GIBBONS v. BICKELL et al

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
STEPHEN BARRY GIBBONS,
)
)
Civil Action No. 21-1210
Plaintiff,
)
)
District Judge Marilyn J. Horan
V.
) Magistrate Judge Maureen P. Kelly
)
SABANDA, Imam SCI-Green,
)
Re: ECF Nos. 107 and 109
)
Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. RECOMMENDATION
Pending before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment filed on behalf of Plaintiff Stephen Barry Gibbons ("Plaintiff"), ECF No. 107, and a Motion for Summary Judgment filed on behalf of Defendant Sabanda ("Defendant"), ECF No. 109. For the reasons that follow, it is respectfully recommended that Plaintiff's motion be denied and that Defendant's motion be granted.
II. REPORT
Plaintiff brings this pro se action asserting violations of his right to freely practice his religion under the First Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq., while incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Greene ("SCI- Greene"). ECF No. 84.
A. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. Preliminary Discussion of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e)
Defendant's Statement of Material Facts Not in Dispute is docketed at ECF No. 111. Plaintiff has not responded to this document and has cited no evidence that would contradict any
AUTHENTICATED U.S. GOVERNMENT INFORMATION GPO

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of the facts contained therein.1 Accordingly, except where Plaintiff has provided evidence that may tend to contradict these facts, they will be considered to be undisputed by the Court.
Plaintiff, in his various filings, raises additional factual allegations. Some are supported by attached exhibits, which the Court has considered. Other allegations, however, are merely stated in documents that have been neither sworn to under oath nor made under penalty of perjury pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that "while an unsworn statement may be considered on summary judgment, an unsworn statement that has not been made under penalty of perjury cannot." United States ex rel. Doe v. Heart Sol., PC, 923 F.3d 308, 315 (3d Cir. 2019). Therefore, the Court cannot consider Plaintiff's "unsworn allegations when determining whether genuine disputes remained as to any material fact." Lauria v. Lieb, 152 F.4th 549, 553 (3d Cir. 2025).
However, the Court may consider Plaintiff's statements made neither under oath nor under the penalty of perjury pursuant to Section 1746 "as a potential reason to delay its summary judgment ruling and grant [Plaintiff] 'an opportunity to properly support' his allegations or 'issue any other appropriate order' pursuant to Rule 56(e)." Id. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) provides that "[i]f a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c)," the Court has the discretion to take several actions, including giving the party "an opportunity to properly support or address the fact" or issuing "any other appropriate order." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(1), (4). In this case, the Court exercises its discretion to not issue any such orders pursuant to Rule 56(e). See Lauria, 152 F.4th at 553-54.
1 Plaintiff did file a "Traverse to Defendant Sibanda's Motion for Summary Judgment" in which he, for the most part, agrees with Defendant's recitation of the procedural history of this case. ECF No. 116.
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Here, unlike the situation in Lauria, the Court has twice provided affirmative notice of the procedural rules of summary judgment to Plaintiff. In its Case Management Order, ECF No. 96, issued on August 21, 2024, the Court stated:
Plaintiff is advised that his Response to a motion for summary judgment may include opposing or counter affidavit[s] which have either been sworn to under oath (notarized) or include at the end of the affidavit, immediately before the signature, the following in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1746: "I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed this day of _, 20 ." Affidavits that are not either notarized or contain a declaration under penalty of perjury as set forth above will not be considered when determining the motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff may attach copies of any depositions, answers to interrogatories or requests for admission, institutional records or other documents Plaintiff requests this Court to consider when addressing the summary judgment motion. Plaintiff's response must comply with Local Civil Rule 56. A copy of Local Civil Rule 56 is provided to Plaintiff with this order. The motion for summary judgment will be evaluated under the procedures set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Similarly, in its April 10, 2025 Order setting forth the response/briefing schedule in regard to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 113, the Court stated:
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to Local Rule 56.E, alleged material facts set forth in the moving party's Concise Statement of Material Facts or in the opposing party's Responsive Concise Statement, which are claimed to be undisputed, will for the purpose of deciding the motion for summary judgment be deemed admitted unless specifically denied or otherwise controverted by a separate concise statement of the opposing party.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff is advised that the response to any Motions for Summary Judgment may include opposing or counter-affidavits (executed by Plaintiff or other persons) which have either been notarized or must include at the end of the document, immediately before the Plaintiff's or other person's signature, the following statement, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1746: "I declare (or certify, verify, or state) under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on (date)."
