Mission Critical Partners, LLC v. Mission Critical Talent Partners, LLC

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MISSION CRITICAL PARTNERS,
LLC,
Plaintiff,
v.
MISSION CRITICAL TALENT
PARTNERS, LLC,
Defendant.
No. 4:25-CV-00961
(Chief Judge Brann)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
M ARCH 4, 2026
I. 	BACKGROUND
In May 2025, Mission Critical Partners, LLC (“Mission Critical”) filed a
complaint against Mission Critical Talent Partners, LLC (“Talent Partners”) alleging
violations of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114, et. seq., and the common law. 1 In
August 2025, Talent Partners was served with a summons and complaint through an
individual designated by law to accept service of process on behalf of Talent
Partners.2 To date, Talent Partners has failed to respond to the complaint in any
manner. In October 2025, Mission Critical moved for an entry of default against
Talent Partners,3 and default was subsequently entered by the Clerk of Court.4
1 	Doc. 1.
2 	Doc. 9.
3 	Doc. 10.
4 	Doc. 11.
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In January 2026, Mission Critical filed this motion for default judgment.5
Talent Partners has not responded, and the motion is now ripe for disposition. For
the following reasons, the motion will be granted.
II. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	Whether Default Judgment is Warranted
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 allows a district court to enter default
judgment upon application by a party.6 “Generally, the entry of a default judgment
is disfavored, and a court is required to exercise sound judicial discretion in deciding
whether to enter default judgment.”7 “This element of discretion makes it clear that
the party making the request is not entitled to a default judgment as of right, even
when defendant is technically in default and that fact has been noted under Rule
55(a).”8
“Three factors control whether a default judgment should be granted: (1)
prejudice to the plaintiff if default is denied, (2) whether the defendant appears to
have a litigable defense, and (3) whether defendant’s delay is due to culpable
conduct.”9 “But when a defendant has failed to appear or respond in any fashion to
the complaint, this analysis is necessarily one-sided; entry of default judgment is
5 	Docs. 12, 13.
6 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2).
7 	Kibbie v. BP/Citibank, No. 3:08-CV-1804, 2010 WL 2573845, at *2 (M.D. Pa. June 23, 2010).
8 	10A Charles Alan Wright and Arthur R. Miller, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND P ROCEDURE , § 2685
(Apr. 2020 Update).
9 	Chamberlain v. Giampapa, 210 F.3d 154, 164 (3d Cir. 2000).
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typically appropriate in such circumstances at least until the defendant comes
forward with a motion to set aside the default judgment under Rule 55(c).”10 In cases
where a defendant fails to appear, courts may enter default judgment “based solely
on the fact that the default has occurred.” 11
A consideration of those factors favors a grant of default judgment here. First,
Mission Critical would be prejudiced by its “current inability to proceed with [its]
action due to [Talent Partners’] failure to defend.”12 Talent Partners’ decision to not
respond to the complaint would otherwise prevent Mission Critical from recovering
any damages for its claims. More importantly, given that this is a Lanham Act case
based upon alleged trademark infringement, Talent Partners’ failure to respond
could lead to irreparable harm, as it would prevent Mission Critical from stopping
that infringement. 13
Similarly, the second factor weighs in favor of default judgment. “[Talent
Partners] has not responded to the allegations and, thereby, has failed to assert a
defense.” 14 Finally, there does not appear to be any excuse for Talent Partners’
failure to respond to the complaint. After Mission Critical initiated this action, it
10 	Deutsche Bank Nat. Tr. Co. v. Strunz, No. 1:12-CV-01678, 2013 WL 122644, at *1 (M.D. Pa.
Jan. 9, 2013).
11 	Anchorage Assocs. v. V.I. Bd. of Tax Review, 922 F.2d 168, 177 n. 9 (3d Cir.1990).
12 	Broad. Music, Inc. v. Kujo Long, LLC, No. 1:14-CV-00449, 2014 WL 4059711, at *1 (M.D.
Pa. Aug. 14, 2014).
13 	See S & R Corp. v. Jiffy Lube Int’l, Inc., 968 F.2d 371, 378 (3d Cir. 1992) (“trademark
infringement amounts to irreparable injury as a matter of law”).
