USA v. Figueroa-Figueroa

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
v.
JASAEL FIGUEROA FIGUEROA
Defendant.
Crim. No. 24-214 (ADC)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
On June 20, 2024, Defendant Jasael Figueroa-Figueroa was charged with violations of 18
U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A), 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(B)(ii), 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) and 21 U.S.C. §§
841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C) and (b)(1)(D). Docket No. 1. Defendant filed a motion to suppress at Docket
No. 25. The United States opposed at Docket No. 37. Defendant replied at Docket No. 43 and the
United States sur-replied at Docket No. 46. The matter was referred to me for a hearing and Report
and Recommendation. Docket No. 27. An evidentiary hearing was scheduled but continued several
times at the parties’ request. See Docket Nos. 41, 51, 53. The case was called for an evidentiary
hearing, but upon hearing arguments on standing and Franks, the hearing was not held and I took
the matter under advisement. See Docket No. 67. After carefully considering the written
submissions and arguments of both sides, I recommend that Defendant’s motion to suppress at
Docket No. 25 be DENIED.
I. Background
Defendant requests that evidence seized from a residence at Barrio San José in Toa Baja
on June 11, 2024, pursuant to a search warrant be suppressed. He argues that, on the day of the
execution of the search warrant, he was seized at a sidewalk close to the residence and dragged
inside the residence prior to execution of the warrant. Although he disclaims ownership of the
residence, he nonetheless claims that, because law enforcement brought him into the house prior
to the search, he has standing to seek suppression of the evidence seized there. Defendant also
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argues that the affidavit submitted in support of the search warrant of the residence was deficient
both because it was generic and lacked particularity with respect to the residence to be searched.
And that he is entitled to a Franks hearing. Critically, Defendant did not submit an affidavit in
support of his request for suppression and did not even submit to the Court the affidavit he claims
was deficient and should be the subject of a Franks hearing. He complains of an illegal arrest. But
no evidence was seized from his person. The only evidence challenged by Defendant is that which
was seized from the residence. During the argumentative hearing, Defendant proffered that he
would present the testimony of three witness that would establish: (1) he was arrested in the
sidewalk and involuntarily brought inside the residence prior to execution of the warrant, (2)
another house was also searched without permission or consent of the owner of that house, and (3)
the falsity of some of the statements used by law enforcement to seek and obtain a warrant to
search a car that was parked in front of the residence at issue. That second warrant was not
submitted to the Court. More importantly, all the evidence subject to suppression here was seized
from the residence, not from the car.
The Government sustains that the evidence was seized pursuant to a valid search warrant
and that the search was authorized, and would have been validly executed, regardless of
Defendant’s arrest. So that the search and seizure of the evidence in the residence was not
conditioned or in any way impacted by Defendant’s purported illegal arrest. The Government also
argues that Defendant has not submitted an affidavit in support of his motion to suppress and has
not established standing to seek suppression of the evidence seized from the house. Indeed,
Defendant has expressly disclaimed ownership of the residence. Because Defendant has not
established standing to seek suppression of the evidence seized from the residence, he also lacks
standing to seek a hearing under Franks. The Government proffered that it would present four (4)
witnesses to establish the investigation and surveillance that gave law enforcement probable cause
to request a warrant for the search of the residence, and that the warrant correctly identified the
residence at issue. That upon arriving to execute the warrant, law enforcement observed Defendant
at the door frame of the residence with a firearm on hand. That upon sight of law enforcement, he
ran and exited the residence through the back door and was apprehended in the backyard of the
house and brought inside the residence. At the residence, law enforcement identified him as one
of the individuals seen during surveillance with evidence of firearms and controlled substances.
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That all the evidence was seized from inside the residence, including a firearm close to where
Defendant was seen standing before he fled to the back of the house.
II. Discussion
A. Defendant is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress
as he did not make a sufficient showing that material facts are in dispute.
A defendant does not have an automatic right to an evidentiary hearing on a motion to
suppress. United States v. Cintrón, 724 F.3d 32, 36 (1st Cir. 2013); United States v. Brown, 621
F.3d 48, 57–58 (1st Cir. 2010); United States v. Lewis, 40 F.3d 1325, 1332 (1st Cir. 1994); United
States v. Laureano Vélez, 210 F. Supp. 2d 54, 56 (D.P.R. July 8, 2002). “Rather, ‘[a] hearing is
required only if the movant makes a sufficient threshold showing that material facts are in doubt
or dispute, and that such facts cannot reliably be resolved on a paper record. Most importantly, the
defendant must show that there are factual disputes which, if resolved in his favor, would entitle
him to the requested relief.’” Cintrón, 724 F.3d at 36 (quotations in the original) (citations omitted).
