VAN v. ODDO et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JOHNSTOWN DIVISION
SEREYRATH VAN,
Petitioner,
vs.
LEONARD ODDO, IN HIS OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS WARDEN OF
MOSHANNON VALLEY
PROCESSING CENTER; BRIAN
MCSHANE, IN HIS OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS ACTING FIELD
OFFICE DIRECTOR OF THE
IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT, ENFORCEMENT
AND REMOVAL OPERATIONS
PHILADELPHIA FIELD OFFICE;
KRISTI NOEM, IN HER OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY; AND PAM BONDI, IN
HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE
UNITED STATES;
Respondents.
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Civil Action No. 3:25-cv-00322
United States Magistrate Judge
Christopher B. Brown
MEMORANDUM OPINION CONDITIONALLY GRANTING PETITION
FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, ECF NO. 11
Christopher B. Brown, United States Magistrate Judge
1 	All parties have consented to full jurisdiction before a United States Magistrate Judge,
including entry of a final judgment, under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). See ECF Nos. 8 and 13.
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Petitioner Sereyrath Van (“Van”), who is currently in immigration detention
at Moshannon Valley Processing Center (“MVPC”), has filed a verified counseled
petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. ECF No. 1. He has
been detained in the custody of the United States Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (“ICE”) since August 15, 2024. Id., ¶ 2. He seeks his immediate
release or, in the alternative, an individualized bond hearing on the grounds his
detention violates the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559,
701-706, the Accardi doctrine,2 the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8
U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537, the INA’s implementing regulations, and the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as applied to
him. Id., ¶¶ 3, 6. The matter has been fully briefed. For the reasons that follow,
the Court will conditionally grant the Petition and order Van be provided a bond
hearing before a neutral immigration judge of the Executive Office of Immigration
Review on or before December 19, 2025. 	If Respondents fail to provide Van with a
bond hearing by December 19, 2025, the WRIT SHALL ISSUE, and Van shall be
released with conditions of supervision consistent with applicable law. To the
extent Van seeks any additional habeas relief, that request will be denied.
2 	The Accardi doctrine is a legal doctrine derived from the landmark Supreme Court case in
administrative law, United States et rel. Accardi v. Schaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954). Under the
Accardi doctrine, a government agency must follow its own regulations, rules, and procedures or run
the risk of having their actions invalidated if challenged in court.
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I. 	Factual Background
Van is a 45-year-old lawful permanent resident (“LPR”) who has lived in the
United States since 1984. ECF Nos. 1, ¶ 1; 1-4, ¶ 3. He was born in 1980 near a
refugee camp in Thailand to Cambodian refugee parents. ECF No. 1, ¶ 15. In 1984,
Van entered the United States when he was four years old with his family as a
refugee. Id., ¶ 16. His status was adjusted to that of a LPR on May 24, 1988. ECF
No. 1-4, ¶ 4.
On June 25, 2018, in the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County,
Pennsylvania, Van was convicted of two counts of manufacture, delivery or
possession with intent to manufacture or deliver in violation of 35 P.S. § 780-
113(a)(30), one count of criminal use of communication facility in violation of 18
Pa.C.S. § 7512(a), one count of conspiracy in violation of 18 Pa.C.S. § 903, and one
count of use or possession of drug paraphernalia in violation of 35 P.S. § 780-
113(a)(32). ECF No. 1-14. See also public docket Commonwealth v. Van, CP-09-CR-
0001628-2016, available at https://ujsportal.pacourts.us/Report/CpDocketSheet?
docketNumber=CP-09-CR-0001628-2016. He was sentenced to an aggregate
sentence of 6.5 to 13 years confinement. ECF No. 1, ¶ 20.
On April 2, 2021, while serving his prison sentence, the Department of
Homeland Security (“DHS”) issued a Notice to Appear charging Van with being
removable having been convicted of an aggravated felony pursuant to INA §
101(a)(43)(B) and (U) and convicted of a controlled substance offense under INA §
237(a)(2)(B)(i). ECF No. 1-4 at 5; ECF No. 1-14 at 4.
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On June 2, 2021, Van appeared remotely from the State Correctional
Institution – Phoenix for the removal hearing. ECF No. 1-14 at 4. During the
hearing, he conceded he was removable, but denied DHS’s allegation of his
Cambodian citizenship and nationality. Id. The Immigration Judge found Van
subject to removal as charged and ordered Van removed to Thailand or, in the
alternative, Cambodia. ECF No. 1-5 at 3. Van did not appeal that decision and, as a
result, the removal order became final on July 2, 2021. ECF No. 1-11 at 5, 6.
