4:25-cv-00313•Case Name in Social Security Case - Unavailable
Gesamter Gesetzestext
1 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA MELISSA ANDERSON, : Civil No. 4:25-CV-313 : Plaintiff : (Judge Munley) : v. : (Magistrate Judge Carlson) : FRANK BISIGNANO, : Commissioner of Social Security,1 : : Defendant. : REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION I. Introduction. In Social Security Appeals adequate articulation of the ALJ’s analysis is essential for informed decision-making. It follows that an unexplained absence of analysis is anathema and often compels a remand. This concept applies with particular force when we consider an ALJ’s assessment of a claimant’s ability to meet the mental demands of the workplace. 1 Frank Bisignano became the Commissioner of Social Security on May 6, 2025. Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Frank Bisignano should be substituted as the defendant in this suit. No further action need be taken to continue this suit by reason of the last sentence of section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Case 4:25-cv-00313-JKM Document 18 Filed 02/12/26 Page 1 of 32
2 Oftentimes experts conclude that claimants are highly restricted in their ability to maintain concentration and confine them to performing one-to-two step tasks. When an expert reaches this conclusion, and the expert’s opinion is deemed persuasive by the ALJ, our colleague, Judge Bloom, has recently explained what the ALJ’s duty of articulation requires: [W]hen a medical opinion is found persuasive and contains a limitation to one- and two-step tasks, the ALJ is obligated to either: (1) include the limitation in the RFC and limit the claimant to reasoning level one occupations, or, (2) identify the substantial evidence that the ALJ is relying on in rejecting the limitation. . . . [A] limitation to “simple, repetitive tasks” is insufficient to account for a limitation to one- and two-step tasks. Cruz v. Bisignano, No. 1:24-CV-1966, 2025 WL 2813882, at *8 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2025). The instant case aptly illustrates this principle. The plaintiff, Melissa Anderson, suffers from a cascading array of severe emotional impairments, including major depressive disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), anxiety disorder, and post-traumatic stress disorder. (Tr. 23). Anderson’s treating physician stated that these impairments were disabling, (tr. 995-1003); an examining source found that she suffered marked limitations in her ability to respond to changes in the workplace, (tr. 806); and a state agency expert opined that she could perform one-and-two step tasks. (Tr. 114). Case 4:25-cv-00313-JKM Document 18 Filed 02/12/26 Page 2 of 32
3 The ALJ found this state agency expert opinion to be persuasive but did not include the expert’s one-to-two step limitation in Anderson’s residual functional capacity (RFC) assessment. (Tr. 25-26, 30). Nor did the ALJ provide an evidence- based reason for refusing to adopt this limitation to one and two step tasks. Instead, the ALJ stated paradoxically that this mental RFC—which was less exacting that the state agency expert’s opinion—“provided a somewhat more restrictive residual functional capacity than is indicated by the opinions of the State agency psychological consultants.” (Tr. 30). The ALJ then denied Anderson’s claim, concluding that Anderson could perform tasks which had greater reasoning requirements than the one-to-two step task limitation found by the state agency expert the ALJ deemed persuasive. This assertion seems factually incorrect, and this enigmatic analysis falls short of what is needed in this setting to meet the ALJ’s duty of articulation. Accordingly, we recommend that this case be remanded for further consideration by the Commissioner. II. Statement of Facts and of the Case A. Introduction On April 13, 2021, the plaintiff, Melissa Anderson, filed applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income pursuant to Titles II Case 4:25-cv-00313-JKM Document 18 Filed 02/12/26 Page 3 of 32
4 and XVI for the Social Security Act, alleging an onset of disability beginning May 1, 2014. (Tr. 18). Anderson later amended this date of onset to April 13, 2021. (Id.) In these applications the plaintiff indicated that she was disabled due to the combined effects of a host of physical and emotional conditions including osteoarthritis, fibromyalgia, degenerative disc disease, spina bifida, scoliosis of the lumbar spine, major depressive disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), anxiety disorder, and post-traumatic stress disorder. (Tr. 21). Anderson was born in June of 1983 and was thirty-seven years old on the alleged onset date; thus, she was defined as a younger individual under the Commissioner’s regulations. (Tr. 33). She had a high school education and prior employment as a pharmacy technician and wire harness assembler. (Tr. 32-33). B. Evidence Relating to Anderson’s Emotional Impairments With respect to her emotional impairments,2 the ALJ explained that: [Anderson] has alleged experiencing symptoms of a depressed mood, hopelessness, helplessness, sadness, a lack of energy, anhedonia guilt, difficulty sleeping, decreased energy, difficulty concentrating, decreased appetite, suicidal ideation, dysphoric moods, guilt, hopelessness, loss of interest in activities, fatigue, loss of energy, worthlessness, short-term memory deficits, long-term memory deficits, organization and planning difficulties, diminished self-esteem, a 2 As discussed below, we conclude that errors in the evaluation of Anderson’s emotional impairments now call for a remand in this case. Therefore, we are limiting our factual narrative to a discussion of these emotional impairments. Case 4:25-cv-00313-JKM Document 18 Filed 02/12/26 Page 4 of 32
