Gonzalez-Lopez et al v. Municipality of San Juan et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
Mónica E. González-López, et al
Plaintiffs,
v.
Municipality of San Juan, et al
Defendants.
CIVIL NO. 23-1278 (RAM)
OPINION & ORDER
Pending 	before 	the 	Court 	are 	four 	Motions 	for 	Summary
Judgment: (1) Codefendant Police Officer Emmanuel Ramos-Pabón (“PO
Ramos-Pabón”)’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 209); (2)
Codefendant Police Officer Alberto Robles-Concepción (“PO Robles-
Concepción”)’s 	Motion 	for 	Summary 	Judgment 	(Docket 	No. 	224); 	(3)
Codefendants 	Municipality 	of 	San 	Juan, 	Mr. 	Miguel 	A. 	Romero-Lugo
and Mr. Juan J. García (collectively, the “Municipality”)’s Motion
for 	Summary 	Judgment 	(Docket 	No. 	226); 	and 	(4) 	Plaintiffs 	Ms.
Mónica 	González 	and 	Mr. 	José 	Rodríguez 	(collectively,
“Plaintiffs”)’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 214).
For 	the 	reasons 	set 	forth 	below, 	the 	Court 	GRANTS 	PO 	Ramos-
Pabón, 	PO 	Robles-Concepción 	and 	the 	Municipality’s 	Motions 	and
DENIES Plaintiffs’ Motion.
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Civil No. 23-1278 (RAM) 	2
I. 	PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The 	suit 	arises 	from 	the 	untimely 	death 	of 	Plaintiffs’ 	son,
Mr. Christian José Rodríguez-González (“Mr. Rodríguez-González” or
the 	“decedent”), 	who 	was 	shot 	and 	killed 	during 	a 	police 	chase
carried out by PO Robles-Concepción and PO Ramos-Pabón on July 15,
2022. (Docket No. 52 ¶ 15). Plaintiffs filed suit on May 30, 2023,
and then filed an Amended Complaint on September 18, 2024. (Docket
Nos. 1 and 52).
On 	November 	24, 	2025, 	Plaintiffs 	and 	Defendants 	moved 	for
summary judgment in four separate filings. (Docket Nos. 209, 214,
224, and 226). In their Motions, PO Robles-Concepción and PO Ramos-
Pabón 	(collectively, 	the 	“Officers”) 	argued 	the 	uncontroverted
evidence 	supported 	summary 	judgment 	in 	their 	favor. 	(Docket 	Nos.
209 and 224). The Officer’s arguments included that: (1) they are
entitled 	to 	qualified 	immunity 	for 	their 	involvement 	in 	the
intervention with and death of Mr. Rodríguez-González on July 15,
2022; 	and 	(2) 	they 	should 	prevail 	on 	the 	merits 	of 	the 	case
regardless 	of 	immunity 	because 	their 	use 	of 	force 	was 	reasonable
and that, if a right to provide care exists, they provided it. Id.
On their part, the Municipality argued that, because the Officers
did 	not 	commit 	a 	constitutional 	violation, 	there 	can 	be 	no 	basis
for 	finding 	supervisory 	liability 	against 	the 	Municipality.
(Docket No. 226 at 3). The Municipality also argued that they did
not 	personally 	violate 	any 	constitutional 	rights 	of 	the 	decedent
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Civil No. 23-1278 (RAM) 	3
and 	could, 	therefore, 	not 	be 	found 	liable 	regardless 	of 	the
liability of the Officers. Id. at 4.
In 	their 	Motion, 	Plaintiffs 	conversely 	averred 	the
uncontroverted evidence supported summary judgment in their favor.
(Docket 	No. 	214). 	Plaintiffs’ 	arguments 	included 	that: 	(1) 	there
is 	uncontroverted 	evidence 	that 	PO 	Robles-Concepción 	used
excessive use of force when he shot Mr. Rodríguez-González in the
back; (2) PO Ramos-Pabón failed to stop the shooting; and (3) the
Officers failed to comply with their duty to transport the decedent
to the hospital in the patrol car if the ambulance was taking too
long to arrive. Id.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Summary 	judgment 	is 	proper 	under 	Fed. 	R. 	Civ. 	P. 	56(a) 	“‘if
the 	pleadings, 	depositions, 	answers 	to 	interrogatories, 	and
admissions 	on 	file, 	together 	with 	the 	affidavits, 	if 	any, 	show
there 	is 	no 	genuine 	issue 	as 	to 	any 	material 	fact 	and 	that 	the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’” White
v. 	Hewlett 	Packard 	Enterprise 	Company, 	985 	F.3d 	61, 	68 	(1st 	Cir.
2021) 	(quoting 	Celotex 	Corp. 	v. 	Catrett, 	477 	U.S. 	317, 	322)). 	A
genuine 	dispute 	exists 	“if 	the 	evidence 	about 	the 	fact 	is 	such
that 	a 	reasonable 	jury 	could 	resolve 	the 	point 	in 	favor 	of 	the
non-moving party.” Alicea v. Wilkie, 2020 WL 1547064, at *2 (D.P.R.
