment of credibility, if the totality of the circumstances establish that
Villa-González had probable cause to arrest Méndez.
The testimony of Villa-González that he observed Méndez running with a Ziplock
bag in his hand containing what in his experience was controlled substances, is simply
not credible. I was able to observe the agent’s demeanor and inflection while testifying
before me. He testified with ease on direct but was confronted with several mistakes and
material omissions on cross examination. In addition to his story defying credulity, and
the strong incentive Villa-González had to manufacture a narrative supporting his
assertion of probable cause, there were also significant inconsistencies with the
testimony (both internal and external) that are impossible for me to overlook.
As an initial matter, it is undisputed that the work plan to intervene at La Perla on
October 8, 2024, did not include a mention of Méndez. The officers arrived at La Perla
6 To be sure, Méndez was seized for the first time when agent Villa-González caught up to him and arrested
him. See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 111 S. Ct. 1547, 113 L. Ed. 2d 690 (1991)). In Hodari D., a
group of youths fled at the approach of an unmarked police car. 499 U.S. at 623. The police officers were
suspicious, and they gave chase. Id. One officer followed the defendant, Hodari, and during the pursuit,
Hodari tossed out a “rock” of crack cocaine. Id. at 623. The officer then tackled Hodari and handcuffed
him. Id. Hodari moved to suppress the evidence relating to the cocaine, and the court denied the motion.
Id. The admissibility of the evidence turned on whether the police seized Hodari at the moment the chase
began or at the time of the tackle. The Supreme Court held that where a suspect fails to submit to an
officer’s approach and runs away, he is not seized until he is apprehended. Id. at 626. Hodari was therefore
not seized until he was tackled.
Case 3:24-cr-00402-GMM-HRV Document 75 Filed 10/22/25 Page 15 of 25

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28 	16
in unmarked vehicles and in plain clothes. But they had their police issued identifications.
There is no question that police presence was immediately noticed because consistent
with prior police interventions at La Perla, individuals began running as soon as the
police entered. Thus, it is clear to me that Méndez took off running on October 8, 2024,
when the police showed up.
That said, I agree with the Defense that for me to assign credibility to Villa-
González with respect to the critical observation I would have to believe that Méndez,
who had taken steps to hide all of the contraband in his pockets (and we know this
because this is where most of the contraband was seized following his arrest), decided to
hold on to a bag full of cocaine baggies for the whole world to see. 	What’s more, the
Government is asking me to believe that having had many opportunities to discard the
bag as he ran through a maze of abandoned structures full of garbage and debris, the
Defendant made the conscious decision to hold on to the incriminating evidence. I find
this proposition to be untenable. Judges should not be asked to believe as judges what
we would not believe as persons. See Landron-Class v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 64,
78 (D.P.R. 2015). Alternatively, the demonstration provided at the hearing of a clear
plastic bag of the same size as the Ziplock bag seized that day, shows the implausibility
of Villa-González’ testimony that he was able to readily identify the contents of the bag
as containing controlled substance. The way that Méndez was allegedly gripping7 the bag,
7 Even if I believed for a second that Méndez had the bag in his hand (which, as stated, I do not), I am not
prepared to find that the bag was held, as the Government urges me to do, in a manner that provided an
unobstructed view of the contents. That is simply not how anyone would hold a bag under the same
circumstances.
Case 3:24-cr-00402-GMM-HRV Document 75 Filed 10/22/25 Page 16 of 25

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28 	17
and as he was swinging his arms while running, makes it impossible that anyone could
readily see the contents with enough clarity in a fluid, rapidly evolving scenario, to
conclude, or even suspect, that it was drugs.
Further, the credibility of agent Villa-González’ version of the event is undermined
by the testimony of fellow officer Pagán-Rojas. On cross examination, at least three
material contradictions were established. The first one—perhaps the most benign of the
contradictions/omissions—is that as he ran behind Villa-González, Pagán-Rojas saw
two individuals running towards them being chased by fellow officer Xavier Rivera. At
no time during his testimony did Villa-González ever mention a second individual or
fellow officer Xavier Rivera. Even though this omission could be characterized, standing
alone, as inconsequential, there seems to be no valid reason to leave these facts out from
the narration.
Second, Pagán-Rojas’ testimony was that he first spotted Méndez running
towards them when he was about 60 feet away. (Tr. 179). According to Pagán-Rojas,
Villa-González was only approximately 10 feet ahead of him. If accurate, then Villa-
González would have been about 50 feet away from Méndez when he first saw him, not
20 feet as he testified. This factual divergence goes to the heart of Villa-González’ ability
to observe the contents of the bag allegedly held by the Defendant.
More importantly, Pagán-Rojas did not see anything in Mendéz’s hand as he ran
towards them and before turning to go down the alleyway. In fairness, Pagán-Rojas did
testify that he saw the bag in Mendéz’s hand after Villa-González had already detained
him and was holding on to him. Notably, this occurred after Pagán-Rojas stopped briefly
to assist officer Xavier Rivera with his detainee and after losing sight momentarily of
Case 3:24-cr-00402-GMM-HRV Document 75 Filed 10/22/25 Page 17 of 25

