CANAAN v. CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
YAEL CANAAN, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	Civil Action No. 23-2107
)
CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY, 	)
)
Defendant. 	)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The present discovery dispute emanates from Plaintiff Yael Canaan’s claims against
Carnegie Mellon University (“CMU” or the “University”) asserting that CMU harbors a culture of
antisemitism, that certain of its professors and administrators intentionally discriminated against
her and harassed her because she is Jewish and of Israeli descent, and that it’s faculty and
administration 	were 	deliberately 	indifferent 	to 	her 	concerns 	about 	such 	discriminatory
mistreatment and retaliated against her, in violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(“Title VI”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq, and in breach of its own policies. (ECF No. 1).
In furtherance of her efforts to adduce evidence of a discriminatory motive, Canaan has
propounded discovery requests seeking to elicit information concerning CMU’s relationship with
the State of Qatar (“Qatar”) and affiliates such as its sovereign wealth fund, the Qatar Investment
Authority 	(“QIA”), 	and 	the 	Qatar 	Foundation 	for 	Education, 	Science 	and 	Community
Development (“Qatar Foundation”). Canaan contends that Qatar and its affiliates supplied CMU
more than $1 billion and thus influenced CMU in creating an antisemitic organizational culture
motivating it to unlawfully discriminate against her and harass her, to avoid addressing her
expressed concerns about her discriminatory mistreatment, and then to retaliate against her for
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seeking redress for being mistreated. 	For its part, CMU denies that Qatar has had any influence
over it and contends that the information Canaan seeks to discover is not relevant and otherwise
disproportionate to the needs of the case, and thus not discoverable.
Despite their conferral efforts, the parties have reached an impasse, so this Court granted
Canaan leave to file the instant Motion to Compel. (Docket No. 99). Canaan supports her motion
with a Memorandum of Law and supporting documents. (Docket Nos. 101; 100-1-100-20
(Exhibits A – S)). CMU opposes Canaan’s motion with its own Memorandum of Law and
supporting documents. (Docket Nos. 109, 110). Canaan also filed a Reply with more supporting
documents. (Docket No. 114). The matter is now fully briefed and ripe for decision.
Whether CMU’s relationship with Qatar and its receipt of Qatar’s financial largesse is
worthy of societal celebration, ambivalence, or opprobrium, is not for this Court to say. Such
matters are more appropriately the concern of the public square and our political branches who
choose to legislate or not legislate restrictions on such relationships, along with executive branch
agencies such as the U.S. Department of Education which is dutybound to regulate aspects of such
relationships according to applicable law.1 Also, not presently before the Court is whether
testimony or documents pertaining to any aspect of the CMU-Qatar relationship would be
admissible evidence in this case. 	As outlined below, information need not be admissible to be
discoverable. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Rather, presently, this Court’s singular focus is on whether
specified aspects of CMU’s contractual and financial relationship with Qatar is discoverable in
this case. To make that decision, the Court must determine whether such information is relevant
and proportional to the needs of the case. As explained below, CMU’s relationship with and
1 	See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1011f.
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funding from Qatar is relevant, generally speaking, but nonetheless does not give Canaan carte
blanche into all aspects of CMU’s extensive, twenty-plus year relationship with Qatar. For the
reasons set forth herein, Canaan’s Motion to Compel will be GRANTED in part and DENIED in
part.
I. 	BACKGROUND
CMU is a private university operating its Main Campus in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. CMU
costs $83,6972 per year to attend, it has an endowment of approximately $3 billion, and it received
a total of approximately $1.753 billion in federal funding over the course of Canaan’s attendance.
(Docket No. 1, ¶¶ 12-13). CMU also maintains a campus in Doha, Qatar. (Docket No. 1, ¶¶ 13,
24). Canaan contends that Qatar hosts CMU’s Doha campus (sometimes referred to herein as
“CMU-Q”) at its expense and has supplied related funding, in an estimated total amount of
approximately $1 billion. Canaan further contends CMU’s relationship with Qatar influences its
own antisemitic culture, motivates its institutional priorities and incentives not to acknowledge or
enforce antisemitism protections, and that “CMU’s officials[’] deliberate indifference to Canaan’s
plight was intentional, systematic, and . . . a direct result of CMU’s ties to Qatar.” (Docket Nos. 1,
¶ 70; 114, at 1, 4, 6).
Canaan proffers two contracts between CMU and Qatar as initial support for contending
that she is entitled to further discovery regarding CMU’s contractual and financial relationship
with Qatar, which she contends serves as motivation for CMU to foster an antisemitic culture that
led to her discrimination, harassment, and retaliation. The first of these contracts is the Agreement
2 	Canaan cites to CMU’s website for tuition and fees pertaining to the 2023-2024 academic year. (Docket No.
1, ¶ 13 and n. 2) (citing https://www.cmu.edu/admission/costs-aid/tuition-and-fees (last visited Dec. 8, 2023). Current
tuition and fees are published at https://www.cmu.edu/sfs/tuition/undergraduate/index.html (last visited Dec. 5, 2025).
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to Establish and Operate Carnegie Mellon University in Qatar (the “CMU-Q Agreement”), entered
into on February 16, 2004, by and between CMU and the Qatar Foundation for Education, Science
and Community Development (“Qatar Foundation”). (Docket No. 101-1). 	This CMU-Q
Agreement establishes CMU’s campus in Doha, Qatar. 	The second is CMU’s Cooperation
Agreement with the Qatar Investment Authority (“QIA”) to establish the “QIA Center for
Professional Education 	and Research” at CMU’s campus in Doha, Qatar. (“Cooperation
Agreement”) (Docket No. 101-2).
A. The CMU-Q Agreement3
The CMU-Q Agreement commits the Qatar Foundation to fund the capital costs and
operating expenses for the establishment, maintenance, and operation of CMU’s degree-granting
branch campus in Doha, Qatar, and precludes CMU from establishing another branch campus in
the Middle East. (Docket No. 101-1, §§1.1; 2.12; 5.1; 5.3). This agreement is self-characterized as
a “cost-reimbursable contract” and expressly provides that “there shall be no financial cost or risk
to Carnegie Mellon.”4 (Id., §§1.1; 6). 	It also obligates the Qatar Foundation to pay CMU a
management fee which shall be inclusive of all the costs incurred at CMU’s Main Campus for
establishing, managing, and operating CMU-Q, excepting only such CMU personnel costs as are
3 	The CMU-Q Agreement contains provisions regarding Confidentiality (Id., § 11.11) and Publicity (Id., §
11.12). By its terms, the CMU-Q Agreement and “its exhibits, and all reports, audits, financial statements, plans and
budgets associated with or generated as a result of performance of this Agreement shall be deemed confidential” unless
such information is in the public domain, is independently developed by either party without use of the other party’s
confidential information, is received from a third party under no duty of confidentiality, or disclosure of such
information is required by law. (Id., § 11.11).
