ZAMICHIELI v. CLOSE et al

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

Case 3:25-cv-01949-MEM-SH Document 39 Filed 10/14/26 Page 1 of 20

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAMONT ZAMICHIELI,

Petitioner : CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:25-1949
V. ; (JUDGE MANNION)
SUPERINTENDENT DAVID
CLOSE, et al.,
Respondents
MEMORANDUM

Currently before the Court are: (1) pro se Petitioner Lamont Zamichieli

(“Zamichieli’)’s second motion for a default judgment; (2) Respondents’ two

[
motions for additional extensions of time to file their response/answer to

Zamichieli’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. §2254; (3)

Zamichieli's motion for an extension of time to file his reply brief in further
support of his Section 2254 petition; (4) Zamichieli’s motion for bail; (5)
Zamichieli's motion for an order directing Respondents to file certain

additional state court records on the docket in this case; (6) Zamichieli’s

motion for leave to request discovery—in the form of requests for
|| admissions—from Respondents; and (7) Zamichieli’s motion for recusal. For

the reasons stated below, the Court will: (1) deny Zamichieli’s motion for a

default judgment, motion for bail, and motion for recusal; (2) deem withdrawn

Case 3:25-cv-01949-MEM-SH Document 39 Filed 10/14/26 Page 2 of 20

Zamichieli's motion seeking an order directing them to file additional state
court records on the docket due to his failure to file a supporting brief as well
as his motion for leave to serve discovery requests upon Respondents; and
(3) grant the parties’ motions for extensions of time.
F BACKGROUND

Zamichieli is currently serving a state sentence of a minimum of four-
and-a-half years to a maximum of fourteen years after a jury sitting in the
Court of Common Pleas of Huntingdon County convicted him of two counts
of aggravated harassment by a prisoner (18 Pa. C.S. §2703.1), one count of
indecent assault (18 Pa. C.S. §3126(a)(1)), and one count of harassment (18
Pa. C.S. §2709(a)(4)) in March 2019. See (Doc. 2 at 1); Commonwealth v.
Zamichieli, No. 794 MDA 2019, 2019 WL 7000025, at *1 (Pa. Super. Ct. Dec.
20, 2019) (“Zamichieli f’), After unsuccessfully challenging his convictions
and sentences in the Pennsylvania state courts, see Zamichieli |, 2009 WL
7000025, at *1, 5; Commonwealth v. Zamichieli, No. 1420 MDA 2024, 2025
WL 1233630, at *1, 10 (Pa. Super. Ct. July 8, 2025), Zamichieli commenced
the instant action by filing his Section 2254 petition and supporting brief in

the Western District of Pennsylvania (“WDPA”) on September 14, 2025.

Case 3:25-cv-01949-MEM-SH Document 39 Filed 10/14/26 Page 3 of 20

(Doc. 2.)' On September 23, 2025, the WDPA transferred the case to this
Court (Doc. 4), although it does not appear that it was electronically
transferred until October 16, 2025 (Doc. 6).

The following day, the Court issued an Order which, inter alia, directed
Respondents to file a response/answer to Zamichieli’s habeas petition within
twenty-one days. (Doc. 8.) However, Respondents did not file their response
to Zamichieli’s petition; as such, the Court issued a second Order on
November 24, 2025, which required Respondents to file a response within
twenty-one days and warned them that a failure to file a response could
result in the imposition of sanctions. (Doc. 10.)

On November 28, 2025, Zamichieli filed a motion for an extension of
| time to file a reply brief and a motion to sanction Respondents for their failure
to serve an answer (Doc. 11). On December 2, 2025, the Court issued an

Order denying Zamichieli’s motions as premature. (Doc. 12.)

' Under the federal “prisoner mailbox rule,” a pro se prisoner's
submission is deemed filed “at the time [the prisoner] delivered it to the prison
authorities for forwarding to the court clerk.” Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266,
276 (1988). Here, Zamichieli declares that he placed his Section 2254
habeas petition in the prison mailing system on September 14, 2025. See
(Doc, 2 at 19). As such, the Court uses September 14, 2025, as the petition’s
filing date even though it appears that the WDPA did not docket it until
| September 18, 2025. (Doc. 1.)