2020) 	(quotation 	omitted). 	A 	fact 	is 	material 	if 	“it 	is 	relevant
to the resolution of a controlling legal issue raised by the motion
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Civil No. 23-1278 (RAM) 	4
for summary judgment.” Bautista Cayman Asset Co. v. Terra II MC &
P, Inc., 2020 WL 118592, at *6 (D.P.R. 2020) (quotation omitted).
The 	movant 	bears 	the 	burden 	of 	showing 	a 	lack 	of 	genuine
issues 	of 	material 	fact. 	See 	Feliciano-Muñoz 	v. 	Rebarber-Ocasio,
970 F.3d 53, 62 (1st Cir. 2020) (citing Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at
323). This burden is met when the movant shows that the nonmovant
“has 	failed 	‘to 	make 	a 	showing 	sufficient 	to 	establish 	the
existence 	of 	an 	element 	essential 	to 	that 	party’s 	case, 	and 	on
which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.’” E.E.O.C.
v. 	Kohl’s 	Dept. 	Stores, 	Inc., 	774 	F.3d 	127, 	131 	(1st 	Cir. 	2014)
(quoting Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322).
The 	non-movant 	may 	defeat 	summary 	judgment 	by 	evincing,
“through 	submissions 	of 	evidentiary 	quality, 	that 	a 	trialworthy
issue 	persists.” 	Robinson 	v. 	Town 	of 	Marshfield, 	950 	F.3d 	21, 	24
(1st Cir. 2020) (quotation omitted). It “cannot merely ‘rely on an
absence 	of 	competent 	evidence 	but 	must 	affirmatively 	point 	to
specific 	facts 	that 	demonstrate 	the 	existence 	of 	an 	authentic
dispute.’” Vogel v. Universal Insurance Company, 2021 WL 1125015,
at *2 (D.P.R. 2021) (quoting Feliciano-Muñoz, 2020 WL 4592144, at
*6). 	Conclusory 	allegations 	and 	unsupported 	speculation 	do 	not
defeat summary judgment. See River Farm Realty Tr. v. Farm Family
Cas. Ins. Co., 943 F.3d 27, 41 (1st Cir. 2019) (quotation omitted).
Local 	Rule 	56 	also 	governs 	summary 	judgment. 	See 	L. 	CV. 	R.
56. 	Per 	this 	Rule, 	a 	non-movant 	must 	“admit, 	deny 	or 	qualify 	the
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Civil No. 23-1278 (RAM) 	5
facts 	supporting 	the 	motion 	for 	summary 	judgment 	by 	reference 	to
each numbered paragraph of the moving party’s statement of material
facts.” L. CV. R. 56(c). Adequately supported facts shall be deemed
admitted 	unless 	controverted 	per 	the 	manner 	set 	forth 	in 	Local
Rule 	56. 	See 	Muñiz 	Negrón 	v. 	Worthington 	Cylinder 	Corporation,
2021 WL 1199014, at *3 (D.P.R. 2021) (quotation omitted). Litigants
ignore this Rule at their peril. Id.
III. FINDINGS OF FACT
To make findings of fact, the Court analyzed Defendants’ three
Statements of Uncontested Material Facts in Support of Motion for
Summary 	Judgment 	(“DSUF”) 	(Docket 	Nos. 	209-1, 	220, 	and 	228) 	as
well as Plaintiffs’ three Denials, Qualifications, and Admissions
(“Responses”) thereto. (Docket Nos. 256-1, 257-1, and 255-1). The
Court also analyzed Plaintiffs’ Statement of Uncontested Material
Facts 	(“PSUF”) 	(Docket 	No. 	215) 	and 	Defendants’ 	respective
Responses thereto (Docket Nos. 251, 268, and 275).
After 	only 	crediting 	material 	facts 	that 	are 	properly
supported by a record citation and uncontroverted, the Court makes
the following findings of fact:
1. On 	July 	15, 	2022, 	PO 	Robles-Concepción 	and 	PO 	Ramos-Pabón
were 	assigned 	to 	the 	municipal 	police 	headquarters 	in
Antillas. (Docket No. 220-1 at 29).
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Civil No. 23-1278 (RAM) 	6
2. On that day, the Officers were patrolling the streets of San
Juan 	on 	patrol 	car 	number 	P-001 	(the 	“patrol 	car”). 	Id. 	at
29-30; (Docket No. 220-9 at 38).
3. The Officers were inside the patrol car which was stopped at
a 	red 	light 	in 	the 	65th 	Infantry 	Avenue 	and 	Street 	No. 	49
intersection of Parcelas Falú. (Docket Nos. 220-1 at 30; 220-
9 at 57).
4. While 	at 	the 	intersection, 	the 	Officers 	spotted 	two
motorcycles that ran through the red light. Id.
5. One 	of 	the 	motorcycles 	was 	a 	grey, 	black 	and 	red 	Honda 	CRF
250 R from 2007 (the “motorcycle”). (Docket Nos. 220-4 at 61;
220-11 at 28).
6. Mr. Rodríguez-González was driving the motorcycle fast and in
a reckless manner. (Docket No. 220-1 at 31).
7. Mr. Rodríguez-González was carrying a backpack with what the
Officers believed to be a long, black rifle barrel protruding
from the top. (Docket Nos. 220-1 at 30; 220-9 at 57).
