Glover v. D.A. Dauphin, Co., PA et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JUSTIN ANTHONY GLOVER, JR.,
Petitioner,
v.
SUP’T S.C.I. COAL TWP.,
Respondent.
No. 4:26-CV-00112
(Chief Judge Brann)
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
FEBRUARY 19, 2026
Petitioner Justin Anthony Glover, Jr., is currently serving a life sentence
imposed by the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County, Pennsylvania, for
first-degree homicide, conspiracy, and abuse of a corpse. 1 In January 2026, Glover
filed the instant pro se “protective” petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2254, which collaterally attacks his 2008 state-court convictions and
sentence. 2 Glover, however, has already filed one such petition in federal court
that has been adjudicated and denied on the merits. 3 Because Glover has not
obtained permission from the appropriate court of appeals to file a second or
1 	See Doc. 1 at 1.
2 	See generally Doc. 1.
3 	See Glover v. Coleman, 3:14-cv-01800, Docs. 45, 46 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 1, 2017), certificate of
appealability denied, No. 17-2879 (3d Cir. Nov. 9, 2017), certiorari denied, Glover v. Lane,
138 S. Ct. 1991 (2018) (mem.).
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successive Section 2254 petition,4 this Court must dismiss the instant petition for
lack of jurisdiction.5
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)
establishes strict limitations on filing second or successive habeas corpus petitions
in federal court.6 Of particular relevance for Glover’s instant petition, “[a] claim
presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under section 2254
that was not presented in a prior application shall be dismissed” unless the
petitioner can satisfy one of two narrow exceptions. 7 Those exceptions are either
(1) reliance on a previously unavailable “new rule of constitutional law, made
retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court”; or (2) new facts
that could not previously have been discovered by due diligence which would
establish “by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error,” no
reasonable juror would have found the petitioner guilty.8 However, even if a
petitioner can potentially meet one of these exacting preconditions, he must first
4 	Glover has not alleged or established that he has received authorization from the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit to file a second or successive Section 2254 petition.
The Court has also independently scoured the Third Circuit’s docket, and it does not appear
that Glover has filed a motion for leave to file a second or successive Section 2254 petition.
5 	See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Rule 4 (“If it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits
that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court, the judge must dismiss the petition
and direct the clerk to notify the petitioner.”).
6 	See generally 28 U.S.C. § 2244.
7 	Id. § 2244(b)(2) (emphasis added); Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 530 (2005).
8 	28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A)-(B).
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“move in the appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court
to consider the [second or successive] application.” 9
In his “protective” Section 2254 petition, Glover asserts that he has filed a
new petition for post-conviction relief in state court (his fourth such petition) that
is still pending, and he is filing the instant Section 2254 petition to protect his
federal statute of limitations while he litigates in state court. 10 But the AEDPA’s
statute of limitations is a secondary concern for Glover. His primary problem is
that he has already filed a fully adjudicated Section 2254 petition in federal court
and therefore is precluded from filing another such petition in the district court
unless he first obtains authorization from the Third Circuit.
Glover contends that his new Section 2254 petition, while second in time, is
not a true “second or successive” habeas petition,11 but he is wrong. That is
exactly what it is. It is a second Section 2254 petition raising new claims that were
not included in his prior, fully adjudicated petition. Moreover, his instant petition
appears to be based on alleged newly discovered facts, which is one of the express
grounds for seeking authorization from the court of appeals to file a second or
successive petition.12
9 	Id. § 2244(b)(3)(A)-(C).
10 	See Doc. 3 at 4; Doc. 1 at 15.
11 	See Doc. 1 at 15-20.
12 	See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B) (requiring authorization from court of appeals that “the factual
predicate for the claim [in the second or successive Section 2254 application] could not have
been discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence; and (ii) the facts underlying
the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to
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The cases on which Glover relies for his argument that the instant petition is
not second or successive are inapposite. He first cites Banister v. Davis, 590 U.S.