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Unfortunately, Respondents again did not file a response to
Zamichieli’s petition or a motion seeking an extension of time, which led to
Zammichieli filing both a motion for entry of default and a motion for a default
judgment on January 15, 2026. (Docs. 13, 14.) On January 20, 2026, the
Court issued an Order explaining that even though Zamichieli “ha[d] a
good[-|faith basis to seek entry of default insofar as Respondents ha[d] yet
to respond to his habeas petition,” the Court could not grant his motions
because “default judgments are unavailable in Section 2254 habeas
proceedings [insofar as] petitioners must demonstrate that they are ‘in
custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States.” (Doc. 15 at 2-3 (quoting 28 U.S.C. §2254(a) and citing Walker v.
Douglas, No. 25-1215, 2025 WL 2536054, at “5 (6th Cir. Aug. 5, 2025)
(nonprecedential), cert. denied, 146 S.Ct. 2628 (2026), Quinones-Torres v.
United States, 240 F. App’x 876, 878 (1st Cir. 2007) (nonprecedential),
Gordon v. Duran, 895 F.2d 610, 612 (9th Cir. 1990), and Sfinson v.
Wakefield, No. 07-cv-1237, 2017 WL 878425, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 6, 2017)).
The Court also again attempted to get Respondents to file their response to
Zamichieli’s petition by directing the Clerk of Court to serve Zamichieli’s
petition and the Court’s Orders upon them by certified mail. See (id, at 3-4).

The Court also provided Respondents with a period of twenty-one days to

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file their response to the petition and warned them that the failure to file a
response could result in the imposition of sanctions. See (id. at 4).

On February 25, 2026, Respondents, acting through the Office of the
Pennsylvania Attorney General (“OAG’), filed a motion for an extension of
time until May 11, 2026, to file their response. (Doc. 20.)* On March 2, 2026,
the Court issued an Order granting Respondents’ motion for an extension of
time and extending the time for them to file their response until May 11, 2026.
(Doc. 22.)

Although the Court granted Respondents this extension of time to file
their response, Zamichieli filed another motion for a default judgment, along

with a supporting brief, both of which the Clerk of Court docketed on March

2 In this motion, the OAG indicated that pursuant to an “existing
understanding and agreement” between it and the Huntingdon County
District Attorney’s Office ("DA’s Office’), the DA’s Office was counsel of
record for Respondents during the times that the Court directed
Respondents to respond to Zamichieli’s petition. See (id. FfJ4—10). Then, on
February 10, 2026, which was the Court’s most-recent deadline for
Respondents’ response, the DA’s Office transmitted a request to the OAG
that it assume responsibility for representing Respondents in this case
because “it had only one attorney[,]. . . limited resources, manpower, and
time... .” See (id. 911). Two days later, the OAG agreed to represent
Respondents, and it was the first time that their current counsel became
aware of the case. See (id. J]12—13). Counsel then attempted to access the
docket in this case through PACER but was unable to do so due to new
security features adopted by the PACER system. See (id. 914). Counsel was
finally able to access the docket through PACER on February 24, 2026, and
filed Respondents’ motion for an extension of time the following day. See (id.
9715-16).

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30, 2026. (Docs. 25, 26.) Then, on May 11, 2026, Respondents filed their
second motion for an extension of time to file their response. (Doc. 27.) They
later filed a third motion for an extension of time to file their response on May
29, 2026 (Doc. 30), as well as their response to Zamichieli’s petition on June
5, 2026 (Doc. 31).