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all affidavits must be based upon the personal knowledge of the person executing the affidavit; that no affidavit, complaint, pretrial narrative or other document containing Plaintiff's allegations will be considered when determining the motion for summary judgment unless it has been notarized or unless it contains a declaration under penalty of perjury as set forth above; that Plaintiff may attach to an affidavit copies of any depositions, answers to interrogatories, institutional records or other documents for this Court to consider when addressing the summary judgment motion; and that the motion for summary judgment will be evaluated under the procedure standard set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; and that failure to respond may result in entry of judgment against Plaintiff.
Based on these prior directives to Plaintiff specifically advising him of the need under the procedural rules of summary judgment to submit affidavits that were either notarized or made under penalty of perjury, the Court will exercise its discretion not to issue any additional orders pursuant to Rule 56(e). Plaintiff has had ample notice and opportunity to remedy the defects of his summary judgment materials; a third opportunity is unwarranted. Regardless, as discussed below, the unsworn facts alleged by Plaintiff would not be material to the determination of this matter.
2. Summary of Undisputed Facts
a. Events at SCI-Greene in 2020
Plaintiff has been in the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections ("DOC") since September 9, 2010. ECF No. 111 [ 10. From the period of January 31, 2020, to September 4, 2020, Plaintiff was confined at SCI-Greene. Id. [ 3.2 Defendant, at all times relevant, served as the Interfaith Chaplain at SCI-Greene. Id. 12.
2 In his Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he was transferred to SCI- Greene from the State Correctional Institution at Somerset ("SCI-Somerset") in July of 2019. ECF No. 84 [ 4. However, Defendant has provided evidence in the form of Plaintiff's cell history demonstrating that Plaintiff was actually transferred from SCI-Somerset to the State
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Plaintiff identifies himself as a practicing Muslim. ECF No. 117 at 2. However, as of at least October 25, 2019, the DOC recognized his religious preference as "none." ECF No. 117-1, Ex. 5. This designation was noted by a person named Stacy A. Shaffer and was made while Plaintiff was incarcerated at SCI-Forest. Id .; ECF No. 112-1.
On February 4, 2020, after being transferred to SCI-Greene, Plaintiff submitted an Inmate's Request to Staff Member addressed to the "Chaplain/Iman." ECF No. 117-1, Ex. 1. In it, he requested "to receive forms to sign up to participate in Ramadan," and indicated that he had just transferred from SCI-Forest. Id. Ramadan is an Islamic holy month that is observed by Muslims by fasting from sunrise to sundown for a period of 30 days. In 2020, Ramadan began on April 23, 2020, and ended on May 23, 2020. ECF No. 111 T[ 26-27.
Defendant did not receive this request, and Plaintiff received no response. ECF No. 117- 1, Ex. 1; ECF No. 118-1 [6. On March 8, 2020, Plaintiff submitted a second Inmate's Request to Staff Member addressed to the Chaplain again requesting to participate in "the Holy Month of Ramadan." ECF No. 117-1, Ex. 2. Although Defendant did not receive this request, Plaintiff did receive a written response from an SCI-Greene staff member dated March 10, 2020, stating, "You are listed 'none' and not 'Muslim' on the DOC net. You have to be listed 'Muslim' to participate." Id .; ECF No. 118-1 11 9, 10.
Sometime in March 2020, a sign-up sheet to participate in Ramadan was distributed to inmates at SCI-Greene who had previously designated their religious preference as Muslim.
Correctional Institution at Forest ("SCI-Forest") in July 2019, and then from SCI-Forest to SCI- Greene on January 31, 2020. ECF No. 112-1. Plaintiff offers no evidence in opposition, and in fact, material submitted by Plaintiff confirms that he transferred to SCI-Greene from SCI-Forest on that date. ECF No. 107-1, Ex. 2. As such, the Court will treat as undisputed that Plaintiff began his incarceration at SCI-Greene on January 31, 2020.
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ECF No. 111 [ 28. This sheet was to be filled out and returned by March 20, 2020. Id. As of that date, Plaintiff had not signed the sheet. Id. 129.
