Baez v. Davis et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MANUEL BAEZ,
Plaintiff
v.
CO DAVIS, et al.,
Defendants.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:24-CV-02070
(MEHALCHICK, J.)
MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff Manuel Baez, previously incarcerated at SCI-Rockview, proceeds on Eighth
Amendment claims against defendants CO Davis and CO Mackenzie under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
He alleges that these officers were deliberately indifferent to his safety when they allowed him
to possess a razor despite his “razor restriction,” and that he used this razor to deliberately
cut himself in the shower. All parties have now moved for summary judgment. See (Doc. 26,
Doc. 50). Because the record, consisting mainly of the parties’ affidavits, does not establish
any party’s entitlement to summary judgment, the motions will be denied.
I. 	B ACKGROUND AND P ROCEDURAL HISTORY
On December 2, 2024, the Court received and docketed Baez’s complaint (Doc. 1). In
brief, the complaint alleges as follows: On August 21, 2024, Baez was incarcerated on “G-
Block” at SCI-Rockview. Baez has been on a permanent razor restriction since 2017, for what
he describes as “a chronic history of suicide attempts and self-harm.” At 4:30 p.m., Davis and
Mackenzie opened Baez’s cell door to escort him to the shower. Davis told Baez that the unit
manager, Mr. Miller, wanted to get Baez “out of the way” because of a lawsuit Baez filed
against Miller’s “friends.” Davis allegedly told Mackenzie to “get that razor for Baez so he
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can kill himself.” While in the shower, Baez, “already stressed out” from other disputes with
staff, intentionally cut himself in the leg with the razor, requiring 23 stitches.
On January 13, 2025, the Court granted Baez’s motion for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis, and dismissed several of his claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, but permitted
him to proceed on Eighth Amendment claims against Davis and Mackenzie premised on their
alleged deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm. See (Doc. 8, Doc. 9).
Prior to the close of discovery, the defendants filed what they styled as a “Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings,” seeking entry of judgment based on their own affidavits. (Doc.
26). The Court converted this motion to a motion for summary judgment and directed Baez
to respond accordingly. See (Doc. 29; Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d)). Baez has now filed a document
entitled 	“Summary 	Judgment 	Supporting 	Factual 	Positions” 	(Doc. 	50), 	with 	an
accompanying “Summary Judgment Brief Against[] All Defendants.” (Doc. 51). Baez has
filed two letters clarifying that he intended these filings to serve as his opposition to
Defendants’ motion. See (Doc. 55, Doc. 56).
II. 	L EGAL STANDARDS
Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment should be
granted only if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” only if it might
affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A
dispute of material fact is “genuine” if the evidence “is such that a reasonable jury could return
a verdict for the non-moving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. In deciding a summary
judgment motion, all inferences “should be drawn in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party, and where the non-moving party’s evidence contradicts the movant’s, then the
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non-movant’s must be taken as true.” Pastore v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pa., 24 F.3d 508, 512 (3d Cir.
1994).
A federal court should grant summary judgment “if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.” Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 278 (3d Cir. 2000).
In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court’s function is not to make credibility
determinations, weigh evidence, or draw inferences from the facts. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.
Rather, the court must simply “determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson,
477 U.S. at 249.
The party seeking summary judgment “bears the initial responsibility of informing the
district court of the basis for its motion,” and demonstrating the absence of a genuine dispute
of any material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the movant makes
such a showing, the non-movant must go beyond the pleadings with affidavits or declarations,
answers to interrogatories, or the like to demonstrate specific material facts which give rise to
a genuine issue. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. The non-movant must produce
evidence to show the existence of every element essential to its case, which it bears the burden
of proving at trial, because “a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the
nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at
323. Furthermore, mere conclusory allegations and self-serving testimony, whether made in
the complaint or a sworn statement, cannot be used to obtain or avoid summary judgment
when uncorroborated and contradicted by other evidence of record. See Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife
Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990); see also Thomas v. Delaware State Univ., 626 F. App’x 384, 389
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n.6 (3d Cir. 2015) (not precedential) (“[U]nsupported deposition testimony, which is
contradicted by the record, is insufficient to defeat summary judgment.”); Nat’l Labor Rel. Bd.
v. FES, 301 F.3d 83, 95 (3d Cir. 2002) (“[The plaintiff’s] testimony . . . amounts to an
unsupported, conclusory assertion, which we have held is inadequate to satisfy the movant’s
burden of proof on summary judgment.”). With the aforementioned standards in mind, a
document filed pro se is “to be liberally construed.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).