Two years later, in October 2023, Van was released from state custody on
parole. ECF No. 1, ¶ 20. Upon his release, he was immediately transferred to ICE
custody and moved to MVPC. Id., ¶ 23. Three months later, in January 2024, Van
was released from ICE custody and placed under an Order of Supervision (“OSUP”),
and there appears from the record to be no dispute that Van complied with all
reporting requirements. Id., ¶ 24.
Following a scheduled check-in with ICE on July 24, 2024, Van was told his
OSUP would be revoked, id., ¶ 28, and was given a notice of appointment directing
him to report back to ICE to be re-detained on August 15, 2024 “for the execution of
your final removal order and removal to Cambodia[.]” ECF No. 1-8, at 2. Van
appeared for the appointment on August 15, 2024 as required and was detained by
ICE. ECF No. 1, ¶ 28. At that time, he was served with a Notice of Revocation of
Release, dated August 14, 2024, stating he was being taken into ICE custody
“pursuant to 8 CFR 241.13,” as there were “changed circumstances” in his case and
ICE had “determined that there is a significant likelihood of removal in the
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reasonably foreseeable future[.]” ECF No. 1-9 at 4. Van was immediately
transferred back to MVPC for a second time, where he continues to be detained.
About two weeks after being detained, on August 22, 2024, Van filed a motion
to reopen his removal proceedings based on prior counsel’s ineffective assistance of
counsel. ECF No. 1-11 at 5. Van’s motion to reopen was granted on September 6,
2024. Id. at 11. Thereafter, on December 4, 2024, Van filed a motion to terminate
removal proceedings arguing the Government had failed to meet its burden of
proving that Van’s drug and conspiracy convictions were related to a controlled
substance or qualified as “aggravating felonies” under section 237(a)(2). ECF No. 1-
12 at 3-5. The Immigration Judge found the Government had met its burden and
denied the motion on January 7, 2025 finding the charges of removability could be
sustained. Id. at 6.
An individual removal hearing was held the next month on February 12,
2025. ECF No. 1-13. At the close of the hearing, the Immigration Judge denied
Van’s applications for asylum, withholding of removal to Thailand and Cambodia,
and protection under the Convention Against Torture, and again ordered Van to be
removed to Thailand, with removal to Cambodia ordered in the alternative. Id. at
9.
Van then filed a timely appeal of the removal order to the Board of
Immigration appeals (“BIA”), which appeal was denied on September 22, 2025.
ECF No. 1-15 at 7. The day after the denial of the appeal by the BIA, Van filed a
petition for review with the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. ECF No. 1-15;
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see publicly available Court of Appeals docket, Van v. Attorney General United
States, Case Number 25-2851, available at https://ca3-ecf.sso.dcn/cmecf/jsp/
CaseSummary.jsp (last viewed 12/4/2025). The appellate court granted a temporary
stay of removal pending the appellate court’s consideration of the motion for stay of
removal. See CTA3 Order of 10/29/2025. As of the date of this writing, Van’s appeal
remains pending. Id.
II. 	Federal Habeas Proceedings
On September 26, 2025, three days after filing the petition for review with
the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, counsel for Van filed the instant habeas
petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. ECF No. 1. Van contends the Government’s
failure to comply with procedural requirements revoking his OSUP entitle him to be
returned to supervised release status or, in the alternative, his prolonged detention
without a bond hearing violates his rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. ECF No. 1, ¶ 3. The Government3 filed a response, ECF No. 12, to
which Van filed a Reply, ECF No. 13.
The matter is fully briefed and ripe for disposition. For the reasons below,
the Court finds as follows: (1) to the extent Van asserts he is entitled to release
based on the Government’s failure to comply with their own regulations governing
the revocation of OSUPs, Van has not pointed to authority showing that the remedy
for a violation of these regulations (if such a violation has occurred) is release from
3 	When used in this Memorandum Opinion, “Government” refers to the federal entities and
officials named as respondents in the petition.