Attorneys’ arguments submitted in support of the request for suppression are not based on first-
hand knowledge of the facts and are insufficient for the defendant to establish the required
“definite, specific, detailed, and nonconjectural [facts] to enable the court to conclude that a
substantial claim is presented.” Lewis, 40 F.3d at 1332.
Although Defendant is seeking suppression of the evidence seized from the residence, and
despite the requirements of Local Rule 147(a),1 Defendant has not presented an affidavit in support
of his request nor has he proffered evidence that would establish that there are factual disputes that
need to be resolved in an evidentiary hearing. Defendant’s arguments can be summarized as
follows: he was illegally arrested outside of the residence and brought inside the residence before
the execution of the search warrant, and the investigation of law enforcement prior to seeking the
search warrant was insufficient for a finding of probable cause to justify the issuance of the
warrant. But Defendant has disclaimed ownership of the residence. So, even assuming for purposes
of discussion the illegality of his arrest and the deficiency in the probable cause finding for the
search warrant, as will be discussed more fully below, there are no factual disputes that if resolved
would entitle Defendant to the requested relief. See e.g., United States v. Calderón, 77 F.3d 6, 9
1 This District Court’s Local Rule 147(a) provides that “[e]very dispositive motion shall
include citations and supporting authorities. Affidavits and other documents setting forth or evidencing
facts on which the motion is based shall be filed with the motion.”
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(1st Cir. 1996) (no right to evidentiary hearing when defendant did not submit affidavit or provide
offer of proof to establish coercion in consent for search); Laureano Vélez, 210 F. Supp. 2d at 57–
58 (no affidavit submitted, no need for evidentiary hearing).
B. Defendant has not made a threshold showing of legitimate expectation of
privacy in the residence that was searched and thus lacks standing to seek
suppression of the evidence seized.
The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Accordingly, searches and seizures should be conducted only after acquiring a warrant supported
by probable cause. Id. To assert a violation of Fourth Amendment rights, a person needs to have
legal standing to do so. This means that only a person whose reasonable or legitimate expectation
of privacy has been invaded by a search or seizure can seek redress under the Fourth Amendment.
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (discussing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 576
(1967) (string of cases omitted)); United States v. Battle, 637 F.3d 44, 48 (1st Cir. 2011) (“To
prevail on a claim that a search or seizure violated the Fourth Amendment, a defendant must show
as a threshold matter that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place or item
searched.”); United States v. Symonevich, 688 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 2012) (“As a general
proposition, ‘[a] person who is aggrieved by an illegal search and seizure only through the
introduction of damaging evidence secured by a search of a third person’s premises or property
has not had any of his [or her] Fourth Amendment rights infringed.’”) (citations omitted).
To determine whether a person has standing to seek the suppression of evidence illegally
searched and seized, we first ask what is the activity that is being challenged. Smith, 442 U.S. at
741. We then look at two criteria. A subjective one, which requires that the complainant have an
actual expectation of privacy over the things or activities at issue and to have taken steps or
demonstrated an intention of keeping those things or activities private. Id. at 740 (citing Katz, 389
U.S. at 361); Vega-Rodríguez v. Puerto Rico Telephone Co., 110 F.3d 174, 178 (1st Cir. 1997).
The objective factor requires that the complainant’s expectation of privacy is one that society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable. Smith, 442 U.S. at 740 (citing Katz 389 U.S. at 353); Vega-
Rodríguez, 110 F.3d at 178. See also United States v. Moore-Bush, 36 F.4th 320, 328 (1st Cir.
2022) (examining the two criteria). Some factors that may be considered by the Court in examining
whether a defendant has met the required threshold are: “ownership, possession, and/or control;
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historical use of the property searched or the thing seized; ability to regulate access; the totality of
the surrounding circumstances; the existence or nonexistence of a subjective anticipation of
privacy; and the objective reasonableness of such an expectancy under the facts of a given case.”
United States v. Aguirre, 839 F.2d 854, 856–57 (1st Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). But the burden
of establishing standing lies entirely with the defendant. Lewis, 40 F.3d at 1333; United States v.
Vilches-Navarrete, 523 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2008).
