Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MARTIN RAUL DIAZ APARICIO,
A245-653-427,
Petitioner,
v.
CRAIG LOWE, in his official
capacity as Warden, Pike County
Correctional Facility, et al.,
Respondents.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:25-cv-02413
(SAPORITO, J.)
MEMORANDUM
On December 15, 2025, the petitioner, appearing through counsel,
filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
Doc. 1. In this petition, Martin Raul Diaz Aparicio, a native and citizen
of 	Venezuela, 	challenges 	the 	legality 	of 	his 	pre-removal-order
immigration detention without an individualized bond hearing. At the
time of filing, Diaz Aparicio was being held in the custody of United
States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) at Pike County
Correctional Facility, located in Pike County, Pennsylvania.
I. 	BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Diaz Aparicio initially entered the United States without inspection
Case 3:25-cv-02413-JFS Document 16 Filed 02/25/26 Page 1 of 25

- 2 -
at or near Eagle Pass, Texas, on or about December 20, 2023. Shortly
after Diaz Aparicio entered the United States, he was served with a
Notice to Appear, DHS Form I-862, dated December 23, 2023, which
declared him to be subject to removal as an “alien present in the United
States who has not been admitted or paroled,”1 and which directed him
to appear for a hearing before an immigration judge in Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, on September 11, 2025. Pet. Ex. 1, Doc. 1-2, at 14.
From the time of his entry into the United States in December 2023
until he was taken in custody for immigration detention in November
2025, 	Diaz 	Aparicio 	lived 	in 	West 	Chester, 	Pennsylvania, 	with 	his
longtime partner, Yolsergis Andreina Torcates Chirinos, and his minor
stepson, A.J.S.T. Diaz Aparicio has no criminal record, either here or in
Venezuela. He timely applied for asylum in April 2024,2 and he was
granted a work permit in September 2024. His asylum petition has not
yet been adjudicated. At the time of his arrest and detention, he was
1 Notably, a box on the Notice for declaring him to be an “arriving
alien” was
not checked. Pet. Ex. 1, Doc. 1-2, at 14.
2 In Venezuela, Diaz Aparicio had served as a police officer, but he
had refused orders to repress and shoot at peaceful protestors. As a
result, he faced threats to his life, and he was forced to flee Venezuela
along with his partner and his stepson.
Case 3:25-cv-02413-JFS Document 16 Filed 02/25/26 Page 2 of 25

- 3 -
gainfully employed as a driver and delivery worker.
Diaz Aparicio has complied with all directions and requirements of
asylum and immigration officers since submitting his application for
asylum. He was doing so when he reported to the Philadelphia ICE
Enforcement and Removal Operations field office on November 21, 2025,
for a routine check-in. Once there, he was taken into custody and
detained by immigration authorities. Later, he was transferred to Pike
County Correctional Facility, where he remains in civil immigration
detention.3 He has been denied any opportunity to post bond or to be
released on other conditions.
II. 	DISCUSSION
Since 	the 	United 	States 	began 	restricting
immigration into this country in the late 19th century,
it has distinguished between those noncitizens seeking
entry 	into 	the 	country 	and 	those 	already 	residing
within it. Noncitizens “stopped at the boundary line”
who have “gained no foothold in the United States” do
not enjoy the same constitutional protections afforded
to 	persons 	inside 	the 	United 	States. 	But 	once 	a
noncitizen 	enters 	the 	United 	States, 	“the 	legal
circumstance changes,” for the constitutional right to
due process applies to all “persons” within our nation’s
3 The respondent’s exhibits suggest that Diaz Aparicio may have
been transferred initially to Moshannon Valley Processing Center in
Clearfield County, Pennsylvania. At the time of filing, however, he was
being detained at the Pike County Correctional Facility.
Case 3:25-cv-02413-JFS Document 16 Filed 02/25/26 Page 3 of 25

