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AUTHENTIC

Case 3:26-cv-00361-RDM Document5- Filed 03/03/26 Page 1of15

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

IRAKL! DOKVADZE

Petitioner, | 3:26-cv-364

| (JUDGE MARIANI)
Vv
oo FILED
CRAIG LOWE, in his Official Capacity : SCRANTON
as Warden of the Pike County :
Correctional Facility et al., MAR 03 2006
| pen RA

Respondents. DEPUTY CLERK

MEMORANDUM OPINION

| l. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On February 12, 2026, Petitioner lrakli Dokvadze, a citizen of Georgia residing in the

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United States since January 2023, with no criminal record and a pending asylum
application filed a petition for habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. 1).
Petitioner ‘s currently detained at the Pike County Correctional Facility within the Middle
District of Pennsylvania. (/d., J 1). The Petition names as Respondents: Craig Lowe,
Warden of the Pike County Correctional Facility; Michael T. Rose, Acting Field Office
Director of Enforcement and Removal Operations, Philadelphia Field Office, Immigration
and Customs Enforcement; Kristi Noem, Secretary of the United States Department of

Homeland Security; and Pamela Bondi, United States Attorney General. (/d., {J 8-17).

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1 Petitioner also names as Respondents: (1) Todd Lyons, Acting Director, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement; (2) Daren K. Margolin, Director of the Executive Office for Immigration; (3) U.S. Immigration

Case 3:26-cv-00361-RDM Document5 Filed 03/03/26 Page 2of15

Petitioner is a 32-year-old noncitizen from Georgia currently detained by
Respondents at the Pike County Correctional Facility. (Doc. 1, 1). Prior to his detention
in October 2026, Petitioner had lived in Philadelphia and has resided in the United States
since on or about January 15, 2023. (/d.). Petitioner alleges he is a bona fide

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asylum seeker “who is a member and ally of the LGBTQ+ Georgian population and was ;

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political dissident and spoke freely regarding his disagreements with the Georgian
government, who governs like an authoritarian, repressed free expression of youth and has
criminalized [the] LGBTQ+ population.” (/d., Jf 2, 28).

Petitioner entered the United States without inspection in January 2023 to seek
asylum and was detained in Arizona. (/d., | 31) (Doc. 1-4). Petitioner was released into
the United ‘States on his own recognizance and thereafter moved to Philadelphia. (Id).
Following his release and parole, Petitioner “regularly attended routine supervision
appointments with immigration officials” and “did not miss any appointments or violate the
terms of his release whatsoever.” (Doc. 1, 33). Petitioner's pending asylum application is
scheduled for a merits hearing before an Immigration Judge in August 2029. (/d., J 34).
Nevertheless, Respondents took Petitioner into custody during a routine supervision
appointment on October 20, 2025, in Philadelphia. (/d., J 35). Petitioner has no criminal

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history, ‘ot any other adverse factors that would suggest he presents a danger to the

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and Custoris Enforcement; (4) U.S. Department of Homeland Security; (5) U.S. Department of Justice; and
(6) U.S. Executive Office for Immigration Review. (Doc. 1, fj 8-17).

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community.” (/d., J 38). On the contrary, Petitioner alleges “he has demonstrated deep
respect for lawful authority and a consistent willingness to participate in legal proceedings
and comply with all conditions of supervision.” (/d.).

Because Petitioner is charged with having entered the United States without
inspection, the Department of Homeland Security has denied or will deny Petitioner release
from immigration custody, consistent with a new DHS policy issued on July 8, 2025,
instructing all Immigration and Customs Enforcement employees to consider anyone
inadmissible under § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i)—.e., those who entered the United States without
admission or inspection—subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and therefore
ineligible to be released on bond. In addition, on September 5, 2025, the Board of
Immigration Appeals issued a precedential opinion holding that an Immigration Judge has
no authority to consider bond requests for any person who entered the United States
without admission. Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 |. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025)). The Board
of Immigration Appeals determined that such individuals are subject to detention under 8
U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and therefore ineligible to be released on bond.

Petitioner alleges he is being unlawfully detained by Respondents without a bond
hearing under the mandatory detention provision of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A),
instead of the discretionary detention provision of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). This
distinction matters because noncitizens detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) are

not entitled to a bond hearing, whereas noncitizens detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)

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are entitled to a bond hearing before an Immigration Judge. Patel v. O'Neil, 2025 WL
3516865, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 2025) (citations omitted).