5 diminished sense of pleasure, social withdrawal, excessive apprehension and worry, being easily fatigued, irritability, restlessness, racing/ruminating thoughts, muscle tension, avoidance of social settings, hyper startle responses, nightmares, hypervigilance, avoidance, intrusive thoughts, detachment from others, and panic attacks with associated heart palpitations, sweating, trembling, chest pain, nausea, dizziness, and "a sense of dread” (Exhibits 11F and 13F). Additionally, [Anderson]’s medical records indicate [she] was assessed with clinical examination findings of a frustrated mood, a depressed mood, mildly impaired attention and concentration, and mildly impaired recent and remote memory skills and the claimant was noted to be tearful during a medical appointment (Exhibits 6F, 11F, and 13F). (Tr. 28). Further, the ALJ reported that during the hearing conducted in her case Anderson: [T]estified that she has no motivation to do anything, she feels sad and worthless, she wants to sleep all the time, and she cries while waiting for the day to be over. She feels anxious most of the day which makes it hard for her to function normally and she experiences panic attacks once or twice a month. She has a lot of difficulty concentrating and she forgets what she is saying in the middle of a sentence. She cannot remember things that just happened and she will rewind television shows because she does not remember what happened. She needs to set reminders or make lists regarding paperwork that she needs to do for her child and her father helps her with it. She also needs to set reminders on her phone to help her remember to take medication. (Tr. 27).3 3 We note that the ALJ’s decision attempts to minimize these symptoms based upon isolated excerpts from three treatment notes. (Tr. 28). Because we recommend remand on other grounds, we have not addressed the legal sufficiency of the ALJ’s reliance on these limited excerpts to partially discount the plaintiff’s symptoms Case 4:25-cv-00313-JKM Document 18 Filed 02/12/26 Page 5 of 32
6 Given this clinical history, and Anderson’s self-reported limitations due to her psychological conditions, three experts provided opinions which fully assessed her mental residual functional capacity.4 One of these experts, Dr. Louise Butler, had been treating Anderson on a monthly basis for more than two years. (Tr. 996). From this extended treatment perspective, Dr. Butler stated in September of 2022, that Anderson experienced sleep disturbances, decreased energy, feelings of hopelessness, distractibility, panic attacks, muscle tension, and feelings of inadequacy. (Tr. 999-1000). According to the doctor, Anderson was markedly impaired when it came to maintaining attention and attendance at work, working beyond observing that: “It is well-established that an ALJ may not ‘“cherry-pick” results that support his conclusion and ignore those that do not.’” Edinger v. Saul, 432 F. Supp. 3d 516, 529 (E.D. Pa. 2020). 4 Two other experts addressed Anderson’s emotional impairments, albeit in a fashion which does not materially advance our understanding of her mental RFC. For example, in July of 2022, a state agency expert, Dr. John Gavazzi, declined to opine regarding her ability to meet the mental demands of the workplace. (Tr. 164). In March of 2024, Dr. Suzanna Martin, another non-treating, non-examining source, found that Anderson suffered from depressed mood, diminished interest in activity, appetite disturbance, sleep disturbance, psychotomotor retardation, decreased energy, feelings of guilt, difficulty concentrating and thoughts of suicide, irritability, fatigue, difficulty concentrating, sleep disturbance, re-experiencing symptoms (nightmares, flashbacks) due to exposure to violence, avoidance behavior, mood disturbance and hyperarousal. (Tr. 1153-1156). Dr. Martin concluded that these symptoms moderately affected her ability to understand, remember and apply information and concentrate, persist and maintain pace. (Id.) However, Dr. Martin provided no further evaluation of Anderson’s mental RFC. Case 4:25-cv-00313-JKM Document 18 Filed 02/12/26 Page 6 of 32
7 with others, completing a work-day without interruptions, performing at a consistent pace, and dealing with normal work stress. (Tr. 1001). She was moderately impaired in terms of remembering and carrying out work procedures and very short and simple instructions, sustaining a routine without special supervision, making simple work decisions, asking simple questions, accepting criticism and instructions, working with others, identifying workplace hazards, and responding to changes in a routine work setting. (Id.) Overall Dr. Butler found that Anderson had marked limitations in concentration, persistence and pace, would be off-task more than 20% of the work- day, and would miss four or more days each month due to her impairments. (Tr. 1002). A second medical opinion was provided in November of 2021 by a consulting examining source, Dr. Leah Bielski. (Tr. 799-812). Dr. Bielski reported that Anderson: [H]as difficulties with staying asleep waking two to three times a night. She also experiences a loss of appetite. Depressive symptomatology includes dysphoric moods, guilt, hopelessness, loss of interest in activities, irritability, fatigue, loss of energy, worthlessness, diminished self-esteem, concentration difficulties, diminished sense of pleasure, and social withdrawal. Suicidal/homicidal ideation, intent, and plan were denied. Anxiety-related symptomatology includes excessive apprehension and worry, easily fatigued, irritability, restlessness, racing/ruminating thoughts, difficulties concentrating, muscle tension, and avoidance of social settings. Phobic responses were denied. There is a history of exposure to trauma, including physical, sexual, and Case 4:25-cv-00313-JKM Document 18 Filed 02/12/26 Page 7 of 32
8 emotional abuse in adulthood, and physical and emotional abuse in childhood by her twin sister. She reported flashbacks, hyperstartle responses, nightmares, hypervigilance, avoidance, intrusive thoughts, detachment from others, and sleep disturbances. Panic attacks occur two times a month. Specific situations were not noted. They include heart palpitations, sweating, trembling, chest pain, nausea, dizziness, and “a sense of dread.” Manic symptomatology and thought disorder denied. Cognitive symptomatology includes short-term memory deficits, long-term memory deficits, concentration difficulties, organization and planning difficulties. (Tr. 800-801). Dr. Bielski further opined that Anderson was moderately impaired in terms of all spheres of simple or complex workplace decision making, (tr. 805), and concluded that she suffered from marked limitations responding appropriately to usual work situations and changes in work routine. (Tr. 806). Thus, the treating and examining source opinions indicated that Anderson suffered from a cascading array of severe emotional impairments. These experts, who actually treated or examined the plaintiff, concluded that she experienced multiple marked and moderate impairments. Moreover, Anderson’s treating doctor opined based upon a two year treatment history that these impairments were disabling. There was one further opinion from a non-treating, non-examining state agency expert which also indicated that Anderson was significantly limited in meeting the mental demands of the workplace. On December 15, 2021, Dr. Molly Case 4:25-cv-00313-JKM Document 18 Filed 02/12/26 Page 8 of 32