On April 7, 2020, Plaintiff submitted a third Inmate Request to Staff Member, addressed to "Chaplain/Religious Services," requesting to receive a Religious Preference Form to declare his religion. ECF No. 107-1, Ex. 3. Defendant apparently did receive this request and responded on April 10, 2020, by attaching the requested form. Id.
Plaintiff submitted a Religious Preference Form indicating his religious category as "Muslim-Sunni" dated April 14, 2020. ECF No. 117-1, Ex. 4. Defendant received the form and entered Plaintiff's religious preference into the DOC system on April 27, 2020. Id. However, because Ramadan had already begun as of that date, Plaintiff was not permitted to participate in the DOC organized observances. ECF No. 111 [ 33. Plaintiff was not prohibited from his own observance of Ramadan, including fasting, and continued to have access to purchasing food from the SCI-Greene commissary. Id. IT 34-38.3
b. DOC Policy
Effective February 1, 2013, the DOC implemented Policy Statement DC-ADM 819: Religious Activities ("DC-ADM 819"), which outlines the department's policies and procedures with respect to accommodation of inmates' religious activities. Id. [ 19; ECF No. 112-2 at 1. DC-ADM 819 seeks to "accommodate inmates' religious beliefs consistent with the security needs and orderly administration of the facility by providing for the orderly management of religious opportunities for all inmates under the Department's jurisdiction." ECF No. 111 1[ 4,
3 Although Plaintiff has continued to maintain that "he was denied the ability to purchase food from the commissary," ECF No. 117 at 1, he offers no evidence sufficient to satisfy Rule 56(c) to support such an allegation. In any event, evidence submitted by Defendant, specifically Plaintiff's receipts for purchases at the SCI-Greene commissary from March 11, 2020, through July 7, 2020, clearly demonstrates that Plaintiff was able to purchase food during the relevant time period. ECF No. 112-7.
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20; ECF No. 112-2 at 1. Pursuant to DC-ADM 819, an inmate may designate his or her religious preference upon intake and may request to change this preference once every six months by completing an Inmate Request to Change Religious Preference Form in the presence of the Facility Chaplaincy Program Director ("FCPD"). The FCPD then forwards the form to the Inmate Records Office, which is to note the change in its mainframe with 30 calendar days of submission. ECF No. 111 11 5, 7-8, 21-22, 24; ECF No. 112-2 at 8.
The religious preference noted by an inmate is for self-identification purposes only and does not bind the DOC to accommodate any religious belief or practice other than the inmate's right to believe as he or she chooses. Religious accommodations and participation by inmates in religious gatherings and activities may be limited to those formally registered as identifying with that particular religion in advance. ECF No. 111 11 6, 9, 23, 25; ECF No. 112-2 at 8.
3. Procedural History
Plaintiff initiated this action on September 10, 2021, by lodging a Complaint without paying the filing fee or moving for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. ECF No. 1. He subsequently paid the requisite filing fee, and his Complaint was filed on December 7, 2021. ECF No. 13. The Complaint named a number of DOC employees from SCI-Somerset, SCI- Forest, and SCI-Greene as defendants, including Defendant. Id. IT 1, 11-23, 87. In this initial Complaint, Plaintiff set forth a First Amendment claim for violation of the Free Exercise clause, a First Amendment retaliation claim, a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim, and an Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. Id. 11 5, 6, 84-98.
The defendants filed motions to dismiss and briefs in support thereof, ECF Nos. 37, 38, 43, and 44, to which Plaintiff responded, ECF No. 58. On May 5, 2023, the Court issued a Report and Recommendation recommending the dismissal of all claims except for Plaintiff's
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First Amendment right to practice his religion claim asserted against Defendant. ECF No. 63. On August 14, 2023, United States District Judge Marilyn J. Horan entered an Order adopting the Report and Recommendation and granting Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint. ECF No. 71.
Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on October 11, 2023, naming Defendant and attempting to add two other SCI-Greene employees. ECF No. 74. After the two proposed new defendants moved to dismiss the claims against them, Plaintiff sought, and was granted, leave to file a seconded amended complaint. ECF Nos. 76, 82, and 83.