8. Mr. 	Rodríguez-González 	was 	wearing 	a 	face 	mask 	that 	covered
his 	face 	and 	neck 	almost 	completely. 	(Docket 	Nos. 	220-1 	at
30; 220-9 at 66; 220-14 at 3).
9. The 	only 	visible 	part 	of 	the 	decedent’s 	face 	were 	his 	eyes.
Id.
10. The 	motorcycle 	did 	not 	have 	a 	license 	plate. 	(Docket 	Nos.
220-1 at 30; 220-9 at 67).
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Civil No. 23-1278 (RAM) 	7
11. A 	valid 	license 	plate 	is 	required 	for 	a 	motor 	vehicle 	to
transit 	through 	the 	streets 	of 	Puerto 	Rico. 	Puerto 	Rico
Vehicle 	and 	Traffic 	Act, 	P.R. 	Laws. 	Ann. 	Tit. 	9 	§§5001(75),
5001(96) and 5021.
12. Mr. 	Rodríguez-González 	was 	not 	wearing 	a 	safety 	helmet 	or
protective gear. (Docket Nos. 220-1 at 30; 220-9 at 67).
13. The Officers ordered the two motorcycles to stop. (Docket No.
220-1 at 31).
14. Both 	motorcycles 	failed 	to 	yield 	and 	instead 	fled 	from 	the
Officers. (Docket No. 220-4 at 36).
15. Mr. 	Edwin 	Colbourne 	(“Mr. 	Colbourne”), 	the 	driver 	of 	the
second motorcycle, testified that, when he and Mr. Rodríguez-
González 	saw 	the 	Officers, 	they 	accelerated 	the 	motorcycles
and attempted to escape from the police. Id.
16. Mr. Colbourne testified he was worried because Mr. Rodríguez-
González’s rifle looked real. (Docket No. 220 at 5).
17. After beginning the chase, PO Robles-Concepción informed the
Command 	Center 	of 	what 	was 	happening 	and 	provided 	a
description 	of 	the 	individuals 	driving 	the 	motorcycles.
(Docket No. 220-1 at 31).
18. During 	the 	pursuit, 	the 	two 	motorcycles 	separated 	and
continued 	in 	different 	directions. 	(Docket 	No. 	220-4 	at 	36-
37).
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Civil No. 23-1278 (RAM) 	8
19. The Officers continued pursuit of Mr. Rodríguez-González who
ignored their orders to stop. (Docket No. 220-1 at 31-32).
20. At one point during the chase, the Officers lost sight of Mr.
Rodríguez-González. Id.
21. When the Officers saw Mr. Rodríguez-González again, the rifle
that was originally in his backpack had been repositioned and
moved to the front of the motorcycle, between the decedent’s
legs. Id.; (Docket No. 220-9 at 58-59).
22. Pictures 	captured 	from 	the 	security 	cameras 	of 	a 	nearby
business 	show 	Mr. 	Rodríguez-González 	riding 	the 	motorcycle
with 	the 	rifle 	between 	his 	thighs 	and 	the 	motorcycle 	fuel
tank. (Docket No. 220-17 at 13-21).
23. After 	noticing 	that 	Mr. 	Rodríguez-González 	had 	moved 	the
rifle 	to 	the 	front 	of 	the 	motorcycle, 	PO 	Robles-Concepción
took 	his 	regulation 	weapon 	out 	of 	the 	patrol 	car 	window 	and
aimed it at the motorcycle. (Docket No. 220-1 at 32-33).
24. Mr. Rodríguez-González then grabbed a hold of the rifle with
his right hand. (Docket Nos. 220-1 at 31-33; 220-9 at 59-62).
25. PO Robles-Concepción testified that, at that time, he feared
for his life and his partner’s life. (Docket No. 220-1 at 32-
33).
26. PO Robles-Concepción yelled at Mr. Rodríguez-González to put
the gun down. (Docket No. 220-9 at 60).
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Civil No. 23-1278 (RAM) 	9
27. While 	holding 	the 	rifle 	with 	his 	right 	hand, 	Mr. 	Rodríguez-
González began to make a movement with his body to the right.
(Docket Nos. 220-1 at 31-33; 220-9 at 59-62).
28. When 	the 	Officers 	saw 	Mr. 	Rodríguez-González 	turning 	to 	the
right, PO Robles-Concepción fired one shot. Id.
29. The 	bullet 	PO 	Robles-Concepción 	fired 	hit 	Mr. 	Rodríguez-
González 	in 	the 	left 	side 	of 	his 	back 	and 	the 	decedent 	fell
to the ground. (Docket Nos. 220-11 at 22; 220-1 at 33).
30. After Mr. Rodríguez-González fell to the ground, the Officers
stopped 	the 	patrol 	car 	and 	got 	out 	of 	the 	car. 	(Docket 	No.
220-1 at 33).
31. The 	Officers 	called 	the 	Command 	Center 	on 	the 	radio 	to 	ask
for an ambulance. (Docket Nos. 220-9 at 49; 220-1 at 33).
32. The 	Officers 	made 	various 	follow 	up 	calls 	to 	the 	Command
Center to ask the location of the ambulance. (Docket No. 220-
9 at 86-87).