14 	Pesotski v. Summa & Iezzi, Inc., No. 1:17-CV-00221, 2017 WL 3310951, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Aug.
3, 2017).
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properly served Talent Partners with the complaint through an individual designated
by law to accept service of process on behalf of Talent Partners.15 Having received
the complaint, Talent Partners has yet to respond. Because Talent Partners has
offered no explanation for its failure to respond, the Court finds that it is culpable. 16
Therefore, 	the 	Court 	finds 	that 	default 	judgment 	is 	appropriate 	under 	the
circumstances.
However, a finding that default judgment is warranted “is not the end of the
inquiry.”17 The Court must further consider whether the “unchallenged facts
constitute a legitimate cause of action.” 18 Although defaulting parties do not concede
conclusions of law, “the factual allegations of the complaint, except those relating
to the amount of damages, will be taken as true.” 19
Mission 	Critical 	has 	alleged 	claims 	of 	trademark 	infringement, 	unfair
competition, false advertising, and dilution under the Lanham Act, as well as a
common law claim for unfair competition.20 Because the trademark infringement
claim is central to the complaint and this motion, the Court will consider whether
15 	Doc. 9.
16 	See Laborers Loc. Union 158 v. Shaffer, No. 1:CV-10-1524, 2011 WL 1397107, at *1 (M.D.
Pa. Apr. 13, 2011).
17 	Martin v. Nat’l Check Recovery Servs., LLC, No. 1:12-CV-1230, 2016 WL 3670849, at *1
(M.D. Pa. July 11, 2016).
18 	Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Spring Mount Area Bavarian Resort, Ltd., 555 F.Supp.2d 537, 541
(E.D. Pa. 2008).
19 	PPG Indus. Inc v. Jiangsu Tie Mao Glass Co. Ltd, 47 F.4th 156, 161 (3d Cir. 2022) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
20 	Doc. 1.
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the allegations contained in the complaint, taken as true, adequately state such a
claim against Talent Partners.
B. 	Whether the Allegations Sufficiently State a Claim for Trademark
Infringement Under the Lanham Act
The facts alleged in the amended complaint, which the Court must accept as
true for the purposes of determining whether Mission Critical has stated a claim, are
as follows.
Mission Critical
provides consulting services in the fields of 911 and emergency
communication, 	law 	enforcement, 	fire 	and 	emergency 	medical
services, 	healthcare, 	transportation, 	special 	systems, 	engineering,
operations, 	tech/IT, 	facilities 	design, 	engineering, 	operations, 	and
maintenance among other MCP services include recruiting services and
executive-level recruiting assistance. 21
Mission Critical provides these services nationwide and, in connection with those
services, 	it 	uses 	the 	“MISSION 	CRITICAL 	PARTNERS®” 	trademark 	(the
“Mark”). 22
In 2009 Mission Critical registered the Mark with the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (“USPTO”) under registration number 5,274,098.23 The Mark has
been used by Mission Critical since 2008 in “interstate commerce as a trademark
and service mark which designates [Mission Critical] as the source, provider,
21 	Id. ¶ 7.
22 	Id. ¶¶ 8, 9.
23 	Id. ¶¶ 10, 11.
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licensor, or sponsor of goods or services to which the mark is attached.”24 The Mark
applies to “[t]elecommunication consultation in the nature of technical consulting in
the field of audio, text and visual data transmission and communication” and to
consulting 	in 	the 	fields 	of 	information 	technology 	and 	telecommunications
technology.25
Talent Partners in turn “provides placement and consulting services” of a
similar nature to Mission Critical. 26 Talent Partners uses “the term ‘Mission Critical’
and ‘Partners’ in conjunction with these service.”27 It further “advertises, promotes
and markets its services using ‘Mission Critical’ and ‘Partners’ in conjunction, and
the name ‘Mission Critical Talent Partners,’” and “utilized ‘Mission Critical’ and
‘Partners’ in conjunction with job recruitment efforts on online employment and
talent acquisition platforms.”28 Talent Partners’ use of these terms has caused actual
confusion in the marketplace, resulting in, for example, Mission Critical receiving
phone calls from recruiters responding to Talent Partners’ posts on job marketing
platforms, and from applicants to Talent Partners seeking an update on their
application.29 Moreover, a “Google search of ‘Mission Critical Talent Partners’ will