Defendant seeks suppression of the evidence seized from the residence at Barrio San José
in Toa Baja. See Docket No. 25 at pp. 10, 13; see also Docket No. 1-1 (listing the evidence seized
at the residence); Docket No. 43 at p. 6. He does not seek suppression of any evidence found on
his person. His argument on standing rests on his purported illegal arrest outside of the house and
on having been purportedly dragged inside the house prior to the execution of the warrant. See
Docket No. 43 at p. 7.2 Defendant has not submitted any evidence to establish that he had an
expectation of privacy in the searched residence. He did not proffer any evidence on this issue
when given the opportunity to do so during the argumentative hearing. On the contrary, counsel
argued in no uncertain terms that Defendant “had nothing to do with the house.” And the law is
clear that Defendant had the burden of establishing a privacy interest in the house and that by
disclaiming ownership of the house he has achieved the opposite. “[D]isclaiming ownership is
tantamount to declaring indifference, and thus negates the existence of any privacy concern in
[searched item].” United States v. Zapata, 18 F.3d 971, 978 (1st Cir. 1994) (citation omitted);
United States v. Samboy, 433 F.3d 154, 161–62 (1st Cir. 2005) (distancing from any possible
interest, coupled with no evidence that defendant rented or owned the apartment in question, or
had a right to exclude others or even that he maintained a regular presence there; no standing);
United States v. De Los Santos Ferrer, 999 F.2d 7, 9 (1st Cir. 1993) (disclaimed ownership of
searched luggage, forfeited claim of privacy in its content); United States v. Colón, 845 F. Supp.
923, 930 (D.P.R. Jan. 28, 1994) (disclaimed ownership of item searched, no standing to argue that
search was illegal).
2 Defendants’ arguments on Terry are misplaced. See Docket No. 43 at pp. 5-7. The relief
requested by Defendant is the suppression of the evidence seized from the residence that he claims he does
not own or possessed. He does not seek suppression of any evidence seized from his person. Therefore,
whether his detention was illegal under Terry is inconsequential.
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Far from establishing standing to seek relief for a Fourth Amendment violation,
Defendant’s claim with respect to the supposed illegality of the arrest goes to his claim of
innocence— that he cannot be deemed to have been in possession of the incriminating evidence
found in the house. But that is an argument for trial. See Lewis, 40 F.3d at 1333 (defendant’s
interest to avoid the evidentiary force of the seized evidence is different from an interest protected
by the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Agosto Pacheco, 2022 WL 16734558, at *3 (D.P.R.
June 16, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, 635 F. Supp. 3d 59 (D.P.R. 2022). Indeed,
contrary to the arguments made by Defendant at Docket No. 43 at pp. 3, 9, 11, there is nothing
impermissible with the Government arguing that a defendant does not have an expectation of
privacy in a place to assert a Fourth Amendment violation, while arguing that the defendant
possessed the evidence seized in that same place to prove guilt at trial. United States v. Gómez,
770 F.2d 251, 253–54 (1st Cir. 1985) (“the fourth amendment protects legitimate privacy
expectations. Therefore, it is possible for prosecutors to assert that a defendant had a possessory
interest in goods seized yet had not had any privacy expectation invaded.”) (internal citations
omitted) (emphasis in the original).3
C. Defendant has not established that he is entitled to a Franks hearing.
Because Defendant does not have standing to seek suppression of the evidence seized from
the residence, the inquiry could stop here and the motion to suppress denied without more. But in
any event, Defendant has not made the required showing to trigger a Franks hearing in this case.
An affidavit in support of a search warrant is presumptively valid. United States v. Gifford, 727
F.3d 92, 98 (1st Cir.2013) (citations omitted). “[A] defendant may attempt to rebut this
3 Even if the Court were to find that Defendant established that he has standing to challenge
the evidence seized from the house, his arguments that the evidence seized should be suppressed on account
of the application of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine would also be rejected. See Docket No. 43 at
p. 10. Under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, evidence with a “sufficiently close relationship to the
underlying illegality” may be suppressed as an extension of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule.
United States v. Sierra-Ayala, 39 F.4th 1, 16 (1st Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). But “suppression as fruit of
the poisonous tree is not appropriate where ‘the connection between the illegal police conduct and the
discovery and seizure of the evidence is ‘so attenuated as to dissipate the taint[.]’” Id. at 17 (citations
omitted); United States v. Camacho, 661 F.3d 718, 728–29 (1st Cir. 2011). As correctly argued by the
Government during the hearing, the evidence Defendant seeks to suppress was seized during the execution
of a search warrant of the residence. That seizure was not contingent on Defendant’s arrest and would have
occurred regardless of whether Defendant was present in the residence or illegally arrested. The evidence
was seized through independent means unrelated to the arrest.
