Benton et al v. UBER Technologies, Inc. et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
CRISTAL BENTON and AYSE SARI,
Plaintiffs,
v.
UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC, et al.,
Defendants,
v.
COOPERATIVA 	DE 	SEGUROS 	MÚLTIPLES,
et al.
Third-Party Defendants.
CIVIL NO. 23-1363(RAM)
OPINION AND ORDER
RAÚL M. ARIAS-MARXUACH, United States District Judge
Pending before the Court is third-party defendant Cooperativa
de Seguros Multiples’ (“CSM”) Motion to Dismiss. (Docket No. 71).
For the reasons outlined below, CSM’s Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.
I. 	PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On 	July 	12, 	2023, 	Plaintiffs 	Crystal 	Benton 	and 	Ayse 	Sari
(collectively “Plaintiffs”) filed their Original Complaint against
Uber 	Technologies, 	Inc. 	(“Uber”), 	Lindaliz 	Gómez-Orta 	(“Gómez-
Orta”) 	and 	Frances 	Estephanie 	Rivera-Rivera 	(“Rivera-Rivera”).
(Docket 	No. 	1). 	In 	essence, 	Plaintiffs 	allege 	that 	on 	July 	17,
2022, they were riding in an Uber being driven by Gómez-Orta when
Rivera-Rivera 	crashed 	into 	the 	vehicle, 	causing 	Plaintiffs
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extensive 	injuries 	that 	have 	impacted 	their 	daily 	lives 	and
required considerable medical treatment and physical therapy. Id.
¶¶ 	8, 	10, 	16-19. 	The 	same 	day 	the 	Original 	Complaint 	was 	filed,
Plaintiffs 	also 	sought 	to 	stay 	the 	case 	for 	arbitration
proceedings. 	(Docket 	No. 	5). 	The 	Court 	granted 	this 	request, 	and
the 	case 	was 	stayed 	until 	January 	14, 	2025. 	(Docket 	Nos. 	7 	and
21). 	Plaintiffs 	filed 	their 	First 	Amended 	Complaint 	on 	April 	29,
2025. (Docket No. 36).1
On May 13, 2025, Gómez-Orta filed its Answer to First Amended
Complaint, 	Crossclaim 	Against 	Codefendant 	Frances 	Estephanie
Rivera-Rivera, and Third-Pary Complaint. (Docket No. 40). Therein,
Gómez-Orta filed: (1) a crossclaim against Rivera-Rivera, claiming
her actions were the sole proximate, legal, and adequate cause of
the accident described in the Amended Complaint; and (2) a third-
party 	complaint 	against 	CSM, 	as 	the 	insurer 	of 	Rivera-Rivera’s
vehicle 	that 	was 	involved 	in 	the 	accident, 	seeking 	contribution
and indemnification. Id. at 28-38.
CSM 	filed 	the 	pending 	Motion 	to 	Dismiss 	on 	August 	21, 	2025,
asserting 	that 	Gómez-Orta’s 	claims 	against 	CSM 	are 	time-barred.
(Docket 	No. 	71). 	Specifically, 	CSM 	claims 	that 	the 	Original
Complaint 	was 	filed 	by 	Plaintiffs 	on 	July 	21, 	2025, 	i.e., 	three
years after the accident and two years after the applicable statute
1 Plaintiffs subsequently amended the complaint on two additional occasions.
(Docket Nos. 50 and 57).
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of limitations had elapsed. Id. at 6. CSM contends that the statute
of 	limitations 	was 	never 	interrupted 	against 	Rivera-Rivera, 	its
insured, and thus the claims against CSM are equally untimely. Id.
Gómez-Orta 	filed 	her 	Opposition 	on 	September 	11, 	2025
asserting 	that 	the 	original 	complaint 	whereby 	Plaintiffs 	sued
Rivera-Rivera was in fact filed on July 12, 2023, within the one-
year 	statute 	of 	limitations. 	(Docket 	No. 	75 	at 	2). 	Gómez-Orta
contends that because there is perfect solidarity between Rivera-
Rivera and CSM, dismissal of the claims against CSM is unwarranted.
Id.
II. 	APPLICABLE LAW
When ruling on a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss,
“[t]he 	sole 	inquiry 	... 	is 	whether, 	construing 	the 	well-pleaded
facts 	of 	the 	complaint 	in 	the 	light 	most 	favorable 	to 	the
plaintiffs, 	the 	complaint 	states 	a 	claim 	for 	which 	relief 	can 	be
granted.” 	Ocasio-Hernandez 	v. 	Fortuno-Burset, 	640 	F.3d 	1, 	7 	(1st
Cir. 2011). The Court must first “isolate and ignore statements in
the 	complaint 	that 	simply 	offer 	legal 	labels 	and 	conclusions 	or
merely 	rehash 	cause-of-action 	elements.” 	Schatz 	v. 	Republican
State 	Leadership 	Committee, 	669 	F.3d 	50, 	55 	(1st 	Cir. 	2012)
(citations omitted). Then, the Court takes “the complaint's well-
pled 	(i.e., 	non-conclusory, 	non-speculative) 	facts 	as 	true,
drawing 	all 	reasonable 	inferences 	in 	the 	pleader's 	favor,” 	to
determine 	“if 	they 	plausibly 	narrate 	a 	claim 	for 	relief.” 	Id.
