Diggs v. Corbett et al

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Case 4:07-cv-01505-JFS-SA Document 38 Filed 03/13/26 Page 1 of 3

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

CHARLES DIGGS,
Petitioner, CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:07-ev-01505
Vv. (SAPORITO, J.)

DAVID DIGUGLIELMO, et a/,

Respondents.

ORDER

After the Court denied petitioner Charles Diggs’s motion seeking
relief from the 2011 denial of his habeas corpus petition, he has now filed
a motion for reconsideration. (Doc. 37). As with his prior motion, the
Court construes Diggs as requesting relief pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 60. See (Doc. 36); McFadden v. Quay, No. 1:21-CV-01477,
2023 WL 3098378, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 26, 2023) (finding that a
petitioner’s second motion for reconsideration should be assessed under
Rule 60).

Rule 60 permits a party to seek relief from judgment on the grounds
of “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect” (Fed. R. Civ. P.
60(b)(1)); “newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence,

could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial” (Fed. R.

Case 4:07-cv-01505-JFS-SA Document 38 Filed 03/13/26 Page 2 of 3

Civ. P. 60(b)(2)); and “fraudl,] misrepresentation, or misconduct by an
opposing party.” (Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(8)). A motion seeking relief under
these provisions must be made no more than a year after the entry of the
judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1). In addition, the rule permits relief from
judgment for “any other reason that justifies relief,” but the motion must
still be made “within a reasonable time” of the judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P.
60(b)(6), 60(c)(1). Generally, a judgment may be altered or amended if a
party “shows at least one of the following grounds: (1) an intervening
change in the controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence that
was not available when the court granted the motion for summary
judgment; or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law or fact or to
prevent manifest injustice.” Max’s Seafood Cafe ex rel, Lou-Ann, Ine. v.
Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999) (citation omitted).

As previously explained, Diggs is not entitled to relief because he
has not presented “newly discovered evidence” within the meaning of
Rule 60(b)(2), nor is there a basis for a finding that this motion was filed
within a “reasonable time.” See (Doc. 36 at 4-5). Regardless, noting
Diggs’s argument that his claims were “misunderstood,” the Court has

reviewed the motion and finds no basis for reconsideration on the merits.

Case 4:07-cv-01505-JFS-SA Document 38 Filed 03/13/26 Page 3 of 3

Diggs insists that a key prosecution witness in his trial, Jack
Singer, was a “surprise witness” to the defense because of “fraudulent”
disclosures by the prosecution, and Diggs’s counsel was thus “unable to
seek discovery” specific to Singer. The memorandum resolving Diggs’s
petition explains why the Court found otherwise: the prosecution filed an
affidavit identifying Singer as a material witness, which was docketed
and served on the Public Defender’s office well before trial. These
findings were corroborated by the testimony of Diggs’s own attorney and
by the affidavit itself. See (Doc. 19-6 at 41-45; Doc. 25 at 8). Diggs’s
disagreement with these evidentially-supported findings does not justify
reconsideration. Nor did the Court “fail to consider’ his argument that he
was prejudiced by the lack of discovery. Rather, the asserted prejudice did
not entitle him to relief on his Brady claim because the prosecution did
not suppress the evidence. See (Doc. 20 at 11; Doc. 36 at 2-3, 6).

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that all relief requested in

Diggs’s motion (Doc. 37) is DENIED.

Dated: March 138, 2026 s/Joseph F. Saporito, Jr.
JOSEPH F. SAPORITO, JR.
United States District Judge