4 	This provision is qualified insofar as CMU’s operation of its Doha campus is subject to independent audits
and adjustments for expenses that jointly selected auditors deem to be not allowable (§6.9). Also, this CMU-Q
Agreement obligates CMU to maintain appropriate liability, casualty, and other insurances coverages “provided
directly by the Qatar Foundation” though such premium costs are deemed “Allowable Costs” and thus reimbursed by
the Qatar Foundation.” (Id., §9.1). Even so, the Qatar Foundation also agrees to indemnify and hold CMU and related
parties harmless against claims in connection with CMU’s management or operation of CMU-Q, except for acts or
omissions which constitute negligence or willful misconduct. (Id., §9).
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attributable to CMU Main Campus personnel who are substantially or entirely dedicated to
operations at CMU-Q. (Id., §6.7). Additionally, by the terms of this agreement, the Qatar
Foundation agrees to provide $3 million annually in “seed research funding” for CMU-Q faculty
who have agreed to reside in Qatar and serve in an active teaching capacity for a period of at least
three years. (Id., §4.7)5.
Subject to certain pertinent limitations described below, the CMU-Q Agreement provides
that CMU “shall have full operational control of the establishment and operation of CMU-Q with
complete academic autonomy and adherence to CMU quality standards.” (Id., §1.1.2). Such
operational control also includes “the authority and responsibility for selecting, employing and
supervising academic and administrative staff, establishing and implementing student admissions
policies, and delivering a curriculum and degree program – all according to the CMU policies,
core values and principles, including those relating to individual and academic freedom, and non-
discrimination, observed at the Main Campus.” (Id., §1.1.2). However, while CMU-Q shall be
operated under the direction of a Dean who shall be the Chief Executive Officer of CMU-Q and
who shall report to CMU’s President and Provost, such appointment only may occur “following
consultation with the Qatar Foundation during the candidate identification, review and selection
process.” (Id., §3.2). Additionally, the CMU-Q Agreement creates a Joint Advisory Board
comprised of four CMU representatives, four Qatar Foundation representatives, and three
representatives jointly chosen by their respective representatives. (§3.3). This Joint Advisory
Board provides advice regarding the management of CMU-Q. (Id., § 3.3.2).
5 	Conditions for receipt of this seed research funding include that the research shall be substantially conducted
in Qatar and that the Qatar Foundation be prominently recognized as the research funding source in any publication
or other release of the research results. (Id., §4.7.1).
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In addition to requiring that CMU consult with the Qatar Foundation concerning the
identification, review and selection process for CMU-Q’s Dean and Associate Deans, the CMU-
Q Agreement also provides certain other limitations on CMU’s “full operational control” of CMU-
Q. For instance, while CMU is responsible for recruiting, hiring, terminating, and establishing
compensation and personnel policies for its faculty and staff, the faculty serving on the Doha
campus must have CMU faculty appointments and CMU must strive to recruit at least two-thirds
of the Doha faculty from CMU’s Main Campus to serve in Qatar for terms of at least three
consecutive years. 	(Id., § 4.2). 	Moreover, while CMU is to design its academic curriculum to
duplicate as closely as possible the curriculum offered at its Main Campus, course offerings at
CMU-Q may only be added, eliminated, or modified by CMU “after consultation with the Qatar
Foundation[.]” (Id., § 2.2.2). 	The CMU-Q Agreement also provides that admissions preference
shall be given to Qatari citizens among applicants qualified under CMU standards for admission
and with the goal of admitting classes that reflect at least 70% representation by Qatari citizens.
(Id., § 2.3.2). The CMU-Q Agreement further provides that CMU and CMU-Q shall operate a
regular exchange program, and that the tuition, fees and other expenses of CMU-Q students
enrolling at the Main Campus shall be borne by the students, students’ sponsors, and/or the Qatar
Foundation. (Id., §§ 2.8; 2.8.1).
Notably, the CMU-Q Agreement provides that “CMU, CMU-Q, and their respective
employees, students, faculty, families, contractors, and agents, shall abide by the applicable laws
and regulations of the State of Qatar, and shall respect the cultural, religious and social customs of
the State of Qatar.” (§ 11.9). The CMU-Q Agreement also provides that “[a]ll faculty and staff
who are hired in the United States to work in the State of Qatar shall participate in an extensive
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orientation program in Doha designed to orient them to the culture in the State of Qatar and to
CMU-Q.” (Id., §4.4).
B. The Cooperation Agreement6
CMU’s Cooperation Agreement with the QIA establishes the “QIA Center for Professional
Education and Research” (the “QIA Center”) at CMU’s Doha campus. (Docket No. 101-2). The
QIA is the sovereign wealth fund of the State of Qatar. 	(Id., Preface). 	By the terms of this
Cooperation Agreement, QIA agreed to pay to CMU-Q a total amount of Qrs. 1,950,1507 in six
installments from June 30, 2023, through June 30, 2025 (Id., Art. 2), for which CMU-Q aims to
provide “a variety of high-quality educational programs that are both consistent with its non-profit
mission and aligned with Qatar’s 2030 vision and the National Development Strategy (2018-
2022).” 	(Id., Preface). 	CMU-Q facility members receive funding hereunder to support their
research efforts. (Id., Ex. A).
The “goal” of the QIA Center is “to research activities that are designed to foster an
environment, 	and 	inspire 	a 	spirit, 	of 	learning 	and 	innovation 	in 	the 	fields 	of 	business
administration, business intelligence and business technology that are targeted largely to university
graduates and leaders of the financial and investment sector in the State of Qatar.” (Id., Art. 1).
The QIA Center has two stated objectives: the first is to provide support to faculty for region-
specific research; the second is to develop a similarly focused QIA lecture series with “input and
6 	Unlike the CMU-Q Agreement, the Cooperation Agreement does not contain any confidentiality provisions.
Rather, its express terms contemplate both CMU-Q and QIA publicizing the activities of the QIA Center and QIA’s
funding of its activities through media and otherwise. (Docket No. 101-2, Art. 1, 7).
7 	The Court takes judicial notice that Qrs. 1,950,150 is the approximate equivalent of $535,609 in U.S. dollars
based upon an exchange rate of 0.27 dollars to 1 Qatari riyal. Convert Qatari Rial to United States Dollar, Forbes
(Dec. 	3, 	2025, 	at 	16:57 	ET), 	https://www forbes.com/advisor/money-transfer/currency-converter/qar-
usd/?amount=1950150.
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assistance of subject matter experts from QIA, including guest lecturers . . . as requested by CMU-
Q and as determined appropriate by QIA . . ..” (Id., Art. 1) (emphasis added).
In addition to these contracts and their economic value to CMU, Canaan also points to data
and reports issued by the U.S. Department of Education, and to studies published by social
scientists, all of which, Canaan contends, reflects her view that CMU has been influenced by its
funding and contractual commitments with Qatar.