33. PO 	Ramos-Pabón 	requested 	paper 	towels 	and 	gloves 	from 	a
neighbor, 	and 	he 	used 	those 	materials 	to 	provide 	Mr.
Rodríguez-González with first aid, namely putting pressure on
the 	wound 	until 	the 	ambulance 	arrived. 	(Docket 	No. 	220-9 	at
86-87).
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Civil No. 23-1278 (RAM) 	10
IV. 	DISCUSSION
A. Excessive Force
The Fourth Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of the people to
be 	secure 	in 	their 	persons, 	houses, 	papers, 	and 	effects, 	against
unreasonable 	searches 	and 	seizures.” U.S. 	Const. 	amend. 	IV. “A
police officer’s use of deadly force is deemed a seizure under the
Fourth 	Amendment, 	and 	such 	an 	extreme 	action 	is 	reasonable 	(and,
therefore, constitutional) only when ‘at a minimum, a suspect poses
an immediate threat to police officers or civilians.’” McKenney v.
Mangino, 	873 	F.3d 	75, 	81 	(1st 	Cir. 	2017) 	(citing 	Jarrett 	v. 	Town
of Yarmouth, 331 F.3d 140, 149 (1st Cir. 2003)). A claim that law-
enforcement 	officers 	used 	excessive 	force 	to 	effect 	a 	seizure 	is
governed 	by 	the 	Fourth 	Amendment’s 	reasonableness 	standard.
Plumhoff 	v. 	Rickard, 	572 	U.S. 	765, 	774 	(2014). 	Reasonableness 	is
assessed 	“from 	the 	perspective 	of 	a 	reasonable 	officer 	on 	the
scene,” 	it 	requires 	analyzing 	the 	totality 	of 	the 	circumstances
and 	it 	cannot 	benefit 	from 	the 	20/20 	vision 	of 	hindsight. 	Bannon
v. 	Godin, 	99 	F.4th 	63 	(1st 	Cir. 	2024), cert. 	denied, 145 	S. 	Ct.
1048 (2025), reh'g denied, 145 S. Ct. 1347 (2025). 	In the totality
of 	the 	circumstances 	analysis, 	courts 	consider: 	(1) 	whether 	a
reasonable 	officer 	on 	the 	scene 	could 	believe 	that 	the 	suspect
posed 	an 	immediate 	threat 	to 	police 	officers 	or 	civilians; 	(2)
whether 	a 	warning 	was 	given 	before 	the 	use 	of 	force 	and 	whether
the 	suspect 	complied 	with 	this 	command; 	(3) 	whether 	the 	suspect
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Civil No. 23-1278 (RAM) 	11
was 	armed 	at 	the 	time 	of 	the 	encounter 	or 	whether 	the 	officers
believed the suspect to be armed; (4) the speed with which officers
had 	to 	respond 	to 	unfolding 	events, 	both 	in 	terms 	of 	the 	overall
confrontation 	and 	the 	decision 	to 	employ 	force; 	(5) 	whether 	the
suspect was advancing on the officers or otherwise escalating the
situation; (6) the suspect’s physical proximity to the officers at
the 	time 	of 	the 	use 	of 	force; 	(7) 	whether 	multiple 	officers
simultaneously 	reached 	the 	conclusion 	that 	a 	use 	of 	force 	was
required; 	and 	(8) 	the 	nature 	of 	the 	underlying 	crime. 	See 	id.
(collecting cases).
Notably, the Supreme Court recently rejected the “moment-of-
threat 	rule” 	whereby 	courts 	look 	“only 	to 	the 	circumstances
existing 	at 	the 	precise 	time 	an 	officer 	perceived 	the 	threat
inducing him to shoot” because said approach “improperly narrow[s]
the 	requisite 	Fourth 	Amendment 	analysis.” 	Barnes 	v. 	Felix, 	605
U.S. 73, 76 (2025). In Barnes, the Supreme Court reasoned that:
[T]he “totality of the circumstances” inquiry
into 	a 	use 	of 	force 	has 	no 	time 	limit. 	Of
course, 	the 	situation 	at 	the 	precise 	time 	of
the shooting will often be what matters most;
it is, after all, the officer’s choice in that
moment that is under review. But earlier facts
and circumstances may bear on how a reasonable
officer would have understood and responded to
later ones.
Id. at 80.
While 	Plaintiffs 	contend 	the 	Officers’ 	actions 	were
unreasonable 	under 	the 	Fourth 	Amendment 	because 	the 	decedent 	was
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Civil No. 23-1278 (RAM) 	12
fleeing 	from 	the 	Officers 	when 	PO 	Robles-Concepción 	shot 	him 	in
the 	back, 	they 	have 	not 	provided 	evidence 	that 	controverts 	the
Officers’ version of the events. (Docket No. 214 at 1). Plaintiffs
provide 	an 	unsworn 	expert 	report 	to 	support 	their 	argument 	that
the 	decedent 	did 	not 	make 	a 	threatening 	movement 	with 	his 	gun.
