Scocozzo v. Henry et al

3:24-cv-01748Pamd21.01.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ANTHONY SCOCOZZO, 	: 	Civ. No. 3:24-CV-1748
:
Plaintiff, 	: 	(Judge Munley)
:
v. 	:
: 	(Magistrate Judge Carlson)
:
MICHELLE HENRY, et al, 	:
:
Defendants. 	:
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. 	Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, commenced this in forma pauperis
lawsuit by filing a complaint, (Doc. 1), which he has amended on several occasions.
(Docs. 91, 95, 98). In this a pro se lawsuit Scocozzo names multiple local, state and
federal defendants and brings a host of legal challenges relating to the ability of the
plaintiff to possess firearms following what is alleged to have been his involuntary
mental health commitment in 2009. Scocozzo’s amended complaint, the operative
pleading in this case, stitches together disparate events involving distinct actors and
distinct episodes spanning some fourteen years between 2009 and 2023 into a single
seamless gestalt. (Doc. 98 passim). In essence, Scocozzo alleges that in 2009 he was
twice improperly involuntarily committed following episodes in which he threatened
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to kill himself. As a result of these involuntary mental health commitments Scocozzo
was placed on a computerized database of persons who were legally prohibited from
possessing firearms. According to the plaintiff, he learned that these involuntary
commitments barred him from possessing firearms in March of 2020 when he
attempted to acquire a gun. Scocozzo unsuccessfully attempted to challenge this
prohibition on firearms possession and alleges that, as a result of this petitioning
activity, he was charged by local authorities with making false statements in
connection with the attempted acquisition of firearms, charges that remain pending.
Based upon this sweeping array of averments, Scocozzo has lodged a host of
legal claims against some thirteen defendants ranging from the Attorney General of
the United States to a local police officer who initiated involuntary commitment
proceedings against Scocozzo in March of 2009 based upon Scocozzo’s voiced
threats of suicide; namely, his statement that: “I am going to take 50 ambient [sic]
and 90 zanax [sic] and kill myself. I can’t take this anymore. I am going to kill
myself.” (Doc. 98-1 at 31).
Included among the defendants named in Scocozzo’s amended complaint are
the former Attorney General of Pennsylvania, Michelle Henry, the Commissioner of
the Pennsylvania State Police, Christopher Paris, and State Police Lieutenant Bryan
Paulshock. As to these defendants, Scocozzo’s amended complaint lodges a Due
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Process claim, First Amendment retaliation claim, and seeks injunctive relief which
would effectively prohibit the ongoing state prosecution of the plaintiff for making
false statements in connection with the attempted acquisition of firearms. Notably,
although many of Scocozzo’s claims are grounded in assertions of false arrest or
malicious prosecution, the plaintiff has not achieved a favorable resolution of these
state charges, which remain pending.
It is thus hardly surprising that this sweeping complaint has inspired a series
of pretrial motions, including a motion to dismiss filed by the former Attorney
General, State Police Commissioner and Lieutenant Paulshock. (Doc. 124). This
motion to dismiss is fully briefed and is, therefore, ripe for resolution. For the reasons
set forth below, it is recommended that the motion to dismiss be granted.
II. 	Discussion
A. Motion to Dismiss–Standard of Review
The defendants have moved to dismiss Scocozzo’s amended complaint
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides
that a complaint should be dismissed for “failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). With respect to this benchmark standard
for the legal sufficiency of a complaint, the United States Court of Appeals for the
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Third Circuit has aptly noted the evolving standards governing pleading practice in
federal court, stating that:
Standards of pleading have been in the forefront of jurisprudence in
recent years. Beginning with the Supreme Court’s opinion in Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), continuing with our
opinion in Phillips [v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir.
2008)], and culminating recently with the Supreme Court’s decision in
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, BU.S.B, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), pleading standards
have 	seemingly 	shifted 	from 	simple 	notice 	pleading 	to 	a 	more
heightened form of pleading, requiring a plaintiff to plead more than
the possibility of relief to survive a motion to dismiss.
Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2009).
