Hale v. Green et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
TERRELL HALE,
Plaintiff,
v.
J. GREENE, et al.,
Defendants.
No. 4:25-CV-01576
(Chief Judge Brann)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
J ANUARY 14, 2026
Plaintiff Terrell Hale filed the instant pro se civil rights lawsuit alleging
constitutional violations by prison officials at the Federal Correctional Institution,
Allenwood Low (FCI Allenwood Low), in White Deer, Pennsylvania. He asserts
claims for money damages under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Because Hale fails to state a claim for
relief and granting leave to amend would be futile, the Court will dismiss this
Bivens action with prejudice.
I. 	BACKGROUND
In August 2025, Hale lodged the instant civil rights lawsuit in this Court. 1
At that time, Hale was incarcerated at FCI Allenwood Low,2 and he filed this
action pursuant to Bivens v. Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of
1 	Doc. 1.
2 	See id. ¶ 3.
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Narcotics. 3 Hale has since been transferred and is currently incarcerated in FCI
Ashland, located in Ashland, Kentucky. 4
The gravamen of Hale’s lawsuit concerns disciplinary proceedings at FCI
Allenwood Low. On June 4, 2025, Hale was charged with a minor disciplinary
infraction—Refusing to Obey an Order (Code 307) and Interfering with Staff
(Code 398)—for approaching psychiatrist C. Schmidt and asking him a question
when Dr. Schmidt had previously directed Hale to speak with him at “mainline.”5
The Unit Discipline Committee (UDC) determined that Hale had committed the
charged offenses,6 and it appears that he was sanctioned with the loss of phone and
internet tablet privileges for six months. 7
Hale appealed the UDC’s decision and sanctions to Warden J. Greene, who
affirmed the actions of the UDC. 8 Hale then appealed to the BOP’s Regional
Director, who found that a “thorough review of the record reveals questions
concerning the disciplinary process” and accordingly expunged the offenses and
related sanctions from Hale’s record. 9
3 	See id. ¶ 1.
4 	See Doc. 13.
5 	See Doc. 1-1 at 17.
6 	See id. at 10.
7 	Doc. 1 ¶ 13.
8 	Doc. 1-1 at 10.
9 	Id. at 3.
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In the instant lawsuit, Hale asserts that multiple FCI Allenwood Low
officials violated his constitutional rights during this flawed disciplinary process.
He first alleges that defendants B. Noone and T. Noon found him guilty of the
disciplinary offenses without following BOP policy or providing him the
opportunity to challenge the incident report. 10 Next, he claims that Dr. Antonucci
witnessed the incident involving Dr. Schmidt and refused to help Hale prove his
innocence. 11 Third, he avers that defendants N. Myers, J. Mansell, and L. Getz
knew that Hale’s “rights were violated during the discipline process” and “did
nothing about it.”12 Finally, Hale asserts that Warden Greene knew that Hale’s due
process rights had been violated, admitted as much directly to Hale, but refused to
reverse the UDC’s decision.13
Hale contends that Defendants’ actions violated his Fourth, Fifth, Eighth,
and Fourteenth Amendment rights.14 He maintains that being held in the Special
Housing Unit (SHU) while he awaited a disciplinary hearing violated the Fourth
Amendment’s protection against “Unreasonable Searches and Seizures.” 15
According to Hale, his Fifth Amendment procedural due process rights were
violated when he was deprived of his right to present evidence and challenge the
10 	Doc. 1 ¶ 13.
11 	Id. ¶ 14.
12 	Id. ¶ 15.
13 	Id. ¶ 16.
14 	Id. ¶ 18.
15 	Id. ¶ 19.
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charged offenses.16 Hale further asserts that his treatment during the disciplinary
process caused nightmares, PTSD, and depression, thus resulting in “cruel and
unusual punishment” in violation of the Eighth Amendment.17 Finally, Hale
contends that his placement in disciplinary segregation prior to his UDC hearing
for a minor offense—a circumstance that other inmates of different races and
religions did not experience—represents a “Fourteenth Amendment” equal
protection violation.18
Hale thus brings claims under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
Federal Bureau of Narcotics against Defendants for these constitutional torts.
However, because Hale’s claims represent extensions of Bivens and those
extensions are not warranted, the Court will dismiss Hale’s complaint.