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detention; and (2) Van’s prolonged detention without a bond hearing violates the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as applied to him. The Court will
order that Van be provided a bond hearing before a neutral immigration judge of
the Executive Office of Immigration Review on or before December 19, 2025. If
Respondents fail to provide Van with a bond hearing by December 19, 2025, the
WRIT SHALL ISSUE, and Van shall be released with conditions of supervision
consistent with applicable law. To the extent Van seeks any additional habeas
relief, that request will be denied.
II. 	Jurisdiction
Title 28, United States Code, Section 2241, grants federal courts the
authority to hear habeas corpus petitions by noncitizens challenging the lawfulness
or constitutionality of their detention by ICE. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281,
292-96 (2018); Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517 (2003); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533
U.S. 678, 687 (2001). See also Roe v. Oddo, No. 3:25-cv-128, 2025 WL 1892445, at *4
(W.D. Pa. July 9, 2025) (holding that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) did not strip the court of
jurisdiction since it was “examining the contest of Petitioner’s detention” and not
“reviewing Petitioner’s removal order”), reconsideration denied, 2025 WL 3030692
(W.D. Pa. Oct. 30, 2025).
The Supreme Court of the United States has explained that “the essence of
habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody,
and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.”
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). Habeas relief applies to petitioners
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seeking relief from executive detention but not to petitioners seeking to remain in
the United States. See Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 116-
120 (2020).
The Government argues this Court does not have jurisdiction to hear Van’s
petition because 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) does not allow district courts to assert
jurisdiction over actions concerning the execution of removal orders. The
Government is correct in that this Court does not have jurisdiction over the
execution of removal orders. That said, the Court does have jurisdiction here
because the instant petition does not challenge Van’s removal, rather it raises due
process claims related to his current detention.
III. 	Analysis
The apprehension, detention and release of aliens in pending administrative
proceedings is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). Demore, 538 U.S. 510. After
completion of administrative removal proceedings, the detention and release of an
alien who has been ordered removed then shifts and is governed by 8 U.S.C. §
1231(a). Id.; Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 683 (referring to § 1231 as the “post-removal-
period detention statute”).
Section 1231(a)(1), which specifies when the post-removal period commences,
provides in pertinent part:
(A) In general
Except as otherwise provided in this section, when an
alien is ordered removed, the Attorney General shall
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remove the alien from the United States within a period
of 90 days (in this section referred to as the “removal
period”).
(B) Beginning of period
The removal period begins on the latest of the following:
(i) The date the order of removal becomes
administratively final.
(ii) If the removal order is judicially reviewed and if
a court orders a stay of the removal of the alien, the
date of the court's final order.
(iii) If the alien is detained or confined (except
under an immigration process), the date the alien is
released from detention or confinement.
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A)-(B). Because the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
granted a stay of the February 25, 2025 removal order pending Van’s appeal, the
removal period has not yet commenced. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B)(ii); 8 CFR 1241.1.
As a consequence, Van’s current detention reverts to the pre-removal period statute,
8 U.S.C. § 1226, rather than the post-removal-period statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1231.
Understanding this context and that Van is presently detained pursuant to
§ 1226, his arguments for release and/or a bond hearing will now be addressed in
turn.
A. 	Accardi Doctrine and the Administrative Procedure Act
Van’s first argument is that ICE violated certain regulations which govern
the revocation of orders related to immigration supervision. ECF Nos. 1, ¶¶ 54, 58,
61, 65, 69. Under the Accardi doctrine, when an agency fails to follow its own
procedures or regulations, that agency’s actions are generally invalid. See United
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States ex rel. v. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 268 (1954); see also Roble v.
Bondi, No. 25-cv-3196, 2025 WL 2443453, at *3 (D. Minn. Aug. 25, 2025) (“Once
ICE releases a noncitizen on an Order of Supervision, ICE’s ability to re-detain that
noncitizen is constrained by its own regulations.”).
Van argues ICE failed to comply with its own regulatory procedural
requirements in various way:
● He has not been provided adequate notification of the
reasons for revocation of release in violation of 8 C.F.R. §
241.13(i)(3); ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 61-64;
● He has not been afforded a prompt “initial informal
review” as required by 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(3); id., ¶¶ 65-
68; and
● The Government “did not validly comply with 8 C.F.R.
§ 241.13(i)(2) in revoking Mr. Van’s release because it
skipped the statutory requirement under 8 U.S.C. §
1231(b)2) to first pursue removal to Thailand,” rather
than the alternative Cambodia; id., ¶¶ 69-75.