9 Haas Cowan evaluated the severity of Anderson’s psychological conditions, and found that: The claimant can make simple decisions. The claimant would be able to maintain regular attendance and be punctual. The claimant is able to carry out very short and simple instructions. The claimant can perform one- and two-step tasks. (Tr. 113) (emphasis added). Dr. Cowan’s opinion that Anderson could perform one-and-two steps tasks is significant. The reference to one-to-two steps tasks is a term of art in Social Security practice which connotes jobs limited to reasoning level 1 since the definition of this reasoning level is confined to jobs which entail: “Apply[ing] commonsense understanding to carry out simple one- or two-step instructions.” Dictionary of Occupational Titles, Appendix C - Components of the Definition Trailer, 1991 WL 688702. Thus, the state agency expert’s opinion that Anderson could perform one- and-two step tasks was tantamount to a finding that she was limited to reasoning level 1 jobs. C. The ALJ Hearing and Decision. It was against this medical backdrop that Anderson’s disability claim came to be heard by the ALJ on June 2, 2023. Anderson and a Vocational Expert (VE) both testified at this hearing. (Tr. 45-72). The ALJ’s hypothetical questions posed to the Case 4:25-cv-00313-JKM Document 18 Filed 02/12/26 Page 9 of 32
10 VE did include a limitation to simple and routine tasks, but the ALJ did not question the VE about whether a limitation to one and two step tasks would preclude the plaintiff from working the occupations he identified. (Tr. 68-70). In response to these hypotheticals the ALJ identified a number of jobs Anderson might be able to perform, but many of the positions named by the VE required level 2 reasoning, a greater level of reasoning than the level 1 reasoning level that the state agency expert identified when she opined that Anderson could perform one-and-two step tasks. Following this hearing, on May 23, 2024, the ALJ issued a decision denying Anderson’s application for benefits. (Tr. 18-34). In that decision, the ALJ first concluded that the plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since April 13, 2021, the amended alleged onset date and application date for supplemental security income benefits. (Tr. 21). At Step 2 of the sequential analysis that governs Social Security cases, the ALJ found that Anderson had the following severe impairments: osteoarthritis, fibromyalgia, degenerative disc disease, spina bifida, scoliosis of the lumbar spine, major depressive disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), anxiety disorder, and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). (Id.) At Step 3, the ALJ determined that these impairments did not meet or medically equal the severity of any listed impairments. (Tr. 22-25). Case 4:25-cv-00313-JKM Document 18 Filed 02/12/26 Page 10 of 32
11 Between Steps 3 and 4 the ALJ fashioned the following residual functional capacity (RFC), for Anderson: After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform less than the full range of light work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(b) except the claimant can occasionally climb ramps or stairs, but never climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds. She can occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch or crawl. She can understand, remember or carry out simple, routine, repetitive tasks. These are tasks that can be easily understood, easily performed, basic, not complicated, clear and straightforward. These tasks require little to no demonstration, and they can be learned within 30 days or less from the beginning of the job. The claimant can make judgments on simple, work-related decisions. She can occasionally interact with the public, coworkers and supervisors in a routine work setting. (T. 25-26). Notably, this RFC made no provision limiting Anderson to one-to-step tasks despite Dr. Cowan’s opinion stating that she “can perform one- and two-step tasks.” (Tr. 113). The ALJ’s analysis of the medical opinion evidence further heightened the ambiguity in this RFC. At the outset, the ALJ largely discounted the opinion of every medical source who actually treated or examined Anderson, finding Dr. Butler’s opinion unpersuasive, (Tr. 31), and concluding that “the aspect of Dr. Bielski’s opinion pertaining to understanding, remembering, or carrying out simple instructions and the ability to make judgments on simple work related decisions” was unpersuasive. (Tr. 30). Case 4:25-cv-00313-JKM Document 18 Filed 02/12/26 Page 11 of 32
12 Instead, the ALJ deemed the opinion of the state agency expert, Dr. Cowan, to be persuasive, stating that: State agency psychological consultants completed mental residual functional capacity assessments on December 15, 2021 and April 13, 2022 that indicate the claimant has some moderate limitations pertaining to sustained concentration and persistence and adaptation. The State agency psychological consultants also completed psychiatric review techniques that indicate the claimant has an overall mild degree of limitation pertaining to understanding, remembering, or applying information and social interaction and an overall moderate degree of limitation pertaining to concentration, persistence, or maintaining pace, and adapting or managing oneself (Exhibits 3A, 4A, and 10A). In support of the opinions, the State agency psychological consultants provided explanatory comments that include references to symptoms related to the claimant’s mental impairments. Additionally, the opinions of the State agency psychological consultants are generally consistent with the claimant’s medical records on a longitudinal basis, including clinical examination findings of an appropriate mood, an appropriate affect, appropriate eye contact, clear sensorium, normal motor behavior, a full range of affect, fluent speech, good insight, and good judgment. Thus, the undersigned generally finds the opinions of the State agency psychological consultants persuasive. However, to fully accommodate the claimant’s symptoms related to the claimant’s mental impairments the undersigned has provided a somewhat more restrictive residual functional capacity than is indicated by the opinions of the State agency psychological consultants. (Tr. 30). This aspect to the ALJ’s decision is curious in several respects. First, the ALJ referred to the opinions of state consultants. The use of the plural term “consultants”, implied that there was a medical consensus among these sources. This is incorrect, Case 4:25-cv-00313-JKM Document 18 Filed 02/12/26 Page 12 of 32