In addition to the above motions, Zamichieli filed (1) a motion for bail
and a supporting brief (Docs. 28, 29), (2) a motion for an order directing
Respondents to file additional state court records on the docket (Doc. 33),
(3) a motion for an extension of time to file his reply brief (Doc. 34), (4) his
reply brief (Doc. 35), (5) a motion seeking leave to serve discovery requests
in the form of requests for admissions on Respondents as well as his
proposed requests for admissions (Docs. 36, 37), and (6) a motion for
recusal of the undersigned. All the pending motions are ripe for disposition.
ll. DISCUSSION

A. Zamichieli’s Motion for a Default Judgment

Zamichieli once again seeks a default judgment (Docs. 25—26) even
though the Court already explained to him that he cannot obtain a default
judgment in this case simply because Respondents did not file a
response/answer to his habeas petition despite being ordered to do so. See

(Doc. 15 at 2-3). Moreover, by the time Zamichieli filed his motion, the Court

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had already extended the time for Respondents to file their response,
meaning that they were not in default as that legal concept pertains to non-
habeas civil actions. (Doc. 22.) Accordingly, the Court will deny Zamichieli’s
second motion for a default judgment as frivolous and meritless.

B. The Parties’ Motions for Extensions of Time

Respondents move for an extension of time to file their response to

Zamichielis habeas petition (Docs. 27, 30), and Zamichieli seeks an

extension of time to file his reply brief in further support of his habeas petition
| (Doc. 34). After reviewing these motions, the Court finds that the parties set

forth good cause for the requested extensions in their motions. See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 6(b){(1)(A) (“When an act may or must be done within a specified time,

the court may, for good cause, extend the time: (A) with or without motion or
| notice if the court acts, or if a request is made, before the original time or its
extension expires ... .”), As such, the Court will grant their motions and
deem Respondents’ response to Zamichieli’s habeas petition as well as
Zamichieli’s reply brief in further support of his habeas petition to be timely
|| filed.

C. Zamichieli’s Motion for Bail

Zamichieli moves for an Order granting him bail until the resolution of

his habeas petition (Doc. 28). A district court has the authority “to grant bail

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to a state prisoner prior to ruling on the prisoner's petition for habeas corpus.”
Landano v. Rafferty, 970 F.2d 1230, 1239 (3d Cir. 1992) (citing /n re
Shuttlesworth, 369 U.S. 35, 35 (1962)); see also In re Shuttlesworth, 369
U.S. at 35 (directing that after petitioner seeks bail from state court, district
court should “proceed to hear and determine the cause, including any
application for bail pending that court's final disposition of the matter’); Lucas
v. Hadden, 790 F.2d 365, 367 (3d Cir. 1986) (acknowledging the district
court’s inherent authority to grant such bail in the Section 2254 context).
However, “[bjail is an exceptional form of relief in a habeas corpus
proceeding’ and the standard for granting bail in such proceedings is strict.”
Ingram v. Sauers, No. 12-cv-1900, 2014 WL 12704694, at *1 (M.D. Pa. July
1, 2014) (citing Lucas, 790 F.2d at 367)); see also Singleton v. Piazza, No.
05-cv-6685, 2006 WL 2520581, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 25, 2006) (explaining
that a habeas petitioner seeking bail pending resolution of their habeas
petition has a “high burden”). As such, the habeas petitioner must show
“exceptional circumstances that would justify a grant of bail.” Lucas, 790 F.2d
at 368: Landano, 970 F.2d at 1239 (explaining that “the factual predicate for
the exercise” of a district court’s power “to grant bail pending review of the