Van contends these procedural violations render his re-detention invalid
under the Accardi doctrine and constitute a violation of his due process rights. ECF
No. 1 at 12-18. The Government responds that Van “offers the Court no objective
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proof or evidence in support of his claim” and furthermore, the claims are without
merit. ECF No. 12 at 7, 9, 12.
While some procedural violations may, in some circumstances, rise to the
level of a due process violation, the Court concludes that Van has not shown that
the alleged violations here, if they did constitute violations of those regulations, rise
to the level of a due process violation and/or would independently entitle Van to a
grant of habeas relief in the form of release from detention. But see Santamaria
Orellana v. Baker, Case No. CV 25-1788, 2025 WL 2444087, at *6-8 (D. Md. Aug. 25,
2025) (finding violations rose to the level of a due process violation as “there [wa]s
absolutely no record of the decision to revoke Santamaria Orellana’s release, much
less one that was presented to him” in writing or otherwise.) (internal citations
omitted). Therefore Van is not granted relief on this basis.
B. 	Van’s Prolonged Detention Violates Due Process under
German Santos
Van’s second argument is that his prolonged detention without a bond
hearing since August 15, 2024 violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, as applied to him. ECF No. 1, at 19-25. He requests this Court to
conduct a bond hearing or order an individualized bond hearing before an
immigration judge. Id. at 1, 26. The Government argues Van’s petition should be
denied as he is being detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), which requires the
detention of certain noncitizens on statutorily defined criminal or national security
grounds during their removal proceedings. ECF No. 12, at 11-17.
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1. There is No Statutory Basis to Order A Bond Hearing
Because Van is detained under 1226(c), his detention is mandatory under the
statute. Title 8, United States Code, section 1226, distinguishes between two
categories of removable noncitizens: those held under section 1226(a) who may be
released on conditional parole, and those held under section 1226(c), which permits
conditional parole only if release is necessary for witness protection purposes and
the noncitizen can demonstrate they are neither a danger to their community nor a
flight risk. See Jennings, 583 U.S. at 288-89. “[A]n alien detained under § 1226(a)
must be afforded a bond hearing before an immigration judge to determine if the
alien's detention is necessary while he or she awaits immigration proceedings.”
Guerrero-Sanchez v. Warden York Cnty. Prison, 905 F.3d 208, 214 (3d Cir. 2018)
abrogated on other grounds by Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez, 596 U.S. 573 (2022).
In contrast, Section 1226(c)'s mandatory detention of certain persons, including
noncitizens convicted of certain enumerated crimes, does not require a hearing to
begin or continue a noncitizen’s detention under that statute. See 8 U.S.C. §
1226(c); see also Jennings, 583 U.S. at 288. Under section 1226(c), the Government
is required to detain certain noncitizens pending a final removal decision. See
Jennings, 583 U.S. at 303. Given the mandatory detention requirement of
subsection (c), the Court finds there is no statutory basis to grant Van a bond
hearing.
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2. 	Van is Nonetheless Entitled to Habeas Relief
Even though Van’s detention is mandatory under § 1226(c), Jennings does
not prevent the Court from awarding habeas relief where Van’s detention without a
bond hearing has become so unduly prolonged that it renders § 1226(c)
unconstitutional as applied to him.4
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides: “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. It is settled law that the Due
Process clause applies to noncitizens within the United States “whether their
presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at
693. “Freedom from imprisonment – from government custody, detention, or other
forms of physical restraint – lies at the heart of the liberty [the Due Process] Clause
protects.” Id. at 690. While certain constitutional protections do not extend outside
the “geographic borders” of the United States, “legal circumstances change” as soon
as a noncitizen “enters the country.” Id. at 693; see also A.A.R.P. v. Trump, 605
U.S. 91, 94 (2025) (‘“[T]he Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law in
the context of removal proceedings.”’) (quoting Trump v. J.G.G., 145 S. Ct. 103, 1006
(2025) (per curiam)).
4 	In Jennings, the Supreme Court rejected the conclusion that § 1226(c) contained an implicit
reasonableness limitation. However, the Jennings decision did not call into question the
constitutional holding in Diop that detention under § 1226(c) may violate due process if
unreasonably long.
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In this case, Van argues his prolonged detention without a bond hearing
constitutes a violation of due process. The Court agrees.