II. 	STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Courts are statutorily obligated to review, “as soon as practicable,” pro se
prisoner complaints targeting governmental entities, officers, or employees. 19 One
16 	Id. ¶ 20.
17 	Id. ¶ 21.
18 	Id. ¶ 22. 	The Court observes that the Fourteenth Amendment applies to state (rather than
federal) officials and therefore will construe Hale’s complaint as asserting a Fifth Amendment
equal protection claim. The Fifth Amendment, unlike the Fourteenth, does not contain an
express Equal Protection Clause, but the Supreme Court of the United States has “construed
the Fifth Amendment to contain an equal protection guarantee.” 	Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie,
239 F.3d 307, 316-17 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S.
614, 616 (1991)); see also Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 234-35 (1979). Fifth Amendment
equal protection claims are examined coextensively with Fourteenth Amendment equal
protection jurisprudence. Abdul-Akbar, 239 F.3d at 317.
19 	See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).
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basis for dismissal at the screening stage is if the complaint “fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted[.]” 20 This language closely tracks Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Accordingly, courts apply the same standard to
screening a pro se prisoner complaint for sufficiency under Section 1915A(b)(1) as
they utilize when resolving a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).21
In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, courts should not inquire
“whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to
offer evidence to support the claims.” 22 The court must accept as true the factual
allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences from them in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff.23 In addition to the facts alleged on the face of
the complaint, the court may also consider “exhibits attached to the complaint,
matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents” attached to
a defendant’s motion to dismiss if the plaintiff’s claims are based upon these
documents.24
20 	Id. § 1915A(b)(1).
21 	See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 109-10 & n.11 (3d Cir. 2002); O’Brien
v. U.S. Fed. Gov’t, 763 F. App’x 157, 159 & n.5 (3d Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (nonprecedential);
cf. Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).
22 	Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); see Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 66 (3d Cir.
1996).
23 	Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2008).
24 	Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Pension Benefit Guar. Corp.
v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993)).
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When the sufficiency of a complaint is challenged, the court must conduct a
three-step inquiry.25 At step one, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements [the]
plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” 26 Second, the court should distinguish well-
pleaded factual allegations—which must be taken as true—from mere legal
conclusions, which “are not entitled to the assumption of truth” and may be
disregarded.27 Finally, the court must review the presumed-truthful allegations
“and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” 28
Deciding plausibility is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to
draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” 29
Because Hale proceeds pro se, his pleadings are to be liberally construed and
his complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]” 30 This is particularly true when the
pro se litigant, like Hale, is incarcerated. 31
25 	Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted) (footnote omitted).
26 	Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009) (alterations in original)).
27 	Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).
28 	Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).
29 	Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681.
30 	Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (citations omitted).
31 	Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2020) (citation omitted).
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III. 	DISCUSSION
Upon review of the various Bivens claims raised in Hale’s complaint, it is
clear that dismissal is required. Each of Hale’s claims represents an extension of
Bivens, and those extensions are not warranted under the present circumstances.
A. 	Bivens Claims
In 1971, the Supreme Court of the United States held that, “even absent
statutory authorization, it would enforce a damages remedy” to compensate
individuals who experienced violations by federal officers of the Fourth
Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. 32
Subsequently, the Court extended the Bivens cause of action in two cases involving
other types of constitutional violations. First, in Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228,
248-49 (1979), the Court held that the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause
provided an implied damages remedy to an administrative assistant claiming that a
Congressman had discriminated against her based on gender. Next, the Court
concluded that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishment implied a cause of action for damages against federal prison officials
who had failed to provide adequate medical treatment to an asthmatic inmate. 33
“These three cases—Bivens, Davis, and Carlson—represent the only instances in
32 	Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120, 130-31 (2017); Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397.
33 	See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 16 n.1 (1980).
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which the Court has approved of an implied damages remedy under the
Constitution itself.”34
Over the years that followed, the Supreme Court has “consistently refused to
expand Bivens actions beyond these three specific contexts.” 35 The Supreme Court
has specifically noted that “expanding the Bivens remedy is now a ‘disfavored’
judicial activity.”36
In Ziglar v. Abbasi, the Court provided a “restrictive, two-step framework
for courts to follow when analyzing Bivens claims.”37 First, courts must determine
whether the case presents a “new context,” i.e., if it is “different in a meaningful
way from previous Bivens cases decided by [the Supreme] Court.”38 The Supreme
Court has defined “new context” broadly,39 explaining that “even a modest
[Bivens] extension is still an extension.” 40 A Bivens claim “may arise in a new
context even if it is based on the same constitutional provision as a claim in a case
in which a damages remedy was previously recognized.” 41
If the case presents a new context, courts must then consider whether special
factors counsel against extending the Bivens remedy.42 If so, the court must reject
