BEAUCHAINE v. UNDERWOOD, et al.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
DONALD BEAUCHAINE, 	:
Petitioner 	:
v. 	: Case No. 3:25-cv-58-SLH- KAP
MICHAEL UNDERWOOD, WARDEN, 	:
F.C.I. LORETTO, 	:
Respondent 	:
Report and Recommendation
Recommendation
Petitioner Beauchaine, an inmate at F.C.I. Loretto, filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.§ 2241. ECF no. 5. The respondent responded at ECF
no. 12, and petitioner filed a traverse at ECF no. 13. The petition should be denied on the
merits.
Report
Beauchaine asserts in his habeas corpus petition that the Bureau of Prisons is
illegally refusing to apply to his sentence a quantity of earned time credits (ETC) for
programming completed under the applicable provisions of the First Step Act of 2018,
Pub.L.No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5208 (December 21, 2018). The First Step Act amended 18
U.S.C.§ 3621 to require the Bureau of Prisons to create or expand programs that will
reduce the risk of recidivism by persons convicted of federal offenses, and to award
eligible inmates who participate in these programs credits that can be applied toward time
in prerelease custody or supervised release.
It is specified in the First Step Act that inmates with convictions for certain
(approximately 68) offenses that Congress deems incompatible with recidivism reduction
are ineligible to have ETCs applied. In other words, not all inmates who earn ETCs by
taking recidivism-reducing programs are eligible to have ETCs applied to their sentences.
Those offenses are listed by reference to their statutory section, subsection, or in some
cases paragraph within subsection, at 18 U.S.C.§ 3632(d)(4)(D)(“A prisoner is ineligible
to receive [ETC] ... if the prisoner is serving a sentence for a conviction under any of the
following provisions of law[.]” See Pacheco-Mejia v. Underwood, No. 25-2205 (3d Cir.
Nov. 7, 2025), summarily affirming the judgment in Case No. 3:24-cv-278 (W.D. Pa.
June 10, 2025)(Pesto, M.J.).
Beauchaine pleaded guilty in the Eastern District of North Carolina to manufacture
of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C.§ 2251(a) & (e). United States v. Beauchaine,
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Case No. 7:15-cr-63-D-1 (E.D.N.C.); see also United States v. Beauchaine, No. 22-7240
(4 th Cir. March 24, 2023)(affirming the denial of motion for compassionate release). On
July 12, 2016, the Honorable James Dever sentenced Beauchaine to 180 months
imprisonment followed by a 15-year term of supervised release. Beauchaine’s offense is
expressly 	designated 	in 	the 	First 	Step 	Act 	as 	an 	ineligible 	offense. 	18 	U.S.C.§
3632(d)(4)(D)(xxxix).
But, says Beauchaine, this violates the equal protection clause, constitutes a bill of
attainder, and offends separation of powers principles. Beauchaine has failed to exhaust
his administrative remedies but since his claims are frivolous there is little to be gained
by making Beauchaine present them the right way.
The equal protection doctrine, whether implied by the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment or expressly spelled out in the Fourteenth Amendment, can be summed
up as requiring all persons subject legislation to be treated alike under like circumstances
and conditions and where there is a difference in treatment that there be at least a rational
basis for the difference. See Engquist v. Oregon Dep't of Agriculture, 553 U.S. 591, 602
(2008). That there is a rational basis for treating criminal offenses differently for
purposes of the First Step Act rests on the same foundation that treats criminal offenses
differently for purposes of the Sentencing Guidelines or allows there to be grades in
criminal offenses in the first place. A fentanyl trafficker murderer and a heroin trafficker
can be regarded as deserving of different treatment either at sentencing or under the First
Step Act because it is rational to consider their conduct as differing. Beauchaine’s spew of
words at Petition 6-8 fails even to identify any class of FSA-eligible offenders he claims to
be similarly situated to. Policy choices by the legislative branch of government do not
become subject to equal protection scrutiny simply because they are policy choices.
To put it in simple language, treating distinct groups of individuals differently
presents no equal protection problem. Engquist v. Oregon Dep't of Agriculture, supra,
553 U.S. at 605, citing New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 593 (1979)
(upholding city's exclusion of methadone users from employment under rational-basis
review); Harrah Independent School District v. Martin, 440 U.S. 194, 199-201 (1979);
(classification 	between 	teachers 	who 	had 	complied 	with 	a 	continuing-education
requirement and those who had not is rational and does not violate the Equal Protection
Clause); and Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314-17 (1976)
(upholding a mandatory retirement age under rational-basis review). Beauchaine’s belief
that as a manufacturer of child pornography he is entitled to a higher level of
constitutional scrutiny than transit workers, schoolteachers, and law enforcement officers
may seem reasonable to him. But his belief that pointing out that some offenses do not
preclude some classes of offenders from being designated FSA-eligible is all he has to do
to state an equal protection claim is frivolous.
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Beauchaine’s other two claims are even less substantial. The prohibition against
bills of attainder is “surely” not a variant of the equal protection doctrine. Nixon v.
Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 471 (1977). When the legislature singles
out conduct for reward or punishment, as it did in the First Step Act, the bill of attainder
doctrine is not even relevant. As for Beauchaine’s three paragraphs at page 9 of the
Petition that he heads with “Separation-of-Powers Doctrine,” they do not articulate a
claim, they refute one. Beauchaine claims in his second paragraph that the First Step Act
constitutes “the legislative imposition of punishment… .” He thus negates his assertion in
the third paragraph that the First Step Act is offensive because in it Congress is exercising
judicial powers. He also fails to state any reason why if the First Step Act were invalid that
would result in him obtaining benefits that can flow to him only if the First Step Act is
valid. The respondent charitably refers to Beauchaine’s argument as vague. In fact, it is
nonsense.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.§ 636(b)(1), the parties are given notice that they have
fourteen days to file written objections to this Report and Recommendation. In the
absence of timely and specific objections any appeal would be severely hampered or
entirely 	defaulted. 	See 	EEOC 	v. 	City 	of 	Long 	Branch, 	866 	F.3d 	93, 	100 	(3d
Cir.2017)(describing standard of appellate review when no timely and specific objections
are filed as limited to review for plain error).
DATE: November 10, 2025
Keith A. Pesto,
United States Magistrate Judge
Notice by ECF to counsel and by U.S. Mail to:
Donald Beauchaine Reg. No. 14409-027
F.C.I. Loretto
P.O. Box 1000
Cresson, PA 16630
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