As directed by the Court, the Respondents filed a response to the Petition on
February 19, 2026. (Doc. 3). On February 23, 2026, Petitioner filed a reply to
Respondents response. (Doc. 4).

The Respondents do not dispute the factual allegations contained in the Petition.
Rather, they set forth legal arguments as to why Petitioner's detention is lawful under 8

U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). But, as discussed more fully below, Respondents’ interpretation of the
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INA—the same one they advance here—has already been rejected by this Court and the

overwhelming majority of federal judges to address this issue. See Patel, 2025 WL

3516865, at *4n.7 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 2025 (collecting cases).

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ll. | STANDARD OF REVIEW

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, a federal district court may grant a habeas petition
where a vetitioner’s immigration detention is “in violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Itis well established that a federal
habeas corpus petitioner generally has the burden of proving facts entitling him to a
discharge from custody, Goins v. Brierley, 464 F.2d 947, 949 (3d Cir. 1972) (citations

omitted): accord Patel, 2025 WL 3241212, at *2.

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lll. ANALYSIS

A. This Court Has Jurisdiction Over Petitioner's Habeas Petition.

Before addressing the merits, the Court must first address Respondents’ previous
position that the Court lacks jurisdiction to grant the writ. Although Respondents do not
seek dismissal of the Petition on jurisdictional grounds, Respondents have in prior habeas
petitions directed the Court to three subparagraphs of the INA: 8 U.S.C. §§
1252(g),1252(b)(9), and 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) which they claim divest this Court of jurisdiction to

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hear habeas petitions. The Court need not dwell on the jurisdictional issues because it has
previously rejected Respondents’ jurisdictional arguments, and federal district courts to
consider this issue have almost universally held that they have jurisdiction to consider
habeas petitions like the one filed by Petitioner. In short, Section 1252(g) does not apply
since Petitioner “does not attempt by this petition to address the commencement,
adjudication, or execution of removal orders and their proceedings.” Soumare v. Jamison,
2025 WL 3461542, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 2, 2025) (citing Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-
Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 482 (1999) (jurisdiction stripping under § 1252(g)(2)

applies “only to [these] three discrete actions”); see also Demirel v. Fed. Det. Ctr.

Philadelphia, 2025 WL 3218243, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 18, 2025) (Section 1252(g) does not

2 Section 1252(g) of the INA provides, in relevant part, that: “no court shall have jurisdiction to hear
any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to
commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien under this chapter.”
8 U.S.C. § 1252(g).

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bar jurisdiction because the petitioner “seeks a bond hearing; he does not challenge the
commencement, adjudication, or execution of his removal (which may not even occur)’).
Section 1252(b)(9) also does not divest this Court of jurisdiction over the habeas
petition, because it “does not reach claims that are independent of, or wholly collateral to,
the removal process.”> E.0.H.C. v. Sec’y United States Dept. of Homeland Sec., 950 F.3d
177, 186 (3d. Cir. 2020) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Moreover, §
1252(b)(9) “does not strip jurisdiction when aliens seek relief that courts cannot
meaningfully provide alongside review of a final order of removal.” /d. (‘If ‘later’ is not an
option, review is available now.’); see also Demirel, 2025 WL 3218243, at *3 (“Later is not
an option here, because the Court of Appeals could not ‘meaningfully’ redress Demirel’s
purported unlawful denial of release on bond should his final removal be ordered.”). The
same logic applies here: later is not an option here because the Court of Appeals could not

meaningfully address Petitioner's unlawful detention without a bond hearing.4

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3 Section 1252(b)(9) of the INA provides, in relevant part, that “Judicial review of all questions of law
and fact, including the interpretation and application of constitutional or statutory provisions, arising from any
action takeni or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United States under this subchapter shall be
available only in judicial review of a final order under this section.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9). These claims must
be filed “with an appropriate court of appeals.” /d. § 1252(a)(2)(D).