- 4 -
borders, 	“whether 	their 	presence 	here 	is 	lawful,
unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” This distinction
between noncitizens who have entered and reside in
the United States and those who have not yet entered
“runs throughout immigration law.”
Quijada Cordoba v. Knight, ___ F. Supp. 3d ____, 2025 WL 3228945, at *1
(D. Idaho Nov. 19, 2025) (quoting
Kaplan v. Tod, 267 U.S. 228, 230 (1925),
and
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001)) (citations omitted).
Consistent with this distinction, “[t]wo statutory sections govern
the detention of noncitizens prior to a final order of removal: 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225 and 1226.”
Lepe v. Andrews, 801 F. Supp. 3d 1104, 1111 (E.D. Cal.
Sept. 23, 2025),
appeal filed, No. 25-7429 (9th Cir. Nov. 25, 2025). As
concisely summarized by the Supreme Court: “U.S. immigration law
authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens
seeking admission
into the country under §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2). It also authorizes the
Government to detain certain aliens
already in the country pending the
outcome of removal proceedings under §§ 1226(a) and (c).”
Jennings v.
Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 289 (2018) (emphasis added).
Under § 1225, “an alien who ‘arrives in the United States,’ or ‘is
present’ in this country but ‘has not been admitted,’ is treated as an
‘applicant for admission.’”
Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287 (quoting 8 U.S.C.
Case 3:25-cv-02413-JFS Document 16 Filed 02/25/26 Page 4 of 25

- 5 -
§ 1225(a)(1)). Applicants for admission may be detained pending removal
under two separate provisions: § 1225(b)(1) and § 1225(b)(2).
Section 1225(b)(1) applies to aliens who (
A) are arriving in the
United States,
see § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (the “arriving aliens provision”), or
have been physically present in the United States for less than two years
without 	being 	admitted 	or 	paroled,
	see 	§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii) 	(the
“designation 	provision”),4	
and 	(
B) 	are 	inadmissible 	either 	for
misrepresenting a material fact while attempting to gain admission to
the United States or for lacking proper immigration documentation.
See
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A);
see also § 1182(a)(6)(C) (inadmissibility based
on 	misrepresentation); 	§ 1182(a)(7) 	(inadmissibility 	for 	lack 	of
4 This so-called “designation provision” further limits this group of
aliens subject to expedited removal proceedings to certain categories of
aliens expressly designated by the Secretary of Homeland Security,
see
§ 1225(b)(1)(a)(ii), but the current scope of that designation is “the full
scope of statutory authority,” and thus all aliens who have not been
admitted or paroled into the United States and who have not been
physically present in the United States continuously for the two-year
period prior to determination of inadmissibility are subject to expedited
removal 	under 	§ 1225(b)(1).
	See 	Designating 	Aliens 	for 	Expedited
Removal, 90 Fed. Reg. 8139 (Jan. 24, 2025);
see also Make The Rd. New
York v. Wolf, 962 F.3d 612, 619–20 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (providing a historic
overview 	of 	groups 	designated 	under 	§ 1225(b)(1)(a)(ii));
	Coal. 	for
Humane Immigrant Rts. v. Noem, 805 F. Supp. 3d 48, 62–64 (D.D.C.
2025) (same),
appeal filed, No. 25-5289 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 11, 2025).
Case 3:25-cv-02413-JFS Document 16 Filed 02/25/26 Page 5 of 25

- 6 -
documentation). For these aliens, § 1225(b)(1) provides for expedited
removal proceedings without further hearing or review, unless the alien
expresses a fear of persecution or an intent to apply for asylum, in which
case 	the 	alien 	is 	subject 	to 	mandatory 	detention 	pending 	a 	final
determination of credible fear of persecution and, if found not to have
such a fear, until removal.
See § 1225(b)(1)(B).
See generally Make The
Rd. New York v. Wolf, 962 F.3d 612, 618–20 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (summarizing
expedited removal provisions);
	Rodriguez-Acurio v. Almodovar, ___ F.
Supp. 3d ____, 2025 WL 3314420, at *9–10 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2025)
(same);
Coal. for Humane Immigrant Rts. v. Noem, 805 F. Supp. 3d 48,
59–64 (D.D.C. 2025) (same),
appeal filed, No. 25-5289 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 11,
2025).
Section 1225(b)(2) is a “broader . . . catchall provision” that applies
to other “applicants for admission” who are “seeking admission” to the
United States.5
See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A);
Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287.
Under § 1225(b)(2), an applicant for admission is placed into ordinary
(not expedited) removal proceedings.
	See § 1225(b)(2)(A);
	see also id.
5 The statute expressly provides that § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to
those to whom § 1225(b)(1) applies, as well as other categories not
relevant here.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(B).
Case 3:25-cv-02413-JFS Document 16 Filed 02/25/26 Page 6 of 25