Plaintiff filed the operative Second Amended Complaint on December 15, 2023, raising his First Amendment claims against only Defendant. ECF No. 84. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss and brief in support, ECF Nos. 88 and 89, and Plaintiff filed a response and brief in support, ECF Nos. 91 and 92. On June 26, 2024, the Court issued a Report and Recommendation recommending that Defendant's motion be denied. ECF No. 93. The Honorable Judge Horan adopted this Report and Recommendation pursuant to her July 24, 2024 Memorandum Order. ECF No. 94. Defendant filed an Answer to the Second Amended Complaint on August 15, 2024. ECF No. 95.
Pursuant to the Court's August 21, 2024 Case Management Order, the parties conducted discovery. ECF No. 96. On April 4, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Pretrial Statement and a Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF Nos. 106 and 107. Defendant filed his own Motion for Summary Judgment, Brief in Support, Statement of Material Facts Not in Dispute, and accompanying Appendix on April 9, 2025. ECF Nos. 109, 110, 111, and 112. On April 28, 2025, Plaintiff filed his Traverse to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and brief in support thereof. ECF Nos. 116
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and 117. On May 13, 2025, Defendant filed his Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and Response to Plaintiff's Pretrial Statement. ECF Nos. 118 and 119.
Each Motion for Summary Judgment is ripe for consideration.
B. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is properly entered "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Cattrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Under this standard, "the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). "[A] fact is 'material' where 'its existence or nonexistence might impact the outcome of the suit under the applicable substantive law." Baloga v. Pittston Area Sch. Dist., 927 F.3d 742, 752 (3d Cir. 2019) (citations omitted). "A dispute is 'genuine' if 'a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Clews v. Cnty. of Schuylkill, 12 F.4th 353, 358 (3d Cir. 2021) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248).
The moving party bears the initial burden of establishing that the evidence fails to support one or more essential elements of the non-moving party's claim, while the non-movant must establish the existence of each element for which he bears the burden of proof at trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23; see also Conoshenti v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 364 F.3d 135, 140 (3d Cir. 2004). The parties must support their positions by "citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). "[W]hen the moving
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party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts .... Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial." Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986)) (internal quotations omitted).
In making this assessment, the court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and must draw all reasonable inferences and resolve all doubts in favor of the non-moving party. See Matreale v. New Jersey Dep't of Mil. & Veterans Affs., 487 F.3d 150, 152 (3d Cir. 2007); Woodside v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. Bd. of Educ., 248 F.3d 129, 130 (3d Cir. 2001). If the non-moving party "fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to [the non-movant's] case, and on which [the non-movant] will bear the burden of proof at trial," Rule 56 requires the entry of summary judgment because such a failure "necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23; Jakimas v. Hoffman-La Roche Inc., 485 F.3d 770, 777 (3d Cir. 2007).
As noted, Plaintiff and Defendant have each filed a Motion for Summary Judgment in this case. The standard is "more stringent" for a plaintiff or the party that otherwise bears the burden of proof at trial to obtain summary judgment. Nat'l State Bank v. Fed. Rsrv. Bank of New York, 979 F.2d 1579, 1582 (3d Cir. 1992).
When the moving party bears the burden of persuasion at trial, it must point to evidence in the record that supports its version of all material facts and demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of material fact .... If the moving party does not meet this standard, the court must deny the motion for summary judgment .... If the moving party does meet this standard, the non-moving party can counter with evidence showing there is a genuine issue of material fact.
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EFMC Int'l, Inc. v. Leep, Inc., No. 4:05-CV-1289, 2006 WL 8448817, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 19, 2006) (internal citations omitted). Therefore, to warrant summary judgment a plaintiff "must come forward with 'credible evidence' that would entitle the party to a 'directed verdict if not controverted at trial." DeLeon v. Shaw, No. 1:21-CV-289, 2023 WL 8456133, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 6, 2023) (quoting In re Bressman, 327 F.3d 229, 237 (3d Cir. 2003)).
Where, as here, the plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the pleadings must be held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). Nonetheless, at the summary judgment stage, a court need not credit mere allegations or assertions unsupported by evidence. See Jones v. United Parcel Serv., 214 F.3d 402, 407 (3d Cir. 2000). "[A] pro se plaintiff is not relieved of his obligation under Rule 56 to point to competent evidence in the record that is capable of refuting a defendant's motion for summary judgment." Dawson v. Cook, 238 F. Supp. 3d 712, 717 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (citation omitted); see also Mala v. Crown Bay Marina Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013).
