3:25-cv-00265•Saunders v. City of Scranton et al
Gesamter Gesetzestext
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA DAJUAN SAUNDERS, : Civil No. 3:25-CV-265 : Plaintiff, : : (Judge Munley) v. : : (Chief Magistrate Judge Bloom) : CITY OF SCRANTON, et al., : : Defendants. : REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION I. Factual Background This case comes before us for a screening review of the pro se plaintiff’s amended complaint. The plaintiff, DaJuan Saunders, initially filed this civil rights action against the City of Scranton, Mayor Paige Cognetti, Lackawanna County, three Lackawanna County commissioners, and three Scranton Police Department (“SPD”) officers. 1 The initial complaint asserted various claims against the defendants: a First Amendment retaliation claim against the individual police officers for directing the doctor not to treat Saunders’ wounds in retaliation for 1 Doc. 1. Case 3:25-cv-00265-JKM-DFB Document 20 Filed 11/25/25 Page 1 of 12
2 filing a lawsuit against SPD; 2 a Monell 3 claim against the City and the County for failure to train and supervise its officers; 4 a failure to intervene claim against Officer Merkel arising out of the hospital incident; 5 a racial discrimination claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 against the individual police officers;6 a Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection claim against all of the defendants; 7 a defamation claim against Sergeant Shields; 8 and an Eighth Amendment claim of cruel and unusual punishment arising out of the hospital incident.9 We recommend that the complaint be served on Defendants City of Scranton, Lackawanna County, Officer Merkel, and Sergeants Shields and Megivern as to the First Amendment, failure to intervene, and 2 Id. at 8. 3 Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 695 (1978). 4 Doc. 1 at 10. 5 Id. at 12. 6 Id. 7 Id. at 13. 8 Id. at 14. 9 Id. at 15. Case 3:25-cv-00265-JKM-DFB Document 20 Filed 11/25/25 Page 2 of 12
3 Monell claims, but that the remainder of Saunders’ complaint be dismissed. 10 Saunders submitted untimely objections to our recommendation. 11 The district court overruled the objections as they could “only be construed as the facts that Saunders would plead in an amended complaint.”12 Accordingly, the district court adopted our recommendation and dismissed defendants Cognetti, Chermak, Gaughan, and McGloin, and dismissed Saunders’ Section 1983 conspiracy and defamation claims along with his claims arising under Section 1981, the Eighth Amendment, and the Equal Protection Clause without prejudice to refiling an amended complaint. 13 Saunders thereafter filed an amended complaint pertaining to only his claim under the Equal Protection Clause.14 This claim arises out of 10 Doc. 7. 11 Doc. 8. 12 Doc. 10 at 3. 13 Id. at 4-6. 14 Doc. 17. Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a court to dismiss claims for failure to prosecute or to comply with the Federal Rules or court orders. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). Saunders’ amended complaint does not reassert claims under Section 1981 or the Eighth Amendment. He further fails to reassert claims against defendants Case 3:25-cv-00265-JKM-DFB Document 20 Filed 11/25/25 Page 3 of 12
4 his arrest in November of 2023 for various charges, including, inter alia, burglary, aggravated assault, and witness intimidation.15 16 Saunders alleges that he was handcuffed to the bed at the hospital and interrogated by Sergeant Shields of the SPD. 17 He claims that Shields referred to him as a racial slur upon finding out that Saunders had filed a previous lawsuit against SPD. 18 He further asserts that officers directed the doctor not to treat Saunders’ injuries in retaliation for Saunders filing a lawsuit against SPD. 19 Saunders claims that he suffered from a shoulder injury and an infection in his neck due the lack of medical treatment at the hospital.20 In addition to the derogatory comments made to him at the hospital, Saunders again claims that he has been the subject of such Cognetti, Chermak, Gaughan, and McGloin. Accordingly, we recommend these claims and defendants be dismissed with prejudice. 15 See Commonwealth v. Saunders, CP-35-CR-0000007-2024. 16 We may take judicial notice of the public docket in Saunders’ underlying state criminal case. Orabi v. Att’y Gen., 738 F.3d 535, 537 n.1 (3d Cir. 2014) (“We may take judicial notice of the contents of another Court’s docket.”). 17 Doc. 17 ¶ 2. 18 Id. 19 Id. ¶ 3 . 20 Id. ¶ 4. Case 3:25-cv-00265-JKM-DFB Document 20 Filed 11/25/25 Page 4 of 12
5 racial animus on two prior occasions—once when officers were searching for him and remarked that the house they were at “was too nice to be [Saunders’], and once when he was allegedly stopped for illegal tint on his car windows. 21 Saunders asserts that “a pattern of racial bias within the City of Scranton can be seen in the context of other legal matters involving the City.”22 Specifically, he claims that two female officers brought a lawsuit against the City for alleged sexual abuse but they “were not subject to derogatory treatment, racial slurs, or retaliation by the City in connection with their legal claims.” 23 For the following reasons, we will recommend that the remaining claim be dismissed. II. Discussion A. Screening of Pro Se Complaints – Standard of Review We have a statutory obligation to preliminarily review pro se complaints brought by plaintiffs given leave to proceed in forma 21 Id. ¶ 5. 22 Id. ¶ 12. 23 Id. ¶ 13. Case 3:25-cv-00265-JKM-DFB Document 20 Filed 11/25/25 Page 5 of 12
6 pauperis. 24 We review such complaints to determine whether there are frivolous or malicious claims, or if the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 25 This statutory preliminary screening mirrors review under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides for dismissal of a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” 26 With respect to this legal benchmark, under federal pleading standards a plaintiff is required to set forth a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” 27 In determining whether a complaint states a claim for relief under this pleading standard, a court must accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true 28 and accept “all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them after construing them in the light most favorable to the non-movant.” 29 However, a court is not required to accept legal 24 See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 25 Id. 26 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 27 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). 28 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 29 Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). Case 3:25-cv-00265-JKM-DFB Document 20 Filed 11/25/25 Page 6 of 12