habeas petition of a state prisoner... was a finding of ‘extraordinary

Case 3:25-cv-01949-MEM-SH Document 39 Filed 10/14/26 Page 9 of 20

circumstances” (citing Lucas, 790 F.2d at 367)).° As for the required showing

of extraordinary circumstances, “[vjery few cases have presented

3 In Landano, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals explained that both the

Fifth and Eighth Circuits held that “bail pending post-conviction habeas
corpus review was available ‘only when the petitioner has raised substantial
constitutional claims upon which [they have] a high probability of success,
and also when extraordinarily or exceptional circumstances exist which
make the grant of bail necessary to make the habeas remedy effective.” 970
F.2d at 1239 (quoting Calley v. Callaway, 496 F.2d 701, 702 (5th Cir. 1974)
and citing Martin v. Solem, 801 F.2d 324, 329 (8th Cir. 1986)). This “standard
is conjunctive; that is, Petitioner must establish both a substantial
constitutional claim upon which [they have] a high likelihood of success and
extraordinary circumstances for [the court] to grant [them] bail.” Ingram v.
PBPP, No. 23-cv-565, 2023 WL 6129539, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 19, 2023)
(citations omitted). Several district courts consider the Third Circuit to have
adopted this conjunctive standard in Landano and, consequently, have
applied it to Section 2254 habeas petitioners’ motions for bail. See, e.g.,
Hudler v. Union Cnty., No. 21-cv-5, 2021 WL 963452, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Mar.
15, 2021) (“In other words, the district court’s authority to grant state bail
should be exercised... only when a petitioner has presented a subsiantial
meritorious constitutional claim and exceptional circumstances render the
exercise of that authority necessary effectively to preserve the habeas
remedy.” (omission in original) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted)); Kennedy v. Mason, No. 20-cv-3512, 2021 WL 106378, at *1 (E.D.
Pa. Jan. 11, 2021) (“The grant of release on bail is appropriate in habeas
cases only where: 1) the petitioner has raised ‘substantial constitutional
claims upon which he has a high probability of success’; and, 2)
‘extraordinary or exceptional circumstances exist which make the grant of
bail necessary to make the habeas remedy effective.” (quoting Landano,
970 F.2d at 1239)). However, at least one district court has viewed Landano
as establishing different standards for state and federal habeas petitioners,
with state prisoners having a burden to show only extraordinary
circumstances. See Roe v. Oddo, No. 25-cv-18, 2025 WL 3030692, at *16
(W.D. Pa. Oct. 30, 2025) (“[W]hen a state habeas petitioner seeks bail
pending adjudication of [their] underlying petition, the factual predicate
remains the extraordinary circumstances prong, but when the matter
(footnote continued on next page)

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extraordinary circumstances, and those that have seem to be limited to
situations involving poor health or the impending completion of the prisoner's
sentence.” Landano, 970 F.2d at 1239.

Here, Zamichieli falls far short of demonstrating that extraordinary
circumstances warrant the Court granting him bail in this case. Outside of
arguing that his habeas claims have merit, he mainly focuses on
Respondents’ delay in responding to his habeas petition as justifying his
release on bail. See (Doc. 29 at 1-2, 8-9). While it is unfortunate that there
has been a delay in Respondents filing a response to Zamichieli’s habeas
petition, this delay, especially considering that Zamichieli still has several
years to serve towards his maximum sentence, is not an extraordinary
| circumstance warranting his release on bail while the Court resolves his
habeas petition. Accordingly, the Court will deny Zamichieli’s motion for bail

pending resolution of his habeas petition.

involves a federal habeas petitioner, the Third Circuit has made clear that
both prongs must be met to justify a grant of bail.”). Nevertheless, for
|| purposes of this Memorandum, the Court need not address this issue, since
the Third Circuit clearly indicated that all habeas petitioners must show
extraordinary circumstances warranting bail and Zamichieli fails to do so
here.

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D. Zamichieli’s Motion for an Order Directing Respondents to
Submit Additional State Court Records on the Docket

Although Respondents attached numerous documents from the state
court record to their response to Zamichieli’s habeas petition, see (Doc. 31-
1-31-32), Zamichieli moves for an order directing Respondents to produce
the following additional documents: (1) a transcript of his preliminary hearing
on August 28, 2017, which appears to have been docketed on September
13, 2017; (2) a March 5, 2018 criminal continuance request with order; (3) a
May 7, 2018 order continuing jury selection to July 2, 2018; (4) a bill of costs
filed on August 27, 2018; (5) the Commonweaith’s trial exhibits 8, 21, and
22: (6) a transcript of jury selection on July 2, 2018; (7) a transcript of jury
selection on March 11, 2019; (8) the Commonwealth’s August 29, 2024 brief
in support of dismissal of Zamichieli’s Post Conviction Relief Act petition; (9)
his motion for reconsideration/reargument filed in the Superior Court on May
12, 2025; and (10) the Commonwealth’s Superior Court brief. See (Doc. 33
at 1-2). However, Zamichieli did not file a brief in support of this motion as
required by the Local Rules. See M.D. Pa. L.R. 7.5 (“Within fourteen (14)
days after the filing of any motion, the party filing the motion shall file a brief
in support of the motion. . . . If a supporting brief is not filed within the time
provided in this rule the motion shall be deemed to be withdrawn.”).