13 only one state agency expert, Dr. Cowan, described Anderson’s mental abilities. The second state agency expert, Dr. Gavazzi, declined to opine on this question. Second, Dr. Cowan’s opinion stated that Anderson could perform one-and- two step tasks but, without explanation, this material limitation imposed by a source deemed persuasive by the ALJ never found its way into Anderson’s mental RFC. Nor was the omission explained in any way by the ALJ. Instead, the ALJ’s analysis of this opinion closed with a paradoxical proposition. The ALJ stated that he “has provided a somewhat more restrictive residual functional capacity than is indicated by the opinions of the State agency psychological consultants.” (Id.) However, by excluding Dr. Cowan’s limitation to one-to-two step tasks from this RFC, the ALJ had done just the opposite—he formulated a mental RFC which was less restrictive than Dr. Cowan’s opinion. It appears that the ALJ did not recognize this internal inconsistency. The ALJ’s decision then went on to further highlight these inconsistencies. The ALJ determined that Anderson could not perform her past relevant work, (tr. 32-33), but identified the following tasks that he believed Anderson could undertake: photocopy machine operator, DOT#207.685-014, light exertional level, unskilled, SVP2 (21,000 jobs nationally); housekeeper, cleaner, DOT#323.687-014, light exertional level, unskilled, SVP 2 (391,000 jobs nationally); and office helper, DOT#239.567-010, light exertional level, unskilled, SVP2 (43,000 jobs nationally). Case 4:25-cv-00313-JKM Document 18 Filed 02/12/26 Page 13 of 32
14 (Id.) Two of these jobs were performed at reasoning level 2,5 a reasoning level which under the Commissioner’s regulations required more than the reasoning capabilities defined by Dr. Cowan, the ability to perform one-to-two step tasks. The ALJ’s decision did not reconcile this apparent contradiction. Instead, having reached these conclusions, the ALJ found at Step 5 that Anderson had not met the exacting standards for disability prescribed by law and denied her claim. (Tr. 34). This appeal followed. On appeal, Anderson argues inter alia that the ALJ’s mental RFC analysis was fundamentally flawed. As discussed below, we agree and recommend that this case be remanded for further consideration by the Commissioner. III. Discussion A. Substantial Evidence Review – the Role of this Court When reviewing the Commissioner’s final decision denying a claimant’s application for benefits, this Court’s review is limited to the question of whether the findings of the final decision-maker are supported by substantial evidence in the record. See 42 U.S.C. §405(g); Johnson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 529 F.3d 198, 200 5 Photocopy machine operator, DOT#207.685-014, reasoning level 2, 1991 WL 671745; Office helper, DOT#239.567-010, reasoning level 2, 1991 WL 672232. Case 4:25-cv-00313-JKM Document 18 Filed 02/12/26 Page 14 of 32
15 (3d Cir. 2008); Ficca v. Astrue, 901 F. Supp.2d 533, 536 (M.D. Pa. 2012). Substantial evidence “does not mean a large or considerable amount of evidence, but rather such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988). Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance of the evidence but more than a mere scintilla. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). A single piece of evidence is not substantial evidence if the ALJ ignores countervailing evidence or fails to resolve a conflict created by the evidence. Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1064 (3d Cir. 1993). But in an adequately developed factual record, substantial evidence may be “something less than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent [the ALJ’s decision] from being supported by substantial evidence.” Consolo v. Fed. Maritime Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966). “In determining if the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence the court must scrutinize the record as a whole.” Leslie v. Barnhart, 304 F. Supp.2d 623, 627 (M.D. Pa. 2003). The Supreme Court has underscored for us the limited scope of our review in this field, noting that: The phrase “substantial evidence” is a “term of art” used throughout administrative law to describe how courts are to review agency factfinding. T-Mobile South, LLC v. Roswell, 574 U.S. ––––, ––––, Case 4:25-cv-00313-JKM Document 18 Filed 02/12/26 Page 15 of 32
16 135 S.Ct. 808, 815, 190 L.Ed.2d 679 (2015). Under the substantial- evidence standard, a court looks to an existing administrative record and asks whether it contains “sufficien[t] evidence” to support the agency's factual determinations. Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938) (emphasis deleted). And whatever the meaning of “substantial” in other contexts, the threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not high. Substantial evidence, this Court has said, is “more than a mere scintilla.” Ibid.; see, e.g., Perales, 402 U.S. at 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420 (internal quotation marks omitted). It means—and means only—“such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Consolidated Edison, 305 U.S. at 229, 59 S.Ct. 206. See Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 153, 119 S.Ct. 1816, 144 L.Ed.2d 143 (1999) (comparing the substantial-evidence standard to the deferential clearly- erroneous standard). Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1154. The question before this Court, therefore, is not whether the claimant is disabled, but rather whether the Commissioner’s finding that she is not disabled is supported by substantial evidence and was reached based upon a correct application of the relevant law. See Arnold v. Colvin, No. 3:12-CV-02417, 2014 WL 940205, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 2014) (“[I]t has been held that an ALJ’s errors of law denote a lack of substantial evidence”) (alterations omitted); Burton v. Schweiker, 512 F. Supp. 913, 914 (W.D. Pa. 1981) (“The Secretary’s determination as to the status of a claim requires the correct application of the law to the facts.”); see also Wright v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 675, 678 (3d Cir. 1990) (noting that the scope of review on legal Case 4:25-cv-00313-JKM Document 18 Filed 02/12/26 Page 16 of 32
