Mayo v. Szumski et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
DIANE MAYO, 	: Civil No. 3:25-CV-1797
:
Plaintiff, 	:
: (Judge Munley)
v. 	:
: (Chief Magistrate Judge Bloom)
BRIAN M. SZUMSKI, et al., 	:
:
Defendants. 	:
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. 	Statement of Facts and of the Case
This is a civil action filed by the
pro se plaintiff, Diane Mayo.1
While the complaint is largely incomprehensible, it appears that Mayo is
challenging a foreclosure action and subsequent sheriff’s sale of her
property in Luzerne County, Pennsylvania. 2 	She brings this action
against Brian Szumski, the sheriff of Luzerne County, and “Individuals
of the 	Luzerne County Court.” 3 	Mayo’s complaint is replete with
nonsensical language reminiscent of the sovereign citizen movement,4
1 Doc. 1.
2
Id. at 17-18.
3
See generally Doc. 1.
4
See Mouratidis v. Wolf, et al., No. 22-CV-4628, 2023 WL 2025035, at *1
n.2 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 15, 2023) (“ ‘[L]egal-sounding but meaningless verbiage
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including referring to herself as “a living woman leaena-lucis under
Almighty God, existing in flesh and blood and not a legal fiction or
corporate entity[.]”5 	She also challenges the state court’s and sheriff’s
authority to foreclose on her property, and further appears to allege that
these actions amount to “constructive custody” of her person and requests
“[t]hat the living-woman, (“her body-Property”) be released from all
unlawful restraint[.]” 6 	The complaint also relies on irrelevant legal
maxims, such as Blackstone’s Commentaries and the Magna Carta.7
Defendant Szumski filed a motion to dismiss the complaint as
frivolous, arguing that the complaint fails to state a claim, and further,
that any claim regarding the property foreclosure is barred by the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine.8 	Mayo was subsequently granted leave to
proceed
in forma pauperis.9 	After consideration, we will recommend
commonly used by adherents to the so-called sovereign citizen movement’
is nothing more than a nullity.”) (citations omitted).
5
Id. at 2.
6
Id. at 41.
7
Id. at 3.
8 Doc. 4.
9 Docs. 9-10.
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that the plaintiff’s complaint be dismissed and her motion for temporary
restraining order (“TRO”)10 be denied.
II. 	Discussion
A. Screening of
Pro Se Complaints – Standard of Review
We have a statutory obligation to preliminarily review
	pro se
complaints 	brought 	by 	plaintiffs 	given 	leave 	to 	proceed
	in 	forma
pauperis.11 	We review such complaints to determine whether there are
frivolous or malicious claims, or if the complaint fails to state a claim
upon 	which 	relief 	may 	be 	granted. 12 	This 	statutory 	preliminary
screening mirrors review under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which provides for dismissal of a complaint for “failure to
10 Doc. 6.
11
	See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 	Because the court’s screening
review of a complaint mirrors the standard applied when considering a
motion to dismiss, we consider both motions together in this Report and
Recommendation.
See Picozzi v. Guy Peiagelee & Sons, 313 F. Supp. 3d
600, 602 (E.D. Pa. 2018) (noting that the standards for “[w]hether a
complaint fails to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is
governed by the same standard applicable to motions to dismiss under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).”).
12
Id.
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state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”13
With 	respect 	to 	this 	legal 	benchmark, 	under 	federal 	pleading
standards a plaintiff is required to set forth a “short and plain statement
of 	the 	claim 	showing 	that 	the 	pleader 	is 	entitled 	to 	relief.” 14 	In
determining whether a complaint states a claim for relief under this
pleading standard, a court must accept the factual allegations in the
complaint as true and accept “all reasonable inferences that can be drawn
from them after construing them in the light most favorable to the non-
movant.”15 	However, a court is not required to accept legal conclusions
or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.”16
As the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has aptly summarized:
[A]fter
Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim, district courts should conduct a two-
part analysis. First, the factual and legal elements of a claim
should be separated. The District Court must accept all of the
complaint’s well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any
legal conclusions.
	Id. Second, a District Court must then
13 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
14 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
15
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007);
Jordan v.
Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994).
16
Id.;
see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice”).
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determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are
sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for
relief.”
Id. at 1950. In other words, a complaint must do more
than allege the plaintiff’s entitlement to relief. A complaint
has to “show” such an entitlement with its facts.
See Phillips,
515 F.3d at 234–35. As the Supreme Court instructed in
Iqbal,
“[w]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer
more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint
has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is
entitled to relief.’ ”
Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. This “plausibility”
determination will be “a context-specific task that requires
the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and
common sense.”
Id.17
Generally, when considering a motion to dismiss, a court relies on
the complaint and its attached exhibits, as well as matters of public
record.18 	A court can also consider “undisputedly authentic document[s]
that a defendant attached as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the
plaintiff’s 	claims 	are 	based 	on 	the 	[attached] 	documents.” 	19
Additionally, if the complaint relies on the contents of a document not
physically attached to the complaint but whose authenticity is not in
dispute, the court may consider such document in its determination.20
17
Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009).
18
Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2007).
19
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192,
1196 (3d Cir. 1993).
20
See Pryor v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir.
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However, the court may not rely on any other part of the record when
deciding a motion to dismiss.21
Finally, when reviewing a
pro se complaint, we are reminded that
such complaints are to be construed liberally, “so ‘as to do substantial
justice.’”22 	We must apply the relevant law even if the
pro se plaintiff
does not mention it by name.23
B. This Complaint Should be Dismissed.
After consideration, we conclude that Mayo’s complaint fails to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted and should be dismissed.