(Docket 	No. 	216-14). 	However, 	an 	unsworn 	expert 	report 	is
inadmissible testimonial evidence that cannot be considered at the
summary 	judgment 	stage. 	See 	Rios 	Colon 	v. 	United 	States, 	928 	F.
Supp. 2d 388, 391 (D.P.R. 2012) (unsworn expert report is, at best,
an 	inadmissible 	hearsay 	document 	of 	the 	purported 	expert's
opinion); 	Pack 	v. 	Damon 	Corp., 	434 	F.3d 	810, 	815 	(6th 	Cir.2006)
(expert report was “unsworn and thus is hearsay, which may not be
considered on a motion for summary judgment”). “While a court may
take into account any material that would be admissible or usable
at 	trial, 	inadmissible 	evidence 	may 	not 	be 	considered 	[at 	the
summary 	judgment 	stage.” 	Ramirez-Ortiz 	v. 	Corporacion 	Del 	Centro
Cardiovascular de Puerto Rico y Del Caribe, 32 F. Supp. 3d 83, 88
(D.P.R. 2014) (citing Horta v. Sullivan, 4 F.3d 2, 8 (1st Cir.1993)
(cleaned 	up)). 	Moreover, 	the 	Court 	sees 	“nothing 	inherently
unbelievable 	about 	[the] 	officer[s’] 	testimony.” 	LaFrenier 	v.
Kinirey, 550 F.3d 166, 167-68 (1st Cir. 2008) (holding that, where
two defendant police officers’ testimony was consistent as to key
point, that testimony could support summary judgment despite fact
officers were not “disinterested” in result).
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Civil No. 23-1278 (RAM) 	13
Therefore, 	the 	Court 	only 	considers 	the 	admissible 	evidence
before it. Here, most of the eight factors laid out in Bannon weigh
in 	favor 	of 	the 	Officers 	use 	of 	force. 	The 	evidence 	shows 	the
Officers: (1) believed that Mr. Rodríguez-González was armed with
a 	long, 	black 	assault 	rifle 	and 	they 	feared 	their 	lives 	were 	in
danger; 	(2) 	ordered 	Mr. 	Rodríguez-González 	to 	drop 	the 	gun 	and
stop the motorcycle multiple times; (3) were involved in a rapidly
evolving 	situation 	during 	a 	high 	speed 	pursuit; 	and 	(4) 	were
confronted 	with 	threatening 	movements 	from 	the 	decedent 	who 	they
believed was armed. (Docket No. 220-1 at 30-33); (Docket No. 220-
9 at 40, 57-62).
The 	Court 	must 	consider 	“the 	fact 	that 	police 	officers 	are
often 	forced 	to 	make 	split-second 	judgments 	-- 	in 	circumstances
that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving -- about the amount
of force that is necessary in a particular situation.” Bannon, 99
F. 	4th 	at 	78 	(citing 	Graham 	v. 	Connor, 	490 	U.S. 	386, 	387(1989)).
The 	record 	makes 	clear 	that 	any 	reasonable 	officer 	would 	have
concluded 	that 	Mr. 	Rodríguez-González 	posed 	an 	immediate 	threat
both 	to 	the 	officers 	and 	to 	the 	public 	at 	the 	time 	of 	the 	fatal
split-second 	decision 	by 	PO 	Robles-Concepción 	to 	shoot 	the
decedent. The Officers witnessed the decedent driving fast and in
a 	reckless 	manner 	openly 	carrying 	what 	they 	believed 	was 	a 	long,
black assault rifle. Moreover, the Officers saw the decedent, who
had 	ignored 	their 	orders 	to 	stop 	and 	drop 	the 	weapon, 	hold 	the
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Civil No. 23-1278 (RAM) 	14
weapon in his right hand and make a threatening gesture toward the
patrol car. Therefore, the Officers had probable cause to make an
arrest, and they had reason to consider the decedent dangerous.
With 	the 	benefit 	of 	hindsight, 	it 	is 	certainly 	tragic 	that
Mr. 	Rodríguez-González 	was 	making 	threatening 	movements 	with 	a
pellet gun. However, it was Mr. Rodríguez-González’s own decision
to flee from police officers and threaten them which served as the
catalyst for the chain of events that resulted in his death. From
the 	Officers 	perspective 	on 	that 	fateful 	day, 	Mr. 	Rodríguez-
González 	represented 	a 	danger 	and 	a 	significant 	threat 	to 	the
safety of the agents and the public as he fled at high speed with
what the Officers believed to be a dangerous assault rifle in his
hand. 	The 	use 	of 	deadly 	force 	to 	apprehend 	the 	decedent 	was
certainly 	reasonable. 	Because 	the 	use 	of 	force 	in 	this 	case 	was
reasonable, 	Plaintiffs’ 	argument 	that 	PO 	Ramos-Pabón 	failed 	to
intervene 	and 	stop 	the 	fatal 	shooting 	is 	meritless. 	Accordingly,
the Officers did not violate the decedents Fourth Amendment rights
in the force they used to intervene with him.