- 7 -
§ 1229a (describing ordinary removal proceedings before an immigration
judge). With limited exceptions, however, an alien is subject to mandatory
detention under § 1225(b)(2) while removal proceedings remain pending.
See § 1225(b)(2)(A);
see also § 1182(d)(5) (authorizing the Secretary of
Homeland Security to grant humanitarian parole to aliens awaiting
removal proceedings); § 1225(b)(2)(C) (providing that aliens arriving on
land from a foreign territory contiguous to the United States may be
returned to that foreign territory pending removal proceedings, rather
than be detained);
Quijada Cordoba, 2025 WL 3228945, at *1 (“Section
1225(b) mandates detention without bond hearings, except for narrow
humanitarian parole.”).
Meanwhile, as noted above, § 1226 “authorizes the Government to
detain certain aliens already in the country pending the outcome of
removal proceedings.”
Jennings, 583 U.S. at 289. Such aliens who are
already present in the United States may be detained pending removal
under two separate provisions: § 1226(a) and § 1226(c).
Section 1226(a) prescribes a discretionary detention framework for
these aliens when subject to removal proceedings, providing that: “On a
Case 3:25-cv-02413-JFS Document 16 Filed 02/25/26 Page 7 of 25

- 8 -
warrant issued by the Attorney General, [6] an alien may be arrested and
detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from
the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). The statute further provides that
such an alien may be released on bond while removal proceedings remain
pending.
Id. § 1226(a)(2). The relevant implementing regulations provide
that a § 1226(a) detainee may be released on bond upon showing “that
such release would not pose a danger to property or persons, and that the
alien is likely to appear for any future proceeding.” 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(c)(8),
1236.1(c)(8). Immigration authorities7 are tasked with an initial bond or
custody determination,
see id. §§ 236.1(c)(8), 1236.1(c)(8), after which the
alien 	may 	may 	request 	an 	individualized 	bond 	hearing 	before 	an
immigration judge,
see id. §§ 236.1(d)(1), 1236.1(d)(1);
see also § 1003.19
(setting 	out 	procedures 	for 	the 	review 	of 	bond 	determinations 	by
immigration judges).
See generally Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U.S. 392, 397
(2019) (“If the alien is detained, he may seek review of his detention by
6 This statutory authority to issue immigration arrest warrants has
been delegated to a number of supervisory immigration officials listed in
the 	applicable 	regulations.
	See 	8 	C.F.R. 	§ 287.5(e)(2);
	see 	also 	id.
§§ 236.1(b), 1236.1(b).
7 The same supervisory immigration officials authorized to issue
arrest warrants.
See 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(c)(8), 1236.1(c)(8).
Case 3:25-cv-02413-JFS Document 16 Filed 02/25/26 Page 8 of 25

- 9 -
an officer at the Department of Homeland Security and then by an
immigration judge (both exercising power delegated by the Secretary);
and the alien may secure his release if he can convince the officer or
immigration judge that he poses no flight risk and no danger to the
community.”) (citations omitted). An adverse bond determination by the
immigration judge can be appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals.
See 8 U.S.C. §§ 236.1(d)(3), 1236.1(d)(3).
See generally Borbot v. Warden
Hudson 	Cnty. 	Corr. 	Facility, 	906 	F.3d 	274, 	275 	(3d 	Cir. 	2018)
(summarizing § 1226(a) bond procedures).
Finally, “Section 1226(c) . . . carves out a statutory category of
aliens who may
not be released under § 1226(a).”
Jennings, 583 U.S. at
289. This subsection specifies certain criminal histories that require
mandatory detention of aliens who would otherwise be eligible for a bond
hearing under § 1226(a).
See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). Such criminal aliens may
only 	be 	released 	under 	very 	narrow 	circumstances 	involving 	a
determination 	by 	the 	Attorney 	General 	that 	the 	alien’s 	release 	is
necessary for witness-protection purposes and the alien does not pose a
flight risk or a danger to the community.
See id. § 1226(c)(4);
see also
Jennings, 583 U.S. at 289.
Case 3:25-cv-02413-JFS Document 16 Filed 02/25/26 Page 9 of 25