17 matters is plenary); Ficca, 901 F. Supp.2d at 536 (“[T]he court has plenary review of all legal issues . . . .”). Several fundamental legal propositions which flow from this deferential standard of review. First, when conducting this review “we are mindful that we must not substitute our own judgment for that of the fact finder.” Zirnsak v. Colvin, 777 F.3d 607, 611 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 552 (3d Cir. 2005)). Thus, we are enjoined to refrain from trying to re-weigh the evidence. Rather our task is to simply determine whether substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s findings. However, we must also ascertain whether the ALJ’s decision meets the burden of articulation demanded by the courts to enable informed judicial review. Simply put, “this Court requires the ALJ to set forth the reasons for his decision.” Burnett v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 220 F.3d 112, 119 (3d Cir. 2000). As the Court of Appeals has noted on this score: In Burnett, we held that an ALJ must clearly set forth the reasons for his decision. 220 F.3d at 119. Conclusory statements . . . are insufficient. The ALJ must provide a “discussion of the evidence” and an “explanation of reasoning” for his conclusion sufficient to enable meaningful judicial review. Id. at 120; see Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 505 & n. 3 (3d Cir.2004). The ALJ, of course, need not employ particular “magic” words: “Burnett does not require the ALJ to use particular language or adhere to a particular format in conducting his analysis.” Jones, 364 F.3d at 505. Diaz v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 577 F.3d 500, 504 (3d Cir. 2009). Case 4:25-cv-00313-JKM Document 18 Filed 02/12/26 Page 17 of 32
18 Thus, in practice ours is a twofold task. We must evaluate the substance of the ALJ’s decision under a deferential standard of review, but we must also give that decision careful scrutiny to ensure that the rationale for the ALJ’s actions is sufficiently articulated to permit meaningful judicial review. This principle applies with particular force to legal challenges, like the claim made here, based upon alleged inadequacies in the articulation of a claimant’s mental RFC. In Hess v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 931 F.3d 198, 212 (3d Cir. 2019), the United States Court of Appeals recently addressed the standards of articulation that apply in this setting. In Hess the court of appeals considered the question of whether an RFC which limited a claimant to simple tasks adequately addressed moderate limitations on concentration, persistence, and pace. In addressing the plaintiff’s argument that the language used by the ALJ to describe the claimant’s mental limitations was legally insufficient, the court of appeals rejected a per se rule which would require the ALJ to adhere to a particular format in conducting this analysis. Instead, framing this issue as a question of adequate articulation of the ALJ’s rationale, the court held that: “as long as the ALJ offers a ‘valid explanation,’ a ‘simple tasks’ limitation is permitted after a finding that a claimant has ‘moderate’ Case 4:25-cv-00313-JKM Document 18 Filed 02/12/26 Page 18 of 32
19 difficulties in ‘concentration, persistence, or pace.’ ” Hess v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 931 F.3d 198, 211 (3d Cir. 2019). There is a corollary to this pragmatic analysis which applies when an ALJ deems a medical opinion which contains a one-to-two step limitation to be persuasive. In this setting the ALJ’s duty of articulation is clear: “when a medical opinion is found persuasive and contains a limitation to one- and two-step tasks, the ALJ is obligated to either: (1) include the limitation in the RFC and limit the claimant to reasoning level one occupations, or, (2) identify the substantial evidence that the ALJ is relying on in rejecting the limitation.” Cruz, 2025 WL 2813882, at *8. See also Rita R. v. Kijakazi, No. 21 C 5631, 2023 WL 2403139, at *3–4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 8, 2023) (“Indeed, an ALJ is required to provide a thorough and appropriate explanation for rejecting a state agency psychologist's opinion that a claimant is limited to one-to-two step tasks.”) B. Initial Burdens of Proof, Persuasion, and Articulation for the ALJ To receive benefits under the Social Security Act by reason of disability, a claimant must demonstrate an inability to “engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(1)(A); see also 20 Case 4:25-cv-00313-JKM Document 18 Filed 02/12/26 Page 19 of 32
20 C.F.R. §404.1505(a). To satisfy this requirement, a claimant must have a severe physical or mental impairment that makes it impossible to do his or her previous work or any other substantial gainful activity that exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(2)(A); 20 C.F.R. §404.1505(a). To receive benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, a claimant must show that he or she contributed to the insurance program, is under retirement age, and became disabled prior to the date on which he or she was last insured. 42 U.S.C. §423(a); 20 C.F.R. §404.131(a). In making this determination at the administrative level, the ALJ follows a five-step sequential evaluation process. 20 C.F.R. §404.1520(a). Under this process, the ALJ must sequentially determine: (1) whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment; (3) whether the claimant’s impairment meets or equals a listed impairment; (4) whether the claimant is able to do his or her past relevant work; and (5) whether the claimant is able to do any other work, considering his or her age, education, work experience and residual functional capacity (“RFC”). 20 C.F.R. §404.1520(a)(4). Between Steps 3 and 4, the ALJ must also assess a claimant’s residual functional capacity (RFC). RFC is defined as “that which an individual is still able to do despite the limitations caused by his or her impairment(s).” Burnett v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 220 F.3d 112, 121 (3d Cir. 2000) (citations omitted); see also 20 C.F.R. Case 4:25-cv-00313-JKM Document 18 Filed 02/12/26 Page 20 of 32
