CONLEY-REIFER v. MAJOR JEFFREY KENGERSKI et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
SKYLAR ANNABELL CONLEY-REIFER, )
)
Plaintiff, 	) 	Civil Action No. 2:23-cv-1804
)
v. 	) 	Judge William S. Stickman
) 	Magistrate Judge Patricia L. Dodge
MAJOR JEFFREY KENGERSKI, et al., 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. 	Recommendation
It is respectfully recommended that the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant former
Captain Randy S. Russell (“Russell”) (ECF No. 135) be denied.
II. 	Report
A. 	Relevant Procedural History
Plaintiff Skylar Annabell Conley-Reifer, a prisoner who is currently in the custody of the
Federal Bureau of Prisons, brings this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
concerning events that occurred when she was housed in the Butler County Prison (“BCP”). In
addition to Russell, Plaintiff also brings this action against other BCP-related defendants1 and
Chaplain Tim Bogden.2
After Plaintiff filed an original Complaint (ECF No. 6) and an Amended Complaint (ECF
No. 48), Russell filed a motion to dismiss and a motion for a more definite statement. (ECF No.
100.) Those motions were denied. (ECF No. 116.) The Court held that the nature of Plaintiff’s
1 Those defendants have also filed a motion to dismiss, which is pending. (ECF No. 133.)
2 The correct last name of the defendant is Boden. This Court has issued a supplemental service
order directing that the Third Amended Complaint be served on Boden and has not yet been
notified that service has been effectuated.
Case 2:23-cv-01804-WSH-KT Document 156 Filed 11/25/25 Page 1 of 6

2
claims against Russell could be discerned, and that Plaintiff stated a plausible claim of excessive
force against Russell. Other defendants also moved to dismiss, and their motions were granted in
part and denied in part in an order issued on January 27, 2025. (Id.) Plaintiff was permitted to file
a second amended complaint as to claims and parties who were not dismissed with prejudice. (Id.)
Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 121) that was subsequently stricken
(ECF No. 124) because she failed to comply with the directives set forth in the Court’s January
27, 2025 Order. Plaintiff then filed the operative Third Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 132.)
Thereafter, Russell filed the instant Motion to Dismiss and a supporting Brief (ECF Nos. 135, 136)
to which Plaintiff has responded. (ECF Nos. 146, 148.)
Russell’s motion is ripe for consideration.
B. 	Relevant Factual Allegations3
Plaintiff identifies as a transgender female who was a pre-trial detainee at the time of her
imprisonment at BCP. (ECF No. 132 ¶¶ 3, 14.) She names Russell as a defendant and alleges that
he was a captain at BCP when she was initially in custody. (Id. ¶ 6.) According to Plaintiff, Russell
was legally responsible for daily operations, daily assignments of the correctional officers and the
welfare of the inmates. (Id.) She makes similar allegations about Defendants Warden Sneddon,
Major Kengerski, Captain Wingrove and Captain Popinski. (Id. ¶¶ 4, 5, 7, 8.) Warden Sneddon is
alleged to be responsible for “the promulgation and enforcement of policies and rules” at BCP.
(Id. ¶ 5.)
While she was housed at BCP, Plaintiff lodged multiple complaints about harassment. (Id.
¶ 16.) She claims that Russell confronted Plaintiff about her continuous grievances. (Id.) When
Plaintiff told Russell she was aware of her right to file a lawsuit, Russell grabbed Plaintiff’s arm
3 The facts in this section are limited to those relevant to Russell’s motion.
Case 2:23-cv-01804-WSH-KT Document 156 Filed 11/25/25 Page 2 of 6

3
and violently twisted it behind her back. (Id.) Plaintiff was in handcuffs at the time. (Id.) Plaintiff
told Russell that her arm was already injured, and he was hurting her. (Id.) Russell responded by
pushing Plaintiff down the stairs, nearly causing her to fall. (Id.) He told her to shut up and as he
escorted her to the RHU, he pushed her injured shoulder and her face into walls and corners along
the way before shoving her into a caged shower in the RHU. (Id.)
C. 	Legal Standard
A complaint requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), a complaint may be dismissed, in whole or in part, for “failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the
court must “accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff
may be entitled to relief.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting
Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008)). When “accept[ing] all of the
complaint’s well-pleaded facts as true,” the court “may disregard any legal conclusions.” Id. at
210-11.
Further, “[a] document filed pro se is to be liberally construed and a pro se complaint,
however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted
by lawyers[.]” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal citation and quotation marks
omitted); see also Higgs v. Att’y Gen., 655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 2011) (“The obligation to
liberally construe a pro se litigant’s pleadings is well-established.”). Additionally, the court must
“apply the relevant legal principle even when the complaint has failed to name it.” Mala v. Crown
Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244 (3d Cir. 2013). That said, “pro se litigants still must allege
Case 2:23-cv-01804-WSH-KT Document 156 Filed 11/25/25 Page 3 of 6