Summary judgment procedures are further governed by Local Rule 56.1, which
requires the moving and the responding parties to file statements of material facts. See M.D.
Pa. L.R. 56.1. However, because Defendants’ motion was initially filed as a request for
judgment on the pleadings, neither party submitted the separate, compliant statement of facts
contemplated by the local rules. Therefore, in assessing the summary judgment record, the
Court will consider all evidence submitted by the parties, including Baez’s verified complaint1.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3) (“The court need consider only the cited materials, but it may
consider other materials in the record.”); see also United States v. Eleven Vehicles, Their Equip. &
Accessories, 200 F.3d 203, 215 (3d Cir. 2000) (a district court has discretion “to waive a
requirement of its local rules in appropriate circumstances”).
III. 	M ATERIAL FACTS
Applying these standards to the instant case, the summary judgment record indicates
as follows: Within the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”), Baez has been on
a “permanent razor restriction” since 2017, due to his “chronic history of suicide attempts
1 See (Doc. 1); Revock v. Cowpet Bay W. Condo. Ass’n, 853 F.3d 96, 100 n.1 (3d Cir. 2017)
(“[W]e consider as affidavits [the plaintiffs’] sworn verified complaints, to the extent that they
are 	based 	upon 	personal 	knowledge 	and 	set 	out 	facts 	that 	would 	be 	admissible 	in
evidence.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4).
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and self-harm.” See (Doc. 50-1 at 2). On August 21, 2024, Baez was incarcerated in the
Behavioral Management Unit (“BMU”) at SCI-Rockview.2 If an inmate in the BMU is on a
razor restriction, that decision is generally “communicated to the Corrections Officers by the
Unit Manager.” Inmates in the BMU who are not on razor restrictions are permitted to keep
razors outside of their cells in individually assigned containers. At 4:30 p.m. on August 21,
Defendants Davis and Mackenzie escorted Baez to the shower. It is undisputed that Baez’s
individual container had a razor, that the officers permitted Baez to have this razor, and that
Baez’s behavior during this interaction did not “suggest . . . he would use his razor to harm
himself or others.” See (Doc. 27-1, Doc. 27-2).
However, the parties dispute the circumstances under which Baez obtained the razor.
Baez contends that Davis told him the unit manager, Mr. Miller, wanted to get Baez “out of
the way” because of a lawsuit Baez filed against Miller’s “friends”; and that Davis told
Mackenzie to “get that razor for Baez so he can kill himself.” Davis and Mackenzie, by their
own affidavits, contend that the unit manager had not told them Baez was on a razor
restriction, and they did not “understand or believe” that Baez had such a restriction.
While in the shower, Baez intentionally cut his leg with a razor. When the officers
returned to the shower and discovered Baez’s injury, they sought immediate medical attention
for Baez. Baez was ultimately transferred to a hospital and received 23 stitches on his leg.
2 The Court takes judicial notice that within the DOC, a Behavioral Management Unit
is “a secure diversionary unit for mentally ill individuals who . . . require a secure setting due
to their demonstrated problematic behavior in less secure environments.” See DOC Policy
Statement 13.8.1, Access to Mental Health Care Procedures Manual, § 12.A.1 (available at
https://www.pa.gov/agencies/cor/about-us/doc-policies) (last accessed Jan. 21, 2026).
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IV. 	DISCUSSION
To establish an Eighth Amendment claim based on failure to protect from self-harm,
a prisoner must show that he was incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of
serious harm, and the official was deliberately indifferent to that substantial risk. See Hayes v.
Gilmore, 802 F. App’x 84, 89 (3d Cir. 2020) (citing Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 367 (3d Cir.