21 §§404.1520(e), 404.1545(a)(1). In making this assessment, the ALJ considers all of the claimant’s medically determinable impairments, including any non-severe impairments identified by the ALJ at step two of his or her analysis. 20 C.F.R. §404.1545(a)(2). There is an undeniable medical aspect to an RFC determination, since that determination entails an assessment of what work the claimant can do given the physical limitations that the claimant experiences. Yet, when considering the role and necessity of medical opinion evidence in making this determination, courts have followed several different paths. Some courts emphasize the importance of medical opinion support for an RFC determination and have suggested that “[r]arely can a decision be made regarding a claimant's residual functional capacity without an assessment from a physician regarding the functional abilities of the claimant.” Biller v. Acting Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 962 F. Supp. 2d 761, 778–79 (W.D. Pa. 2013) (quoting Gormont v. Astrue, Civ. No. 11–2145, 2013 WL 791455 at *7 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 4, 2013)). In other instances, it has been held that: “There is no legal requirement that a physician have made the particular findings that an ALJ adopts in the course of determining an RFC.” Titterington v. Barnhart, 174 F. App’x 6, 11 (3d Cir. 2006). Further, courts have held in cases where there is no evidence of any credible medical opinion supporting a claimant’s allegations of disability that “the Case 4:25-cv-00313-JKM Document 18 Filed 02/12/26 Page 21 of 32
22 proposition that an ALJ must always base his RFC on a medical opinion from a physician is misguided.” Cummings v. Colvin, 129 F. Supp. 3d 209, 214–15 (W.D. Pa. 2015). These seemingly discordant legal propositions can be reconciled by evaluation of the factual context of these decisions. Those cases which emphasize the importance of medical opinion support for an RFC assessment typically arise in the factual setting where a well-supported medical source has identified limitations that would support a disability claim, but an ALJ has rejected the medical opinion which supported a disability determination based upon a lay assessment of other evidence. Biller, 962 F.Supp.2d at 778–79. In this setting, these cases simply restate the commonplace idea that medical opinions are entitled to careful consideration when making a disability determination, particularly when those opinions support a finding of disability. In contrast, when an ALJ is relying upon other evidence, such as contrasting clinical or opinion evidence or testimony regarding the claimant’s activities of daily living, to fashion an RFC courts have adopted a more pragmatic view and have sustained the ALJ’s exercise of independent judgment based upon all of the facts and evidence. See Titterington v. Barnhart, 174 F. App'x 6, 11 (3d Cir. 2006); Cummings v. Colvin, 129 F. Supp. 3d 209, 214–15 (W.D. Pa. 2015). In either event, once the ALJ has made this determination, our review of the ALJ's assessment Case 4:25-cv-00313-JKM Document 18 Filed 02/12/26 Page 22 of 32
23 of the plaintiff's RFC is deferential, and that RFC assessment will not be set aside if it is supported by substantial evidence. Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113, 129 (3d Cir. 2002); see also Metzger v. Berryhill, No. 3:16-CV-1929, 2017 WL 1483328, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2017), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Metzgar v. Colvin, No. 3:16-CV-1929, 2017 WL 1479426 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 21, 2017); Rathbun v. Berryhill, No. 3:17-CV-00301, 2018 WL 1514383, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 12, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:17-CV-301, 2018 WL 1479366 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 27, 2018). At Steps 1 through 4, the claimant bears the initial burden of demonstrating the existence of a medically determinable impairment that prevents him or her in engaging in any of his or her past relevant work. Mason, 994 F.2d at 1064. Once this burden has been met by the claimant, it shifts to the Commissioner at Step 5 to show that jobs exist in significant number in the national economy that the claimant could perform that are consistent with the claimant’s age, education, work experience and RFC. 20 C.F.R. §404.1512(f); Mason, 994 F.2d at 1064. The ALJ’s disability determination must also meet certain basic substantive requisites. Most significant among these legal benchmarks is a requirement that the ALJ adequately explain the legal and factual basis for this disability determination. Thus, in order to facilitate review of the decision under the substantial evidence Case 4:25-cv-00313-JKM Document 18 Filed 02/12/26 Page 23 of 32
24 standard, the ALJ's decision must be accompanied by “a clear and satisfactory explication of the basis on which it rests.” Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 704 (3d Cir. 1981). Conflicts in the evidence must be resolved and the ALJ must indicate which evidence was accepted, which evidence was rejected, and the reasons for rejecting certain evidence. Id. at 706-07. In addition, “[t]he ALJ must indicate in his decision which evidence he has rejected and which he is relying on as the basis for his finding.” Schaudeck v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 181 F.3d 429, 433 (3d Cir. 1999). C. Legal Benchmarks for the ALJ’s Assessment of Medical Opinions The plaintiff filed this disability application following a paradigm shift in the manner in which medical opinions were evaluated when assessing Social Security claims. Prior to March 2017, ALJs were required to follow regulations which defined medical opinions narrowly and created a hierarchy of medical source opinions with treating sources at the apex of this hierarchy. However, in March of 2017, the Commissioner’s regulations governing medical opinions changed in a number of fundamental ways. The range of opinions that ALJs were enjoined to consider were broadened substantially, and the approach to evaluating opinions was changed from a hierarchical form of review to a more holistic analysis. As one court as aptly observed: Case 4:25-cv-00313-JKM Document 18 Filed 02/12/26 Page 24 of 32