4 The Third Circuit recent opinion in Khalil v. President, United States, 164 F.4th 259 (3d Cir. 2026),
interpreting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9), does not divest this Court of jurisdiction. The Court agrees with other
district courts that have addressed this issue and concludes that Khalil and 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) do not
divest this court of jurisdiction to rule on Petitioner's habeas petition. See Giyosov v. Jamison, 2026 WL
209839, at.“1 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 27, 2026) (“The Court concludes that Khalil is distinguishable because
[petitioner's] petition does not present legal or factual questions that can be meaningfully reviewed alongside
review of a final order of removal.”); Kourouma v. Jamison, 2026 WL 120208, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 15, 2026)
(“Unlike the challenge to detention in Khalil, Petitioner's challenge here is not ‘inextricably linked’ to his
removal proceedings.”). The same logic applies here: Khali! does not divest this Court of jurisdiction over

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And'section 1252(a}(2)(B)(ii) is inapposite because the Respondents’ “statutory
detention power is ‘not a matter of discretion’ to which § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) applies.”
Soumare, 2025 WL 3461542, at *2 (quoting Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001)):
see also Demirel, 2025 WL 3218243, at *3 (“Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) thus also does not
apply here.”), In sum, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(g),1252(b)(9), and 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) do not divest
this Court of jurisdiction to hear Petitioner's habeas petition.

In addition, although Respondents no longer appear to be advancing an exhaustion
of administrative remedies argument, the Court feels it prudent to nevertheless address
exhaustion as it has been raised by the Respondents in numerous similar petitions. While
habeas petitioners are “ordinarily required to exhaust their administrative remedies,”
Moscato ’ Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 98 F.3d 757, 760 (3d Cir. 1996), they “need not exhaust
administrative remedies where the issue presented involves only statutory construction.”
Vasquez v. Strada, 684 F.3d 431, 434-35 (3d Cir. 2012). Moreover, exhaustion of
administrative remedies is also not required when doing so would be futile. Demirel, 2025
WL 3218243, at *4. Because the Board of Immigration Appeals in Matter of Yajure Hurtado,

29 |. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025) “predetermined the statutory issue” Petitioner “has no

Petitioner's habeas petition because his challenge is not “inextricably linked” to his removal proceedings and
the Petition does not present factual and legal issues that can be meaningfully reviewed along with a final
order of removal.

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5 Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) of the INA provides, in relevant part, that “no court shall have jurisdiction to
review . . . any other decision or action by the Attorney General or Secretary of Homeland Security the
authority for which is specified under this subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney General or the
Secretary of Homeland Security.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii).

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reasonable, prospect of obtaining relief through administrative remedies.” Demirel, 2025 WL

3218243, at *4 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, the Petition will

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not be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

B. The Court Will Grant Petitioner’s Habeas Petition.

Turning to the merits of the Petition, the Court will first consider the two statutory
provisions of the INA at issue. 8 U.S.C. § 1225 is a statute entitled “Inspection by
immigration officers; expedited removal of inadmissible arriving aliens; referral for hearing.”
It provides, in relevant part:

(b) Inspection of applicants for admissions
_ (2) Inspection of other aliens

(A) In General

Subject to subparagraph (B) and (C), in the case of an alien who is an
applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines
that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt
entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding
under section 1229a [removal proceedings] of this title.

8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). 8 U.S.C. § 1226, in contrast, is entitled “Apprehension and
detention of aliens.” It provides, in relevant part:

(a) Arrest, detention, and release
On.a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained
pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.
Except as provided in subsection (c) and pending such decision, the Attorney
General—
(1) may continue to detain the arrested alien; and
(2) may release the alien on—
(A) bond of at least $1,500 with security approved by, and containing
conditions prescribed by, the Attorney General; or
(B) conditional parole; but

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(3) may not provide the alien with work authorization (including an ‘employment
authorized’ endorsement or other appropriate work permit), unless the alien
is lawfully admitted for permanent residence or otherwise would (without
regard to removal proceedings) be provided such authorization.

8 U.S.C. § 1 226(a). Respondents are currently detaining Petitioner pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §

1225(b)(2)(A). It is undisputed that Petitioner has not been charged with or convicted of a

criminal offense, does not have a final order of removal, and his asylum application is

currently pending before an Immigration Judge with a merits hearing scheduled for 2029.

As the Court previously found, “the overwhelming majority of federal district courts
that have addressed this issue have interpreted the INA to find that

persons similarly situated to Petitioner—noncitizens who previously entered the United

States and are currently residing in the United States—are not subject to the mandatory

detention provision of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) but instead are subject to the discretionary

detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and accordingly are entitled to a bond hearing.”

Patel, 2025 WL 3519895, at *4 (collecting cases). “These courts have further found that the

statutory provisions of the INA that Respondents’ claim divest this Court of jurisdiction do

not apply fo persons similarly situated to Petitioner and that there is no need to exhaust

administrative remedies prior to filing a habeas petition.” Id.