yield links to [Mission Critical] sites in two of the first three results.” 30
24 	Id. ¶¶ 12, 13.
25 	Id. ¶ 14.
26 	Id. ¶ 23.
27 	Id. ¶ 24.
28 	Id. ¶¶ 25, 26.
29 	Id. ¶¶ 27, 29, 30.
30 	Id. ¶ 31.
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Mission Critical has not authorized Talent Partners to use the Mark. 31 As a
result of Talent Partners’ “actions in adopting and incorporating” the Mark into its
business,32 Mission Critical sent cease and desist letters to Talent Partners in
February and March 2024, followed by two emails in October 2024.33
With regard to whether these facts state a claim under the Lanham Act, to
adequately allege trademark infringement under 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a), “a plaintiff
must demonstrate that (1) it has a valid and legally protectable mark; (2) it owns the
mark; and (3) the defendant’s use of the mark to identify goods or services causes a
likelihood of confusion.”34
The allegations contained within the complaint easily satisfy the first two
elements of this claim. The complaint alleges that Mission Critical owns the Mark,
it is valid and has been registered with the USPTO since 2009, and continuously
used in commerce by Mission Critical since 2008. 35
Turning then to the third element, “[a] likelihood of confusion exists when
consumers viewing the mark would probably assume that the product or service it
represents is associated with the source of a different product or service identified
by a similar mark.”36 The Third Circuit has “developed a nonexhaustive list of
31 	Id. ¶ 33.
32 	Id. ¶ 34.
33 	Id. ¶¶ 20-22.
34 	A & H Sportswear, Inc. v. Victoria’s Secret Stores, Inc., 237 F.3d 198, 210 (3d Cir. 2000).
35 	Doc. 1 ¶¶ 10-14.
36 	A & H Sportswear, 237 F.3d at 211 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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factors to consider in determining whether there is a likelihood of confusion between
marks.” 37 Those factors, known at the “Lapp factors,” are:
(1) the degree of similarity between the owner’s mark and the alleged
infringing mark;
(2) the strength of the owner’s mark;
(3) the price of the goods and other factors indicative of the care and
attention expected of consumers when making a purchase;
(4) the length of time the defendant has used the mark without evidence
of actual confusion arising;
(5) the intent of the defendant in adopting the mark;
(6) the evidence of actual confusion;
(7) whether the goods, though not competing, are marketed through the
same channels of trade and advertised through the same media;
(8) the extent to which the targets of the parties’ sales efforts are the
same;
(9) the relationship of the goods in the minds of consumers because of
the similarity of function;
(10) other facts suggesting that the consuming public might expect the
prior owner to manufacture a product in the defendant’s market, or
that he is likely to expand into that market. 38
An analysis of these factors demonstrates sufficient allegations to establish a
likelihood of confusion. First, there appears to be some similarity between the Mark
and Talent Partners’ infringing mark—the only difference is the addition of the word
37 	Id. at 215.
38 	Id. (quoting Interpace Corp. v. Lapp, Inc., 721 F.2d 460, 463 (3d Cir. 1983)).
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talent. Given the similarity, these marks would facially appear to “create the same
overall impression when viewed separately.” 39
Second, there are adequate allegations to establish the strength of the Mark.
The Mark seems to be suggestive, implying that Mission Critical provides services
related to first responders, meaning it is a weaker mark.40 However, the allegations
establish 	that 	the 	Mark 	has 	achieved 	commercial 	strength 	or 	marketplace
recognition.41 This therefore weighs in favor of finding a likelihood of confusion.
The third, fourth, and fifth factors are unclear, as there are no allegations in
the complaint related to these considerations. The sixth factor weighs in favor of
concluding that there is a likelihood of confusion, as Mission Critical has provided
examples of actual confusion.42
Seventh, the services from both Mission Critical and Talent Partners are
directly competing and marketed through the same channels of trade and advertised
through the same media. 43 Eighth, and relatedly, the targets of sales efforts appear
to be the same. 44 The ninth and tenth factors indicate a likelihood of confusion, as
the companies provide similar services in the same fields.