In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted, the court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint and all
reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, Inc.,
20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court “need not credit a complaint’s
bald assertions or legal conclusions when deciding a motion to dismiss.” Morse v.
Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Additionally, a court
need not “assume that a . . . plaintiff can prove facts that the . . . plaintiff has not
alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of
Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). As the Supreme Court held in Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), in order to state a valid cause of action, a
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plaintiff must provide some factual grounds for relief which “requires more than
labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
actions will not do.” Id., at 555. “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right
to relief above the speculative level.” Id.
In 	keeping 	with 	the 	principles 	of 	Twombly, 	the 	Supreme 	Court 	has
underscored that a trial court must assess whether a complaint states facts upon
which relief can be granted when ruling on a motion to dismiss. In Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Supreme Court held that, when considering a motion to
dismiss, a court should “begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no
more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id., at 679.
According to the Supreme Court, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id., at 678. Rather,
in conducting a review of the adequacy of a complaint, the Supreme Court has
advised trial courts that they must:
[B]egin by identifying pleadings that because they are no more than
conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal
conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be
supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual
allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine
whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.
Id., at 679.
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Thus, following Twombly and Iqbal, a well-pleaded complaint must contain
more than mere legal labels and conclusions; it must recite factual allegations
sufficient to raise the plaintiff’s claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere
speculation. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has stated:
[A]fter Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim, district courts should conduct a two-part analysis. First,
the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The
District Court must accept all of the complaint’s well-pleaded facts as
true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. Second, a District Court
must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are
sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief.” In
other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff’s
entitlement to relief. A complaint has to “show” such an entitlement
with its facts.
Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-11.
As the Court of Appeals has observed:
The Supreme Court in Twombly set forth the “plausibility” standard for
overcoming a motion to dismiss and refined this approach in Iqbal. The
plausibility standard requires the complaint to allege “enough facts to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955. A complaint satisfies the plausibility standard
when the factual pleadings “allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal,
129 S. Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S. Ct. 1955).
This standard requires showing “more than a sheer possibility that a
defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. A complaint which pleads facts
“merely consistent with” a defendant’s liability, [ ] “stops short of the
line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement of relief.’ ”
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Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 220-21 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied,
132 S. Ct. 1861 (2012).
In practice, consideration of the legal sufficiency of a complaint entails a
three-step analysis:
First, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead
to state a claim.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1947. Second, the court should
identify allegations that, “because they are no more than conclusions,
are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id., at 1950. Finally, “where
there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their
veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an
entitlement for relief.”
Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Iqbal, 129
S. Ct. at 1950).
In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted the court generally relies on the complaint, attached exhibits, and
matters of public record. Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2007).
The court may also consider “undisputedly authentic document[s] that a defendant
attached as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff’s claims are based on the
[attached] documents.” Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998
F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). Moreover, “documents whose contents are alleged
in the complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not
physically attached to the pleading, may be considered.” Pryor v. Nat’l Collegiate
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Athletic Ass’n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir. 2002); see also U.S. Express Lines, Ltd.
v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that “[a]lthough a district court
may not consider matters extraneous to the pleadings, a document integral to or
explicitly relied upon in the complaint may be considered without converting the
motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment”). However, the court may not
rely on other parts of the record in determining whether to dismiss a complaint or
when determining whether a proposed amended complaint is futile because it fails
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild,
O’Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994).
In addition to these pleading rules, a civil complaint must comply with the
requirements of Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, which defines what
a complaint should say and provides that:
(a) A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain (1) a short and
plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction, unless the
court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new jurisdictional
support; (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought,
which may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8.
Thus, a well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere legal labels and
conclusions. Rather, a pro se plaintiff’s complaint must recite factual allegations that
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are sufficient to raise the plaintiff’s claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere
speculation, set forth in a “short and plain” statement of a cause of action.
Judged against these legal guideposts, this amended complaint fails as a
matter of law on several scores as discussed below.
B. Defendants Henry, Paris and Paulshock Should Be Dismissed from
this Case.
With respect to Defendants Henry, Paris and Paulshock, Scocozzo’s amended
complaint brings claims which are both untimely and lacking in merit.