34 	Abbasi, 582 U.S. at 131; see also Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. 482, 492 (2022).
35 	Mack v. Yost, 968 F.3d 311, 318 (3d Cir. 2020).
36 	Abbasi, 582 U.S. at 135 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009)).
37 	Mack, 968 F.3d at 317.
38 	Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Abbasi, 582 U.S. at 139).
39 	See id.
40 	Abassi, 582 U.S. at 147.
41 	Hernandez v. Mesa, 589 U.S. 93, 103 (2020).
42 	See Mack, 968 F.3d at 317 (citing Abbasi, 582 U.S. at 136).
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the requested extension. 43 The Supreme Court has clarified that courts are required
“to ask whether ‘the Judiciary is at least arguably less equipped than Congress’ to
weigh the costs and benefits of a damages action.” 44 If the court “ha[s] reason to
pause before applying Bivens in a new context or to a new class of defendants,”
then special factors counseling hesitation exist.45 There may be many special
factors, but two are “particularly weighty: the availability of an alternative
remedial structure and separation-of-powers concerns.” 46 Indeed, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that the existence of an alternative
remedial structure—like the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ Administrative Remedy
Program (ARP)—is a “special factor” that can create a new context at step one of
the two-step analysis. 47
Hale’s Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Amendment claims present new contexts,
and special factors counsel against extending the Bivens remedy here. As to step
one, none of the three Supreme Court cases recognizing an implied damages
remedy align with Hale’s complaint. In other words, the circumstances in Bivens,
43 	See id. (citing Hernandez, 589 U.S. at 102).
44 	Fisher v. Hollingsworth, 115 F.4th 197, 205 (3d Cir. 2024) (quoting Egbert, 596 U.S. at 492).
45 	Hernandez, 589 U.S. at 102.
46 	Mack, 968 F.3d at 320 (internal quotation marks omitted).
47 	See Muniz v. United States, 149 F.4th 256, 263-64 (3d Cir. 2025); Kalu v. Spaulding, 113 F.4th
311, 327-28 (3d Cir. 2024). 	But see Muniz, 149 F.4th at 266-67 (Restrepo, J., concurring)
(disagreeing with approach taken in Kalu v. Spaulding and observing that Seventh, Ninth, and
Tenth Circuits consider “alternative remedial structures” only at step two, not as part of step
one, which better aligns with the Supreme Court’s approach in Egbert and Goldey v. Fields,
606 U.S. 942 (2025)).
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Davis, and Carlson are all materially different than Hale’s. Although Hale relies
on the same constitutional amendments as those cited in the Bivens trilogy, this is
plainly not enough, as a Bivens claim “may arise in a new context even if it is
based on the same constitutional provision as a claim in a case in which a damages
remedy was previously recognized.” 48
Indeed, Hale’s Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Amendment claims are all
drastically different than those asserted in Bivens, Davis, and Carlson,
respectively. Hale’s Fourth Amendment claim concerns being held in the SHU
during prison disciplinary proceedings (presumably an unreasonable seizure),
whereas the claim in Bivens dealt with a warrantless, unreasonable search and
seizure of a non-incarcerated citizen in his home. Hale’s Fifth Amendment
procedural due process claim involves alleged policy violations during prison
disciplinary proceedings, while Davis concerned a claim of gender-based
discrimination by a political figure. Hale’s Eighth Amendment claim is based on
his allegedly unlawful treatment by prison officials during disciplinary proceedings
and his resulting emotional injuries, whereas Carlson concerned a claim of
deliberate indifference to serious medical needs resulting in the death of an inmate.
Finally, Hale’s Fifth Amendment equal protection claim (being treated differently
than prisoners of other races and religions by being held in the SHU during
48 	Hernandez, 589 U.S. at 103.
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disciplinary proceedings for a minor offense) is substantially different than the
gender-discrimination claim in Davis.