Therefore, the Court will deem Zamichieli’s motion withdrawn. If Zamichieli
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desires an order directing Respondents to produce the aforementioned
documents, he may file an appropriate motion and brief in support of the
motion.

E. Zamichieli’s Motion for Leave to Request Discovery

Zamichieli also moves for an order permitting him to submit written
discovery requests to Respondents pursuant to Rule 6 of the Rules
Governing Section 2254 Cases. (Doc. 36.) In particular, he seeks permission
to serve Respondents with thirty-five requests for admissions. See (id. at 1—
2; Doc. 37 at 2-8). It appears that he seeks this discovery because he claims
that Respondents have not submitted all relevant documents from the state
court record with their response to his habeas petition. See (Doc. 36 at 1).

As with his prior motion, Zamichieli did not file a brief in support of this
motion as required by the Local Rules. Therefore, the Court will deem this

motion withdrawn.*

4 Even if the Court did not deem this motion withdrawn, the Court would
deny it because Zamichieli fails to establish good cause for the requested
discovery based on the information contained in his motion. See R. 6(a), 28
U.S.C. foll. §2254 ("A judge may, for good cause, authorize a party to
conduct discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and may limit
the extent of discovery.”).

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F. Zamichieli’s Motion for Recusal

Zamichieli moves for the undersigned’s recusal from this case based
on the undersigned’s alleged “personal bias.” See (Doc. 38 at 1). He asserts
in his “Affidavit of Facts” attached to his motion that, inter alia, this Court has
wrongfully delayed his habeas proceedings, “always attempts to justify
Respondents’ bad faith delay and failure to follow/comply with orders,” and
“intentionally decides in favor of Respondents in bad faith.” (/d. (cleaned up)).
He also asserts that the undersigned “dislike[s]” him because he previously
filed a judicial misconduct complaint apparently related to other civil actions
he filed that were assigned to the undersigned. (/d. at 2.) As for those other
civil actions, Zamichieli points out that he filed four civil rights actions,® and
the undersigned issued “adverse decisions” after “excessive [d]elay,”
resulting in Zamichieli settling three of them “to avoid any further future
excessive delay .. . or [a]dverse bias [sic] decisions.” (/d. at 3-4.)

Zamichieli bases his motion for recusal on two federal statutes: 28
U.S.C. §144 and 28 U.S.C. §455. Section 144 provides that:

Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and
files a timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom

5 Zamichieli identifies those actions as: Zamichieli v. Delbalso, No. 17-
cv-1898 (M.D. Pa.); Zamichieli v. Ficks, No. 18-cv-850 (M.D. Pa.); Zamichieli
v. Merritts, No. 20-cv-180 (M.D. Pa.); and Zamichieli v. Mihal, No. 21-1246
(M.D. Pa.). See (id. at 3).

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the matter is pending has a personal bias or prejudice either

against [them] or in favor of any adverse party, such judge shail

proceed no further therein, but another judge shall be assigned

to hear such proceeding.

The affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief

that bias or prejudice exists, and shall be filed not less than ten

days before the beginning of the term at which the proceeding is

to be heard, or good cause shall be shown for failure to file it

within such time. A party may file only one such affidavit in any

case. It shall be accompanied by a certificate of counsel of record

stating that it is made in good faith.
28 U.S.C. §144. As for Section 455, it requires, infer alia, “[a]ny... judge...
of the United States” to “disqualify [themselves] in any proceeding in which
[their] impartiality might reasonably be questioned” as well as “[w]here [they
have] a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party... .” 28 U.S.C.
§§455(a), (b)(1); see also Petrossian v. Cole, 613 F. App’x 109, 112 (3d Cir.
2015) (unpublished) (explaining that Section 455 “requires a judge to recuse
where [their] impartiality might reasonably be questioned” (citation omitted)).