- 10 -
The petitioner in this case, Martin Raul Diaz Aparicio, has been
detained 	by 	immigration 	authorities 	without 	a 	bond 	determination
pending disposition of his ordinary, § 1229a removal proceedings.8 In his
petition, Diaz Aparicio argues that, because he was detained within the
interior of the United States, he is not properly subject to mandatory pre-
removal-order detention under § 1225(b)(2). Rather, he contends that he
may only be properly detained under § 1226(a), which requires that he
be given an opportunity for an individualized bond hearing. In addition
to his statutory arguments, Diaz Aparicio argues that his pre-removal
detention without an opportunity to be considered for release on bond
violates his Fifth Amendment due process rights.9 He further argues that
8 The parties appear to agree that the petitioner has been putatively
detained without an opportunity for a bond determination pursuant to
§ 1225(b)(2). 	The 	respondent 	has 	identified 	no 	other 	basis 	for 	his
detention. Moreover, the petitioner has not been placed in expedited
removal proceedings, as would be expected for a § 1225(b)(1) detainee, he
has no criminal record to qualify him for mandatory detention under
§ 1226(c), and immigration officials have refused to give him a bond
hearing, as required under § 1226(a).
9 Having found a statutory basis for relief, we do not reach the
constitutional issues raised by the petitioner as alternative grounds for
relief.
See generally Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485
U.S. 439, 445 (1988) (“A fundamental and longstanding principle of
judicial 	restraint 	requires 	that 	courts 	avoid 	reaching 	constitutional
questions in advance of the necessity of defending them.”).
Case 3:25-cv-02413-JFS Document 16 Filed 02/25/26 Page 10 of 25

- 11 -
he falls within the scope of a class of immigrant detainees certified by a
California federal district court in a class action concerning this same
legal issue, and thus the disposition of his habeas claims in this court is
governed 	by 	a 	recent 	ruling 	by 	the 	California 	court 	finding 	that
§ 1225(b)(2) does
not apply to the class certified, to which Diaz Aparicio
allegedly belongs.10
See generally Bautista v. Santacruz, ___ F. Supp. 3d
____, 2025 WL 3713987 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2025),
appeal filed, No. 25-
7958 (9th Cir. Dec. 19, 2025).
The 	respondent 	raises several arguments in opposition to the
petition. First, the respondent argues that various jurisdiction-stripping
provisions of the Immigration and Naturalization Act (“INA”) prevent
this court from considering the petition before us. Second, the respondent
argues that the court is precluded from considering the instant habeas
petition because the petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies.
10 Having granted relief on the merits of the petitioner’s statutory
claims, we decline to reach the petitioner’s alternative argument that the
respondent is collaterally estopped from relying on § 1225(b)(2) to subject
him to mandatory detention.
See generally Samayoa v. Smith, No. 5:25-
cv-190, 2026 WL 483243 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 20, 2026) (holding that final
declaratory judgment entered in
Bautista v. Santacruz, ___ F. Supp. 3d,
____, 2025 WL 3713987, at *32 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2025), in favor of a
certified class that included the petitioner precluded the respondent from
relying on § 1225(b)(2) to justify that petitioner’s detention).
Case 3:25-cv-02413-JFS Document 16 Filed 02/25/26 Page 11 of 25

- 12 -
Third, the respondent argues that § 1225(b)(2) does properly apply to the
petitioner, 	and that 	it 	prescribes mandatory 	detention. 	Finally, 	the
respondent argues that applying § 1225(b)(2) here comports with due
process.11
A. Jurisdiction
We necessarily turn first to the question of this courts’ jurisdiction.
The respondent initially argued that the petitioner’s habeas claims are
jurisdictionally 	barred 	under 	8 	U.S.C. 	§ 1252(g), 	§ 1252(b)(9), 	and
§ 1252(a), 	statutory 	provisions 	that 	strip 	federal 	district 	courts 	of
jurisdiction to consider certain immigration-related habeas claims. The
respondent, however, has withdrawn that argument and conceded that
this court has subject matter jurisdiction to rule on the merits of the
petition.
See Doc. 10. The court agrees that it may properly exercise
jurisdiction over this matter.
1. Section 1252(g)
Section 1252(g) provides that, “[e]xcept as provided in this section
and notwithstanding any other provision of law . . . , no court shall have
jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising
11
See supra note 9.
Case 3:25-cv-02413-JFS Document 16 Filed 02/25/26 Page 12 of 25