C. DISCUSSION
As noted, Plaintiff and Defendant have each filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. As the Third Circuit has explained, such cross-motions:
are no more than a claim by each side that it alone is entitled to summary judgment, and the making of such inherently contradictory claims does not constitute an agreement that if one is rejected the other is necessarily justified or that the losing party waives judicial consideration and determination whether genuine issues of material fact exist.
Transportes Ferreos de Venezuela II CA v. NKK Corp., 239 F.3d 555, 560 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Rains v. Cascade Indus., Inc., 402 F.2d 241, 245 (3d Cir. 1968)). "When confronted with cross-motions for summary judgment 'the court must rule on each party's motion on an
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individual and separate basis, determining, for each side, whether a judgment may be entered in accordance with the Rule 56 standard."" Bowman v. Wahl, No. 2:19-CV-3092, 2021 WL 2588951, at *3 (E.D. Pa. June 24, 2021) (quoting Canal Ins. Co. v. Underwriters at Lloyd's London, 333 F. Supp. 2d 352, 353 n.1 (E.D. Pa. 2004), aff'd, 435 F.3d 431 (3d Cir. 2006)). See also Repa v. Napierkowski, No. 1:19-CV-101, 2021 WL 9406786, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2021).
Accordingly, the Court will consider each Motion for Summary Judgment separately, applying the standard of review set forth in Rule 56 for each motion.
1. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
Defendant argues that he is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's claim that his First Amendment right to free exercise of religion was violated.4 He argues that Plaintiff cannot establish that he had a sincerely held religious belief or that DOC Policy DC-ADM 819 burdened him from practicing his religion. Plaintiff, in turn, asserts that his Muslim faith is sincerely held that his religious preference had erroneously been changed from Muslim to none. Because of this change, he contends, he was prevented "from participating in the practice of Ramadan, one of the five mandatory pillars of the Islamic faith." ECF No. 117 at 1.
Although Plaintiff is incarcerated, the United States Supreme Court has held that "convicted prisoners do not forfeit all constitutional protections by reason of their conviction and
4 In his Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff purports to also raise his freedom of religion claims under RFRA. However, RFRA applies only to burdens on religious liberty imposed by the federal government and does not apply to burdens imposed by state and local governments. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532-36 (1997). While Plaintiff does not, in the Second Amended Complaint, purport to raise a claim under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq., this statute does not permit actions against defendants in their individual capacities, as they are not direct recipients of federal funds as required by the statute. Accordingly, neither statute would permit Plaintiff to raise a claim against Defendant in this matter.
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confinement in prison." Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979). "Inmates clearly retain protections afforded by the First Amendment, ... including its directive that no law shall prohibit the free exercise of religion." O'Lone v. Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987) (internal citations omitted). However, an inmate "retains [only] those First Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system." Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974). See also DeHart v. Horn, 227 F.3d 47, 51 (3d Cir. 2000).
As a threshold matter, "only those beliefs which are both sincerely held and religious in nature are entitled to constitutional protection." DeHart, 227 F.3d at 51. In order to establish a free exercise violation, Plaintiff must show that Defendant "burdened the practice of his religion by preventing him from engaging in conduct mandated by his faith without any justification reasonably related to legitimate penological interests." Heleva v. Kramer, 330 F. App'x 406, 408 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)). Here, the Court will assume that Plaintiff's beliefs are sincerely held and religious in nature. However, the record is devoid of evidence that would support an inference that Defendant unduly burdened the practice of his religion.
As noted, Plaintiff's primary contention is that his religious preference was incorrectly changed from Muslim to none. However, Plaintiff himself acknowledges that his religious preference was changed on October 25, 2019, when he was at SCI-Forest. ECF No. 117. Defendant was employed not at SCI-Forest but at SCI-Greene. There is no evidence in the record that would establish that Defendant had any involvement in the changing of Plaintiff's religious designation from Muslim to none in October of 2019 at another DOC facility. See
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Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988) ("A defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs.").
To the extent that Plaintiff is alleging that Defendant violated his rights by not processing his requests to identify as Muslim in a timely manner, the facts show that Defendant responded to Plaintiff's April 7, 2020 Inmate Request to Staff Member requesting to receive a Religious Preference Form to declare his religion - the first request received by Defendant - by providing him the requested form three days later. ECF No. 107-1, Ex. 3. After Plaintiff submitted a Religious Preference Form indicating his religious category as "Muslim-Sunni" dated April 14, 2020, Defendant entered Plaintiff's religious preference into the DOC system on April 27, 2020. ECF No. 117-1, Ex. 4. This was well within the 30 days prescribed by DC-ADM 819. ECF No. 112-2 at 8.