1. These Claims Are Time-Barred
At the outset, Scocozzo’s claims against these defendants are profoundly
flawed in at least two respects. First, these allegations—which relate to civil
commitments in March and November of 2009, and September 2020 and criminal
charges 	relating 	to 	Scocozzo’s 	allegedly 	false 	statement 	regarding 	his 	prior
involuntary commitment made in connection with an attempted acquisition of
firearms in March of 2020, are clearly time barred.
It is well-settled that civil rights claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
are subject to the state statute of limitations for personal injury actions. Wilson v.
Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266-67 (1985). In Pennsylvania, the statute of limitations for
a personal injury action is two years. 42 Pa.C.S. § 5524. A cause of action accrues
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for statute of limitations purposes when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of
the injury that constitutes the basis of the cause of action. Sameric Corp. of
Delaware, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 142 F.3d 582, 599 (3d Cir. 1998); see also,
Nelson v. County of Allegheny, 60 F.3d 1010 (3d Cir. 1995).
While this two-year limitations period may be extended based upon a
continuing wrong theory, a plaintiff must make an exacting showing to avail himself
of this grounds for tolling the statute of limitations. For example, it is well settled
that the “continuing conduct of [a] defendant will not stop the ticking of the
limitations clock [once] plaintiff obtained requisite information [to state a cause of
action]. On discovering an injury and its cause, a claimant must choose to sue or
forego that remedy.” Barnes v. American Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127, 154 (3d Cir.
1998) (quoting Kichline v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 800 F. 2d 356, 360 (3d Cir.
1986)). See also Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 266-68 (3d Cir. 2000). Instead:
The continuing violations doctrine is an “equitable exception to the
timely filing requirement.” West v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 45 F.3d 744,
754 (3d Cir.1995). Thus, “when a defendant's conduct is part of a
continuing practice, an action is timely so long as the last act evidencing
the continuing practice falls within the limitations period; in such an
instance, the court will grant relief for the earlier related acts that would
otherwise be time barred.” Brenner v. Local 514, United Bhd. of
Carpenters and Joiners of Am., 927 F.2d 1283, 1295 (3d Cir.1991).In
order to benefit from the doctrine, a plaintiff must establish that the
defendant's conduct is “more than the occurrence of isolated or sporadic
acts.” West, 45 F.3d at 755 (quotation omitted). Regarding this inquiry,
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we have recognized that courts should consider at least three factors:
(1) subject matter-whether the violations constitute the same type of
discrimination, tending to connect them in a continuing violation; (2)
frequency-whether the acts are recurring or more in the nature of
isolated incidents; and (3) degree of permanence-whether the act had a
degree of permanence which should trigger the plaintiff's awareness of
and duty to assert his/her rights and whether the consequences of the
act would continue even in the absence of a continuing intent to
discriminate. See id. at 755 n. 9 (citing Berry v. Board of Supervisors
of Louisiana State Univ., 715 F.2d 971, 981 (5th Cir.1983)). The
consideration of “degree of permanence” is the most important of the
factors. See Berry, 715 F.2d at 981.
Cowell v. Palmer Township. 263 F.3d 286, 292 (3d Cir. 2001).
In this case, Scocozzo attempts to evade the bar of the statute of limitations,
in part, by asserting that he was not specifically aware of the fact that he was briefly
involuntarily committed at the time of these events in March of 2009. The problem
with this assertion, however, is that it is evident from Scocozzo’s own complaint that
he knew of this involuntary commitment no later than March of 2020, when the
commitment served as the grounds for denying his application to purchase a firearm.
(Doc. 98 at 15). Thus, Scocozzo concedes that he was fully aware of the fact of this
involuntary commitment no later than March 2020. Likewise, Scocozzo’s amended
complaint makes it abundantly clear that he was aware of the criminal investigation
which led to the September 2020 criminal charges relating to Scocozzo’s allegedly
false statement regarding his prior involuntary commitment made in connection with
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an attempted acquisition of firearms in March of 2020. Yet, he did not file this
lawsuit until October 2024, more than four years after the fact of this involuntary
commitment and his subsequent criminal prosecution was well known by the
plaintiff.