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Civil No. 23-1363(RAM) 	4
(citations omitted). When evaluating a motion to dismiss pursuant
to 	Fed. 	R. 	Civ. 	P. 	12(b)(6), 	Courts 	may 	consider: 	“(a)
‘implications from documents’ attached to or fairly ‘incorporated
into the complaint,’ (b) ‘facts’ susceptible to ‘judicial notice,’
and 	(c) 	‘concessions’ 	in 	plaintiff’s 	‘response to 	the 	motion 	to
dismiss.’” Schatz, 	669 	F.3d 	at 	55–56 	(quoting 	Arturet–Vélez 	v.
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 429 F.3d 10, 13 n.2 (1st Cir. 2005)).
The First Circuit has held that “[a]ffirmative defenses, such
as the statute of limitations, may be raised in a motion to dismiss
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), provided that ‘the
facts 	establishing 	the 	defense 	[are] 	clear 	‘on 	the 	face 	of 	the
plaintiff's 	pleadings.’” 	Trans-Spec 	Truck 	Serv., 	Inc. 	v.
Caterpillar 	Inc., 	524 	F.3d 	315, 	320 	(1st 	Cir. 	2008)(quoting
Blackstone Realty LLC v. FDIC, 244 F.3d 193, 197 (1st Cir. 2001));
see also LaChapelle v. Berkshire Life Ins. Co., 142 F.3d 507, 509
(1st 	Cir. 	1998) 	(“Granting 	a 	motion 	to 	dismiss 	based 	on 	a
limitations 	defense 	is 	entirely 	appropriate 	when 	the 	pleader's
allegations 	leave 	no 	doubt 	that 	an 	asserted 	claim 	is 	time-
barred.”). 	If 	the 	dates 	alleged 	in 	the 	compliant 	“show 	that 	the
limitations 	period 	has 	been 	exceeded 	and 	the 	complaint 	fails 	to
sketch 	a 	factual 	predicate 	that 	would 	warrant 	the 	application 	of
either 	a 	different 	statute 	of 	limitations 	period 	or 	equitable
estoppel, 	dismissal 	is 	appropriate.” 	Trans-Spec, 	524 	F.3d 	at 	320
(quotations and citations omitted).
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III. DISCUSSION
Article 	1204 	of 	the 	Puerto 	Rico 	Civil 	Code 	of 	2020 	“sets 	a
one-year 	statute 	of 	limitations 	for 	personal 	injury 	claims.”
Rodriguez v. De Jesus-Rojas, 702 F. Supp. 3d 35, 38 (D.P.R. 2023);
see 	also 	P.R. 	Laws 	Ann. 	§ 	9496. 	In 	the 	case 	at 	bar, 	the 	alleged
accident 	occurred 	on 	July 	17, 	2022, 	and 	Plaintiffs 	filed 	their
Original 	Complaint 	against 	Uber, 	Gómez-Orta 	and 	Rivera-Rivera 	on
July 	12, 	2023, 	i.e., 	within 	the 	applicable 	one-year 	statute 	of
limitations. See id.; Docket No. 1.
Upon reviewing the record, it is evident that CSM incorrectly
identified 	July 	21, 	2025, 	as 	the 	date 	on 	which 	Plaintiffs 	filed
their 	Original 	Complaint. 	In 	fact, 	July 	21, 	2025 	corresponds 	to
the date on which Plaintiffs filed their Third Amended Complaint,
the operative complaint in this case. (Docket No. 57). Accordingly,
the action in its entirety is not time-barred.
Although inartfully raised, the question remaining before the
Court 	is 	whether 	the 	Third-Party 	Complaint 	filed 	on 	May 	13, 	2023
against 	CSM 	in 	its 	capacity 	as 	Rivera-Rivera’s 	insurer 	is 	time-
barred. In Fraguada Bonilla v. Hospital Auxilio Mutuo, 186 D.P.R.
365 (2012), the Puerto Rico Supreme Court “overruled longstanding
state 	law 	that 	automatically 	tolled 	the 	statute 	of 	limitations
against all joint tortfeasors provided that suit was timely brought
against 	at 	least 	one 	of 	them.” 	Rivera-Carrasquillo 	v. 	Centro
Ecuestre 	Madrigal, 	Inc., 	812 	F.3d 	213, 	217 	n. 	4 	(1st 	Cir. 	2016).