39 	Id. at 216.
40 	Id. at 221-22.
41 	Doc. 1 ¶¶ 16-17.
42 	Id. ¶¶ 27, 29, 30, 32.
43 	Compare id. ¶¶ 13, 14 and Doc. 1-3 with Doc. 1 ¶¶ 25-27.
44 	Id. ¶¶ 27, 32.
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These factors collectively militate in favor of finding a likelihood of confusion
based upon the allegations contained within the complaint. Mission Critical has
therefore established all three elements of a trademark infringement action, and the
entry of default judgment is warranted.
C. 	Damages
Because Mission Critical has adequately stated a claim against Talent
Partners, the only remaining consideration is the relief to which Mission Critical is
entitled. “As for damages, the district court must determine the amount if it is not
for ‘a sum certain or a sum that can be made certain by computation.’”45
Mission Critical has provided an affidavit that attests its employees have
dedicated approximately eighteen hours of time to addressing Talent Partners’
infringement, totaling $1,331 in wages paid related to this matter.46 These damages
have been adequately stated as a sum certain total, and will be awarded.
Mission Critical further requests $13,698.58 in attorneys’ fees for work on
this case. 47 With respect to that request, the “Lanham Act . . . permits the recovery
of reasonable attorneys’ fees only ‘in exceptional cases.’” 48 The Third Circuit has
explained that, pursuant to United States Supreme Court precedent, “a district court
45 	PPG Indus. Inc., 47 F.4th at 161 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)).
46 	Doc. 12-3.
47 	Doc. 12-2.
48 	Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 313 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting 15 U.S.C.
§ 1117(a)).
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may find a case ‘exceptional,’ and therefore award fees to the prevailing party, when
(a) there is an unusual discrepancy in the merits of the positions taken by the parties
or (b) the losing party has litigated the case in an ‘unreasonable manner.’” 49
“Thus, it is within a court’s discretion to find a case ‘exceptional’ based upon
‘the governing law and the facts of the case,’ irrespective of whether the losing party
is culpable. For example, ‘a case presenting exceptionally meritless claims may
sufficiently set itself apart from mine-run cases to warrant a fee award.’”50 “Whether
litigation positions or litigation tactics are ‘exceptional’ enough to merit attorneys’
fees must be determined by district courts ‘in the case-by-case exercise of their
discretion, considering the totality of the circumstances.’”51 “The losing party’s
blameworthiness 	may 	well 	play 	a 	role 	in 	a 	district 	court’s 	analysis 	of 	the
‘exceptionality’ of a case,” but culpability is not a requirement to award attorneys’
fees.” 52
The Court cannot, on the facts presented, conclude that this is an exceptional
case meriting an award of attorneys’ fees; rather, this appears to be a highly
unexceptional case. First, it is impossible to determine that there is an unusual
discrepancy in the merits of the positions taken by the parties, since Talent Partners
49 	Id. at 315 (quoting (Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 572 U.S. 545, 554
(2014)).
50 	Id. at 314 (quoting Octane Fitness, 572 U.S. at 555 (ellipsis omitted)).
51 	Id. at 315 (quoting Octane Fitness, 572 U.S. at 555).
52 	Id.
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has not taken a position in this litigation. It may well have been that Talent Partners
could present a meritorious defense, or that Mission Critical’s claims would fall
apart under scrutiny. Under the current facts the Court simply cannot make this
determination.
Second, the evidence and allegations do not demonstrate that Talent Partners
has litigated this case in an unreasonable manner. The fact that Talent Partners did
not respond to pre-suit cease and desist letters does not make its litigation
unreasonable. Nor does the mere fact that it failed to respond to the complaint.
As other courts have observed in similar situations, a defendant who never
responds to a complaint does not “litigate the case in an unreasonable manner
because [it] did not litigate the case at all.” 53 And while “the failure to respond to
demand letters[] and the failure to respond to the lawsuit” means that Mission
Critical becomes the prevailing party by means of default judgment, “the statutory
language [for an award of attorneys’ fees] requires more than merely prevailing.” 54
As those courts have noted, “confessing judgment by default is far more appropriate
than filing a baseless answer and litigating the suit in bad faith (both of which would
53 	RCI TM Corp. v. R & R Venture Grp., LLC, No. 6:13-CV-945-ORL-22, 2015 WL 668715, at
*11 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 17, 2015). See also BMW of N. Am., LLC v. Cuhadar, No. 6:14-CV-40-
ORL-37DAB, 2014 WL 5420133, at *4-5 (M.D. Fla. July 10, 2014).