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28 	18
Villa-González 	and 	Méndes. 	If 	there 	were 	reasonable 	explanations 	for 	these
contradictions, the Government made no attempt to provide them neither at the hearing
nor in its post-hearing submission.
To all of the above I add that the agent struggled to identify with precision the
locations where the events transpired and did not include in his report rather important
facts. These “mistakes” would not have impacted the credibility determination if they
were the only problems with his testimony. But as discussed above, there are serious
issues calling into question the veracity of the version offered by agent Villa-González
anent the important facts that according to the Government established probable cause
to arrest.
In sum, the testimony of Villa-González that he saw Méndez holding a clear plastic
bag containing controlled substances and thus giving him probable cause to arrest is not
credible. The version was internally inconsistent, and inconsistent in several respects
with the version of at least one other law enforcement officer. The testimony was also
uncorroborated as he is conveniently the only agent that saw Méndez running with a bag
of drugs in his hands. United States v. Toledo-Villanueva, No. 23-cr-235 (RAM), 2024
WL 2720295, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97159 at *18-20 (D.P.R. May 28, 2024) (finding
that suppression was warranted and finding agent’s testimony regarding plain view not
credible because it was both inconsistent and uncorroborated.). At bottom, the agent’s
version had all the hallmarks of being contrived to make it fit the narrative of an arrest
supported by probable cause. See United States v. Lopez-Ortiz, 648 F. Supp. 2d 241, 249
(D.P.R. 2009) (refusing to disturb magistrate judges credibility determination and
characterizing agents’ testimonies as contrived and incredible).
Case 3:24-cr-00402-GMM-HRV Document 75 Filed 10/22/25 Page 18 of 25

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28 	19
In view of the forgoing, I find that Méndez was unlawfully arrested on October 8,
2024. Therefore, I recommend that the evidence seized by the police from the
Defendant’s person at the time of his arrest be suppressed.
2. Méndez 	voluntarily 	relinquished 	his 	property 	interest 	in 	the
backpack.
The Government contends that Méndez relinquished any right he might have had
to contest the seizure of the items found in his backpack when he abandoned it prior to
being arrested. According to the Government, the backpack was found “among the
crumbling foundations of a residence, on top of piles of debris and trash . . . in an area
open to public inspection near where Méndez-Rodríguez was arrested.” (Docket No. 72
at 9). The Government says that Defendant did not show an intent to preserve the privacy
of the backpack, nor did he claim ownership of it and its contents.
Méndez responds that the Government has failed to meet its burden to show that
there was a valid exception to the warrant requirement when the police searched his
backpack. He also maintains that he did not discard the backpack before his arrest or
disclaimed ownership of it, which are, as he put it, quintessential forms of abandonment.
Defendant further claims that the inability of the witnesses to specify where the backpack
was recovered in relation to the arrest location, calls into question the Government’s
abandonment theory.
When 	moving 	to 	suppress 	evidence, 	a 	defendant 	“carries 	the 	burden 	of
establishing that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to the area
searched or . . . the items seized.” United States v. Lipscomb, 539 F.3d 32, 35-36 (1st Cir.
2008) (citing United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 91-92, 100 S. Ct. 2547, 65 L. Ed. 2d
Case 3:24-cr-00402-GMM-HRV Document 75 Filed 10/22/25 Page 19 of 25