4
sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim[,]” and “they cannot flout procedural rules—
they must abide by the same rules that apply to all other litigants.” Id. at 245.
D. 	Discussion
Plaintiff’s claims are brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “To state a claim under § 1983,
a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United
States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color
of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Section 1983 does not itself create any
substantive rights; it simply provides a cause of action that allows the plaintiff to vindicate rights
that have already been secured. See, e.g., Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 285 (2002).
Russell argues that Plaintiff’s civil rights claim against him should be dismissed because
she has failed to allege his personal involvement in any of the incidents described in the Third
Amended Complaint or that he had supervisory authority over any the other Defendants. Russell
contends that other than the paragraph that identifies him and his role at BCP, the remainder of the
Third Amended Complaint is “silent” as to him. (ECF No. 136 at 2 (citing ECF No. 132 ¶ 6.))
Russell is wrong about the lack of any allegations of his personal involvement. As
explicitly alleged in Paragraph 16 of the Third Amended Complaint, Plaintiff claims that Russell
applied violent and unnecessary force which hurt her. (ECF No. 132 ¶ 16.)4 Further, she confirms
in her response to Russell’s pending motion that she intends to assert a claim of excessive force
4 These allegations are similar to those in the Complaint and Amended Complaint in which
Plaintiff alleged, among other things, that Russell grabbed her, re-injured her shoulder, caused her
to nearly fall down the stairs and forcefully pushed her into the corners of the sally port and
elevator. (ECF No. 6 at 10; ECF No. 48 ¶ 12.) Based on these allegations, the Court found that she
plausibly stated a Fourteenth Amendment claim of excessive force.
Case 2:23-cv-01804-WSH-KT Document 156 Filed 11/25/25 Page 4 of 6

5
against Russell based on the allegations in Paragraph 16 of the Third Amended Complaint. (ECF
No. 146 at 3.)
Because Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee at the relevant time, her excessive force claim
arises under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Fourteenth Amendment
protects pretrial detainees from “the use of force that amounts to punishment.” Graham v. Connor,
490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10 (1989) (citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 535-39). To state a Fourteenth Amendment
violation for excessive force, a pretrial detainee must allege facts to plausibly suggest “that the
force purposely or knowingly used against him was objectively unreasonable.” Kingsley v.
Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 396-97 (2015). Courts must pay “careful attention to the facts and
circumstances of each particular case,” and use these six “Kingsley factors”: “[1] the relationship
between the need for the use of force and the amount of force used; [2] the extent of the plaintiff’s
injury; [3] any effort made by the officer to temper or to limit the amount of force; [4] the severity
of the security problem at issue; [5] the threat reasonably perceived by the officer; and [6] whether
the plaintiff was actively resisting.” Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 397.
Plaintiff did not expressly reference an excessive force claim against Russell in the “Legal
Claims” section of the Third Amended Complaint. However, it is readily apparent from reviewing
the entire complaint that she has asserted a claim of excessive force against Russell. As a fair
reading reveals, she alleges that for no legitimate penological purpose, Russell used force that was
unreasonable and amounted to punishment because she had asserted complaints or grievances.
Case 2:23-cv-01804-WSH-KT Document 156 Filed 11/25/25 Page 5 of 6

6
Thus, Plaintiff clearly alleges the personal involvement of Russell and has plausibly stated
a Fourteenth Amendment claim against Russell.5 Therefore, Russell’s Motion to Dismiss should
be denied.
E. 	Conclusion
It is respectfully recommended that the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant Former
Captain Randy S. Russell (ECF No. 135) be denied.
Pursuant to the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (C), and Rule 72.D.2
of the Local Civil Rules, litigants who seek to challenge this Report and Recommendation must
seek review by the district judge by filing objections by December 9, 2025. Any party opposing
the objections shall file a response by December 23, 2025. Failure to file timely objections will
waive the right of appeal. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011).
Dated: November 25, 2025 	/s/ Patricia L. Dodge
PATRICIA L. DODGE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
5 By contrast, the mere allegation that Russell was “legally responsible” for operations,
assignments and the welfare of inmates does not support a claim of supervisory liability for the
actions of other defendants, nor is one articulated in the Third Amended Complaint.
Case 2:23-cv-01804-WSH-KT Document 156 Filed 11/25/25 Page 6 of 6