54 	Cuhadar, 2014 WL 5420133 at *4.
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more appropriately warrant an award of attorney’s fees)” and, consequently, is not
necessarily unreasonable. 55
More importantly, this Court cannot entertain a brightline rule where the
failure to respond to a complaint necessarily means that a case was litigated in an
unreasonable manner. To apply such a rule would run contrary to the Supreme
Court’s admonition that questions of exceptionality “must be determined by district
courts in the case-by-case exercise of their discretion, considering the totality of the
circumstances.” 56 In light of that instruction, this Court cannot find that the mere fact
that a defendant has failed to litigate a matter and lost by means of default judgment
necessarily means the defendant litigated the case in an unreasonable manner. 57
In total, there is insufficient evidence that Talent Partners’ actions here have
created exceptional circumstances that would warrant an award of attorneys’ fees.
Accordingly, Mission Critical’s request for such fees will be denied.
Lastly then, the Court turns to the question of whether a permanent injunction
is appropriate. As an initial matter, this Court notes that the entry of a permanent
55 	Id. at *5.
56 	Octane Fitness, 572 U.S. at 555.
57 	The Court recognizes that other courts have reached a contrary result. See, e.g., Rath v. Vita
Sanotec, Inc., No. CV 17-953 (MN), 2020 WL 5877597, at *4 (D. Del. Oct. 2, 2020) (awarding
attorneys’ “fees for litigating a case in an unreasonable manner where . . . the defendant has
failed to litigate resulting in a default judgment”). As discussed, however, this Court cannot
follow those cases, as they are contrary to the Supreme Court’s decision in Octane Fitness.
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injunction may be appropriate after default judgment, provided requirements for
imposition of an injunction are met. 58
The issuance of a permanent injunction is “entrusted to a court’s equitable
discretion, [and therefore] an injunction ‘does not follow from success on the merits
as a matter of course.’”59 To obtain a permanent injunction, a party “must make a
sufficient showing that (1) it will suffer irreparable injury, (2) no remedy available
at law could adequately remedy that injury, (3) the balance of hardships tips in its
favor, and (4) an injunction would not disserve the public interest.” 60 While courts
must “consider these factors holistically, the inability to show irreparable harm—or,
relatedly, that a legal remedy would be inadequate—defeats a request for injunctive
relief.” 61
“The first two elements typically constitute two sides of the same inquiry, for
the availability of adequate monetary damages belies a claim of irreparable injury.” 62
Importantly, however, when a plaintiff in a Lanham Act case has proven trademark
infringement, it “shall be entitled to a rebuttable presumption of irreparable harm.” 63
58 	See PPG Indus. Inc., 47 F.4th at 160 (affirming district court opinion that, inter alia, imposed
permanent injunction related to entry of default judgment).
59 	TD Bank N.A. v. Hill, 928 F.3d 259, 278 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Winter v. Nat. Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 32 (2008)).
60 	Id. (citing eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006)).
61 	Id.
62 	Ne. Pa. Freethought Soc’y v. Cnty. of Lackawanna Transit Sys., 938 F.3d 424, 442 (3d Cir.
2019).
63 	15 U.S.C. § 1116(a).
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An 	analysis 	of 	those 	factors 	supports 	the 	imposition 	of 	a 	permanent
injunction. First, this Court has found that Mission Critical adequately stated a claim
for 	trademark 	infringement 	and, 	through 	default 	judgment, 	Mission 	Critical
established 	trademark 	infringement, 	resulting 	in 	a 	rebuttable 	presumption 	of
irreparable harm. 64 Given that Talent Partners has not defended this action, it quite
obviously has not rebutted that presumption.