- 13 -
from 	the 	decision 	or 	action 	by 	the 	Attorney 	General 	to 	commence
proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any
alien under this chapter.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). The language of this
statutory provision, however, does not “sweep in any claim that can
technically be said to ‘arise from’ the three listed actions of the Attorney
General.”
Jennings, 583 U.S. at 294. Rather, the Supreme Court has
interpreted 	§ 1252(g) 	to 	apply 	to 	“just 	those 	three 	specific 	actions
themselves.”
Id. at 294;
see also Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination
Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 482 (1999) (“[Section 1252(g)] applies only to three
discrete actions that the Attorney General may take: her ‘decision or
action’ to ‘
commence proceedings,
adjudicate cases, or
execute removal
orders.’”). Here, Diaz Aparicio does not challenge the commencement of
his removal proceedings, the Attorney General’s decision to adjudicate
his case, or the execution of a removal order. He contests only the legality
of his detention without a bond hearing. Accordingly, § 1252(g) does not
bar this court from exercising jurisdiction over Diaz Aparicio’s habeas
petition.
2. Section 1252(b)(9)
Section 	1252(b)(9) is 	commonly 	described as a “zipper clause”
Case 3:25-cv-02413-JFS Document 16 Filed 02/25/26 Page 13 of 25

- 14 -
because it channels judicial review of all decisions and actions arising
from removal proceedings into a single petition for review (“PFR”) from a
final order of removal.
See Khalil v. President, 164 F.4th 259, 275 (3d Cir.
2026) (“Section 1252(b)(9) works as a ‘zipper’ clause, channeling ‘most
claims that even relate to removal’ into PFRs. It ensures that petitioners
get only one bite at the apple.”) (citations omitted). Section 1252(b)(9)
provides that “[j]udicial review of all questions of law and fact . . . arising
from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the
United States . . . shall be available only in judicial review of a final order
[of removal],” and that “no court shall have jurisdiction, by habeas corpus
under section 2241 of Title 28 or any other habeas corpus provision . . . to
review 	such 	an 	order 	or 	such 	questions 	of 	law 	or 	fact.” 	8 	U.S.C.
§ 1252(b)(9). “Because judicial review of a final order of removal is
available only in the court of appeals, district courts cannot review these
‘arising from’ claims either.”
E.O.H.C. v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Homeland
Sec., 950 F.3d 177, 184 (3d Cir. 2020).
In
E.O.H.C., the Third Circuit
read the “arising from” phrase to require courts to “ask:
If not now, when? If the answer would otherwise be
never, then § 1252(b)(9) poses no jurisdictional bar.”
The “point” of that subsection, [the
	E.O.H.C. court]
Case 3:25-cv-02413-JFS Document 16 Filed 02/25/26 Page 14 of 25

- 15 -
explained, “is to channel claims into a single PFR, not
to bar claims that do not fit within that process.” So
when aliens can get review later—by litigating before
an 	immigration 	judge, 	the 	Board 	of 	Immigration
Appeals, and then by way of a PFR to a court of
appeals—they must do so. District courts play little if
any role in that sequence. But when aliens raise claims
that courts cannot “meaningfully” review through the
PFR process, those claims do not “arise from” the
“actions taken” or “proceedings brought” to remove
them.
Khalil, 164 F.4th at 273–74 (citations and brackets omitted). In
Khalil,
the Third Circuit further clarified that such “[a] now-or-never claim must
raise legal or factual
questions that a court of appeals will not later be
able to review meaningfully on a PFR. It is not enough to assert an injury
that cannot be remedied later.”
Id. at 274–75;
see also id. at 275 (“[T]o
avoid getting channeled to a PFR, a claim must raise now-or-never
questions, not just now-or-never harms.”).
In
	Khalil, the petitioner brought a detention-specific “punitive
detention” claim, which did not challenge the length or conditions of his
detention, but instead he argued that his detention was “impermissible
retaliation and unlawful because it depend[ed] on [an] unconstitutionally
vague 	foreign 	policy 	ground.”
	Id. 	at 	277. 	These 	arguments 	against
detention were “identical to his arguments against removal.”
Id. at 276.
Case 3:25-cv-02413-JFS Document 16 Filed 02/25/26 Page 15 of 25