Here, the Court will deny Zamichieli's motion to recuse. In the first
instance, Zamichieli’s motion and supporting “Affidavit of Facts” are untimely
for purposes of Section 144. To the extent that he bases his motion on the
proceedings in his four civil rights cases, the latter three of those civil cases
concluded almost three years ago. See Zamichieli v. Ficks, No. 18-cv-850

(M.D. Pa.), ECF No. 89 (dismissing case on November 1, 2023, after

mediator reported parties agreed to settle) Zamichieli v. Merritts, No. 20-cv-
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180 (M.D. Pa.), ECF No. 134 (same); and Zamichieli v. Mihal, No. 21-1246
(M.D. Pa.), ECF No. 68 (same). As such, Zamichieli was aware of those
proceedings for years before filing his motion in this case, which he filed only
after the instant case has been pending for more than a year and is fully
briefed. See Shank v. Am. Motors Corp., 575 F. Supp. 125, 128 (E.D. Pa.
1983) ("An affidavit is untimely when the party significantly invokes
participation by the court in pretrial motions or other judicial proceedings
between the time he first learned of the asserted prejudice and the time the
§144 motion was filed.” (citing Smith v. Danyo, 585 F.2d 83, 86 (3d Cir. 1978)
and Samuel v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 395 F. Supp. 1275, 1279 (W.D. Pa. 1975),
vacated on other grounds, 538 F.2d 991 (3d Cir. 1976))). Therefore,
Zamichieli’s motion, to the extent that he brings it under Section 144, is
untimely, and he fails to establish any reason, much less good cause, for
failing to file it in a timely manner.

Even if Zamichieli timely filed his motion for recusal to the extent he
seeks recusal under Section 144, the Court would deny his motion for
several reasons. First, Zamichieli’s alleged violations mostly consist of
nothing more than a manifestation of his displeasure with the undersigned’s
rulings and the process through which his cases have been resolved.

However, under Sections 144 and 455, “a party’s displeasure with legal

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Case 3:25-cv-01949-MEM-SH Document 39 Filed 10/14/26 Page 16 of 20

rulings does not form an adequate basis for recusal.” Securacomm
Consulting, Inc. v. Securacom Inc., 224 F.3d 273, 278 (3d Cir. 2000)
(citations omitted). As the Supreme Court has explained:

[JJudicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a

bias or partiality motion. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384

U.S. [563, 583 (1966).] In and of themselves (i.¢., apart from

surrounding comments or accompanying opinion), they cannot

possibly show reliance upon an extrajudicial source; and can

only in the rarest circumstances evidence the degree of

favoritism or antagonism required (as discussed below) when no

extrajudicial source is involved. Almost invariably, they are
proper grounds for appeal, not for recusal.
Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994). Therefore, Zamichieli’s
motion, insofar as he premises it on any decisions adverse to him, is
meritless and does not warrant the undersigned’s recusal.

Second, the fact that Zamichieli filed a judicial conduct complaint
against the undersigned is not a valid ground for recusal. A party’s filing of a
judicial misconduct complaint is not a ground for recusal because “it would
be detrimental to the judicial system if a judge had to disqualify [themselves]
anytime someone filed a complaint about [their] conduct. A party would only
have to file a complaint to get a different judge.” /n re Evergreen Sec., Ltd.,
570 F.3d 1257, 1265 (11th Cir. 2009); see also In re Taylor, 417 F.3d 649,
652 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[A] per se rule of disqualification would allow litigants to

judge shop by filing a suit against the presiding judge.”); United States v.

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Martin-Trigona, 759 F.2d 1017, 1020-21 (2d Cir. 1985) (concluding that a
litigant cannot force a judge’s recusal merely by filing a complaint or lawsuit
against that judge); United States v. Moskovits, No. 87-cr-284-1, 1994 WL
583179, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 26, 1994) (‘If the simple act of filing a complaint,
even one which would later prove meritless, would necessitate the recusai
of the judge who was the subject of the complaint, litigants would have free
reign to wantonly require the recusal of judges at will.”). Therefore,
Zamichiel’s prior filing of a judicial misconduct complaint against the
undersigned does not warrant recusal.

