RIOS QUINTANA et al v. MAZA & GREEN ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR
THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
IN RE:
JOSE RAUL RIOS QUINTANA
ALMA ROSA RAMIREZ LOPEZ
CASE NO. 08-00281 BKT
CHAPTER 13
Debtor(s) 	ADVERSARY NO. 12-0054
JOSE RAUL RIOS QUINTANA
ALMA ROSA RAMIREZ LOPEZ
Plaintiff
MAZA & GREEN ATTORNEYS AND
COUNSELORS AT LAW;et als.
FILED & ENTERED ON 05/08/2012
Defendant(s)
ORDER
This proceeding is before the Court upon Defendants’ motion to
shorten terms of discovery (Dkt No. 13), and Plaintiffs’ motion for
reconsideration 	(Dkt 	No. 	17) 	of 	the 	Order 	allowing 	the 	limited
discovery proposed by Defendants (Dkt No. 15). 	For the reasons set
forth below, Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration is DENIED.
I. 	Procedural background
On April 10, 2012, Defendants sought leave of Court to shorten
the 	response 	period 	on 	a 	limited 	discovery 	comprising 	two 	(2)
interrogatories and two (2) requests for production of documents,
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26. 	(Dkt No. 13). 	Defendants argued
that 	said 	discovery 	request 	was 	needed 	to 	properly 	answer 	the
complaint. 	On April 24, 2012, this Court entered an order granting
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Defendants’ unopposed motion and reducing the period for Plaintiffs
to answer the interrogatories to fifteen (15) days. 	(Dkt No. 15).
Plaintiffs 	filed 	a 	motion 	for 	reconsideration 	on 	April 	27, 	2012
(Dkt 	No. 	17), 	stating 	that 	Defendants’ 	request 	to 	shorten 	the
period to answer to discovery should’ve been denied as a matter of
law. 	Plaintiffs’ arguments are threefold. 	First, that Defendants’
cannot use discovery means to answer a complaint, because they are
to 	admit 	or 	deny 	statements 	in 	the 	complaint 	without 	using
extrinsic evidence. 	Second, that discovery procedures cannot begin
until 	the 	parties 	have 	conferred, 	pursuant 	to 	Fed. 	R. 	Civ. 	P.
26(d), or otherwise ordered by the court. 	Finally, that this Court
lacks jurisdiction to entertain or rule upon this discovery matter
until 	the 	parties 	have 	addressed 	the 	controversy 	without 	the
Court’s 	intervention, 	pursuant 	to 	Fed. 	R. 	Civ. 	P. 	26& 	37, 	made
applicable to this proceeding by Fed R. Bankr. P. 7026 & 7037.
II. 	Discussion
A. 	Expedited discovery under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d)
Under 	Fed. 	R. 	Civ. 	P. 	26(b)(1), 	made 	applicable 	to 	this
adversary proceeding by Fed R. Bankr. P. 7026, parties “may obtain
discovery 	regarding 	any 	nonprivileged 	matter 	that 	is 	relevant 	to
any party’s claim or defense.” The limitation with respect to the
scope of discovery under Rule 26(b)(1) is that the matter sought to
be discovered is not privileged, “[o]ther than that, discovery may
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be 	obtained 	with 	respect 	to 	any 	matter 	relevant 	to 	the 	claims 	or
defenses 	of 	any 	party.” 	10 	Collier 	on 	Bankruptcy 	¶ 	9020.01(16th
ed.).
Although a party ordinarily may not commence discovery until
the parties hold the discovery conference required by Rule 26(f),
the parties may engage in discovery earlier, however, if the court
has 	issued 	an 	order 	authorizing 	the 	discovery. 	Fed. 	R. 	Civ. 	P.
26(d)(1). 	Consequently, a party must obtain leave of court if the
party seeks to commence discovery before the time specified in Rule
26(d), given the parties have not agreed otherwise.
The 	majority 	of 	Courts, 	including 	within 	the 	First 	Circuit,
have 	applied 	a 	“good 	cause” 	or 	“reasonableness” 	standard 	when
considering request for expedited discovery. 	See Momenta Pharms.,
Inc. 	v. 	Teva 	Pharms. 	Indus. 	Ltd., 	765 	F.Supp.2d 	87, 	88
(D.Mass.2011); 	see 	also 	6 	Moore's 	Federal 	Practice 	§ 	26.121
(2011).In 	a 	“good 	cause” 	analysis, 	a 	court 	must 	examine 	the
discovery 	request 	on 	the 	entirety 	of 	the 	record 	and 	the
“reasonableness” 	of 	the 	request 	in 	light 	of 	all 	the 	surrounding
circumstances. Edgenet, Inc. v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 259 F.R.D.