On these facts, by March 2020, Scocozzo plainly had sufficient knowledge of
his injury and its cause, that he was legally required to timely “choose to sue or
forego that remedy.” Barnes v. American Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127, 154 (3d Cir.
1998). Scocozzo failed to do so, waiting more than four years before bringing this
claim. Therefore, his claims against these defendants are time-barred and should be
dismissed.
2. The Amended Complaint Fails to State Supervisory Liability
Claims.
Further, the factual recitals set forth in Scocozzo’s amended complaint fail to
state a claim of supervisory liability against the former Attorney General or the
Pennsylvania State Police Commissioner. In its current form, Scocozzo’s amended
complaint seeks to hold these supervisory officials responsible for some form of
constitutional tort without adequately explaining the legal and factual basis for this
supervisory 	liability claim. This will 	not do. Quite the contrary, to 	state a
constitutional tort claim the plaintiff must show that the supervisory defendants
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actively deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution. Morse v. Lower Merion
School Dist., 132 F.3d 902 (3d Cir. 1997); see also Maine v.Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1
(1980). Constitutional tort liability is personal in nature and can only follow personal
involvement in the alleged wrongful conduct shown through specific allegations of
personal direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence in the challenged
practice. Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286 (3d Cir. 1997). As the
Supreme Court has observed:
Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional
conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior. . . .
See Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658,
691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) (finding no vicarious
liability for a municipal “person” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); see also
Dunlop v. Munroe, 7 Cranch 242, 269, 3 L.Ed. 329 (1812) (a federal
official's liability “will only result from his own neglect in not properly
superintending the discharge” of his subordinates' duties); Robertson v.
Sichel, 127 U.S. 507, 515-516, 8 S.Ct. 1286, 3 L.Ed. 203 (1888) (“A
public officer or agent is not responsible for the misfeasances or
position wrongs, or for the nonfeasances, or negligences, or omissions
of duty, of the subagents or servants or other persons properly
employed by or under him, in the discharge of his official duties”).
Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to Bivens and § 1983 suits, a
plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through
the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009).
Fairly construed, Scocozzo’s amended complaint seems to assert that these
supervisory officials are personally liable for alleged civil rights because they
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oversaw state agencies that Scocozzo believes contributed to some injury to him.
Thus, stripped to its essentials the amended complaint seems to allege some form of
respondeat superior liability, which is legally insufficient to state a civil rights claim
under § 1983.
Several examples suffice to illustrate the legal bankruptcy of these claims.
Thus, to the extent that Scocozzo suggests that the former Attorney General is
responsible for his pending state criminal charges, this allegation ignores the fact
that those charges were not brought by the Attorney General’s office. Likewise,
Scocozzo’s efforts to impute liability for his 2020 state criminal charges to State
Police Commissioner Paris runs afoul of a stubborn and immutable fact. Paris was
not the Commissioner of the State Police at the time that Scocozzo was charged in
state court.
Accordingly, any supervisory liability claims against these defendants fail as
a matter of law and should be dismissed.
3. Scocozzo Has Not Achieved a Favorable Termination of His
State Case
Additionally, Scocozzo’s false arrest claims against these defendants—which
is based upon their alleged involvement in his pending state case—rests upon a
fundamentally flawed legal premise. At bottom, the plaintiff appears to seek to bring
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a civil rights action premised, in part, on claims of false arrest and malicious
prosecution without showing that his state criminal case has been resolved in a
fashion that was favorable to him.
This he cannot do.