II. 	DISCUSSION
(i) 	Legal Framework
The scope and limits of discovery are defined by Rule 26(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Rule 26(b)(1) provides, in relevant part: “[p]arties may obtain discovery
regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional
to the needs of the case.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Information is relevant if “it has any tendency
to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and, the fact is of
consequence in determining the action.” 	Fed. R. Evid. 401; see also Est. of Eckelberry v. CSX
Transp., Inc., Civ. No. 18-365, 2019 WL 13199277 at *1-*2 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 3, 2019). Even so,
“[i]nformation within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be
discoverable.” 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Some courts have also stated that relevance in the
discovery context has been “construed broadly to encompass any matter that could bear on, or that
could reasonably lead to other matter that could bear on any issue that is or may be in the case.” 8
8 	In at least one instance, CMU seemingly suggests that the applicable discovery standard includes information
that is “likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence,” though stating that Canaan’s discovery requests do not
satisfy that standard. (Docket No. 110, at 2). It is worth noting that the “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery
of admissible evidence” standard was removed when Rule 26(b)(1) was amended in 2015. Compare Fed. R. Civ. P.
26(b)(1) (2000) with Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (2015); see also Cole’s Wexford Hotel, Inc. v. Highmark Inc., 209 F.
Supp. 3d 810, 820-21 (W.D. Pa. 2016). Also at that time, the provision authorizing courts to order discovery of any
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Plump v. La Salle Univ., No. 19-cv-4579, 2020 WL 3250532, at *2 (E.D. Pa. June 15, 2020) (citing
United States ex rel. Bergman v. Abbott Labs., No. 09-4264, 2016 WL 4247429, at *2 (E.D. Pa.
Aug. 11, 2016) . See also Wilbert v. Pyramid Healthcare, Inc., No. 24-331, 2025 WL 873947 at
*1-*2 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 20, 2024) and In re Diisocyanates Antitrust Litig., Misc. No. 18-1001, MDL
No. 2862, 2023 WL 424186 at *3-*4 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 26, 2023).
Also, “[t]he parties and the [C]ourt have the collective responsibility to consider the
proportionality of all discovery and consider it in resolving discovery disputes.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
26(b)(1), 2015 Advisory Committee Notes. For determining proportionality, courts consider the
importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative
access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving
the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely
benefit. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). 	Ultimately, determining the limits of discovery is within the
sound discretion of the court and is case-specific. Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Republican Nat’l
Comm., No. 18-1215, 2019 WL 117555, at *2 (3d Cir. Jan. 7, 2019).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 provides the procedural mechanisms for adjudicating
discovery disputes. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37. The burden of establishing relevance initially rests with
the moving party and then shifts to the opposing party:
When deciding a motion to compel, “[t]he moving party bears the
initial burden to prove that the requested discovery falls within the
scope of discovery as defined by Rule 26(b)(1). If the moving party
meets this initial burden, the burden then shifts to the opposing party
to demonstrate that the requested discovery (i) does not fall within
the scope of discovery contemplated by Rule 26(b)(1), or (ii) is not
sufficiently 	relevant 	to 	justify 	the 	burden 	of 	producing 	the
information.”
matter “relevant to the subject matter involved in the action” was removed, while retaining the narrower formulation
“relevant to any party’s claim or defense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (emphasis added).
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Plump, 2020 WL 3250532, at *2 (citing Atkinson v. Luitpold Pharms., Inc., 414 F. Supp. 3d 742,
744 (E.D. Pa. 2019).
As expressed above, information is relevant if it has any tendency to make a fact more or
less probable than it would be without the evidence; and, the fact is of consequence in determining
the action. Fed. R. Evid. 401. Accordingly, relevance must be discerned in view of the applicable
substantive legal standards for discrimination, harassment, and retaliation under Title VI.9 Those
standards have been described in this Court’s prior ruling on CMU’s Motion to Dismiss and will
be summarized herein. See Canaan v. Carnegie Mellon University, 790 F. Supp. 3d 306 (W.D.
Pa. 2024) (Docket No. 40).
(a) Direct Discrimination in Violation of Title VI
Title VI provides that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color,
or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 42 U.S.C. §
2000d. 	Compensatory 	damages 	are 	not 	recoverable 	under 	Title 	VI 	unless 	intentional
discrimination is established. Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 272 (3d Cir. 2014).
Intentional discrimination may be established by showing deliberate indifference without
satisfying a higher burden of proving spite, ill-will, or other indicia of animus. Id. at 272.
Accordingly, 	a 	plaintiff 	may 	establish 	intentional 	discrimination 	through 	the 	deliberate
9 	Canaan also asserts a breach of contract claim based upon certain written guidelines, policies, and procedures.
In her Motion to Compel, Canaan does not expressly assert that CMU’s Qatari relationship is relevant to her breach
of contract claim so for purposes of this pending motion the Court will not evaluate relevance in relation to the breach
of contract claim. The Court also notes that Canaan recently filed a Motion for Leave to File An Amended Complaint
(Docket No. 103), seeking to re-assert a claim for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress as well as to add a new
claim for a violation of the Pennsylvania Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Control Act (“Wiretap Act”), 18
PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 5703, 5725. Those claims contemplated therein are also not addressed by Canaan in her Moton
to Compel so the Court will not evaluate relevance in relation to those potential claims either.
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indifference standard by showing that an educational institution had knowledge that a federally
protected right is substantially likely to be violated yet failed to act despite that knowledge. S.H.
v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 729 F.3d 248, 265 (3d Cir. 2013); Canaan, 760 F. Supp. 3d at 320
(containing citations).
A Title VI direct discrimination violation may be established by direct or circumstantial
evidence. Canaan, 760 F. Supp. 3d at 320. Circumstantial poof is to be evaluated in accordance
with the burden-shifting framework developed in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792. See Canaan, 760 F. Supp. 3d at 320 (citing L.L. v. Evesham Township Board of Education,
710 F. App’x 545, 548-49 (3d Cir. 2017). Accordingly, discriminatory intent or motive is relevant
both for establishing the prima facie elements of the claim, as well as for establishing pretext.
Canaan, 760 F. Supp. 3d at 322-23 (stating that the fourth prima facie element may be established
by showing a “causal nexus between the harm suffered and the plaintiff’s membership in a
protected class, from which a reasonable juror could infer, in light of common experience, that the
defendant acted with discriminatory intent.”); See Blunt, 767 F.3d 247 (3d. Cir. 2014) (“Inasmuch
as we have recognized that individuals who violate the law based on discriminatory motives
sometimes do not leave a trail of direct evidence, but instead ‘cover their tracks’ by providing
alternate explanations for their actions, we have found that a plaintiff may establish a prima facie
factual foundation of discrimination by drawing reasonable inferences from certain objective facts
that are generally not in dispute.”
(b) Hostile Environment in Violation of Title VI
To succeed on a hostile educational environment claim, a plaintiff must prove: (1) that he
or she is a member of a protected class; (2) that he or she was harassed because of race, color, or
national origin; (3) that defendant had actual knowledge of and was deliberately indifferent to the
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harassment; and (4) that the harassment was so severe or pervasive that it deprived plaintiff of
access to the educational benefits or opportunities provided by the school. Canaan, 760 F. Supp.
3d at 324-332. More broadly, a determination of “[w]hether an environment is hostile requires
looking at the totality of the circumstances” and whether the defendant was deliberately indifferent
to known acts of harassment. Id., at 327 (citation omitted).