504 (2020).13 But Banister concerns a motion to alter or amend judgment under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) filed within 28 days after the denial of an
initial Section 2254 petition, which the Supreme Court held is not a second or
successive Section 2254 petition.14
Glover then strays into pre-AEDPA case law that relies on the outdated
“abuse of the writ” doctrine. 15 However, the AEDPA’s strict gatekeeping
restrictions on second or successive Section 2254 petitions superseded the more
“forgiving” abuse of the writ doctrine, a fact which, incidentally, is explained in
Banister.16 Glover’s subsequent discussion of pre-AEDPA, abuse-of-the-writ
requirements is therefore irrelevant and unpersuasive as to whether the instant
Section 2254 petition is a second or successive application.
Finally, Glover invokes Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007).
Panetti, too, is inapplicable. In that capital case, the petitioner attempted to raise a
Ford v. Wainright17 mental incompetency claim to avoid execution as soon as the
establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable
factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense”).
13 	See Doc. 1 at 15, 19, 20.
14 	See Banister, 590 U.S. at 507.
15 	See Doc. 1 at 16-18 (citing, primarily, McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991)).
16 	See Banister, 590 U.S. at 514.
17 	477 U.S. 399 (1986).
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claim became ripe. 18 The Supreme Court held that—under those specific and rare
circumstances—doing so was not a second or successive application even though
the petitioner had already filed an earlier Section 2254 petition.19 Glover, of
course, is not raising a Ford-based mental incompetency claim to avoid state-
sanctioned execution, so Panetti is of no assistance. Furthermore, he provides no
legal authority for his novel proposition20 that Brady v. Maryland21 and Napue v.
Illinois22 claims should be treated like Ford-based incompetency claims. 23
Under the AEDPA, this Court does not have jurisdiction to entertain
Glover’s second or successive Section 2254 petition.24 If he desires to press a new
post-conviction claim in this Court that was not raised in his initial Section 2254
petition, he must first obtain authorization from the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3) before filing such a second or
successive habeas petition in this Court. Therefore, because it is clear that subject
18 	See Panetti, 551 U.S. at 934-35, 937, 941.
19 	See id. at 942-47.
20 	See Doc. 1 at 19-20.
21 	373 U.S. 83 (1963).
22 	360 U.S. 264 (1959).
23 	In fact, the Supreme Court has implicated the opposite. For example, in Rivers v. Guerrero, a
petitioner attempted to amend his adjudicated Section 2254 petition to include new claims
based on newly discovered evidence that he had uncovered while appealing the district court’s
denial of his first habeas petition. See Rivers v. Guerrero, 605 U.S. 443, 447-48 (2025). The
Supreme Court held that his second-in-time habeas filing (although related to the original
petition) was a second or successive Section 2254 petition subject to the AEDPA’s “strict
procedural hurdles” found in Section 2244(b). See id. at 446; see also Case v. Hatch, 731 F.3d
1015, 1019, 1026 (10th Cir. 2013) (requiring petitioner to satisfy Section 2244(b)’s strict
procedural demands for a newly discovered Brady v. Maryland claim raised in federal court
after an initial Section 2254 petition had been adjudicated and denied years earlier).
24 	See Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147, 157 (2007).
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matter jurisdiction is lacking, the Court must dismiss the instant Section 2254
petition.25
AND NOW, upon consideration of the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED that:
1. 	Glover’s petition (Doc. 1) for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2254 is DISMISSED without prejudice for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.
2. 	The Court declines to transfer the instant petition to the court of
appeals. Glover is a seasoned pro se litigant who is quite capable of
seeking authorization from the appropriate court of appeals to file a
second or successive Section 2254 petition if he so desires.
Additionally, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(D) provides a tight 30-day
deadline for the court of appeals to make a determination on a motion
for preauthorization of a second or successive petition, so there is no
statute of limitations concern implicated by dismissal.
3. 	A certificate of appealability shall not issue. Glover has not made a
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right, see 28
U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), or that “jurists of reason would find it debatable”
whether this Court’s procedural rulings are correct, Slack v.
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
4. 	Glover’s motion (Doc. 2) “to hold these proceedings in abeyance
pending exhaustion in state court” is DISMISSED as moot in light of
the foregoing paragraphs.
5. 	The Clerk of Court is directed to CLOSE this case.
BY THE COURT:
s/ Matthew W. Brann
Matthew W. Brann
Chief United States District Judge
25 	Burton, 549 U.S. at 157; Benchoff v. Colleran, 404 F.3d 812, 820-21 (3d Cir. 2005).
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