Third, and finaily, Zamichieli’s complaints about any perceived delays
in this case or in his other cases does not warrant recusal. “[T]he manner in
which a court controls its docket is discretionary.” Conklin v. Kane, No. 13-
cv-3058, 2014 WL 4411593, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 5, 2014) (citing In re Fine
Paper Antitrust Litig., 685 F.2d 810, 817 (3d Cir. 1982)), aff'd, 634 F. App’x
69 (3d Cir. 2015) (unpublished). Therefore, a litigant’s “allegations of
inexcusable delay . . . provide no grounds for recusal.” /d.; see also
Arrowpoint Cap. Corp. v. Arrowpoint Asset Mgmt., LLC, 793 F.3d 313, 329
(3d Cir. 2015) (denying litigant’s request to reassign case to different district
judge on remand due to, inter alia, district judge’s delay in ruling on a motion

for preliminary relief because “[wJe have never held that delay alone merits

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Case 3:25-cv-01949-MEM-SH Document 39 Filed 10/14/26 Page 18 of 20

reassignment’); Loranger v. Stierheim, 10 F.3d 776, 781 (11th Cir. 1994)
(“Neither the district judge’s delay, nor [their] adverse rulings, constitute the
sort of ‘pervasive bias’ that necessitates recusal.”); Lawson v. Godderz, No.
29-cv-1179, 2025 WL 2419637, at *1 (D. Kan. Aug. 21, 2025) (“This court
has hundreds of cases filed every year that require decisions to be entered.
Many cases have pending motions that are currently before the court... .
[D]elay is not a basis for recusal.”); Qualls v. United States, Nos. 07-cr-14,
O9-cr-418, 2018 WL 1513625, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2018) ("Delays in
entering judgment or rendering a decision are not bases for recusal.”):
Baldyga v. United States, 337 F. Supp. 2d 264, 270 (D. Mass. 2004) (denying
motion for recusal premises on delay in ruling on pending motion because
such a delay is not a ground for recusal under any statute or case law);
United States v. LaMorte, 940 F. Supp. 572, 577 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (45-month
delay in resolving motion did not warrant recusal), aff'd sub nom. United
States v. Moritz, 112 F.3d 506 (2d Cir. 1997).

Furthermore, although Zamichieli is understandably focused on this
case, his case is only one of hundreds of cases assigned to the undersigned
each year, and most of those cases involve, at one point or another, pending
motions that the undersigned must resolve after giving due consideration to

the applicable facts and law. Zamichieli does not argue (and could not argue)

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Case 3:25-cv-01949-MEM-SH Document 39 Filed 10/14/26 Page 19 of 20

that any delay in resolving pending motions was limited to his case(s) so as
to raise a possible suggestion of bias or partiality, and he has not explained
how any delays demonstrate bias on the part of the undersigned. See
Wereko v. Rosen, No. 22-cv-2177, 2022 WL 16573746, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov.
1, 2022) (denying motion to recuse due to plaintiffs “perceived lack of
progress of the case since its filing [as] suggest[ing] bias on the part of [the
district judge]” in part because “delays are inherent in litigation”). Instead, he
posits a conclusory and unsupported assertion that the undersigned is
biased against him. See /n re Kokinda, 581 F. App’x 160, 161 (3d Cir. 2014)
(unpublished) (“[R]ecusal is not required on the grounds of unsupported,
irrational, or highly tenuous speculation.” (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted)).

“Judges have an obligation to litigants and their colleagues not to
remove themselves needlessly.” Matter of Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of
Pittsburgh, 839 F.2d 1226, 1229 (7th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted). In this
case, a reasonable person, with knowledge of all the facts, would not
conclude that the undersigned’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.

Accordingly, the Court will deny Zamichieli’s motion to recuse.

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Case 3:25-cv-01949-MEM-SH Document 39 Filed 10/14/26 Page 20 of 20

Ill. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court will: (1) deny Zamichieli’s
motion for a default judgment, motion for bail, and motion to recuse; (2) deem
withdrawn Zamichieli's motion seeking an order directing them to file
additional state court records on the docket due to his failure to file a
supporting brief as well as his motion for leave to serve discovery requests

upon Respondents; and (3) grant the parties’ motions for extensions of time.

ME —

MALAGH Y E. MANNION
United States District Judge

An appropriate Order follows.

pate: 2/4/24

25-1949-01

Sie