(c) Retaliation in Violation of Title VI
To establish retaliation in violation of Title VI, a plaintiff must show: (1) her or she was
engaging in a protected activity; (2) the funded entity subjected him or her to an adverse action
after or contemporaneously with the protected activity; and (3) a causal link between the adverse
action and the protected activity. Canaan, at 332.
(ii) 	Analysis
(a) Discriminatory Intent, Motive, and Deliberate Indifference Are Relevant to
Canaan’s Title VI Claims
Common components of the substantive elements of Canaan’s various Title VI claims are
whether CMU had knowledge of the discrimination, harassment, and protected activity; and
whether it acted with a discriminatory intent or motive or otherwise acted or failed to act with
deliberate indifference. Here, Canaan contends that Qatar harbors an antisemitic animus and that
CMU’s contractual and “outsized” financial relationship with Qatar motivates or otherwise
influences CMU to be deliberately indifferent to its obligations for preventing antisemitic
discrimination and harassment of its students under Title VI, and to be deliberately indifferent to
the rights of those students, such as Canaan, who seek assistance and redress for such
discriminatory mistreatment by retaliating against them or otherwise demurring, delaying, and
offering no actual help. (Docket No. 99, at 4-7.) Canaan posits that CMU’s receipt of
approximately $1 billion from Qatar and its affiliates, the largest recipient of Qatari funds among
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U.S. universities, has influenced its own motives and practices regarding matters involving the
rights and protections Title VI affords to its Jewish students of Israeli descent. Id. Citing a report
issued by the U.S. Department of Education Office of the General Counsel entitled Institutional
Compliance with Section 117 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (Oct. 2020), Canaan also posits
that U.S. universities such as CMU historically have underreported funds received from foreign
sources such as Qatar, and that there is “very real reason for concern that foreign money buys
influence or control over teaching and research.” (Docket No. 100 at 5, 12; 100-14).
In further support of her contention that Qatar poses an antisemitic influence on CMU,
Canaan proffers reports from the U.S. State Department and studies from social scientists. For
instance, Canaan proffers a series of annual reports from the U.S. State Department’s Office of
International Religious Freedom for the years 2018 through 2023, to contend that, in Qatar,
Judaism is an “unregistered religion, is ‘illegal’ and generally cannot be practiced in public[,]” and
that numerous examples referenced within these reports demonstrate Qatar’s “state-sanctioned
support of antisemitism.” (Docket Nos. 101, at 11 and note 11; 100 at 6; 100-10; 100-16; 100-17;
100-18; 100-19).
Canaan also proffers a declaration and select research publications of Charles A. Small,
who is the Founding Director and President of the Institute for the Global Study of Antisemitism
and Policy (“ISGAP”), the Director of the ISGAP-Woolf Institute Fellowship Training Program
in Critical Contemporary Antisemitism Studies, Discrimination and Human Rights, a Research
Fellow at St. Edmund’s College, University of Cambridge, and the Director of the Fellowship
Training Program in Critical Contemporary Antisemitism Studies at the Institute for National
Security Studies (“INSS”) at Tel Aviv University. (Docket No. 100-8, ¶ 1). Small avers that he
and his colleagues at ISGAP studied the interference of foreign funding in U.S. higher education
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by 	entities 	that 	“propagate 	anti-democratic, 	anti-American, 	antisemitic 	and 	anti-Western
ideologies” and published a series of reports “focused on the Qatari regime and Muslim
Brotherhood funding to American Universities . . . uncovering disturbing partnerships between
Qatari regime-controlled entities and [these] universities.” (Id., ¶ 4). Canaan supplies some of these
studies, including The Corruption of the American Mind: How Foreign Funding in U.S. Higher
Education by Authoritarian Regimes Widely Undisclosed, Predicts Erosion of Democratic Norms
and Antisemitic Incidents on Campus (2023) (Docket No. 100-9), Volume Two: Examining
Undocumented Foreign Funding of American Universities: Implications for Education and Rising
Antisemitism (2020) (Docket No. 100-15), Qatari National Curriculum: Review of Remaining
Problematic 	Content 	(2023-2024) 	(Docket 	No. 	100-20), 	and 	Networks 	of 	Hate: 	Qatari
Paymasters, Soft Power and the Manipulation of Democracy (2023) (Docket No. 100-11). Small
opines that he would be able to evaluate and render an expert opinion confirming his view that
Qatari influence has substantially contributed to a hostile antisemitic environment at CMU.
(Docket No. 100-8, ¶ 10).
Based upon the foregoing, the Court concludes that Qatar and its affiliates could be a source
of antisemitic influence upon CMU. Indeed, the largesse of Qatari funds supplied to CMU may
permit a reasonable juror to infer, in light of logic and common experience, that significant
amounts of money and the reliance on such funds serves to motivate CMU to abide by expectations
and wishes of its generous donors. Accordingly, and despite CMU’s contrary view, Canaan has
met her initial burden under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 in this Court’s estimation by showing that CMU’s
contractual and financial relationship with Qatar and its affiliates is, generally speaking, relevant
to its intent, motive, and purported deliberate indifference to Canaan’s rights under Title VI.
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Canaan’s interrogatories and requests for production of documents seek to elicit a broad
array of information about CMU’s financial and operational relationship with Qatar. (Docket No.
100-2; Interrogatory Nos. 8, 12, First Requests for Production of Documents Nos. 42, 44-54;
Second 	Requests 	for 	Production 	of 	Documents 	Nos. 	1-3) 	(collectively, 	the 	“Discovery
Requests”).10 In Canaan’s most particularized itemization, which is nonetheless generalized and
stated a bit differently from her other formulations, she seeks an order compelling the production
of the following:
(i) 	the identity of the individuals involved in soliciting money from Qatar,
contracting with Qatar, and complying with Qatari contracts;
(ii) 	all contracts with Qatar (whether or not reported to the U.S. government)
and 	documents 	sufficient 	to 	show 	the 	money 	received 	from 	these
agreements; and
(iii) 	emails from the individuals identified, as well as any centrally stored files,
regarding 	(i) 	and (ii), 	including any communications with the U.S.
Government or authorities in other countries regarding the same.
(Docket No. 101, at 8-9). In essence, Canaan’s Discovery Requests seek to elicit evidence showing
the amount of money CMU has received from Qatar and its affiliates, the identities of those who
procured those funds, and the communications (both internally and with Qataris) regarding such
funds and CMU’s efforts to comply with Qatari law and customs as its contracts require. Canaan
asserts that such evidence is relevant to establish that CMU’s ongoing contractual and financial
relationship with Qatar influenced CMU’s discriminatory motive and deliberate indifference to the
harassment, discrimination, and retaliation she allegedly experienced as a Jewish student of Israeli
descent.
10 	CMU avers that no documents responsive to First RFP Request Nos. 46, 49, 52, and 54, and Second RFP
No. 3, are in its possession, custody, or control, and thus it cannot produce what it does not have. (Docket Nos. 100-
2, at 9; 110, at 5). The Court agrees.