- 16 -
Because his detention-specific claim “just repackage[d] his challenges to
his 	removal,” 	it 	raised 	questions 	that 	the 	court 	of 	appeals 	could
meaningfully review in the PFR context, and the district court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction to decide that claim under the “zipper clause,”
§ 1252(b)(9).
See id. at 277.
Unlike the petitioner in
Khalil, Diaz Aparicio does not argue that
his continued detention is unlawful because the Government’s removal
action itself is invalid. Indeed, Diaz Aparicio does not seek review of a
final order of removal, he does not challenge the decision to initiate
removal proceedings against him, and he does not challenge the decision
to initially detain him. Rather, he challenges only his continued detention
without a bond hearing, to which he contends he is entitled under 8
U.S.C. § 1226(a). His habeas petition presents a proper now-or-never
claim, independent of and wholly collateral to the removal process, which
raises no legal or factual questions that could be meaningfully reviewed
by the court of appeals in the PFR context.
See Jennings, 583 U.S. at
294–95 (plurality opinion) (finding that § 1252(b)(9) did not present a
jurisdictional bar to claims challenging prolonged detention without an
individualized bond hearing);
Preap, 586 U.S. at 402 (plurality opinion)
Case 3:25-cv-02413-JFS Document 16 Filed 02/25/26 Page 16 of 25

- 17 -
(same);
see also E.O.H.C., 950 F.3d at 186 (“[Section 1252(b)(9)] does not
reach claims that are independent of, or wholly collateral to, the removal
process . . . .”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Accordingly, § 1252(b)(9) does not bar this court from exercising
jurisdiction over Diaz Aparicio’s habeas petition.
3. Section 1252(a)
Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) precludes a federal district court from
exercising jurisdiction to review decisions by the Attorney General or the
Secretary of Homeland Security “the authority for which is specified
under 	this 	subchapter 	to 	be 	in 	[their] 	discretion.” 	8 	U.S.C.
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). But Diaz Aparicio does not challenge a
discretionary
decision. Rather, he challenges the statutory authority to detain him
without 	a 	bond 	hearing. 	The 	scope 	of 	the 	government’s 	statutory
detention authority is “not a matter of discretion.”
Zadvydas , 533 U.S. at
688;
	see 	also 	Kashranov 	v. 	Jamison, 	No. 	2:25-cv-05555, 	2025 	WL
3188399, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 14, 2025). Accordingly, § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)
does not bar this court from exercising jurisdiction over Diaz Aparicio’s
habeas petition.
Case 3:25-cv-02413-JFS Document 16 Filed 02/25/26 Page 17 of 25

- 18 -
B. Administrative Exhaustion
“[N]o statute requires exhaustion in habeas proceedings under
§ 2241.”
Kashranov, 2025 WL 3188399, at *4;
see also Quispe v. Rose, ___
F. Supp. 3d ____, 2025 WL 3537279, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 10, 2025) (citing
Kashranov). Rather, “exhaustion exists as a judicially created doctrine
applied at the Court’s discretion.”
Kashranov, 2025 WL 3188399, at *4
(citing
McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144 (1992));
Quispe, 2025 WL
3537279, at *4 (quoting
Kashranov). Here, requiring the petitioner to
pursue further administrative review would serve no practical purpose
in light of a recent decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”),
in which the BIA held that § 1225(b)(2) governs the detention of all
noncitizens who are subject to removal proceedings but not on parole, and
thus “Immigration Judges lack authority to hear bond requests or to
grant bond” to such individuals.
See Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216,
225 (B.I.A. 2025).12 Thus, “[b]ecause the agency has already fixed its
position, exhaustion becomes an empty formality.”
Kashranov, 2025 WL
3188399, at *4 (citing
McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 148);
see also Quispe, 2025
12 The BIA’s decision does not bind this court, which must undertake
its own review of the statutory issues presented.
See Loper Bright Enters.
v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 412 (2024).
Case 3:25-cv-02413-JFS Document 16 Filed 02/25/26 Page 18 of 25

- 19 -
WL 3537279, at *4 (citing
Kashranov). Accordingly, we find good cause to
excuse exhaustion.
C. Merits
We turn then to the merits of the petition. The respondent purports
to have detained Diaz Aparicio pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), which
provides for mandatory detention without the opportunity for release on
bond. The petitioner, however, contends that he could only be properly
detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), and under that statute, he is entitled
to an individualized bond hearing.
“[F]or section 1225(b)(2)(A) to apply, several conditions must be
met—in particular, an ‘examining immigration officer’ must determine
that the individual is: (1) an ‘applicant for admission’; (2) ‘seeking
admission’; 	and 	(3) 	‘not 	clearly 	and 	beyond 	a 	doubt 	entitled 	to 	be
admitted.’”
Martinez v. Hyde, 792 F. Supp. 3d 211, 214 (D. Mass. 2025)
(quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)),
appeal dismissed, No. 25-1902 (1st Cir.
Dec. 23, 2025);
	see also Kashranov, 2025 WL 3188399, at *6 (citing
Martinez);
	Ramirez-Montoya 	v. 	Rose, 	No. 	3:25-CV-02411, 	2025 	WL
3709045, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 2025) (citing
Martinez and
Kashranov);
Carrero Romero v. Lowe, No. 4:26-CV-00009, 2026 WL 296215, at *4
Case 3:25-cv-02413-JFS Document 16 Filed 02/25/26 Page 19 of 25