B. Duty to Provide Care
Fourteenth 	Amendment 	substantive 	due 	process 	requires 	the
government to provide medical care to persons who are injured while
being apprehended by the police. Miranda-Rivera v. Toledo-Davila,
813 	F.3d 	64, 	74 	(1st 	Cir. 	2016) 	(citing 	City 	of 	Revere 	v. 	Mass.
Gen. 	Hosp., 	463 	U.S. 	239, 	244 	(1983)). 	“The 	boundaries 	of 	this
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Civil No. 23-1278 (RAM) 	15
duty have not been plotted exactly; however, it is clear that they
extend at least as far as the protection that the Eighth Amendment
gives 	to 	a 	convicted 	prisoner.” 	Id. 	(citing 	Gaudreault 	v.
Municipality of Salem, Mass., 923 F.2d 203, 208 (1st Cir. 1990)).
Government officials violate the Eighth Amendment if they display
“deliberate indifference” to a prisoner’s “serious medical needs.”
Id. A “serious medical need” “is one that has been diagnosed by a
physician 	as 	mandating 	treatment, 	or 	one 	that 	is 	so 	obvious 	that
even 	a 	lay 	person 	would 	easily 	recognize 	the 	necessity 	for 	a
doctor’s attention.” Id. Deliberate indifference requires (1) that
“the official ... be aware of facts from which the inference could
be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,” and (2)
that 	they 	draw 	that 	inference. 	Farmer 	v. 	Brennan, 	511 	U.S. 	825,
837 (1994). A fact finder can conclude that a government official
was aware of a substantial risk of serious harm based on the fact
that 	the 	risk 	was 	obvious. 	Id. 	at 	842. 	However, 	there 	is 	no
deliberate indifference if an official responds reasonably to the
risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted. Id. at 844–45;
see also Coscia v. Town of Pembroke, 659 F.3d 37, 39 (1st Cir.2011)
(deliberate 	indifference 	can 	consist 	of 	“a 	conscious 	failure 	to
provide 	medical 	services 	where 	they 	would 	be 	reasonably
appropriate”).
Here, 	Plaintiffs 	claim 	the 	Officers 	were 	negligent 	in 	their
duty to provide medical care because they: (1) called the ambulance
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Civil No. 23-1278 (RAM) 	16
three 	minutes 	after 	Mr. 	Rodríguez-González 	was 	shot; 	(2) 	did 	not
immediately provide their whereabouts which delayed the arrival of
the 	ambulance; 	(3) 	put 	pressure 	on 	the 	wound 	which 	was 	not 	an
effective way to stop internal bleeding; and (4) failed to transfer
the decedent to the hospital in their patrol car. (Docket No. 214
and 215). The Court disagrees.
From the moment Mr. Rodríguez-González fell to the ground and
the 	Officers 	realized 	he 	was 	bleeding, 	the 	Officers 	called 	an
ambulance 	and 	began 	providing 	first 	aid 	to 	the 	decedent 	at 	the
scene 	with 	limited 	supplies 	provided 	by 	a 	neighbor. 	(Docket 	No.
220-9 	at 	49); 	(Docket 	No. 	220-1 	at 	33). 	The 	Officers 	also 	made
various follow up calls to the Command Center inquiring about the
status of the ambulance. (Docket No. 220-9 at 86-87).
Substantive 	due 	process 	requires 	only 	that 	an 	official
responds 	reasonably 	to 	the 	risk 	of 	serious 	harm. 	Plaintiffs 	have
not shown the Officers were required to transport the decedent to
the 	hospital 	in 	their 	patrol 	car, 	despite 	the 	fact 	that 	they
seemingly 	were 	allowed 	to, 	nor 	that 	it 	was 	required 	the 	Officers
provide 	care 	beyond 	the 	reasonable 	measures 	they 	took—to 	attempt
to 	stop 	the 	bleeding 	and 	call 	an 	ambulance 	to 	come 	to 	the
decedent’s 	aid. 	No 	more 	can 	be 	expected 	from 	law 	enforcement
officers as they are not doctors. Costoso v. United States, 884 F.
Supp. 	52 	(D.P.R. 	1995). 	Therefore, 	the 	Officers 	did 	not 	violate
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Civil No. 23-1278 (RAM) 	17
the decedents Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights
in the medical attention they provided.
C. Qualified Immunity
Qualified 	immunity 	protects 	officers 	from 	suit 	unless 	“(1)
they violated a federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2)
the 	unlawfulness 	of 	their 	conduct 	was 	clearly 	established 	at 	the
time.” 	Fagre 	v. 	Parks, 	985 	F.3d 	16, 	24 	(1st 	Cir. 	2021) 	(internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Irish v. Fowler, 979 F.3d 65, 76
(1st Cir. 2020)); see also Philip v. Cronin, 537 F.3d 26, 34 (1st
Cir. 	2008) 	(reasoning 	that, 	even 	if 	a 	constitutional 	right 	has
been clearly established, a defendant may nonetheless be protected
by qualified immunity if a reasonable official in the defendant's
position 	could 	have 	believed 	(even 	wrongly) 	that 	the 	at-issue
conduct was not violative of a constitutional right)). “This is a
‘heavy 	burden’ 	for 	a 	plaintiff 	to 	meet.” 	Bannon, 	99 	F. 	4th 	at 	84
(citing 	Johnson 	v. 	City 	of 	Biddeford, 	92 	F.4th 	367, 	375-76 	(1st
Cir. 2024)). The qualified immunity the officers enjoy is intended
to protect all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly
violate 	the 	law. 	Id. 	(cleaned 	up) 	(citing 	Jakuttis 	v. 	Town 	of
Dracut, 95 F.4th 22, 30 (1st Cir. 2024)).