As before, “the Court finds that the near universal rejection of Respondents’
interpretation of the INA by federal district courts to be highly persuasive and will adopt the

same approach.” Id. at *5. Petitioner's detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) is unlawful

under the INA because the plain language of this provision and the statutory framework of

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the INA compels a finding that § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies only to noncitizens who are
affirmatively seeking admission to the United States, not noncitizens like Petitioner who
have resided in the United States for years.8 See Bethancourt Soto, __ F. Supp. 3d __,
2025 WL 2976572, at * 7 (“For all these reasons, the Court concludes that § 1225(b)(2)(A)
applies only to noncitizens who are actively, i.e., affirmatively, ‘seeking admission’ to the
United States. Accordingly, it does not apply to individuals like Petitioner, who has been
residing in the United States ‘for over seven years.”): see also Patel, 2025 WL 3516865 at
*5 (same).

Like other Courts to address this issue, the Court finds that Respondents’
interpretation of the phrase “seeking admission” violates the rule against surplusage, would
negate the plain meaning of the text, and make redundant Section 1226(c) mandatory
detention of noncitizens who have committed or are charged with certain specified crimes.
See Centeno Ibbara, 2025 WL 3294726, at *5-6 ("The government's interpretation of §

1225(b)(2) violates the rule against surplusage. If‘an applicant seeking admission’ is the

same as ‘an applicant for admission,’ then ‘seeking admission’ is surplusage. Congress has

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6 The Supreme Court has also acknowledged that 8 U.S.C. § 1226 “generally governs the process of
arresting and detaining ... aliens already in the country pending the outcome of removal proceedings.”
Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 288-89 (2018) (emphasis added); Id. at 303 ("As noted, § 1226 applies
to aliens already present in the United States.”).

In addition, despite the Board of Immigration Appeals holding in Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 |. & N.
Dec. 216 (BIA 2025), that 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies to noncitizens like Petitioner, “[t]his Court owes
no deference to an agency's interpretation that conflicts with the statute's unambiguous text.” Bethancourt
Soto v. Soto, __F. Supp. 3d __, 2025 WL 2976572, at *7 (D.N.J. Oct. 22, 2025) (ottng Loper Bright Enters.
v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 400- 01 (2024)).

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also recently adopted provisions in § 1226 that would be made superfluous under the
government's interpretation. If a noncitizen enters the country illegally and is subsequently
convicted or charged with certain crimes, these new provisions require that noncitizens be
detained without a bond hearing. Under the government's interpretation, § 1225 would
require such mandatory detention regardless of criminal charges or conviction. If this was
the case, Congress would have no need to create additional requirements for mandatory

detention.’). Here, Petitioner is not affirmatively “seeking admission’ into the United States.
He did so in 2023 and was released into the United States on his own recognizance in order
to pursue his asylum claim. Because Petitioner is not currently “seeking admission” into the
United States, Section 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to him.’

As for Petitioner's constitutional arguments, it is undisputed that Petitioner is entitled
to the protections of the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at
693 (“But once an alien enters the country, the legal circumstances change, for the Due
Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether
their oresence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.”).

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Applying the balancing test of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 325 (1976) to the

mandatory detention without a bond hearing at issue here, the Court must weigh three

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‘ The Court acknowledges that Respondents cite to the Fifth Circuit's recent decision in Buenrosto-
Mendez v. Bondi, __ F.4*__, 2026 WL 323330 (5th Cir. 2026), in which the Fifth Circuit—in a 2-1 decision—
held that noncitizens like Petitioner were “applicants for admission” to the United States who were “seeking
admission” and were thus subject to the INA’s mandatory detention provision. The Fifth Circuit's ruling is not
binding on this Court. Moreover, the Court finds as persuasive Judge Douglas’s dissent.

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factors: (1) the “private interest that will be affected by the official action”; (2) “the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such interest through procedure used, and the probable value, if
any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the Government's interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional
or substitute procedural requirements would entail.” /d. 424 U.S. at 335. The first factor
weighs neal in Petitioner's factor, as the “official action” has deprived him of his physical
liberty. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004) (noting “the most elemental of
liberty interest—the interest in being free from physical detention.”). As for the second
factor, the Court further finds this factor weighs heavily in Petitioner's favor “as he is
presently and erroneously detained under the mandatory detention provisions of § 1225,
without an opportunity for a bond hearing.” Bethancourt Soto, __ F. Supp. 3d __, 2025 WL
2976572, a *8 (emphasis in original). Lastly, the Court notes the Government has an
interest in detaining noncitizens to ensure “the appearance of aliens at future immigration
proceedings” and “preventing danger to the community.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690.
However, his factor still weighs in Petitioner’s favor because Respondents do not dispute
that Petitioner has no criminal record, was released on his own recognizance, has not
missed any appointments with immigration authorities, and the Respondents have not
claimed that Petitioner poses a danger or is a flight risk. Accordingly, the Court further finds
that Petitioner's mandatory detention without a bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §

1225(b)(2)(A) further violates his procedural due process rights under the Fifth Amendment.