In sum, the facts in the case at bar bear little resemblance to Bivens, Davis,
or Carlson, thus presenting new Bivens contexts. Moreover, even if Hale’s claims
mirrored the facts of the Bivens trilogy, the availability of the BOP’s administrative
remedy program—which was not in existence when those cases were considered
by the Supreme Court—creates a new Bivens context here. 49
The second step in the Bivens analysis asks whether special factors counsel
against extending the Bivens remedy. The Court answers this question in the
affirmative. Specifically, a Bivens extension is unwarranted here primarily
because there are alternative remedies available.
As the Third Circuit has repeatedly noted, the availability of the BOP’s
administrative remedy program often provides an alternative to a federal Bivens
lawsuit.50 Through the administrative remedy process, federal prisoners “can alert
the BOP to unconstitutional officer conduct and policies and prevent such
constitutional violations from recurring.” 51 Indeed, in this case, Hale was able to
utilize the BOP’s administrative remedy process to obtain a reversal and
expungement of his disciplinary infraction and its sanctions. Moreover, even if
49 	See Muniz, 149 F.4th at 263-64; Kalu, 113 F.4th at 327-28.
50 	See Muniz, 149 F.4th at 264-65; Dongarra v. Smith, 27 F.4th 174, 181 (3d Cir. 2022); Mack,
968 F.3d at 320-21.
51 	Mack, 968 F.3d at 321.
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Hale’s attempt to resolve his dispute through the administrative process was
ultimately unsuccessful, he had access to at least “some redress.” Therefore, the
Court finds—as in Mack—that the BOP’s administrative remedy program offers a
“convincing reason” to refrain from extending Bivens to claims like those raised by
Hale. 52
Hale’s constitutional claims would extend Bivens to new contexts, yet
special factors counsel against such extensions. The Court will therefore dismiss
Hale’s individual-capacity Bivens claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for failure
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
B. 	Official Capacity Claims
Hale purports to sue all federal officers in their individual and official
capacities. 53 However, a suit against a federal officer in his or her official capacity
is akin to a suit against the United States itself. 54 Such suits are barred by
sovereign immunity—and thus lack subject matter jurisdiction—unless the United
States has expressly waived its immunity and consented to be sued. 55 Hale has not
alleged or shown that the United States has waived its sovereign immunity for
52 	See id. (citations omitted); see also Abbasi, 582 U.S. at 137 (“[I]f there is an alternative
remedial structure present in a certain case, that alone may limit the power of the Judiciary to
infer a new Bivens cause of action.”); Muniz, 149 F.4th at 265 (“At bottom, Muniz’s Bivens
claim fails because an alternative remedy existed and was made available to him.”).
53 	See Doc. 1 ¶ 11.
54 	See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985); Treasurer of N.J. v. U.S. Dep’t of
Treasury, 684 F.3d 382, 395-96 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535,
538 (1980)).
55 	See Treasurer of N.J., 684 F.3d at 395-96.
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Bivens claims, and thus he has failed to establish subject matter jurisdiction for any
official capacity Bivens claim asserted against Defendants. 56 Those claims,
therefore, must be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(2) for seeking monetary
relief from an immune defendant and under Section 1915A(b)(1) as legally
frivolous.
C. 	Leave to Amend
Generally, “plaintiffs who file complaints subject to dismissal under [the
Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995] should receive leave to amend unless
amendment would be inequitable or futile.” 57 Here, leave to amend will be denied
as futile. 58 Hale seeks extensions of Bivens that are both judicially disfavored and
unwarranted under the circumstances. His official capacity claims, moreover, are
legally frivolous, as the United States is plainly immune from his Bivens claims.
56 	See Chinchello v. Fenton, 805 F.2d 126, 130 n.4 (3d Cir. 1986); Tucker v. Sec. Health &
Human Servs., 588 F. App’x 110, 115 (3d Cir. 2014) (nonprecedential).
57 	Grayson, 293 F.3d at 114.
58 	See Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 115 (3d Cir. 2000) (“‘Futility’ means that the complaint,
as amended, would fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.” (citation omitted));
Centifanti v. Nix, 865 F.2d 1422, 1431 (3d Cir. 1989) (“[T]he district court may properly deny
leave to amend where the amendment would not withstand a motion to dismiss.”).
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IV. 	CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court will dismiss with prejudice Hale’s
complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) because he fails to plausibly state
an individual-capacity claim for relief and because his official capacity claims are
legally frivolous. An appropriate Order follows.
BY THE COURT:
s/ Matthew W. Brann
Matthew W. Brann
Chief United States District Judge
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