DOE v. SIMONS et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JOHN DOE,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAMRYN SIMONS,
et al.,
Defendants.
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2:25-CV-1371
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Plaintiff John Doe has moved to compel production of the University Incident
Report regarding an incident he was involved in on the University’s campus on
August 25, 2023. ECF 109. He argues that the document is “materially relevant” to
his 	forthcoming 	renewed 	motion 	to 	proceed 	under 	a 	pseudonym 	because 	it
“substantiates Plaintiff’s fear of having to publicly re-live the trauma” of the
psychiatric breakdown he suffered at that time, as well as the “severe psychiatric
distress that could result” if he is denied pseudonymity.
	Id. at 1. 	After careful
consideration, the Court denies the motion for the reasons below.
LEGAL STANDARD
Generally, under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[a] party may not seek
discovery from any source before the parties have conferred as required by Rule 26(f).”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d). 	The Rules allow early discovery in certain cases, however,
including when authorized “by court order.”
Id. Courts in the Third Circuit typically
require the party moving for early discovery to show “good cause for its motion, such
that the request is reasonable in light of the circumstances.”
	Milko v. Excalibur
Mediation Grp., No. 20-1789, 2021 WL 1043041, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 22, 2021)
(Dodge, M.J.) (quoting
Samuel, Son & Co. v. Beach, No. 13-128, 2013 WL 4855325, at
*3 (W.D. Pa. Sep. 11, 2013) (Fischer, J.)).
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DISCUSSION & ANALYSIS
Doe 	argues 	that 	production 	of 	the 	incident 	report 	is 	necessary 	to
“substantiate[]” the harm he fears he will suffer if the Court were to deny his
forthcoming renewed motion to proceed pseudonymously. ECF 109, at 1. For its part,
the University argues that the incident report will not “enhance the merits of
Plaintiff’s renewed motion.” 	ECF 112, at 4. 	Ultimately, the Court agrees with the
University, and finds that Doe’s cited reasons do not constitute good cause for seeking
early production of the incident report.
To start, the Court is not persuaded that the incident report is necessary to
substantiate Doe’s fear of harm for purposes of deciding a renewed motion to proceed
pseudonymously. 	Doe has already amply described his asserted fear of harm that
would result from having to publicly litigate this case.
	See, e.g., ECF 106-5 (letter
from mental health practitioner); ECF 82, ¶ 7 (“[I]f Plaintiff is denied pseudonymity,
Plaintiff will almost certainly experience exacerbation of his symptoms, stigma, and
bet deterred from pursuing his claims.”). The Court thus does not need to review the
incident report to credit Doe’s assertions that publicly litigating this case risks
exacerbating his mental health symptoms and subjecting him to stigma.
Doe has not argued that the incident report is necessary to substantiate a
different kind of harm from the kinds he has already argued he will suffer.
Compare
ECF 82, ¶ 7
with ECF 109, ¶ 2. But even if the incident report were to substantiate
a fear of harm that the record did not already contain, the Court sees no reason why
Doe cannot substantiate that fear of harm by other means that do not require early
discovery, such as a sworn declaration. 	After all, Doe does not contend that the
incident report contains information he is not privy to that is necessary for him to
succeed on his motion to proceed pseudonymously; indeed, the University permitted
him to review the document in November 2024. ECF 109, ¶ 3.
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In 	sum, 	ordering 	early 	discovery 	of 	the 	incident 	report 	would 	not 	be
“reasonable in light of the circumstances” of this case.
	Milko, 2021 WL 1043041, at
*1. Doe himself is in the best position to substantiate his fear of harm for purposes
of a renewed motion to proceed under a pseudonym. If there are additional bases for
his fear of harm that the Court did not already consider in its memorandum order
(ECF 100) denying his initial motion to proceed pseudonymously, he may present
them in his renewed motion.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Doe’s motion to compel production (ECF 109) is
DENIED. 	An Order re-setting the deadline for Doe to file a renewed motion to
proceed under a pseudonym follows.
DATED this 13th day of October, 2026.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ J. Nicholas Ranjan
United States District Judge
cc:
Plaintiff John Doe
Address on File with Clerk of Court
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