- 20 -
(M.D. Pa. Feb. 4, 2026) (citing
Ramirez-Montoya). Significantly, “Section
1225(b)(2)(A) applies only to an alien who is
	both an applicant for
admission and ‘seeking admission.’”
Kashranov, 2025 WL 3188399, at *6
(emphasis in original);
see also Ramirez-Montoya, 2025 WL 3709045, at
*4 (citing
Kashranov and
Bethancourt Soto v. Soto, ___ F. Supp., 3d ____,
2025 WL 2976572, at *5 (D.N.J. Oct. 22, 2025));
Carrero Romero, 2026
WL 296215, at *4 (quoting
Ramirez-Montoya).
Section 1225 defines an “applicant for admission” as “[a]n alien
present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives
in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). Meanwhile, the phrase
“seeking admission” is not defined in § 1225, and the courts of this circuit
have construed the plain language of “seeking admission” to describe
“active and ongoing conduct—physically attempting to come into the
United States, typically at a border or a port of entry.”
Kashranov, 2025
WL 3188399, at *6;
see also Ramirez-Montoya, 2025 WL 3709045, at *4
(citing
	Kashranov);
	Carrero Romero, 2026 WL 296215, at *4 (citing
Ramirez-Montoya). 	“This 	reading 	preserves 	the 	distinction 	between
‘seeking admission’ and the separate term ‘applicant for admission,’
ensuring that each phrase carries independent meaning.”
Kashranov,
Case 3:25-cv-02413-JFS Document 16 Filed 02/25/26 Page 20 of 25

- 21 -
2025 WL 3188399, at *6;
see also Ramirez-Montoya, 2025 WL 3709045,
at *4 (quoting
Kashranov);
Carrero Romero, 2026 WL 296215, at *4
(quoting
Ramirez-Montoya). It also comports with the Supreme Court’s
finding in
Jennings that Ҥ 1225(b) applies primarily to aliens seeking
entry into the United States.”
	Jennings, 583 U.S. at 297;
	Ramirez-
Montoya, 2025 WL 3709045, at *4 (quoting
Jennings);
Carrero Romero,
2026 WL 296215, at *4 (quoting
Jennings and
Ramirez-Montoya). “In
sum, 	a 	plain 	reading 	of 	§ 1225(b) 	demonstrates 	that 	it 	applies 	to
individuals who are attempting to enter the United States, not those
already within the country.”
Carrero Romero, 2026 WL 296215, at *4;
see
also Kashranov, 2025 WL 3188399, at *7 (considering the statutory
context of § 1225(b)(2) and concluding that this provision “contemplates
inspection and detention at or immediately following border crossing”).
By contrast, as the Supreme Court has previously recognized,
“§ 1226 applies to aliens already present in the United States.”
Jennings,
583 U.S. at 303;
see also Carrero Romero, 2026 WL 296215, at *4 (quoting
Jennings). “Section 1226(a) creates a default rule for those aliens by
permitting—but not requiring—the Attorney General to issue warrants
for their arrest and detention pending removal proceedings,” and it
Case 3:25-cv-02413-JFS Document 16 Filed 02/25/26 Page 21 of 25