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However, while Canaan attaches a verbatim recitation of her discovery requests and
CMU’s responses thereto pursuant to Local Rule 37.2, her briefing does not offer particularized
explanations for the probative value of each of her many discovery requests, nor does CMU
respond principally in a particularized fashion.11 Aside from CMU’s disagreement with the
generalized relevance of its contractual and financial relationship with Qatar, CMU asserts that
Canaan’s discovery requests are overly broad and attenuated from Canaan’s specific claims,
contending that Canaan’s broadly stated discovery requests are not proportional to the needs of
this case. CMU also contends that it already provided copious responses to Canaan’s Discovery
Requests consistent with the Court’s prior guidance, which CMU characterizes as needing to be
tethered to an appropriate timeframe and “relate[d] to the decisionmakers alleged to have been
involved in responding to [Canaan’s] concerns of antisemitism or the information in the
University’s Section 117 reports.” 	(Docket No. 109-1, at 3).12 Consistent with CMU’s putative
standard, it produced its Cooperation Agreement with the Qatar Foundation along with information
regarding funding received thereunder from it and the Qatar National Research Fund, from August
1, 2018, to present, because that contractual relationship and funding underly its Section 117
Reports. (Id.). Additionally, CMU produced its CMU-Q Agreement even though that agreement
11 	CMU does provide particularized responses in two respects. 	First, CMU contends that no documents
responsive to First RFP Request Nos. 46, 49, 52, and 54, and Second RFP No. 3, are in its possession, custody, or
control, and thus it cannot produce what it does not have. (Docket Nos. 100-2, at 9; 110, at 5). The Court agrees.
Second, CMU describes the burdens associated with responding to Interrogatory No. 8, which seeks to elicit the
identities of all persons involved in soliciting, negotiating, approving, or managing financial support or funding from
Qatar or its associates or delegates. 	(Docket No. 110, at 12). 	In the Court’s estimation, the relevance of such
information in certain respects would be far too attenuated and of little consequential value to be proportional to the
needs of the case given the burdens involved in collecting, gathering, and producing such information.
12 	At an informal telephonic status conference convened on April 3, 2025, in accordance with this Judicial
Officer’s Practices and Procedures, the Court did indicate that the CMU-Qatar relationship seemed to be “attenuated”
from Canaan’s claims and suggested informally that Canaan would need to proffer some modicum of relevance by
tethering such information to an appropriately defined time frame and relating it to the decisionmakers pertinent to
her own situation. In doing so, the Court also qualified this suggestion by application of extant law and by the
expectation that the parties would confer thoroughly to avoid or limit disputes if possible. The Court did not expressly
suggest that only matters reportable under Section 117 were discoverable. (Docket No. 61).
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long predated its self-selected 2018-present timeframe because CMU believes that the CMU-Q
Agreement “provides additional insight into [its] relationship with the Qatar Foundation and its
responsibilities related to” its campus in Doha, Qatar. (Id.). The parties have not agreed on the
production of documents and related information pertaining to the CMU-Q Agreement and its
implementation.
The parties’ principal arguments and counterarguments remain framed around relevance,
proportionality, and burdensomeness, in general fashion, so the Court likewise addresses them
categorically, mindful of the parties’ respective burdens under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37.
(b) Relevancy
Though formed in 2004, the CMU-Q Agreement has remained in place during the 2018-
present timeframe and provides the overall contractual structure for the CMU-Qatar relationship
and the terms and conditions applicable to CMU’s receipt of Qatari funds and other valuable
benefits for establishing, maintaining, and operating its campus in Doha, Qatar. CMU contends
that specified terms in the CMU-Q Agreement itself demonstrate that there are no strings attached
for receiving those funds that would be relevant here. For instance, CMU points to § 1.1.1 of the
CMU-Q Agreement which provides that the Doha campus “shall be operated under the direction
and control of CMU” and that “CMU shall establish and maintain at CMU-Q the same standards
of quality for faculty, staff, students, and curricula that apply at the Main Campus.” (Docket Nos.
101-1, § 1.1.1; 109 at 7-9). 	CMU also points to § 1.1.2, which further provides that “CMU shall
have full operational control of the establishment and operation of CMU-Q . . . all according to
the CMU policies, core values and principles, including those relating to individual and academic
freedom, and non-discrimination, observed at the Main Campus.” (Docket No. 101-1, § 1.1.2)
(emphasis added). Yet, aside from the provisions CMU identifies, and in addition to the significant
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financial support CMU receives from Qatar for establishing and maintaining its campus in Doha,
the CMU-Q Agreement also contains some notable strings or other incentives. Those most
pertinent here are the provisions relating to Appointment of the Dean and Associate Deans of
CMU-Q (§3.), CMU Faculty and Staff Appointments (§4.2), Orientation (§4.4), Seed Research
Funding (§4.7), and Local Laws and Customs (§ 11.9).
According to the CMU-Q Agreement, the Dean of CMU-Q and all Associate Deans may
be appointed by CMU’s President and Provost “following consultation with the Qatar Foundation
during the candidate identification, review and selection process.” (Docket No. 101-1, §3.2).
Notably, CMU concedes that Qatari interests partially fund the position of Elizabeth Rosemeyer,
because she serves both CMU’s Main Campus and its Doha campus as Assistant Vice Provost for
DEI and Title IX Coordinator. (Docket Nos. 1, ¶ 44; 109-2; 114-2). Rosemeyer is a law school
graduate who “oversees implementation and monitoring of appropriate policies, procedures,
grievance processes and training programs related to and in compliance with Title VI, VII, IX and
other state and local discrimination laws[,]” along with being both CMU’s Title VI and Title IX
Coordinator. (Docket No. 114-8). Rosemeyer’s deposition testimony indicates that she oversees a
team responsible for CMU’s response to reports of Title VI violations and personally decides
whether to dismiss or investigate formal complaints of unlawful discrimination. (Docket No. 114-
7). Rosemeyer is an integral participant in Canaan’s case. 	She is referenced repeatedly in the
Complaint, notably as one of several CMU officials specifically responsible for enforcing CMU’s
anti-discrimination policies and protecting students from discrimination and harassment. (Docket
No. 1, ¶¶ 4, 27, 30, 44, 46, 69, 83). 	Importantly, Canaan specifically alleges that Rosemeyer
aggressively discouraged her from filing a formal complaint, which would have triggered an
investigation of Professor Arscott’s purported discriminatory mistreatment of her, as well as of the
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DEI Office’s failure to address the misconduct and of Professor Issaias’s purported retaliation.
(Id., ¶¶ 46, 64). Although CMU downplays any possible Qatari influence in its partial funding of
Rosemeyer’s position by averring that she was hired by its then Vice-President of Operations and
not by any Qatari donor, entity, or representative (Docket Nos. 109-2; 114-2), such point merely
generates, at most, a potential factual dispute about whether or to what extent Qatari funding of
Rosemeyer’s position and Qatari “consultation” during CMU’s identification, review, and
selection of Rosemeyer may have influenced Rosemeyer’s handling of Canaan’s complaints of
discrimination, harassment, and retaliation.