In 	the 	Fourth 	Amendment 	context, 	the 	“[s]pecificity” 	of 	the
rule set forth in such precedent “is especially important,” because
it can be “difficult for an officer to determine how the relevant
legal 	doctrine,” 	such 	as 	excessive 	force, 	“will 	apply 	to 	the
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Civil No. 23-1278 (RAM) 	18
factual 	situation 	the 	officer 	confronts.” 	Lachance 	v. 	Town 	of
Charlton, 990 F.3d 14, 21 (1st Cir. 2021) (alteration in original)
(quoting 	City 	of 	Escondido 	v. 	Emmons, 	586 	U.S. 	38, 	42 	(2019)).
Thus, 	outside 	of 	obvious 	cases, 	“‘relevant 	case 	law,’ 	where 	‘an
officer 	acting 	under 	similar 	circumstances 	... 	was 	held 	to 	have
violated the Fourth Amendment,’ is ‘usually necessary’ to overcome
officers’ qualified immunity.” Id. (omission in original) (quoting
District 	of 	Columbia 	v. 	Wesby, 	583 	U.S. 	48, 	64 	(2018)). 	The
plaintiff bears the burden of “identify[ing] controlling authority
or 	a 	consensus 	of 	persuasive 	authority 	sufficient 	to 	put 	the
officers 	on 	notice 	that 	their 	conduct 	violated 	the 	law.” 	Est. 	of
Rahim by Rahim v. Doe, 51 F.4th 402, 412 (1st Cir. 2022).
Moreover, 	courts 	are 	mindful 	“that 	deciding 	qualified
immunity at the summary-judgment stage can be tricky.” Justiniano
v. 	Walker, 	986 	F.3d 	11, 	27 	(1st 	Cir. 	2021). 	However, 	“qualified
immunity 	is 	‘an 	immunity 	from 	suit 	rather 	than 	a 	mere 	defense 	to
liability,’” 	meaning 	“‘it 	is 	effectively 	lost 	if 	a 	case 	is
erroneously 	permitted 	to 	go 	to 	trial.’” 	Id. 	(citing 	Pearson 	v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)). As such, qualified immunity’s
applicability 	“should 	be 	resolved 	at 	the 	earliest 	possible 	stage
of 	litigation.” 	Id. 	(citing 	Rocket 	Learning, 	Inc. 	v. 	Rivera-
Sánchez, 	715 	F.3d 	1, 	8 	(1st 	Cir. 	2013)). 	Nonetheless, 	“[t]he
doctrinal 	intersection 	of 	qualified 	immunity 	principles 	and
summary 	judgment 	principles 	is 	not 	well 	mapped,” 	and 	“[p]lotting
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Civil No. 23-1278 (RAM) 	19
that 	intersection 	can 	present 	thorny 	analytic 	problems.” 	Morelli
v. 	Webster, 	552 	F.3d 	12, 	18 	(1st 	Cir. 	2009) 	(summary 	judgment
“requires 	absolute 	deference 	to 	the 	nonmovant's 	factual
assertions,” 	while 	qualified 	immunity 	“demands 	deference 	to 	the
reasonable, if mistaken, actions of the movant.”).
Here, 	to 	quash 	the 	Officer’s 	qualified-immunity 	defense,
Plaintiffs needed to “show (1) that [the Officers] infracted [the
decedent’s] 	federal 	rights 	and 	(2) 	that 	these 	rights 	were 	so
clearly 	established 	that 	a 	reasonable 	officer 	should 	have 	known
how they applied to the situation at hand.” Justiniano v. Walker,
986 F.3d 11, 26 (1st Cir. 2021) (citing Belsito Commc'ns, Inc. v.
Decker, 	845 	F.3d 	13, 	23 	(1st 	Cir. 	2016)). 	Put 	another 	way, 	the
qualified immunity analysis hinges upon: (i) whether the plaintiff
has 	asserted 	a 	cognizable 	violation 	of 	a 	constitutional 	right;
(ii) 	whether 	that 	right 	was 	clearly 	established 	at 	the 	relevant
time; 	and 	(iii) 	whether 	a 	reasonable 	public 	official 	in 	the
defendant's 	position should 	have 	understood 	that 	his 	actions
infringed that right. Id.
Plaintiffs’ arguments fail at the first branch. As the Court
has established, the Officers did not violate the decedents Fourth
or 	Fourteenth 	Amendment 	rights. 	Moreover, 	Plaintiffs 	have 	failed
to 	identify 	precedent 	finding 	a 	Fourth 	or 	Fourteenth 	Amendment
violation 	under 	similar 	circumstances. 	See 	City 	of 	Tahlequah 	v.
Bond, 595 U.S. 9, 14 (2021). The Court also finds that “objectively
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Civil No. 23-1278 (RAM) 	20
reasonable officers ... would not have understood the[se] actions
to violate the law.” Rahim, 51 F.4th at 413. As such, the Officers
are entitled to qualified immunity.