Second, as the Third Circuit has observed, “[a] finding of infringement or the
likelihood of confusion with the concurrent use of the infringed trademark implicitly
signifies a loss of expectation and goodwill.” 65 The Third Circuit went on to explain
that “[t]he infringement amounts to borrowing the senior user’s reputation and
goodwill, which is an injury in and of itself, even without evidence of actual loss of
goodwill.”66 And it is well established that grounds “for irreparable injury include
loss of control of reputation, loss of trade, and loss of goodwill.” 67
Talent Partners’ infringement presumptively resulted in the co-opting of
Mission 	Critical’s 	reputation 	and 	goodwill, 	which 	sufficiently 	demonstrates
irreparable injury when coupled with the allegations contained within the complaint.
Relatedly, because a loss of control of Mission Critical’s reputation and the loss of
64 	Id.
65 	Citizens Fin. Grp., Inc. v. Citizens Nat. Bank of Evans City, 383 F.3d 110, 131 (3d Cir. 2004).
66 	Id.
67 	Groupe SEB USA, Inc. v. Euro-Pro Operating LLC, 774 F.3d 192, 204 (3d Cir. 2014)
(quoting S & R Corp. v. Jiffy Lube Int’l, Inc., 968 F.2d 371, 378 (3d Cir.1992)).
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goodwill constitute irreparable injury, monetary remedies are insufficient, and no
remedy other than an injunction is likely to remedy those injuries. Mission Critical
has therefore demonstrated both irreparable injury and that no other remedy
available at law could adequately remedy those injuries.
Turning to the third factor, the balance of hardships also favors the imposition
of a permanent injunction. The purpose of this balancing test is “to ensure that the
issuance of an injunction would not harm the infringer more than a denial would
harm the mark’s owner.” 68 As courts within this circuit have noted, “‘[t]he balance
of hardships weighs strongly in favor of an injunction where all that is requested is
that Defendant comply with the law and abstain from infringing.” 69
As a result of the default judgment, Talent Partners’ conduct is considered
infringing and a permanent injunction would require only that they stop violating the
Lanham Act, which weighs in Mission Critical’s favor.70 Failing to issue an
injunction would harm Mission Critical by creating a potential deterioration of its
goodwill and harm to its reputation. Given Talent Partners’ failure to litigate this
matter, the Court cannot conclude that any hardships it would suffer outweigh those
68 	Kos Pharms., Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 727 (3d Cir. 2004).
69 	Pa. State Univ. v. Vintage Brand, LLC, No. 4:21-CV-01091, 2025 WL 1757243, at *4 (M.D.
Pa. June 25, 2025) (quoting Richardson v. Cascade Skating Rink, No. CV 19-8935-NLH-MJS,
2022 WL 833319, at *5 (D.N.J. Mar. 21, 2022)).
70 	Cf. Silvertop Assocs., Inc. v. Kangaroo Mfg., Inc., 319 F. Supp. 3d 754, 769-70 (D.N.J. 2018)
(“The Court finds a balance of the hardships weighs in favor of granting a preliminary
injunction when the only harm is precluding, at least temporarily, a defendant from the sale of
an infringing article”), aff’d, 931 F.3d 215 (3d Cir. 2019).
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that would be suffered by Mission Critical. Accordingly, the third factor also weighs
in favor of the imposition of a permanent injunction.
Finally, an injunction would not disserve the public interest. The Third Circuit
has stated that “the most basic public interest at stake in all Lanham Act cases . . .
[is] the interest in prevention of confusion, particularly as it affects the public interest
in truth and accuracy.” 71 Where there is a likelihood of confusion, “it follows that if
such use continues, the public interest would be damaged. Conversely, a prohibition
upon defendant’s use of its mark would eliminate that confusion.”72 Because the
allegations contained within the complaint establish a likelihood of confusion
through Talent Partners’ use of the Mark, this factor weighs in favor of an injunction.
All four factors therefore militate in favor of the imposition of a permanent
injunction, and one will be entered in this matter.
71 	Kos Pharms., 369 F.3d at 730.
72 	Id. (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).
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III. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that Mission Critical is entitled
to default judgment. Its motion will therefore be granted, appropriate damages
awarded, and a permanent injunction imposed.
An appropriate Order follows.
BY THE COURT:
s/ Matthew W. Brann
Matthew W. Brann
Chief United States District Judge
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