First, as the defendant notes, any claim arising out of the state court
foreclosure proceedings is barred by the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine. This
doctrine, as described by the Court of Appeals, bars federal district courts
from “engag[ing] in appellate review of state court determinations or []
evaluat[ing] constitutional claims that are inextricably intertwined with
2002).
21
Jordan, 20 F.3d at 1261.
22
Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 234 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Fed. R. Civ.
P. 8(f)).
23
Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 369 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing
Higgins
v. Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 688 (3d Cir. 2002)).
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the state court’s [decision] in a judicial proceeding.”24 	The doctrine has
been held to bar federal district courts from reviewing claims that “seek[]
redress from the state court’s judgment . . . .”25 	Liberally construing the
complaint, Mayo appears to seek review of the state court’s foreclosure
determination and resulting sheriff’s sale of her property. 	Accordingly,
any such claim is barred by
Rooker-Feldman and fails as a matter of law.
To the extent Mayo is challenging the jurisdiction of the state court
to adjudicate the foreclosure action, such a claim is wholly without merit.
Pennsylvania 	Courts 	of 	Common 	Pleas 	have 	unlimited 	general
jurisdiction over actions within the Commonwealth, save for exceptions
that are not relevant here.26 	Indeed, the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil
Procedure govern mortgage foreclosure actions, providing that the proper
venue for such actions lies in “the county in which the land is located.”27
24
	Marks v. Stinson, 19 F.3d 873, 885 n.11 (3d Cir. 1994) (internal
citation and quotation omitted);
see D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman,
460 U.S. 462 (1983);
Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923).
25
Moncrief v. Chase Manhattan Mortg. Corp., 275 F. App’x 149, 152-53
(3d Cir. 2008);
see also Ayres–Fountain v. Eastern Savings Bank, 153 F.
App’x 91 (3d Cir. 2005);
In re Knapper, 407 F.3d 5773 (3d Cir. 2005).
26 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 931(a).
27 Pa. R. Civ. P. 1142(a).
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Similarly, the Rules govern the procedure of sheriff’s sales.28 	Therefore,
any challenge to the state court’s jurisdiction over the foreclosure action
is baseless.
Finally, we note that Mayo filed a motion for a TRO, essentially
requesting that we enjoin the sheriff’s sale of her property. 	At the
outset, the Anti -Injunction Act “generally prohibits the federal courts
from interfering with proceedings in the state courts[.]”29 	In fact, the
Act lists only three exceptions to this general prohibition: “... as expressly
authorized 	by 	Act 	of 	Congress, 	or 	where 	necessary 	in 	aid 	of 	its
jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.”30 Courts in this
circuit have declined to issue preliminary injunctive relief to enjoin
aspects of state court foreclosure proceedings, including sheriff’s sales,
finding that the Anti-Injunction Act prohibits such relief.31 	Accordingly,
28
See Pa. R. Civ. P. 3129.1-3135.
29
Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140, 145 (1988); 28 U.S.C. §
2283.
30 28 U.S.C. § 2283.
31
See e.g.,
McShane v. Morris, 2021 WL 3929747, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Sept.
2, 2021);
Lightfoot v. Bank of New York Mellon, 2017 WL 4151171, at *3
(M.D. Pa. Sept. 19, 2017);
	Mason v. Bank of Amer., N.A., 2013 WL
5574439, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 10, 2023).
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we conclude that the Anti-Injunction Act bars Mayo’s requested relief.
But even if the Anti-Injunction Act did not bar Mayo’s request for a
TRO, we conclude that she fails to meet the substantive requirements for
preliminary 	injunctive 	relief. 	Federal 	Rule 	of 	Civil 	Procedure 	65
requires a plaintiff to show “(1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2)
that it will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is denied; (3) that
granting preliminary relief will not result in even greater harm to the
nonmoving party; and (4) that the public interest favors such relief.”32
The Supreme Court has underscored that “a preliminary injunction is an
extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not be granted unless
the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.”33
Here, we have concluded that Mayo’s complaint plainly fails to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted. 	Accordingly, she cannot show
a likelihood of success on the merits, and her motion for TRO should be
denied.
32
Kos Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 708 (3d Cir.
2004) (citing
Allegheny Energy, Inc. v. DQE, Inc., 171 F.3d 153, 158 (3d
Cir. 1999)).
33
	Mazurek 	v. 	Armstrong, 	520 	U.S. 	968, 	972 	(1997) 	(citation 	and
quotation marks omitted).
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III. 	Recommendation
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED
THAT the plaintiff’s complaint be DISMISSED, and her motion for TRO
be DENIED.
The parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule
72.3:
Any 	party 	may 	object 	to 	a 	magistrate 	judge's 	proposed
findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or
matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a
recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a
habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being
served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk
of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties,
written 	objections 	which 	shall 	specifically 	identify 	the
portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report
to which objection is made and the basis for such objections.
The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall
apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those
portions 	of 	the 	report 	or 	specified 	proposed 	findings 	or
recommendations to which objection is made and may accept,
reject, 	or 	modify, 	in 	whole 	or 	in 	part, 	the 	findings 	or
recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge,
however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her
discretion or where required by law, and may consider the
record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or
her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge
may 	also 	receive 	further 	evidence, 	recall 	witnesses 	or
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recommit 	the 	matter 	to 	the 	magistrate 	judge 	with
instructions.
Submitted this 13th day of February 2026.
s/ Daryl F. Bloom
Daryl F. Bloom
Chief United States Magistrate Judge
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