7 conclusions or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” 30 As the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has aptly summarized: [A]fter Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, district courts should conduct a two- part analysis. First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The District Court must accept all of the complaint’s well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 . Second, a District Court must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief.” Id. at 1950. In other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff’s entitlement to relief. A complaint has to “show” such an entitlement with its facts. See Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234–35. As the Supreme Court instructed in Iqbal, “[w]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’ ” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. This “plausibility” determination will be “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. 31 Generally, when considering a motion to dismiss, a court relies on the complaint and its attached exhibits, as well as matters of public 30 Id.; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice”). 31 Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009). Case 3:25-cv-00265-JKM-DFB Document 20 Filed 11/25/25 Page 7 of 12
8 record. 32 A court can also consider “undisputedly authentic document[s] that a defendant attached as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff’s claims are based on the [attached] documents.”33 Additionally, if the complaint relies on the contents of a document not physically attached to the complaint but whose authenticity is not in dispute, the court may consider such document in its determination. 34 However, the court may not rely on any other part of the record when deciding a motion to dismiss. 35 Finally, when reviewing a pro se complaint, we are reminded that such complaints are to be construed liberally, “so ‘as to do substantial justice.’” 36 We must apply the relevant law even if the pro se plaintiff does not mention it by name. 37 32 Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2007). 33 Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). 34 See Pryor v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir. 2002). 35 Jordan, 20 F.3d at 1261. 36 Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 234 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(f)). 37 Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 369 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing Higgins v. Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 688 (3d Cir. 2002)). Case 3:25-cv-00265-JKM-DFB Document 20 Filed 11/25/25 Page 8 of 12
9 B. Saunders’ Equal Protection Claim Fails as a Matter of Law. After review of Saunders’ amended complaint, we conclude that he has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and his remaining claim should be dismissed. Saunders reasserts an Equal Protection claim against the defendants, alleging that he was treated differently than others who also filed lawsuits against the City. 38 To state a claim for discrimination under the Equal Protection clause, the plaintiff must show that he endured “purposeful discrimination” because of a protected characteristic. 39 Accordingly, he must establish that he was subjected to “(1) disparate treatment in relation to other similarly situated individuals, and (2) that the discriminatory treatment was based on [race].” 40 Here, the plaintiff alleges that “the racial bias seen in other legal matters involving the City of Scranton—such as the case of the two white 38 Doc. 17. 39 Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1293 (3d Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). 40 Johnston v. Univ. of Pittsburgh of Com. Sys. of Higher Educ., 97 F. Supp. 3d 657, 667 (W.D. Pa. 2015). Case 3:25-cv-00265-JKM-DFB Document 20 Filed 11/25/25 Page 9 of 12
10 women who were sexually abused by [a Scranton police officer]— illustrates a broader pattern of unequal treatment that favors white Plaintiffs over Black Plaintiffs.”41 “Persons are similarly situated under the Equal Protection clause when they are alike ‘in all relevant respects.’”42 However, “an equal- protection challenge must allege more than ‘broad generalities’ in identifying a comparator.” 43 Again, other than the general assertion that these women filed a lawsuit against the city, there are no facts alleged in the amended complaint from which we can even infer that these women were similarly situated to Saunders. Indeed, Saunders states these women were officers who alleged sexual abuse in the workplace. Accordingly, Saunders’ Equal Protection claim fails. While we recognize that pro se plaintiffs should generally be permitted to amend their complaints, 44 Saunders was already provided with an opportunity 41 Doc. 17 ¶ 16. 42 Harvard v. Cesnalis, 973 F.3d 190, 205 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992)). 43 Stradford v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 53 F.4th 67, 74 (3d Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). 44 See Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, 482 F.3d 247, 253 (3d Cir. 2007); Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004). Case 3:25-cv-00265-JKM-DFB Document 20 Filed 11/25/25 Page 10 of 12
11 to correct the defects previously cited and this amended complaint merely reiterates the prior allegations. Thus, we believe leave to amend would be futile and now recommend that Saunders’ remaining claims be dismissed with prejudice. To the extent that there is a motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s amended complaint presently on the docket filed by Defendants City of Scranton, Megivern, Merkel, and Shields,45 we recommend the court dismiss the motion as moot after dismissing the claim. III. Recommendation Accordingly, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the remainder of the claims and defendants be dismissed with prejudice, and that the defendants’ motion to dismiss be denied as moot. The parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3: Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report 45 Doc. 18. Case 3:25-cv-00265-JKM-DFB Document 20 Filed 11/25/25 Page 11 of 12
12 to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions. Submitted this 25th day of November 2025. s/ Daryl F. Bloom Daryl F. Bloom Chief United States Magistrate Judge Case 3:25-cv-00265-JKM-DFB Document 20 Filed 11/25/25 Page 12 of 12
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