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As 	a 	crucial 	exception 	post 	Fraguada, 	“if 	there 	is 	perfect
solidarity 	between 	the 	joint 	tortfeasors, 	tolling 	as 	to 	one 	co-
tortfeasor [such as through an extrajudicial claim] will toll [the
statute of limitations] as to the rest.” Hamdallah v. CPC Carolina
PR, 	LLC, 	91 	F.4th 	1, 	26 	(1st 	Cir. 	2024) 	(internal 	quotations 	and
citations 	omitted). 	Perfect 	solidarity 	exists 	“where 	several
persons 	[are] 	joined 	by 	a 	common 	interest, 	[and] 	have 	frequent
relations among themselves or know each other” whereas “imperfect
solidarity is the juridical relationship of people who do not know
each 	other, 	who 	are 	only 	accidental 	co-tortfeasors 	or 	when 	they
have sporadic relationships.” Milicevic v. Bayamon Hotel Co. LLC,
No. CV 22-1202 (HRV), 2024 WL 404544, at *6 (D.P.R. Feb. 2, 2024)
(quotations and citations omitted).
Courts 	applying 	Puerto 	Rico 	law 	have 	reached 	different
conclusions as to whether the relationship between an insurer and
its 	insured 	is 	equivalent 	to 	perfect 	solidarity. 	See 	Tonge 	v.
Doctors' 	Ctr. 	Hosp., 	531 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	491, 	511 	(D.P.R. 	2021).
Although 	there 	is 	not 	binding 	precedent 	to 	this 	effect, 	judges
have reasoned that “an insurance company that agrees to be liable
for the acts or omissions of an insured person is not jointly and
severally 	liable, 	unless 	this 	is 	so 	agreed 	between 	the 	parties.”
Id. 	(quoting 	Justice 	Estrella-Martínez 	concurring 	opinion 	in
Menendez 	Lebron 	v. 	Rodriguez 	Casiano, 	203 	D.P.R. 	885, 	(Feb. 	3,
2020)).
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However, 	in 	her 	Third-Party 	Complaint, 	Gómez-Orta 	alleges
that:
At 	all 	times 	material 	hereto, 	CSM 	issued,
subscribed, 	underwrote, 	assumed 	and/or
renewed 	one 	or 	more 	contracts 	of 	insurance—
including, 	without 	limitation, 	compulsory
liability 	(“LI”), 	public 	responsibility,
personal 	liability, 	voluntary 	bodily-injury
and 	property-damage 	liability, 	uninsured 	and
under-insured 	motorists 	(“UM/UIM”), 	no-
fault/personal-injury-protection 	(“PIP”),
medical-payments, 	collision, 	comprehensive,
garage-keepers, 	employer’s 	non-ownership,
umbrella 	and 	excess 	liability, 	and 	any 	other
first- 	or 	third-party 	motor-vehicle-related
coverage 	permitted 	under 	Puerto Rico 	or
federal 	law—affording 	protection 	to 	(i) 	the
2022 	Tesla Model Y 	bearing 	Puerto Rico 	plate
JYE-853, 	(ii) 	its 	titled 	owner, 	(iii) 	its
operator Frances Estephanie Rivera 	Rivera, and
(iv) all permissive and omnibus insureds. Each
such 	policy 	(a) 	was 	in 	full 	force 	and 	effect
on 	July 17 2022; 	(b) 	obligates 	CSM 	to 	defend
and to indemnify, jointly and severally and up
to 	the 	fullest 	extent 	of 	the 	applicable
limits, 	against 	any 	and 	all 	claims 	of 	bodily
injury, 	death, 	personal 	injury, 	property
damage, 	loss 	of 	use, 	economic 	loss, 	loss 	of
consortium, 	prejudgment 	interest, 	costs,
attorney’s 	fees, 	contribution,
indemnification or any other damages that may
be 	awarded, 	if 	any, 	in 	connection 	with 	the
motor-vehicle collision alleged in the Amended
Complaint; and (c) renders CSM directly liable
to the same extent as its insureds pursuant to
Puerto Rico’s direct-action statute.
(Docket 	No. 	40 	at 	29 	¶ 	4) 	(emphasis 	added). 	This 	allegation
is 	sufficient 	at 	this 	procedural 	stage 	to 	adequately 	plead 	that
(1) CSM is jointly and severally liable pursuant to the insurance
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Civil No. 23-1363(RAM) 	8
policy 	it 	issued 	to 	Rivera-Rivera; 	and 	(2) 	perfect 	solidarity
exists between said parties.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
In light of the above, CSM’s Motion to Dismiss at Docket No.
71 is hereby DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan Puerto Rico, this 9 th day of January 2026
S/ Raúl M. ARIAS-MARXUACH_____
United States District Judge
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