385, 	386 	(E.D. 	Wis. 	2009);St. 	Louis 	Group, 	Inc. 	v. 	Metals 	and
Additives Corp., Inc., 275 F.R.D. 236, 239 (S.D. Tex. 2011). Good
cause 	for 	expedited 	discovery 	may 	be 	found 	when 	the 	need 	for 	the
expedited 	discovery 	outweighs 	the 	prejudice 	to 	the 	responding
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party. Edgenet, Inc.,259 F.R.D. at 386; Moore's Federal Practice §
26.121.The 	party 	seeking 	expedited 	discovery 	has 	the 	burden 	of
establishing the need for early discovery and the burden of showing
good cause. St. Louis Group, Inc., 275 F.R.D. at 240, citing Qwest
Commc'n Int'l, Inc. v. WorldQuest Networks, Inc., 213 F.R.D. 418,
419 (D. Colo. 2003); Moore's Federal Practice § 26.121. 	Finally,
in allowing expedited discovery, the courts seek that the subject
matter 	related 	to 	requests 	for 	expedited 	discovery 	are 	narrowly
tailored 	in 	scope. 	St. 	Louis 	Group, 	Inc., 	275 	F.R.D. 	at 	240;
Monsanto Co. v. Woods, 250 F.R.D. 411, 413 (E.D. Mo. 2008).
In 	the 	present 	case, 	Defendants 	have 	in 	fact, 	narrowly
tailored 	the 	discovery 	purportedly 	needed 	to 	answer 	Plaintiffs’
claims and bring forth their defenses. 	Once the need for expedited
discovery 	was 	established 	by 	Defendants, 	and 	upon 	Plaintiffs’
failure 	to 	raise 	a 	timely 	opposition 	that 	outweighed 	Defendants’
request, the Court found good cause to grant Defendants’ reasonable
request for the limited expedited discovery.
With regards to Plaintiffs’ allegations that this Court lacks
jurisdiction to entertain this discovery matter because the parties
failed to confer, or attempted to confer, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 	26& 	37, 	this 	Court 	finds 	that 	nothing 	in 	the 	cited 	statues
precludes 	this 	Court 	from 	entertaining 	Defendants’ 	motion 	for
expedited discovery. 	Rule 26(c)(1) & Rule 37(a)(1), require that,
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prior to requesting that the court issue a protective order or an
order 	to 	compel 	discovery, 	the 	movant 	must 	attempt 	to 	secure 	the
discovery 	by 	making 	a 	good 	faith 	effort 	to 	confer 	with 	the
recalcitrant party. 	That is not the controversy before this Court.
B. 	Relief from a Judgment or Order
Plaintiffs’ 	cite 	no 	legal 	authority 	for 	their 	request 	for
reconsideration. 	However, Fed. R. Civ. P. 	6o, made applicable to
this 	adversary 	proceeding 	by 	Fed 	R. 	Bankr. 	P. 	9024, 	affords 	six
categories of reasons or grounds on which to base a motion seeking
relief from a final judgment, order, or proceeding. 	Fed. R. Civ.
P. 	60(b) 	seeks 	to 	balance 	the 	interest 	in 	the 	stability 	of
judgments 	with 	the 	interest 	in 	seeing 	that 	judgments 	not 	become
instruments 	of 	oppression 	and 	fraud. 	10 	Collier 	on 	Bankruptcy
¶9024.03 (15 th ed. rev.). 	“[T]he court may relieve a party . . .
from 	a 	final 	judgment, 	order, 	or 	proceedings 	for 	. 	. 	. 	mistake,
inadvertence, 	surprise, 	or 	excusable 	neglect." 	Fed 	R. 	Civ. 	P.
60(b)(1); Rule 60(b)(6) permits relief "for any other reason that
justifies relief." 	Fed R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6).
Relief under Rule 60(b) is extraordinary in nature and motions
invoking 	that 	rule 	should 	be 	granted 	sparingly. 	Karak 	v. 	Bursaw
Oil Corp. 288 F.3d 15, 19 (1st Cir.2002). 	Such relief is available
in 	our 	jurisdiction 	only 	when 	exceptional 	circumstances 	exist 	to
justify 	this 	extraordinary 	relief. 	In 	re 	Rodriguez 	Camacho, 	361
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B.R. 294 (1st Cir. BAP 2007) (citing Simon v. Navon, 116 F.3d 1, 5
(1st 	Cir.1997)). 	A 	party 	who 	seeks 	relief 	under 	Rule 	60(b) 	must
persuade 	the 	Court, 	at 	a 	bare 	minimum, 	that 	exceptional
circumstances 	exist, 	favoring 	extraordinary 	relief; 	that 	if 	the
judgment 	is 	set 	aside, 	he 	has 	the 	right 	stuff 	to 	mount 	a
potentially 	meritorious 	claim 	or 	defense; 	and 	that 	no 	unfair
prejudice will accrue to the opposing parties should the motion be
granted. 	Rodriguez 	Camacho, 	supra 	(citing 	Karak 	v. 	Bursaw 	Oil
Corp. 288 F.3d 15, 19 (1st Cir.2002)).
Except 	for 	the 	timeliness 	of 	Plaintiffs’ 	motion 	for 	relief,
none of the above factors have been demonstrated. Plaintiffs’ have
failed 	to 	allege 	details 	showing 	excusable 	neglect 	under 	a 	Rule
60(b)(1), 	or 	“any 	other 	reason 	justifying 	relief” 	under 	a 	Rule
60(b)(6). 	The 	Court 	concludes 	that 	Plaintiffs’ 	request 	for
reconsideration is meritless.
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that Debtors’ motion for reconsideration
shall be, and it hereby is, DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 08 day of May, 2012.
Brian K. Tester
U.S. Bankruptcy Judge
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