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presumption and challenge the veracity of the affidavit.” United States v. McLellan, 792 F.3d 200,
208 (1st Cir. 2015). To do so, pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), a defendant
may try to establish that law enforcement used false statements to obtain the warrant. However, a
defendant does not have an automatic right to a Franks hearing. United States v. Barbosa, 896 F.3d
60, 68 (1st Cir. 2018). A defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing under Franks only when
he makes a “substantial preliminary showing that a false statement, knowingly and intentionally,
or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and if
the allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause.” Franks, 438 U.S. at
155–56. Material omissions in a government’s application can also serve as grounds for a Franks
evidentiary hearing, but only when the omissions are “designed to mislead, or [...] made in reckless
disregard of whether [it] would mislead, the magistrate in his appraisal of the affidavit.” United
States v. Rivera Rosario, 300 F.3d 1, 20 (1st Cir. 2002); Barbosa, 896 F.3d at 68. “Recklessness
may be inferred directly from the fact of omission only if the omitted information was critical to
the probable cause determination.” Id.
To make a “substantial preliminary showing” that would require Franks hearing, a
defendant’s claim must go beyond vague or conclusory statements and must “be supported by
more than a mere desire to cross-examine.” United States v. Andújar-Ortiz, 575 F. Supp. 2d 373,
377 (D.P.R. Sept. 2, 2008) (citations omitted). “Defendant’s allegations of deliberate falsehood or
of reckless disregard for the truth must be accompanied by an offer of proof.” Id. Affidavits or
sworn or otherwise reliable statements of witnesses constitute adequate offers of proof. Id.; Franks,
438 U.S. at 171 (“Affidavits or sworn or otherwise reliable statements of witnesses should be
furnished, or their absence satisfactorily explained.”). These should clearly identify the specific
part of the warrant affidavit that is alleged to be false and provide reasons supporting the claim.
Andújar-Ortiz, 575 F. Supp. 2d at 377. Self-serving statements made by the defendant alone are
insufficient to serve as an offer of proof. Id. (citations omitted).
Defendant’s arguments for a Franks hearing should be rejected. Defendant did not present
an affidavit or any other evidence to make a substantial showing that a false statement or an
omission of a material fact was made knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for
the truth by law enforcement when applying for the search warrant for the house. Franks, 438 U.S.
at 155–56. Defendant did not even present to the Court the affidavit submitted by law enforcement
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in support of the search warrant for the residence. Indeed, when asked during the argumentative
hearing to identify the purported false statements in the affidavit submitted in support of the search
warrant, Defendant was unable to identify any.4 Defendant merely insisted in a conclusory fashion
that the surveillance and investigation that gave rise to the finding of probable cause was deficient.
See also Docket No. 25 at pp. 12, 15. But even assuming for purposes of discussion that law
enforcement investigation was deficient, Defendant did not offer any evidence that could lead the
Court to conclude that law enforcement had serious doubts as to the truth of their statements in the
affidavit to justify a Franks hearing in this case. See United States v. Ranney, 298 F.3d 74, 78 (1st
Cir. 2002) (failure to investigate fully is not enough to establish reckless disregard for the truth
required under Franks; there must be a showing that the affiant had serious doubts as to the truth
of the allegations).
III. Conclusion
For the reasons discussed, I recommend that Defendant’s motion to suppress at Docket No.
25 be DENIED without the need for an evidentiary hearing.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
This Report and Recommendation is issued pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1) and Rule
72(d) of the Local Rules of this District Court. Pursuant to Local Rule 72(d), the parties have
fourteen (14) days to file any objections to this Report and Recommendation. Failure to file timely
and specific objections may be deemed waived by the District Court and claims not preserved by
objections may be precluded on appeal. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 155 (1985); United
States v. Valencia-Copete, 792 F.2d 4, 6 (1st Cir. 1986); Davet v. Maccarone, 973 F.2d 22, 30-31
(1st Cir. 1992); Henley Drilling Co. v. McGee, 36 F.3d 143, 150 (1st Cir. 1994).
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 4th day of November, 2025.
s/Giselle López-Soler
GISELLE LÓPEZ-SOLER
United States Magistrate Judge
4 During the hearing, I repeatedly asked counsel to describe the alleged falsities in the
affidavit submitted in support of the search warrant of the house. She answered that the warrant did not
describe with certainty the place to be searched, that the warrant was a general or generic, and that the
surveillance conducted by law enforcement and described in the affidavit was deficient. None of these carry
the day.
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