Accordingly, discovery requests seeking to elicit information regarding the specific
funding CMU received for Rosemeyer’s position, any “consultation” CMU had with Qataris
during Rosemeyer’s “candidate identification, review, and selection process[,]” Rosemeyer’s job
functions and responsibilities at each respective campus, and any orientation and instruction or
other guidance Rosemeyer received from Qatar and its affiliates, directly or indirectly, for
performing her duties, are highly relevant. Likewise, to the extent Rosemeyer received any such
direction or guidance from Qatari interests and whether such direction or guidance was absorbed
into 	or 	otherwise 	influenced 	her 	contributions 	to 	the 	development, 	maintenance, 	and
implementation of CMU’s policies, procedures and practices at its Main Campus, such work
product and those communications and collaborations are also highly relevant.
Importantly, another relevant connection between Canaan’s Title VI claims and CMU’s
Doha campus is that at least three CMU DEI-related officials involved in Canaan’s complaints of
antisemitism had work-related visits to CMU’s Doha campus. 	Wanda Heading-Grant, CMU’s
Chief Diversity Officer, visited the Doha campus twice, once to provide training and education
programs regarding “civility, bias, discrimination” and “belonging and inclusion, leadership [and]
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listening” along with a “couple of other members from [her] office” (Docket No. 114-4), and a
second time for a “professional development engagement.” (Id.). Mark D’Angelo¸ another senior
CMU administrator responsible for antidiscrimination efforts, similarly visited the Doha campus
for such training. D’Angelo describes the purpose of his visit as follows:
I was there to facilitate – I was there to learn as much as I could about their campus
culture and their context and meet colleagues that work in that global campus and
also I was there to facilitate the implicit bias workshop and help give some of those
staff and facilities the tools to maybe have similar conversations in their context
once we were gone, empower them to support their community in the best way.
(Docket No. 114-6). D’Angelo further describes the workshops and training he helped to facilitate
as involving “bias, explicit [sic] bias, how it shows up in system structures, systems of oppression
and supporting their community and learning their specific cultural context.” (Id.).13 In addition
to visiting the Doha campus, D’Angelo also had regular monthly conversations with the “inclusive
excellence officer” at the Doha campus. CMU assigns an “inclusive intelligence officer” to every
academic unit or college, including CMU-Q, “who’s role in some portion is dedicated to doing
diversity, equity and inclusion work in their own sphere of influence or college.” (Id.). Finally,
Gina Casalengo, CMU’s Vice President for Student Affairs and Dean of Students, visited the Doha
campus approximately four times. (Docket No. 114-5). During those visits, Casalengo met with
the Dean, the student affairs lead, and the student affairs operation, in addition to touring the
facilities, for the purpose of “relationship building with [her] Qatar colleagues.” (Id.).
13 	Certain language D’Angelo uses to describe topics covered in CMU’s CMU-Q training workshops, such as
“systems of oppression,” is an ill-defined expression that may extend beyond the scope of protected categories
Congress placed in the text of Title VI, Title VII, and Title IX, yet it resembles language contained in the blog “The
Funambulist” that Professor Arscott is accused of sending to Canaan for “insightful . . . perspective” in the context of
Professor Arscott’s purported refusal to apologize to Canaan, which reads: “[Y]ou never make concessions to the
oppressor. If you’re going to get punished, and you might, if you piss off Zionists, its always a possibility, right, then
stare the oppressor in the face, and take whatever punishment is coming. Don’t concede, don’t start apologizing . . .
The Palestinians aren’t backing down, nor should we . . . [we] do not make concessions to the oppressor.” (Docket
No. 1, ¶ 39).
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Accordingly, discovery requests seeking to elicit information regarding visits taken to the
Doha campus and the contents of any visits, trainings, workshops, and other communications
involving CMU’s DEI officials such as Wanda Heading-Grant, Mark D’Angelo, and Gina
Casalengo, are also highly relevant, as are the “conversations” and other interactions between
CMU-Q’s “inclusive excellence officers” and D’Angelo and other DEI officials at CMU’s Main
Campus. Furthermore, there is sufficient basis in the record to conclude that there is enough
interaction between the DEI officials at CMU’s Main Campus and administrators at its campus in
Doha to deem relevant any available particularized accounting for the funding for, as well as the
content of, all trainings, workshops, and other communications at or for CMU’s Doha campus that
involved Main Campus administrators related to discrimination, bias, diversity, equity, belonging
and inclusion, and any similar topics regardless of title, euphemism, or label used to describe them.
In relation to faculty selection and support, the CMU-Q Agreement provides that CMU
must use its best efforts to ensure that at least half of all faculty at CMU’s Doha campus come
from existing ranks at its Main Campus, and as a long term goal, CMU must use its best efforts to
ensure that at least two-thirds of its Doha faculty come from its Main Campus and serve in Qatar
for terms of at least three consecutive years. (Id., §4.2). Additionally, CMU is provided $3 million
annually to qualifying facility in Qatar for “seed research funding.” (Id., § 4.7). Moreover, CMU’s
Cooperation Agreement creates the QIA Center, through which CMU receives funding from QIA
to support research efforts of CMU-Q faculty in so far as such research aligns with Qatar’s “2030
Vision” and “National Development Strategy (2018-2022).” (Docket No. 101-2). 	QIA also
supports CMU-Q in developing a lecture series with the “input and assistance of subject matter
experts from QIA, including guest lecturers, in each case as requested by CMU-Q and as
determined appropriate by QIA . . ..” (Id.) (emphasis added). The benefits Qatar has been providing
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to CMU and its faculty through the CMU-Q Agreement and Cooperation Agreement, along with
Qatar’s contractual right to influence the content of the research and lectures, is probative of
Qatar’s possible influence over CMU’s motives and intentions and thus may be of consequence in
Canaan’s Title VI claims.
Importantly, “[a]ll faculty and staff who are hired in the United States to work in the State
of Qatar shall participate in an extensive orientation program in Doha designed to orient them to
the culture in the State of Qatar and to CMU-Q.” (Id., §4.4). So, the faculty at CMU-Q are mainly
from its Main Campus, and certain of these faculty members are supplied with research funding.
Notably, Canaan avers that her primary discriminator, Professor Arscott, “spent professional time
in Qatar.” (Docket No. 1, ¶ 24). Professor Arscott testified that she was “running a workshop” for
the American universities in Qatar and “collaborating with faculty from the School of Design and
faculty who taught alternative semesters at [CMU-Q and Main Campus], who taught architecture
as a non-major in Qatar.” (Docket No. 114-3). Accordingly, discovery requests seeking to elicit
information about Professor Arscott’s time in Qatar, including any orientation she received
pursuant to § 4.4 of the CMU-Q Agreement, is also highly relevant. Also highly relevant is
information about any Qatari funding Professor Arscott received to cover her expenses generally
for visiting Qatar or funding received specially for research or programs pursuant to the
Cooperation Agreement or for “seed research” pursuant to § 4.7 of the CMU-Q Agreement.
Moreover, given the averments regarding Professor Arscott’s position, influential role, and
relationships with her fellow professors and CMU’s DEI administrators, any such funding,
orientation, instruction, or other connection between Qatar and other members from CMU’s
Department of Architecture is also highly relevant.