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See Bethancourt Soto, __ F. Supp. 3d __, 2025 WL 2976572, at “8 (“Taken together, the
Court finds the Mathews factors weigh decisively in Petitioner's favor, and as such his
mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) violates his procedural due process rights.”)
(citations omitted).

Under the Respondents’ approach, Petitioner and those noncitizens residing in the
United States who have not committed, or been charged with, a specified crime under the
INA could be lawfully detained without a bond hearing consistent with constitutional
requirements from January 2023 until August 2029 when an Immigration Judge will hear his
asylum petition. And likely for a period much longer, despite Respondents’ claims that the
detention 5 only “temporary.” This prolonged and indefinite detention would continue if
Petitioner exercised his right to appeal the forthcoming decision on his asylum application.
Further, Respondents approach would be inconsistent with the Supreme Court's decision
in Zadvydas (which considered the indefinite detention of the petitioner after a final removal
order and finding fewer than six months detention is presumed to be constitutional) and
would violate both the INA and Petitioner's due process rights by depriving him of his liberty
without due process of law. Importantly, Respondents do not dispute that there is no
final removal order for Petitioner. Accordingly, the Court will grant Petitioner's habeas

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petition because his detention under § 1225 is unlawful.
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Petitioner's request for fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act will be
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held in abeyance in order to permit Respondents the opportunity to argue that its position in
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this proceeding was “substantially justified.” “Under the EAJA, the Government's position
was substantially justified only if its conduct was justified to a degree that could satisfy a
reasonable person.” Michelin v. Warden Moshannon Valey Corr. Cent.,__ F. 4t"__, 2026
WL 263438, at *11 (3d Cir. Feb. 2, 2026) (allowing fees under EAJA in immigration habeas
proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2241). “The Government bears the burden of proving its
position was justified.” Id. Accordingly, the Court will order Petitioner’s counsel to file a fee
petition and brief and will defer ruling on the fee petition until the completion of the parties’
briefing. |

IV. CONCLUSION

For'the foregoing reasons, Petitioner's habeas petition will be granted because his
mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) without a bond hearing is unlawful and
violates both the INA and the Fifth Amendment's procedural due process clause. Because
the Respondents maintain that a bond hearing is not required and the Respondents’
interpretation is inconsistent with the INA, Respondents will be directed to immediately
release Petitioner lrakli Dokvadze from the custody of Respondent Craig Lowe, Warden of
Pike County Correctional Facility, and file a declaration or affidavit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1746 confirming that Petitioner Dokvadze has been released from custody. See
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 779 (2008) (acknowledging that a habeas court has
“the power to order the conditional release of an individual unlawfully detained—though

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release need not be the exclusive remedy and is not the appropriate one in every case in

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which the wt is granted.”); see also Bethancourt Soto, 2025 WL 2976572, at *9 (ordering
immediate release); Flores Obando, 2025 WL 3452047, at *3 (same); Kashranov, 2025 WL
3188399, at *8 (same); Patel, 2025 WL 3516865, at *6 (same).

Respondents will further be permanently enjoined from detaining Petitioner under 8
U.S.C. § 1225. See Bethancourt Soto, 2025 WL 2976572, at *9 (permanently enjoining
respondents from detaining petitioner under § 1225 where petitioner did not file a motion for
temporary restraining order or motion for preliminary injunction); see also Maldonado, 2025
WL 2985256, at *7 (“The Court grants the writ of habeas corpus and orders Respondents to
release Petitioner within 24 hours. . . . Following Petitioner's release, Respondents are
nermanently enjoined from rearresting or otherwise detaining Petitioner under §
1225(b)(2).”); Patel, 2025 WL 3516865, at *7. If Respondents elect to later detain Petitioner
under 8 U.S.C. § 1226, the Respondents must provide Petitioner Dokvadze with notice and
an opportunity to be heard at a timely individualized bond hearing, where an Immigration

Judge will assess whether he is a danger or flight risk. A separate Order follows.

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PT ua hiter

Frobett DM ni
United States District Judge

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