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28 	20
619 (1980)). However, a defendant said to originally have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the area searched or the item seized, may be deemed to have forfeited such
expectation of privacy by incurring in voluntary acts of abandonment. United States v.
Wilkins, 451 F. Supp. 3d 222, 227 (D. Mass. 2020); see also United States v. Soto-
Beniquez, 356 F.3d 1, 36 (1st Cir. 2004) (“It is well settled that if a defendant abandons
property while he is being pursued by police officers, he forfeits any reasonable
expectation of privacy he may have had in that property.”).
“To 	demonstrate 	abandonment, 	the 	government 	must 	establish 	by 	a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant’s voluntary words or conduct would
lead a reasonable person in the searching officer’s position to believe that the defendant
relinquished his property interests in the item searched or seized.” United States v.
Bailey, No. 08-10031-PBS, 2009 WL 524730, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15870, at *4 (D.
Mass. Feb. 26, 2009) (quoting United States v. Basinski, 226 F.3d 829, 836 (7th Cir.
2000)). The Court must look at the totality of the circumstances paying particular
attention to explicit denials of ownership and facts showing physical relinquishment of
property. Id. “There is also a subjective component . . . in the sense that a defendant who
is trying to show that he did not abandon property must also demonstrate that he actually
expected the item to remain private.” Id.
Here, although Méndez has attempted to cast doubt as to the specific location of
the backpack, and throws credibility jabs at agent Cardé-Rosado, one fact remains
uncontroverted: the backpack was found in an abandoned structure, surrounded by
Case 3:24-cr-00402-GMM-HRV Document 75 Filed 10/22/25 Page 20 of 25

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28 	21
trash and debris, and exposed to the public.8 Whatever subjective expectation (or hope)
Méndez may have had that he would later be able to retrieve the backpack is irrelevant
because by his conduct, and under the totality of the circumstances, he forfeited any
objectively reasonable expectation of privacy by physically relinquishing possession of it.
See United States v. Arboleda, 633 F.2d 985, 991 (2d Cir. 1980) (“Although [the
defendant] may have intended to retrieve the package later, by placing it in an
unprotected area he had abandoned it for Fourth Amendment purposes.”); see also
United States v. Labelle, No. 07-CR-20608, 2008 WL 1931875, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
35999, at *13 (E.D. Mich. May 2, 2008) (abandonment is not negated by the feeble hope
of re-acquisition.).
The abandoned dilapidated structure where the backpack was found was readily
accessible to the public or anyone passing by. And leaving an item in a public place is
strong evidence of abandonment. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S.35, 40, 108 S.
Ct. 1625, 100 L. Ed. 2d 30 (1988); see also United States v. Burnett, No. 24-1443, 2025
8 From the testimony of Cardé-Rosado and the photographic evidence presented, compare Exhibits 5
through 11 with Exhibits 28 and 29, there is no question in my mind that the backpack was found in the
structure that is located down the path that was allegedly followed by Méndez and Villa-González during
the chase. But even if it was unclear that such is the same path followed, Cardé-Rosado unequivocally
testified he found the backpack in the structure depicted in Exhibits 28 and 29. (Tr. 143-44). Also, the
Defense attacks the credibility of Cardé-Rosado as to the location of the backpack by highlighting that
Pagán-Rojas testified he “saw nothing inside” the structure. (Docket No. 73 at 12). Such assertion
mischaracterizes the testimony of Pagán-Rojas. He said that looked inside the opening as he was following
his fellow officer. He saw nothing that called his attention at the time but clarified on re-direct that he was
simply looking for his fellow officer. Thus, contrary to Méndez’s contention, the testimonies of Cardé-
Rosado and Pagán-Rojas can both be true. That Pagán-Rojas did not see a backpack inside the structure
does not mean it was not there. I have not been presented by any clear and convincing evidence that Cardé-
Rosado testified falsely.
Case 3:24-cr-00402-GMM-HRV Document 75 Filed 10/22/25 Page 21 of 25

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28 	22
WL 40850, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 312 (7th Cir. Jan. 7, 2025) (finding defendant
abandoned his Fourth Amendment interest in his bags when he placed them in the
bushes of an apartment building “and did not take active steps to guard them or give
them to another for safekeeping); United States v. Curran, 638 Fed. Appx. 149, 153 (3d
Cir. 2016) (concluding that appellant abandoned any reasonable expectation of privacy
in the bags when he threw them over the storage facility’s fence into a public area, walked
away, and made no attempt to protect the bags or their contents from inspection.);
United States v. Figueroa, No. 96-2065, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26007 (1st Cir. Sep. 22,
1998) (defendant abandoned all expectations of privacy in box he stashed in neighbor’s
house while fleeing from the police where there was no evidence that he intended to
retrieve it at a later time or that he obtained permission from the owners of the residence
to leave box with them for safekeeping); United States v. Morgan, 936 F.2d 1561, 1570
(10th Cir. 1991) (defendant abandoned reasonable expectation of privacy in a bag when
he discarded it in a backyard that was accessible to the public, and made no attempt to
retrieve it.).
Moreover, although Cardé-Rosado never questioned Méndez about the backpack,
there is also no evidence tending to show that Defendant claimed ownership at any time
after his arrest or asserted a privacy interest in it. See United States v. Hill, No. 24-cr-
20521, 2025 WL 1684233, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114324, at *25 (E.D. Mich. Jun. 16,
2025) (noting that a fact that favored a finding of abandonment was that Defendant did
not give a clear signal asserting his privacy or conveying that he maintained a privacy
interest in the backpack). Granted, his personal identification documents were found
Case 3:24-cr-00402-GMM-HRV Document 75 Filed 10/22/25 Page 22 of 25