Quite the contrary, it is well-settled that an essential element of a civil rights
malicious prosecution claim is that the underlying criminal case must have been
terminated in favor of the civil rights claimant. Therefore, where, as here, the civil
rights plaintiff brings a malicious prosecution or false arrest claim in a setting where
he has not achieved a favorable outcome in the underlying state case, the plaintiff's
claim fails as a matter of law. The Third Circuit has aptly observed in this regard:
The Supreme Court has “repeatedly noted that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates
a species of tort liability.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 483, 114
S. Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994) (quoting Memphis Cmty. School
Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 305, 106 S. Ct. 2537, 91 L.Ed.2d 249
(1986) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Given this close relation
between § 1983 and tort liability, the Supreme Court has said that the
common law of torts, “defining the elements of damages and the
prerequisites for their recovery, provide[s] the appropriate starting
point for inquiry under § 1983 as well.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 483 (quoting
Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 257–58, 98 S. Ct. 1042, 55 L.Ed.2d 252
(1978)). The Supreme Court applied this rule in Heck to an inmate's §
1983 suit, which alleged that county prosecutors and a state police
officer destroyed evidence, used an unlawful voice identification
procedure, and engaged in other misconduct. In deciding whether the
inmate could state a claim for those alleged violations, the Supreme
Court asked what common-law cause of action was the closest to the
inmate's claim and concluded that “malicious prosecution provides the
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closest analogy ... because unlike the related cause of action for false
arrest or imprisonment, it permits damages for confinement imposed
pursuant to legal process.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 484. Looking to the
elements of malicious prosecution, the court held that the inmate's
claim 	could 	not 	proceed 	because 	one 	requirement 	of 	malicious
prosecution is that the prior criminal proceedings must have terminated
in the plaintiff's favor, and the inmate in Heck had not successfully
challenged his criminal conviction. Id.
Hector v. Watt, 235 F.3d 154, 155–156 (3d Cir. 2000).
Thus, “our precedents are clear that § 1983 plaintiffs alleging arrest and
prosecution absent probable cause may bring malicious prosecution claims under the
Fourth Amendment but are entitled to relief only if they are innocent of the crime
for which they were prosecuted.” Washington v. Hanshaw, 552 F. App’x 169, 173
(3d Cir. 2014) (citing Hector, 235 F.3d at 156)). Therefore, “a plaintiff claiming
malicious prosecution must prove actual innocence as an element of his prima facie
case.” Steele v. City of Erie, 113 F. App'x 456, 459 (3d Cir. 2004).
In this case, it is evident that this state criminal prosecution did not terminate
favorably for the plaintiff since the record reveals that this case remains pending. In
the absence of such a favorable termination of the state criminal case, this federal
civil rights malicious prosecution lawsuit cannot proceed. In short, this amended
complaint is based upon the fundamentally flawed legal premise that the plaintiff
can sue a state official for malicious prosecution even though he has not prevailed
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in the underlying state criminal case. Since this premise is simply incorrect, this
complaint fails as a matter of law. See Galloway v. Kane, No. 1:15-CV-1007, 2015
WL 3953112, at *5–6 (M.D. Pa. June 29, 2015).
4. Scocozzo is Not Entitled to Injunctive Relief in His Pending
Criminal Case
Further, this amended complaint also seemingly invites us to issue wide-
ranging prospective injunctive relief affecting the future course of his state criminal
case, effectively enjoining this pending state prosecution. To the extent that the
plaintiff urges this Court to enjoin aspects of the administration of a state criminal
sentence, this pro se pleading runs afoul of another settled tenet of federal law, the
Younger abstention doctrine.
The Younger abstention doctrine is inspired by basic considerations of comity
that are fundamental to our federal system of government. As defined by the courts:
“Younger abstention is a legal doctrine granting federal courts discretion to abstain
from exercising jurisdiction over a claim when resolution of that claim would
interfere with an ongoing state proceeding.” Kendall v. Russell, 572 F.3d 126, 130
(3d Cir. 2009) (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971) (“[W]e have
concluded that the judgment of the District Court, enjoining appellant Younger from
prosecuting under these California statutes, must be reversed as a violation of the
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national policy forbidding federal courts to stay or enjoin pending state court
proceedings except under special circumstances.”)).
This doctrine, which is informed by principles of comity, is guided by these
same principles in its application. The Supreme Court has recently narrowed the
scope of Younger, employing courts first to determine whether the parallel state
action falls within one of “three exceptional categories” which trigger Younger
abstention: (1) criminal prosecutions, (2) “certain civil enforcement proceedings,”
and (3) “civil proceedings involving certain orders uniquely in furtherance of the
state court’s ability to perform their judicial functions.” Harmon v. Dep’t of Fin.,
811 Fed. Appx. 156, 157 (3d Cir. 2020) (citing Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571
U.S. 69, 79, 134 S. Ct. 584, 592, 187 L. Ed. 2d 505 (2013)).