To the extent that Plaintiff alleges that Defendant's application of DC-ADM 819 prevented him from engaging in conduct mandated by his faith without any justification reasonably related to legitimate penological interests, thereby challenging the policy itself, the facts support no such claim.
[Turner] directs courts to assess the overall reasonableness of such regulations by weighing four factors. "First, there must be a 'valid, rational connection' between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it," and this connection must not be "so remote as to render the policy arbitrary or irrational." Second, a court must consider whether inmates retain alternative means of exercising the circumscribed right. Third, a court must take into account the costs that accommodating the right would impose on other inmates, guards, and prison resources generally. And fourth, a court must consider whether there are alternatives to the regulation that "fully accommodate[] the prisoner's rights at de minimis cost to valid penological interests."
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DeHart, 277 F.3d at 51 (quoting Waterman v. Farmer, 183 F.3d 208, 213 (3d Cir. 1999)) (emphasis added). These factors, in light of the record of this case, fail to show that Defendant's application of DC-ADM 819's provisions that only inmates who have previously identified as Muslims and who have completed the relevant sign-up form can participate in DOC organized Ramadan activities "burdened the practice of his religion by preventing him from engaging in conduct mandated by his faith without any justification reasonably related to legitimate penological interests."
In regard to the first Turner factor, courts "accord great deference to the judgments of prison officials 'charged with the formidable task of running a prison."" Sutton v. Rasheed, 323 F.3d 236, 253 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 353). Only arbitrary or irrational connections between the challenged policy and the penological interest will generally fail to satisfy the first factor. See id. Plaintiff does not really suggest how or why a policy limiting participation in DOC organized religious events to inmates who have previously identified as that religion and who have completed the relevant sign-up form is irrational or insufficiently related to any legitimate governmental interest. Given the need for the DOC to accommodate many inmates across numerous religious groups, while still maintaining security and orderly administration, this policy is rational, especially in light of the deference owed to the DOC. Such a policy certainly cannot be characterized as the type of arbitrary or irrational policy that would fail to satisfy the first factor.
In evaluating the second Turner factor, courts are to consider "whether the inmate has 'alternate means of practicing his or her religion generally, not whether [the] inmate has alternative means of engaging in [any] particular practice."" Id. at 255 (quoting DeHart, 227 F.3d at 55). "[W]here 'other avenues remain available for the exercise of the inmate's religious
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faith, courts should be particularly conscious of the measure of judicial deference owed to correction officials .... " Id. at 255 (quoting DeHart, 227 F.3d at 59). Here, as discussed, Plaintiff was free to observe Ramadan on his own, and the record conclusively shows that this included access to the SCI-Greene commissary. ECF No. 112-7. Accordingly, the second Turner factor also weighs against any finding that DC-ADM 819 (or any DOC policy) burdened Plaintiff from practicing his Islamic faith or from observing Ramadan.
Plaintiff offers no evidence or argument regarding the applicability of the final two Turner factors. These factors "focus on the specific religious practice or expression at issue and the consequences of accommodating the inmate for guards, for other inmates, and for the allocation of prison resources." DeHart, 227 F.3d at 57. As Plaintiff has not proffered any alternative to the policies contained in DC-ADM 819, these factors certainly do not weigh toward a finding that the DOC's policies burden his exercise of his First Amendment rights.
Indeed, courts have found the very policy at issue here - the requirement that only inmates who have previously identified as Muslims and who have completed the relevant sign- up form can participate in DOC organized Ramadan activities - not to violate inmates' First Amendment right to freedom of religion. As the district court explained in dealing with facts very similar to those here in Scott v. Kauffman:
Moving for summary judgment, Remaining Defendants aver that the prison has a strong legitimate penological interest in maintaining safe and orderly Ramadan procedures for all inmates, that objective is rationally related to the requirement of the completion and signature of the form, and no other ready alternatives exist that are less restrictive than simply completing a one-page form. (Doc. 69, at 20-22). Here, Remaining Defendants established that the policies and practices related to the requirement of a sign-up form were reasonably related to the prison's legitimate interest in institutional security and maintaining order.