2012)). Under the deliberate indifference standard, the official “must actually have known or
been aware of the excessive risk to inmate safety.” Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 125
(3d Cir. 2001). A non-medical officer who knowingly fails to enforce an inmate’s razor
restriction may demonstrate deliberate indifference. See, e.g., Garcia v. Foulds, No. 1:21-CV-
138, 2022 WL 21769875, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 14, 2022), report and recommendation
adopted, 2022 WL 21769856 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 15, 2022).
In this case, the limited record does not permit summary judgment for any party, based
on the genuine dispute established by the parties’ competing affidavits. When a non-movant
attempts to defeat summary judgment through their own testimony, courts consider whether
that testimony, “juxtaposed with the other evidence, is sufficient for a rational factfinder to
credit despite its self-serving nature.” Hricenak v. Mickey Truck Bodies, No. 4:21-CV-00694,
2024 WL 1604650, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 12, 2024) (citations omitted); Whitnum v. Meadows
at Stroud for Nursing & Rehab., LLC, No. 3:18-CV-02137, 2020 WL 7773906, at *4 (M.D. Pa.
Dec. 30, 2020); see also Losch v. Borough of Parkesburg, Pa., 736 F.2d 903, 909 (3d Cir. 1984)
(“While summary judgment may be based on affidavits, conflicts of credibility should not be
resolved . . . unless the opponent’s evidence is too incredible to be believed by reasonable
minds.”) (quotation omitted).
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Here, Defendants have not presented the “other evidence” that would be necessary to
disregard Baez’s verified allegations that they provided him a razor with the belief that he
may try to harm himself. See Doe v. Pennsylvania State Univ., No. 4:21-CV-01862, 2023 WL
7287217, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 3, 2023) (where “the bulk of the ‘other evidence’ are deposition
testimony and affidavits,” the court cannot disregard the plaintiff’s self-serving testimony in
favor of the defendant’s); see also Coit v. Luther, No. 1:19-CV-02036, 2021 WL 5792697, at *14-
15 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 7, 2021) (witness declaration from an alleged “serial frivolous lawsuit filer”
supported a genuine issue of fact as to whether an inmate was encouraged to attempt suicide;
courts “cannot partake in . . . a credibility assessment at the summary judgment stage”).
Defendants rely in part on the fact Baez had a razor in his personal-effects container,
suggesting that he was not on a razor restriction. However, it does not follow that this was
the appropriate way for officers to confirm an inmate’s razor status, nor can that be assumed
in the movant’s favor at the summary judgment stage. See (Doc. 50 at 1) (arguing that
defendants’ “office and group room [has] a giant board with everyone’s . . . restrictions”).
Baez’s verified complaint indicates that he has been on a razor restriction since 2017. On this
limited record, a jury could reasonably infer that officers assigned to deal with inmates in the
BMU, where Baez was located, would know of Baez’s longstanding razor restriction.3
3 The DOC’s response to Baez’s grievance indicates that “no one knew [Baez was] on
a razor ban because it was generated at a different facility,” (Doc. 1-1 at 2), 	but it remains
unclear why a “permanent” razor restriction “generated at a different facility” would not be
recognized at the SCI-Rockview BMU, a unit that was intended to accommodate mentally ill
inmates with such restrictions. Given that Baez had been on a continual razor restriction for
years, this vague explanation is not sufficient to disregard Baez’s attestations.
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To the extent Baez intended to request summary judgment in his favor, that request
must also be denied. Beyond his affidavits, Baez presents no other evidence4 that the officers
knowingly provided Baez a razor “so he [could] kill himself” or that they deliberately (rather
than negligently) ignored his razor restriction. The parties’ competing affidavits raise genuine
disputes of material fact, so no party is entitled to summary judgment.
V. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will deny the parties’ requests for summary
judgment. An appropriate order follows.
Dated: January 23, 2026 	s/ Karoline Mehalchick
KAROLINE MEHALCHICK
United States District Judge
4 Baez has submitted prison grievance records, documents addressing his medical
history prior to 2018, and portions of DOC policies that address the provision of mental health
care. See (Doc. 1-1, Doc. 1-2, Doc. 50 at 6-10). None of these documents demonstrate these
particular defendants’ knowledge of his razor restriction on August 21, 2024.
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