In German Santos v. Warden Pike County Correctional Facility, 965 F.3d 203,
210 (3d Cir. 2020), the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recognized that “an
alien lawfully present but detained under § 1226(c) can still challenge his detention
under the Due Process Clause [of the Fifth Amendment].” The determination of
whether Van’s prolonged detention is unreasonable is a “highly fact-specific
inquiry.” German Santos, 965 F.3d at 210 (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted). To aid in this inquiry, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has
identified four factors for consideration: (1) the duration of the petitioner’s
detention; (2) the likelihood of continued detention; (3) the reasons for any delay;
and (4) the conditions of the petitioner’s confinement. Id. at 212. Van argues the
four German Santos factors favor his request for a bond hearing; the Government,
disagrees. These factors, and the arguments of each party, will be considered in
order.
i. 	Duration:
To begin, the first and most important factor – the length of detention –
weighs in Van’s favor. He has been detained continuously since August 15, 2024,
over 15 months at the time of this writing. The Government argues that this period
of detention is not unreasonable. ECF No. 12 at 12. The Court disagrees.
The Court recognizes that Van’s 15-month detention without a bond hearing
falls well within the range where courts have held that delays start to become
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unreasonable. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 53 U.S. 678, 701 (2001) (prescribing the
presumptively reasonable time period as six months); Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S.
Ct. 830 (2018); German Santos, 965 F.3d at 211 (citing Chavez-Alvarez v. Warden
York Cnty. Prison, 783 F.3d 469, 478 (3d Cir. 2015) (six-month to one-year period
triggered a bond hearing)); see also Diop v. ICE/Homeland Sec., 656 F.3d 221, 234
(3d Cir. 2011) (mandatory detention becomes “more and more suspect” after five
months), overruled on other grounds by Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018).
Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of granting habeas relief.
ii. 	Likelihood of Continued Detention:
The second factor – the likelihood of continued detention – also weighs in
favor of Van. Here, the habeas court must consider “whether the detention is likely
to continue.” German Santos, 965 F.3d at 211. When a noncitizen’s removal
proceedings “are unlikely to end soon, this suggests that continued detention
without a bond hearing is unreasonable.” Id. The Government argues “Petitioner’s
detention accords with the purpose of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), which is ‘preventing
criminal [noncitizens] [like him] from fleeing prior to or during their removal
proceedings[.]’” ECF No. 12 at 13-14.
Van responds that his detention is likely to continue during the pendency of
his pending Petition for Review before the Court of Appeals. ECF No. 13 at 5-6
(citing Davydov v. Doll, No. 1:19-cv-2110, 2020 WL 969618, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 28,
2020) (noting, inter alia, that the undefined period of further detention due to a
pending Petition for Review weighed in favor of granting habeas relief)).
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As stated previously, Van filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit. ECF No. 1-15; see also publicly available Court of Appeals
docket, Van v. Attorney General United States, Case Number 25-2851, available at
https://ca3-ecf.sso.dcn/cmecf/jsp/CaseSummary.jsp (last viewed 12/4/2025). On
October 29, 2025, the appellate court granted a temporary stay of removal pending
the appellate court’s consideration. Id. As of the date of this writing, Van’s appeal
has yet to be fully briefed by the parties and remains pending without a briefing
schedule issued. Id. As a result, the Court cannot reasonably determine how long
the petition will be pending before the Court of Appeals.
Given these facts, the Court finds this factor also weighs heavily in favor of
granting habeas relief.
iii. 	Reason for Delay:
The third factor – the reasons for the delay – is neutral. Here, the habeas
court must consider “the reasons for the delay, such as a detainee’s request for
continuances” and must “ask whether either party made careless or bad-faith
‘errors in the proceedings that cause[d] unnecessary delay.” German Santos, 965
F.3d at 211 (quoting Diop, 656 F.3d at 234).
Courts are not to “hold an alien’s good-faith challenge to his removal against
him, even if his appeals or applications for relief have drawn out the proceedings”
because delays while he exercises the rights afforded to him by statute cannot be
held against him. German Santos, 965 F.3d at 211 (citing Chavez-Alvarez, 783 F.3d
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at 476-77). Similarly, any legal errors by the Government should not be held
against the Government unless there is evidence of carelessness or bad faith. Id.
The Government contends it has not taken any unnecessary action to prolong
Van’s detention. Van’ immigration proceedings have progressed through the agency
process without any bad-faith delays attributable to the Government. ECF No. 12
at 14.