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No. 3:19-CV-00695, 2023 WL 5004047, at *12 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 2023). The court proceeded to state:
Further, there is nothing in the record to lead the Court to conclude that Scott's ability to practice his faith was restricted or that he was prohibited from practicing his religion in any manner, such as fasting on his own. Therefore, the Court concludes that Scott has not demonstrated that there exist genuine issues of material fact as to whether Remaining Defendants violated his First Amendment right to freedom of religion by denying Scott's participation in 2018 and 2019 Ramadan as the actions were reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest.
Id. Similarly, here, the relevant policy is reasonably related to the prison's legitimate interest in institutional security and maintaining order. Moreover, the record shows that Plaintiff was not prohibited from practicing his religion, including fasting for Ramadan on his own. Accordingly, as in Scott, the Court finds that to the extent that Plaintiff is challenging DC-ADM 819 or any other policy restricting participation in DOC organized Ramadan activities, he has failed to put forth evidence to support such a claim.
Therefore, the Court finds that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's claim that his First Amendment right to freedom of religion was violated by denying him participation in DOC organized Ramadan activities in 2020. As such, the Court respectfully recommends that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment be granted.
2. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment
While, as discussed, a ruling on one party's cross-motion for summary judgment does not necessarily dictate the opposite result in regard to an opposing party's cross-motion, here, the same undisputed material facts that demonstrate that Defendant is entitled to summary judgment
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show, for the same reasons, that Plaintiff is not. Accordingly, the Court recommends that Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment be denied. 5
D. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, it is respectfully recommended that the Court deny Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 107, and grant Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 109.
In accordance with the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and Local Rule 72.D.2, the parties are permitted to file written objections within fourteen days, or seventeen days for unregistered ECF Users. Objections are to be submitted to the Clerk of Court, United
5 Plaintiff, in responding to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, changes course and argues that "this case must be submitted to a jury." ECF No. 117 at 3. He appears to argue that additional facts preclude summary judgment at this stage of the proceedings. Specifically, he continues to assert that he was denied the ability to purchase food from the commissary and that the record fails to show any document by which he personally changed his religious preference to none in 2019. Id. at 1-3. He further alleges that, at some point, Defendant advised him that he could not be a Muslim based on Defendant's mistaken belief that Plaintiff was a member of the "Bloods" street gang. ECF No. 107 at 1. While such contentions would not help establish that Plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment, he apparently asserts that they show that Defendant is not entitled to such relief either.
However, as discussed above, these allegations have not been supported by statements made under oath or under penalty of perjury pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746. Indeed, the record conclusively shows that Plaintiff did continue to have access to the commissary for the duration of Ramadan in 2020. ECF No. 112-7. Moreover, it conclusively demonstrates that Plaintiff's religious status was registered as none while he was still incarcerated at SCI-Forest. ECF No. 107-1, Ex. 2; ECF 112-1. As such, even if someone did improperly change this status, there is no evidence that it was Defendant, who at all relevant times was employed at SCI-Greene and not SCI-Forest. ECF No. 111 12.
In regard to the alleged statement made by Defendant that Plaintiff was precluded from identifying as Muslim because he was a member of the Bloods, there is no evidence acceptable under Rule 56(c) that Defendant ever made such a statement. Indeed, Plaintiff does not indicate when this communication occurred or even if it was verbal or in writing. Regardless, even assuming that the existence of this conversation is a disputed issue of fact, it is not material; even if it did occur, the record shows, and Plaintiff does not dispute, that Defendant accepted Plaintiff's request to change his religious preference to Muslim and that he entered Plaintiff's religious preference into the DOC system consistent with DC-ADM 819.
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States District Court, 700 Grant Street, Room 3110, Pittsburgh, PA 15219. Failure to timely file objections will waive the right to appeal. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n. 7 (3d Cir. 2011). Any party opposing objections may file their response to the objections within fourteen (14) days thereafter in accordance with Local Civil Rule 72.D.2.
Dated: November 17,2025
Respectfully submitted,
Maureen Kelly
MAUREEN P. KELLY UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
cc: Honorable Marilyn J. Horan United States District Judge
Stephen Barry Gibbons JS2304 SCI-Greene 169 Progress Drive Waynesburg, PA 15370 All counsel of record via CM/ECF.
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