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28 	23
inside, validating the assertion of a subjective expectation of privacy in the bag.9 But that
fact was only revealed after the search of the backpack was performed. Prior to the search
that the agent treated as a “finding” of abandoned property, there was nothing indicating
that the backpack contained the personal identification documents of an individual.
The cases cited by the Defense, United States v. Ramos-Ramirez, No. 22-50042,
2023 WL 5925902, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 24122 (5th Cir. May 10, 2023) and United
States v. Vining, 675 F. Supp. 3d 778 (E.D. Mich. 2023), are factually distinguishable. In
Ramos-Ramirez, for example, the defendant tossed his jacket over the fence of his
mother’s property. In doing so, the Fifth Circuit found that he did not manifest an intent
to discard it and a continued interest in keeping its contents private. Contrariwise,
Méndez left the backpack in a public place accessible to anyone passing by.
In Vining, after being initially approached by agents at a bus station, Defendant
set his bag down and walked away. The Court observe that to show abandonment, a
defendant must do more than just walk away from something as private as a suitcase;
walking away alone does not provide a conclusive indication of defendant’s intent. 675 F.
Supp. 3d at 792-93. But here, Méndez did more than just walk away from his backpack.
He left it in a location where, by all accounts, could be accessed by anyone thereby
defeating any intent to keep it private or safe from being grabbed and opened. See United
States v. Hill, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114324, at *20-21 (discussing caselaw holding that
9 I am not crediting Cardé-Rosado’s absurd statement that in his experience as a police officer it is
“common” for people to discard or throw away documents such as passports, social security cards or
driver’s licenses. (Tr. 150-51).
Case 3:24-cr-00402-GMM-HRV Document 75 Filed 10/22/25 Page 23 of 25

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28 	24
a crucial factor in the abandonment analysis is the location where the defendant places
an item and explaining that by dropping the item on a public street where it can be
damaged, lost or stolen, a defendant forfeits his right to exclude others and thus has no
expectation of privacy). “The location of Defendant’s backpack on a public street is
therefore consistent with abandonment; Defendant’s actions and the surrounding
circumstances do not show that he maintained a subjective expectation of privacy in his
backpack based on where he placed it.” Id. at *21; see also United States v. Oswald, 783
F.2d 663, 666-67 (6th Cir. 1983) (“[P]rivacy expectations . . . will vary with the location
of the property.”).
For the above-outlined reasons, I find that Méndez forfeited any expectation of
privacy he had over his backpack and that the Government met its burden to show
abandonment. I thus recommend that the request for suppression of the contents of the
backpack be denied.
V. 	C ONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, I recommend that Méndez’s motions to suppress (Docket
No. 50) be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
This report and recommendation is filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and
Rule 72(d) of the Local Rules of this Court. Any objections to the same must be specific
and must be filed with the Clerk of Court within 14 days. Failure to file timely and
specific objections is a waiver of the right to appellate review. See Thomas v. Arn, 474
U.S. 140, 155 (1985); Davet v. Maccorone, 973 F.2d 22, 30–31 (1st Cir. 1992); Paterson-
Leitch Co. v. Mass. Mun. Wholesale Elec. Co., 840 F.2d 985 (1st Cir. 1988); Borden v.
Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 836 F.2d 4, 6 (1st Cir. 1987).
Case 3:24-cr-00402-GMM-HRV Document 75 Filed 10/22/25 Page 24 of 25

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28 	25
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED
In San Juan, Puerto Rico this 22nd day of October, 2025.
S/Héctor L. Ramos-Vega
HÉCTOR L. RAMOS-VEGA
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Case 3:24-cr-00402-GMM-HRV Document 75 Filed 10/22/25 Page 25 of 25