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Finally, the CMU-Q Agreement obligates “CMU, CMU-Q, and their respective employees,
students, faculty, families, contractors and agents [to] abide by the applicable laws and regulations
of the State of Qatar, and shall respect the cultural, religious and social customs of the State of
Qatar.” (Id., § 11.9) (emphasis added). Again, to the extent that Canaan seeks to elicit information
pertaining to CMU’s activities and communications regarding compliance with applicable laws
and regulations of the State of Qatar having any bearing on CMU’s faculty and staff of its
Department of Architecture and DEI officials at its Main Campus, including Rosemeyer, Heading-
Grant, D’Angelo, and Casalengo, such requests also are highly relevant. 	Likewise, any such
activities and communications undertaken by CMU’s DEI officials and/or faculty and staff of its
Department of Architecture, including Professor Arscott, in furtherance of CMU’s contractual
obligation to “respect the cultural, religious and social customs of the State of Qatar” pursuant to
§ 11.9 of the CMU-Q Agreement are also highly relevant.
The CMU-Q Agreement and Cooperation Agreement, along with the engagement
Professor Arscott and CMU DEI officials have had with CMU’s Doha campus, demonstrably tend
to make it more probable that CMU’s relationship with Qatar may have influenced CMU’s
policies, practices, and actions related to issues consequential in this case, such as its motivations
and intentions for how it handles complaints lodged by students concerning antisemitism by
faculty and staff. Fed. R. Evid. 401. Even the provisions identified by CMU that contractually
empowered it to have full operational control of the Doha campus according to its own policies,
core values, and principles, including those relating to non-discrimination, which tend to make
Canaan’s contentions of discriminatory influence less probable, still supports a relevance
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determination. Fed. R. Evid. 401 (“it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable . . .”)
(emphasis added) 14.
(c) 	Proportionality
Relevance is only part of the Court’s analysis. 	To be discoverable, not only must the
information Canaan seeks to elicit be relevant, but it must also be proportional to the needs of the
case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). For determining proportionality, courts consider the importance of
the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant
information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and
whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 26(b)(1).
CMU asserts that Canaan’s attempt to elicit extensive discovery pertaining to its Qatari
relationship is disproportionate to the needs of this case which involves a “single-plaintiff lawsuit,
where the amount in controversy is less than $75,000[.]” (Docket No. 109, at 11). While Canaan’s
potential recovery for compensatory relief may be modest,15 the issues underlying her Title VI
claims are important, nonetheless. Title VI prohibits universities such as CMU from discriminating
against persons under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance. 42 U.S.C. §
14 	The Court notes that CMU previously took the position that its “Statement of Assurance,” a policy providing
that it does not discriminate on the basis of, inter alia, national origin, religion, or ancestry, contains only “brief,
general statements of anti-discriminatory and anti-retaliatory policy that do not set forth specific identifiable promises
that are capable of being measured or enforced in contract.” (Docket No. 33, at 10-11). Retaining its contractual right
in the CMU-Q Agreement to implement such “aspirational” yet unenforceable non-discrimination policies give cold
comfort to those students who rely upon them. Even so, whether § 1.1 of the CMU-Q Agreement tends to make
Qatar’s influence over CMU more or less probable is beside the point, as either way it is relevant to Canaan’s Title
VI claims. Canaan, 760 F. Supp. 3d at 335.
15 	CMU asserts that Canaan still has not provided a calculation of her damages pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
26(a)(1)(A)(iii). (Docket 109 at 11). In her Reply, Canaan reports that she now has supplemented her disclosures
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e) and that her damages are $12 million. (Docket No. 114 at 3). The Court will presume,
for purposes of adjudicating the present motion only, that her monetary damages are below $75,000.
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2000d. CMU must abide by Title VI because it receives Federal financial assistance from the U.S.
Department of Education. The Court notes that CMU does not contest that it falls within Title VI’s
coverage and admits that it received approximately $1.753 billion in federal funding during
Canaan’s time as a student. (Docket Nos. 1, ¶¶ 13, 90-91; 47, ¶ 13). Abiding by such statutory
nondiscrimination obligations as a condition of receiving significant sums of federal funding is
important indeed. Not only is Canaan seeking compensatory and punitive damages, but she is also
seeking injunctive relief to prevent CMU from violating Title VI. 	(Docket No. 1). And,
adjudicating whether CMU’s receipt of a similarly staggering amount of funds from a foreign
government motivated or otherwise influenced its faculty and DEI officials to disregard such an
important legal obligation is also important. The U.S. Department of Education itself has expressed
concerns about possible foreign influence on, and foreign funding of, domestic activities of
institutions of higher education. (Docket No. 100-14). The broader context of this lawsuit is also
important as incidents of antisemitism appear to be ascendent on and near American college
campuses. See, e.g., Hearing on Antisemitism on College Campuses House Judiciary Comm.
Subcomm. on Const. and Ltd. Gov’t, 118 th Congress (2024). Notably, here, Canaan avers that in
her very first semester at CMU, Professor Arscott denied her request for an extension on a
homework assignment so that she could attend a memorial service in the immediate aftermath of
eleven Jews having been murdered and two more critically injured while engaging in Shabbat
prayers at the Tree of Life Synagogue “down the road” from CMU’s Main Campus in what is
“widely considered to be the deadliest antisemitic attack in American history.” (Docket Nos 1, ¶
14; 47 ¶ 14). The criminal trial of the Tree of Life shooter took place in this judicial officer’s
courthouse. The importance of Title VI compliance and the protection of students against unlawful
forms of antisemitism and other categories of unlawful discrimination cannot be understated.
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Next, the Court considers the parties’ resources and their relative access to relevant
information. 	Canaan is a young, recent college graduate. 	In contrast, CMU is a preeminent
research university with a $3 billion endowment, receives billions in funding from the U.S.
government and perhaps a similar amount of funding from foreign nations such as Qatar, and it
advertises charging its students more than $80,000 per year to attend. Moreover, CMU employs
legions of administrators, including a plethora of DEI officials responsible to ensure compliance
with nondiscrimination laws such as Title VI. Most of the information Canaan seeks to discover
is not otherwise available to her but is or ought to be in CMU’s possession, custody, or control.
And, while certain information pertaining to CMU’s receipt of funding from foreign sources
should be publicly available pursuant to Section 117 of the Higher Education Act of 1965
(“HEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1011f (“Section 117”), the U.S. Department of Education itself has
expressed concern that such reporting of funding is “systematically underinclusive and inaccurate”
despite recipient institutions having “highly credentialed administrators and ready access to the
very best accountants and attorneys” and separate “extensive foreign revenue reporting obligations
to the Internal Revenue Service.” (Docket No. 100-14, at 5). These factors also weigh in favor of
discoverability.
Adjudicating CMU’s intent, motive, and purported deliberate indifference to Canaan’s
rights under Title VI is of central importance in this case. Canaan contends that CMU’s contractual
and financial relationship with Qatari interests influences CMU’s handling of complaints involving
antisemitic forms of discrimination, harassment and retaliation. 	Information regarding that
relationship may be consequential depending on what such discovery reveals. This factor also
weighs in favor of discoverability.
(d) Burden
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The Court finally must consider whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery
outweighs its likely benefit. This issue is more difficult to assess based upon the current record.