25 The regulations regarding the evaluation of medical evidence have been amended for claims filed after March 27, 2017, and several of the prior Social Security Rulings, including SSR 96-2p, have been rescinded. According to the new regulations, the Commissioner “will no longer give any specific evidentiary weight to medical opinions; this includes giving controlling weight to any medical opinion.” Revisions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence (“Revisions to Rules”), 2017 WL 168819, 82 Fed. Reg. 5844, at 5867–68 (Jan. 18, 2017), see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a), 416.920c(a). Instead, the Commissioner must consider all medical opinions and “evaluate their persuasiveness” based on the following five factors: supportability; consistency; relationship with the claimant; specialization; and “other factors.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a)-(c), 416.920c(a)-(c). Although the new regulations eliminate the perceived hierarchy of medical sources, deference to specific medical opinions, and assigning “weight” to a medical opinion, the ALJ must still “articulate how [he or she] considered the medical opinions” and “how persuasive [he or she] find[s] all of the medical opinions.” Id. at §§ 404.1520c(a) and (b)(1), 416.920c(a) and (b)(1). The two “most important factors for determining the persuasiveness of medical opinions are consistency and supportability,” which are the “same factors” that formed the foundation of the treating source rule. Revisions to Rules, 82 Fed. Reg. 5844-01 at 5853. An ALJ is specifically required to “explain how [he or she] considered the supportability and consistency factors” for a medical opinion. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c (b)(2), 416.920c(b)(2). With respect to “supportability,” the new regulations provide that “[t]he more relevant the objective medical evidence and supporting explanations presented by a medical source are to support his or her medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s), the more persuasive the medical opinions or prior administrative medical finding(s) will be.” Id. at §§ 404.1520c(c)(1), 416.920c(c)(1). The regulations provide that with respect to “consistency,” “[t]he more consistent a medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s) is with the evidence from other medical sources and nonmedical sources in the claim, the more Case 4:25-cv-00313-JKM Document 18 Filed 02/12/26 Page 25 of 32
26 persuasive the medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s) will be.” Id. at §§ 404.1520c(c)(2), 416.920c(c)(2). Under the new regulations an ALJ must consider, but need not explicitly discuss, the three remaining factors in determining the persuasiveness of a medical source's opinion. Id. at §§ 404.1520c(b)(2), 416.920c(b)(2). However, where the ALJ has found two or more medical opinions to be equally well supported and consistent with the record, but not exactly the same, the ALJ must articulate how he or she considered those factors contained in paragraphs (c)(3) through (c)(5). Id. at §§ 404.1520c(b)(3), 416.920c(b)(3). Andrew G. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:19-CV-0942 (ML), 2020 WL 5848776, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2020). Oftentimes, as in this case, an ALJ must evaluate various medical opinions. Judicial review of this aspect of ALJ decision-making is still guided by several settled legal tenets. First, when presented with a disputed factual record, it is well- established that “[t]he ALJ – not treating or examining physicians or State agency consultants – must make the ultimate disability and RFC determinations.” Chandler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 361 (3d Cir. 2011). Thus, when evaluating medical opinions “the ALJ may choose whom to credit but ‘cannot reject evidence for no reason or for the wrong reason.’” Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 310, 317 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Mason, 994 F.2d at 1066). Therefore, provided that the decision is accompanied by an adequate, articulated rationale, it is the province and the duty of the ALJ to choose which medical opinions and evidence deserve greater weight. Case 4:25-cv-00313-JKM Document 18 Filed 02/12/26 Page 26 of 32
27 However, the ALJ’s duty of articulation remains unchanged and immutable. Therefore, inconsistencies or ambiguities in medical opinion analysis may compel remand. D. This Case Should Be Remanded. Judged against these legal guideposts, we conclude that the ALJ’s mental RFC analysis and evaluation of the medical opinion evidence is flawed in several ways which collectively compel a remand. At the outset, we note that the ALJ’s decision to reject the opinion of every medical source who treated or examined Anderson in favor of a non-examining, non- treating source is potentially problematic. At a minimum, this choice by an ALJ must be supported by a well-articulated explanation. But beyond this threshold concern, we find that the ALJ’s characterization of the opinion of the non-examining state agency expert, Dr. Cowan, that the ALJ found persuasive, and the RFC the ALJ fashioned based upon this opinion are riddled with internal inconsistences, factual errors, and inherent ambiguities. At the outset, the ALJ’s decision refers to the opinions of “state consultants,” implying that there was a medical consensus among more than one state agency expert. This appears to be incorrect, since only one state agency expert, Dr. Cowan, described Anderson’s Case 4:25-cv-00313-JKM Document 18 Filed 02/12/26 Page 27 of 32