- 22 -
“permits the Attorney General to release those aliens on bond.”
Jennings,
583 U.S. at 303;
see also Carrero Romero, 2026 WL 296215, at *4 (quoting
Jennings);
	Ramirez-Montoya, 	2025 	WL 	3709045, 	at 	*5 	(“Unlike
§ 1225(b)(2)(A), § 1226(a) provides for bond or conditional parole.”) (citing
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2)). “[U]nder Section 1226(a) and its implementing
regulations, 	[an 	alien 	discretionarily 	detained 	pending 	removal
proceedings] is entitled to a bond hearing before an Immigration Judge
at which the government must prove by clear and convincing evidence
that he poses a danger to the community[] or . . . that he is a flight risk,
if it seeks to continue detaining him.”
Gomes v. Hyde, 804 F. Supp. 3d
265, 277 (D. Mass. 2025);13
see also Y.Z. v. Soto, ___ F. Supp. 3d ____, 2025
13 We note that, applying First Circuit precedent, the
Gomes court
stated that the government may prove that an alien is a danger to the
community by clear and convincing evidence, or that he is a flight risk by
the lesser preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.
See Gomes, 804 F.
Supp. 3d at 277 (citing
Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons, 10 F.4th 19, 41 (1st Cir.
2021)). The Third Circuit, however, has held that the government must
prove 	either 	dangerousness
	or 	flight 	risk 	by 	clear 	and 	convincing
evidence.
See German Santos v. Warden, 965 F.3d 203, 213–14 (3d Cir.
2020) (“When the Government seeks to take more than just money from
a party, we typically hold the Government to a standard of proof higher
than 	a preponderance 	of the evidence.”);
	see 	also 	Gayle v. 	Warden
Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst., 12 F.4th 321, 333 n.9 (3d Cir. 2021) (“[I]t is
a 	‘settled 	rule 	that 	when 	a 	party 	stands 	to 	lose 	his 	liberty, 	even
temporarily, we hold the Government’ to a ‘clear and convincing evidence’
(continued on next page)
Case 3:25-cv-02413-JFS Document 16 Filed 02/25/26 Page 22 of 25

- 23 -
WL 3564652, at *2 (D.N.J. Dec. 12, 2025) (“Noncitizens who are arrested
after having lived in the United States for a while do not generally have
to be detained. They are instead entitled to a bond hearing before an
immigration court.”) (citing
Gomes) (citations and footnote omitted).
See
generally Carrero Romero, 2026 WL 296215, at *4 (“[I]f an individual is
detained attempting to enter the country illegally or while otherwise
presenting themselves for inspection and entry, they are subject to
mandatory detention pursuant to § 1225. If they are arrested after
having already entered the country, they are subject to detention under
§ 1226 and are entitled to a bond hearing.”).
Here, § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2)(A), applies to the detention of Diaz
Aparicio. We find that Diaz Aparicio is no longer seeking admission into
the United States—at the time of his arrest and detention, he was not
actively attempting to come into the United States at a border or port of
entry. Rather, he is already here, having resided within the United States
for an extended period of time.
See Kashranov, 2025 WL 3188399, at *1
(finding that petitioner who lived in the United States for almost two
standard in the context of civil detention . . . .”) (quoting
German Santos);
Luciano-Jimenez v. Doll, 547 F. Supp. 3d 462, 465 (M.D. Pa. 2021)
(quoting
German Santos).
Case 3:25-cv-02413-JFS Document 16 Filed 02/25/26 Page 23 of 25

- 24 -
years 	was 	not 	“seeking 	admission” 	but 	“already 	here”);
	Ramirez-
Montoya, 	2025 	WL 	3709045, 	at 	*5 	(citing
	Kashranov). 	Thus, 	Diaz
Aparicio may only be properly detained pursuant to § 1226(a), and
therefore he is entitled to a bond hearing.
See Carrero Romero, 2026 WL
296215, at *5.
See generally Patel v. O’Neill, No. 3:25-cv-2185, 2025 WL
3516865, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 2025) (“The overwhelming majority of
federal district courts that have addressed this issue have interpreted the
INA to find that persons similarly situated to Petitioner—noncitizens
who previously entered the United States and are currently residing in
the United States—are not subject to the mandatory detention provision
of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) but instead are subject to the discretionary
detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and accordingly are entitled to
a bond hearing.”);
id. at *4 & n.7 (collecting Third Circuit district court
cases).
III. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court concludes that the petitioner is
currently 	detained 	pursuant 	to 	8 	U.S.C. 	§ 1226(a), 	not 	8 	U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(2), and thus he is entitled to an individualized bond hearing.
Accordingly, the petition will be granted, and the government will be
Case 3:25-cv-02413-JFS Document 16 Filed 02/25/26 Page 24 of 25

- 25 -
ordered to provide the petitioner with an individualized bond hearing
within twenty-one days or to release him from custody. The petitioner’s
motion for preliminary injunctive relief will be denied as moot.
An appropriate order follows.
Dated: February 25, 2026
	s/Joseph F. Saporito, Jr.
JOSEPH F. SAPORITO, JR.
United States District Judge
Case 3:25-cv-02413-JFS Document 16 Filed 02/25/26 Page 25 of 25