Here, the Court finds the record supports the conclusion that neither party is
responsible for the sort of unreasonable or bad faith delays contemplated by the
Court of Appeals in German Santos. As a result, this factor is neutral.
iv. 	Conditions of Confinement:
The fourth and final factor – whether the conditions of Van’s confinement are
“meaningfully different” from criminal punishment – favors Van. As explained
above, Van has been detained at MVPC for over 15 months. He has submitted a
declaration, subject to penalty of perjury, in which he asserts the conditions at
MVPC “feel the same as criminal custody.” ECF No. 1-3, ¶ 16. These conditions
include:
● living in a pod with 60 other detainees, id., ¶ 17;
● limited access to time spent outside of his pod; id.;
● when going to recreational activities, he must go
through a metal detector and pat downs. When having
visitors, he is not allowed to make physical contact with
them and can only see visitors through a plexiglass wall,
id.;
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● ongoing fights in his pod and violent interactions, id., ¶
18;
● the possibility of being placed in solitary confinement,
id., ¶ 19.
● lack of sleep due to air conditioning being turned off at
night, id., ¶ 20; and
● lack of appropriate medical care, id., ¶ 22.
The Government responds that MVPC only houses individuals detained for
immigration purposes and his conditions “are no different from hundreds of other
detainees and are not akin to criminal punishment.” ECF No. 12 at 16. According
to the Government, Van “is being held at an immigration-specific processing center,
in accordance with Section 1226(c), while his immigration case proceeds and any
removal is finalized, and is not in a prison serving a criminal punishment. And
unlike the petitioner in German Santos, Petitioner is not confined to his cell for
twenty-three hours per day.” Id. (emphasis in original). The Government further
represents that MVPC
has areas designed as classrooms, craft rooms, a law
library and general library, and program areas. Each
housing unit has a dayroom equipped with tables, chairs,
televisions, telephones, electronic tablets, and board and
card games. Detainees have access to recreation and
leisure time areas for multiple hours each day and can
participate in a voluntary work program outside their
housing unit. The detainees can also communicate with
family members and friends via email, engage in video
visits, and download music and videos. Visitation is also
permitted.
Id. at 16-17 (internal citations omitted).
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The Court finds Van, who is detained and not free to leave MVPC, has
provided sufficient, persuasive evidence in his declaration that his conditions of
confinement are akin to carceral conditions. Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor
of granting habeas relief.
In sum, three factors – the duration of detention, the likelihood of continued
detention, and the detainee’s conditions of confinement – weigh in favor of granting
habeas relief, and one factor – the reasons for the delay – is neutral.
Van has shown that the factors set forth in German Santos balance in favor
of the conclusion that his detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) without an
individualized bond hearing has become unreasonable and that his continued
detention with no process at all, violates his rights under the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment.
V. 	Conclusion
Van has been detained for over 15 months, “an unreasonably long time, and
there is no end in sight.” German Santos, 965 F.3d at 213. The Court finds Van’s
prolonged detention under § 1226(c) without an individualized bond hearing
violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Petition will be
conditionally granted to the extent Van is requesting he be provided a bond hearing
before a neutral immigration judge of the Executive Office of Immigration Review.
If Respondents fail to provide Van with a bond hearing by December 19, 2025, the
WRIT SHALL ISSUE, and Van shall be released with conditions of supervision
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consistent with applicable law. To the extent Van seeks any additional habeas
relief, same will be denied.
The Court reiterates is not making any recommendation whatsoever
regarding Van’s ultimate detention or release. Rather the Court finds, after more
than 15 months in immigration custody and no clear end to removal proceedings in
sight, that Van’s detention has been unduly prolonged and he is therefore entitled
to a bond hearing. Affording such process, after such a prolonged detention, is
consistent with the Fifth Amendment’s guarantees.
A certificate of appealability is not required for federal detainees seeking
relief under Section 2241. Muza v. Werlinger, 415 F. App’x 355, 357 n.1 (3d Cir.
2011). See also 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). Therefore, it is not necessary to determine
whether one should be issued here.
An appropriate Order follows
DATED this 5th day of December, 2025.
BY THE COURT:
s/Christopher B. Brown
Christopher B. Brown
United States Magistrate Judge
cc: 	All Counsel of Record
(via ECF electronic notification)
Case 3:25-cv-00322-CBB Document 15 Filed 12/05/25 Page 20 of 20