28 mental abilities. The second state agency expert, Dr. Gavazzi, declined to opine on this question. Further, the ALJ’s decision deemed Dr. Cowan’s opinion to be persuasive but then, without explanation, failed to incorporate an apparently significant finding made by the doctor into Anderson’s RFC. Dr. Cowan’s opinion clearly stated that Anderson could perform one-and-two step tasks. However, without explanation, this material limitation imposed by a source deemed persuasive by the ALJ never found its way into Anderson’s mental RFC. This was error since it is well-settled that an ALJ's decision must be accompanied by “a clear and satisfactory explication of the basis on which it rests.” Cotter, 642 F.2d at 704. Furthermore, the ALJ must also “indicate in his decision which evidence he has rejected and which he is relying on as the basis for his finding.” Schaudeck, 181 F.3d at 433. These mandates apply here in the context of the ALJ’s assessment of medical opinion evidence which appeared to limit a claimant to one-to-two step tasks. Indeed, this court, and others, have applied these paradigms in in this setting, specifically concluding that “when a medical opinion is found persuasive and contains a limitation to one- and two-step tasks, the ALJ is obligated to either: (1) include the limitation in the RFC and limit the claimant to reasoning level one occupations, or, (2) identify the substantial evidence that the Case 4:25-cv-00313-JKM Document 18 Filed 02/12/26 Page 28 of 32
29 ALJ is relying on in rejecting the limitation.” Cruz, 2025 WL 2813882, at *8. See also Rita R. v. Kijakazi, No. 21 C 5631, 2023 WL 2403139, at *3–4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 8, 2023) (“Indeed, an ALJ is required to provide a thorough and appropriate explanation for rejecting a state agency psychologist's opinion that a claimant is limited to one-to-two step tasks.”) Moreover, this error is not harmless here since the ALJ’s conclusion that Anderson was not disabled was based in part upon her ability to perform work in occupations requiring a reasoning level of 2 which is inconsistent with a limitation to one-to-two step tasks. As this court explained: The DOT defines occupations by reasoning level and defines “reasoning level one” as the ability to “apply commonsense understanding to carry out simple one-or two-step instructions.” The similarity of that language to “one- and two-step tasks,” leads us to conclude that an individual limited to “one-and two-step tasks” is likewise limited to “reasoning level one” occupations. Importantly, this limitation is dischargeable: an ALJ may find otherwise, so long as they rely on and cite to substantial evidence that adequately explains why they are omitting the limitation in the claimant's RFC despite having found the relevant medical opinion to be persuasive. Additionally, courts in eight of the eleven circuits where a District court has considered this issue have held that “simple repetitive tasks” and “one- and two-step tasks” are legally distinct limitations. And all but one of these cases also found that a limitation to “one- and two-step tasks” necessarily limits the claimant to reasoning level one occupations. Case 4:25-cv-00313-JKM Document 18 Filed 02/12/26 Page 29 of 32
30 Cruz, 2025 WL 2813882, at *7. See also Rita R., 2023 WL 2403139, at *3–4 (“The ALJ's error is of crucial importance because a limitation to ‘simple tasks’ (the RFC limitation the ALJ found here) encompasses jobs that may involve complexity beyond one-to-two step tasks”); Daniel M. v. Kijakazi, No. 2:21-CV-243, 2023 WL 154909, at *3 (D. Vt. Jan. 11, 2023) (collecting cases) (concluding reasoning Levels 2 and 3 are not consistent with “simple, one-to-two step tasks”). Therefore, further clarity is needed here. Finally, the ALJ’s analysis of Dr. Cowan’s medical opinion closed with a paradoxical proposition. The ALJ stated that he “has provided a somewhat more restrictive residual functional capacity than is indicated by the opinions of the State agency psychological consultants.” (Id.) However, by excluding Dr. Cowan’s limitation to one-to-two step tasks from this RFC, the ALJ had done just the opposite—he formulated a mental RFC which was less restrictive than Dr. Cowan’s opinion. In the past we have held that similar, paradoxical reasoning by ALJs compels a remand. See Matos v. Bisignano, No. 4:24-CV-675, 2025 WL 2918975, at *11 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 10, 2025) (ALJ’s assertion that a two-to three-step task RFC is more restrictive than medical opinions limiting the plaintiff to one-to-two step tasks required remand). Case 4:25-cv-00313-JKM Document 18 Filed 02/12/26 Page 30 of 32
31 So it is here. The ALJ’s suggestion that this less restrictive RFC is actually more confining than Dr. Cowan’s opinion, which limited Anderson to one-to-two steps tasks, appears to be in error. This error is potentially prejudicial and warrants a remand of this case for further consideration by the Commissioner. Simply put, more was needed here by way of explanation on the part of the ALJ. Indeed, a rising tide of caselaw supports our recommendation that the ALJ erred in failing to address the one and two step task limitation opined by the expert whose opinion he found persuasive. Since the ALJ’s burden of articulation is not met in the instant case, we recommend this matter must be remanded for further consideration by the Commissioner. Yet, while we recommend that these errors compel a remand in this case, nothing in this Report and Recommendation should be deemed as expressing a judgment on what the ultimate outcome of any reassessment of this evidence should be. Instead, that judgment should remain to province of the ALJ. IV. Recommendation For the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the plaintiff’s request for a new administrative hearing be GRANTED, the final decision of the Commissioner denying these claims be vacated, and this case be remanded to the Commissioner to conduct a new administrative hearing. Case 4:25-cv-00313-JKM Document 18 Filed 02/12/26 Page 31 of 32
32 The parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3: Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses, or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions. Submitted this 12 th day of February 2026. S/ Martin C. Carlson Martin C. Carlson United States Magistrate Judge Case 4:25-cv-00313-JKM Document 18 Filed 02/12/26 Page 32 of 32
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