D. Municipal Liability
“[A] 	municipality 	‘may 	be 	liable 	under 	[§ 	1983] 	if 	the
governmental 	body 	itself 	subjects 	a 	person 	to 	a 	deprivation 	of
rights 	or 	causes 	a 	person 	to 	be 	subjected 	to 	such 	deprivation.’”
Haley v. City of Boston, 657 F.3d 39, 51 (1st Cir. 2011) (internal
quotation 	marks 	omitted) 	(quoting 	Connick 	v. 	Thompson, 	563 	U.S.
51, 60 (2011)). Municipalities “are responsible only for their own
unconstitutional 	acts,” 	and 	“are 	not 	vicariously 	liable 	... 	for
the 	actions 	of 	their 	non-policymaking 	employees,” 	and 	so 	“a
plaintiff must ‘identify a municipal policy or custom that caused
the 	plaintiff’s 	injury.’” 	Id. 	(internal 	quotation 	marks 	omitted)
(quoting Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997)).
A 	municipality's 	“decision 	not 	to 	train 	certain 	employees
about 	their 	legal 	duty 	to 	avoid 	violating 	citizens’ 	rights 	may
rise to the level of an official government policy for purposes of
§ 	1983,” 	but 	only 	where 	the 	“failure 	to 	train 	its 	employees 	in 	a
relevant respect ... amount[s] to ‘deliberate indifference to the
rights 	of 	persons 	with 	whom 	the 	[untrained 	employees] 	come 	into
contact.’” Bannon, 99 F. 4th at 88 (citing Connick, 563 U.S. at 61
(last alteration in original)).
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Civil No. 23-1278 (RAM) 	21
This 	theory 	of 	municipal 	liability 	is 	viable 	only 	where 	a
plaintiff 	establishes 	the 	existence 	of 	“underlying, 	identifiable
constitutional violations ....” Lachance, 990 F.3d at 31 (omission
in original) (quoting Kennedy v. Town of Billerica, 617 F.3d 520,
531 (1st Cir. 2010)). Given that the Court has already found that
the shooting did not violate the Fourth Amendment and the medical
care 	provided 	did 	not 	violate 	the 	Fourteenth 	Amendment, 	neither
can 	support 	the 	claim 	against 	the 	Municipality. 	Therefore, 	the
Municipality cannot be held liable in this matter.
V. 	SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION
First 	Circuit 	case 	law 	is 	clear 	“that 	district 	courts 	may
decline 	to 	exercise 	supplemental 	jurisdiction 	over 	pendent 	state
law 	claims 	when 	the 	anchor 	federal 	claims 	for 	those 	state 	law
claims are dismissed.” Borrás-Borrero v. Corporación del Fondo del
Seguro 	del 	Estado, 	958 	F.3d 	26, 	37 	(1st 	Cir. 	2020); 	see 	also 	28
U.S.C. § 1367(c). Where, as here, the federal claims are dismissed,
a 	District 	Court 	is 	well 	within 	its 	discretion 	to 	decline 	to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over pending state-law claims.
See e.g., Massó-Torrellas v. Mun. of Toa Alta, 845 F.3d 461, 469-
70 (1st Cir. 2017); see also, Rivera-Diaz v. Humana Ins. of Puerto
Rico, 	Inc., 	748 	F.3d 	387, 	392 	(1st 	Cir. 	2014) 	(quoting 	Carnegie–
Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7, (1988)) (“[I]n the
usual 	case 	in 	which 	all 	federal-law 	claims 	are 	eliminated 	before
trial, the balance of factors [...] will point toward declining to
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Civil No. 23-1278 (RAM) 	22
exercise 	jurisdiction 	over 	the 	remaining 	state-law 	claims.”).
Therefore, 	the 	Court 	declines 	to 	exercise 	supplemental
jurisdiction 	pursuant 	to 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1367(c). 	All 	Plaintiffs’
supplemental 	claims 	under 	Puerto 	Rico 	law 	are 	hereby 	DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
VI. 	CONCLUSION
The Court finds that there are no genuine issues of material
fact 	warranting 	a 	jury 	trial. 	Therefore, 	the 	Court 	GRANTS
Codefendants 	Police 	Officer 	Emmanuel 	Ramos-Pabón, 	Police 	Officer
Alberto Robles-Concepción, Municipality of San Juan, Mr. Miguel A.
Romero-Lugo and Mr. Juan J. García’s Motions for Summary Judgment
at 	Docket 	Nos. 	209, 	224 	and 	226. 	The 	Court 	DENIES 	Plaintiffs 	Ms.
Mónica 	González 	and 	Mr. 	José 	Rodríguez’s 	Motion 	for 	Summary
Judgment 	at 	Docket 	No. 	214. 	Plaintiffs’ 	claims 	under 	federal 	law
are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. All Plaintiffs’ supplemental claims
under 	Puerto 	Rico 	law 	are 	hereby 	DISMISSED 	WITHOUT 	PREJUDICE.
Judgment shall be entered accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 14 th day of September 2026.
S/ RAÚL M. ARIAS-MARXUACH
United States District Judge
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