Canaan does not address each of her Discovery Requests with particularity, nor does CMU supply
the estimated expense or burden as to each such Discovery Request. CMU does delineate the
administrative burden it foresees if compelled to search for and produce documents related to
“soliciting, negotiating, approving, and managing funds and working with third-parties[,]” placing
burdens on more than 28 custodians over an estimated “several months and at significant expense.”
(Docket No. 110, at 12).
In essence, CMU complains that Canaan’s Discovery Requests are overly broad and
attenuated from the case at hand, and that searching for, gathering, and producing the requested
information would implicate several departments and burden more than a score of custodians.
Given both parties’ generalized framing of their respective positions, the Court is provided little
upon which to base its proportionality calculus. 	Upon consideration of the record, such as it is,
the Court concludes that certain portions of Canaan’s Discovery Requests pertaining to specific
CMU-Qatari contractual provisions and certain interactions Professor Arscott and various DEI
officials have had with CMU’s Doha campus, are relevant enough given the proximate relationship
with key participants and related functions in this case such that the burden or expense is worth
discoverability 	here. 	Such 	discoverable 	information 	shall 	include 	documents 	and 	other
information pertaining to:
• 	Any direction, guidance, communications, and other information Rosemeyer,
Heading-Grant, D’Angelo, Caselango, or other DEI officials and “inclusive
intelligence officers” provided to CMU-Q pertaining to compliance with laws,
regulations, policies, procedures, and practices 	relating to discrimination, bias,
diversity, equity, belonging and inclusion, “systems of oppression,” “culture” and
“specific cultural contexts,” and any similar topics regardless of title, euphemism,
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or label used to describe them (generally, “nondiscrimination and DEI-related”
laws, regulations, policies, procedures, and practices).
• 	Any direction, guidance, communications, and other information Rosemeyer,
Heading-Grant, D’Angelo, Casalengo, or other DEI officials and “inclusive
intelligence officers” received from Qatar, its affiliates or delegates, and/or
personnel from CMU-Q pertaining to compliance with laws, regulations, and
policies relating to nondiscrimination and other DEI-related laws, regulations,
policies, procedures, and practices, procedures, and practices.
• 	Any direction, guidance, communications, and other information Rosemeyer,
Heading-Grant, D’Angelo, Casalengo, or other DEI officials and “inclusive
intelligence officers” received from CMU and/or Qatar and its affiliates or
delegates, 	pertaining 	to 	CMU-Q’s 	“culture 	and 	context,” 	along 	with
communications, collaborations, and other efforts reflecting if or how such
direction, guidance, or other information was incorporated into, influenced, or
otherwise was considered in the development, maintenance, and implementation of
CMU’s various nondiscrimination and “DEI-related” policies, procedures and
practices.
• 	The meetings, gatherings, “conversations,” and other communications (whether in-
person, virtual, telephonic, or electronic) by and between CMU-Q’s DEI officials
or “inclusive intelligence officers” and any of CMU’s DEI-related officials, and/or
faculty or staff from CMU’s Department of Architecture.
• 	The visits taken to CMU’s Doha campus (or Education City in Qatar, generally) by
any of CMU’s DEI-related officials, Professor Arscott, or any other faculty or staff
member from CMU’s Department of Architecture.
• 	The contents of any trainings and workshops offered at or for CMU’s Doha campus,
and communications regarding same, in which Professor Arscott or any of CMU’s
DEI officials and “inclusive intelligence officers” (including but not limited to
Elizabeth 	Rosemeyer, 	Wanda 	Heading-Grant, 	Mark 	D’Angelo, 	and 	Gina
Casalengo) 	facilitated, 	presented, 	participated 	in, 	attended, 	or 	otherwise
commissioned, approved, oversaw, directed, planned, or assisted as such, whether
directly or indirectly.
• 	Any instruction, guidance, training, or other orientation programs designed or used
to orient faculty and staff members to the culture in the State of Qatar and to CMU-
Q.
• 	Any instruction, guidance, training, or other orientation programs relating to the
obligation of employees, students, faculty, families, contractors and agents of CMU
and CMU-Q to abide by laws and regulations of the State of Qatar and to respect
the cultural, religious, and social customs of the State of Qatar.
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• 	The particularized accounting of funds received from Qatar or its affiliates or
delegates for Elizabeth Rosemeyer’s position, any “consultation” CMU had with
Qatar or its affiliates or delegates during Rosemeyer’s “candidate identification,
review, and selection process[,]” Rosemeyer’s job functions and responsibilities at
each respective campus, and any orientation and instruction or other guidance
Rosemeyer received from CMU and/or Qatar or its affiliates or delegates, directly
or indirectly, for performing her duties pertaining to CMU-Q.
• 	The particularized accounting of “seed research funding,” other research, lecture,
or program funding, or other funding or expense coverage or reimbursement
provided by Qatar, its affiliates or delegates, directly or indirectly, to Professor
Arscott or others within CMU’s Department of Architecture.
• 	Reports and disclosures previously made to the U.S. Department of Education
pursuant to Section 117 of the Higher Education Act of 1965, 20 U.S.C. § 1011f,
relating to CMU’s relationship with Qatar and its affiliates or delegates.
Aside from the discoverable information emanating from the above-referenced contractual
provisions and from interactions Professor Arscott and various DEI officials have had with CMU’s
Doha campus, there remains the question of whether the actual economic value of the CMU-Qatari
relationship, including the total amount of funding CMU received, itself, is relevant enough to
overcome CMU’s proportionality objections. As stated supra, this Court believes that the funding
at the levels CMU purportedly received from Qatar is relevant. But, relevant enough? The Court
believes so. Canaan now qualifies her Discovery Requests in this regard by stating that she is “not
seeking receipts and invoices showing how every one of the over $1 billion CMU received was
spent. Rather, [Canaan] seeks admissible evidence showing the amount of money CMU has
received from Qatar . . ..” (Docket No. 101, at 13). The Court understands that certain information
pertaining to funding has been, or should have been, reported to the U.S. Department of Education
pursuant to Section 117 and has also been produced to Canaan along with the related research
agreements. Such information has already been gathered and produced so reproduction here (if not
done so already) would not be unduly burdensome nor otherwise disproportionate to the needs of
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this case. The Court also believes that CMU additionally must produce information (in the form
of documents, affidavits or declarations, or other appropriate responses) reflecting the full
economic benefit received from its Qatari relationship, comprised of an aggregate number
inclusive of the value of Qatar’s provision of CMU’s campus and infrastructure in Doha, along
with annualized “Allowable Costs” and other specified payments made pursuant to the CMU-Q
Agreement.
The Court is unable to discern whether Canaan’s Discovery Requests are relevant and
proportional to the needs of the case beyond the foregoing. Accordingly, the Court will deny
Canaan’s Motion to Compel except as set forth herein.
III. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff Yael Canaan’s Motion to Compel is GRANTED in part
and DENIED in part.
s/ W. Scott Hardy
W. Scott Hardy
United States District Judge
Dated: December 5, 2025
cc/ecf: All counsel of record
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