Once it is established the parallel action falls within a category to which
Younger applies, courts are directed to consider three additional factors1 in
determining whether abstention is appropriate. Malhan v. Sec’y United States Dep’t
of State, 938 F.3d 453, 456 (3d Cir. 2019). As the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit has observed:
Abstention under Younger is appropriate only if (1) there are ongoing
state proceedings that are judicial in nature; (2) the state proceedings
1 These factors were established by the Supreme Court in Middlesex County Ethics
Comm. v. Garden State Bar Assn., 457 U.S. 423, 433-434 (1982) and are referred to
as Middlesex factors.
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implicate important state interests; and (3) the state proceedings afford
an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims. See Middlesex County
Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Association, 457 U.S. 423, 432,
102 S.Ct. 2515, 2521, 73 L.Ed.2d 116 (1982); Kentucky West Virginia
Gas Co., 791 F.2d at 1116. Even if the necessary three predicates exist,
however, Younger abstention is not appropriate if the federal plaintiff
can establish that (1) the state proceedings are being undertaken in bad
faith or for purposes of harassment or (2) some other extraordinary
circumstances exist, such as proceedings pursuant to a flagrantly
unconstitutional statute, such that deference to the state proceeding will
present a significant and immediate potential for irreparable harm to the
federal interests asserted. See Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 435, 102 S.Ct. at
2523; Younger, 401 U.S. at 49–50, 53–54, 91 S.Ct. at 753, 755.
Schall v. Joyce, 885 F.2d 101, 106 (3d Cir. 1989).
Once these three legal requirements for Younger abstention are met, the
decision to abstain rests in the sound discretion of the district court and will not be
disturbed 	absent 	an 	abuse 	of 	that 	discretion. 	Lui 	v. 	Commission 	on 	Adult
Entertainment Establishments, 369 F.3d 319, 325 (3d Cir. 2004). Moreover,
applying these standards, federal courts frequently abstain from hearing matters
which necessarily interfere with ongoing state criminal cases. Lui, 369 F.3d 319;
Zahl v. Harper, 282 F.3d 204 (3d Cir. 2002).
In this case, the plaintiff’s pro se amended complaint reveals that all the legal
prerequisites for Younger abstention are present here, with respect to those claims
that seek to enjoin state officials from prosecuting him for making false statements
in 	connection 	with 	the 	attempted 	acquisition 	of 	firearms, 	one 	of 	the 	three
Case 3:24-cv-01748-JKM-MCC Document 169 Filed 01/21/26 Page 19 of 21
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“exceptional categories” which trigger Younger. First, it is evident that there are
active state proceedings. Second, it is also apparent that those proceedings afford the
plaintiff a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues raised in this lawsuit in this
state case. See Sullivan v. Linebaugh, 362 F. App'x 248, 249-50 (3d Cir. 2010).
Finally, it is clear that the state proceedings implicate important state interests, since
these matters involve state law enforcement, an issue of paramount importance to
the state. See, e.g., Lui, 369 F.3d 319; Zahl, 282 F.3d 204.
Since the legal requirements for Younger abstention are fully met here, the
decision to abstain rests in the sound discretion of this Court. Lui, 369 F.3d 319.
However, given the important state interest in enforcement of its criminal laws and
recognizing that the state courts are prepared to fully address the merits of these
matters, we believe that the proper exercise of this discretion weighs in favor of
abstention in this case. Lui, 369 F.3d 319; Zahl, 282 F.3d 204.
III. 	Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the motion to dismiss
lodged by Defendants Henry, Paris and Paulshock, (Doc. 124), be GRANTED.
The Parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge’s proposed findings,
recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in
28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the
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disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within
fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party
shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and
all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the
portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which
objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing
requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall
make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or
specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is
made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings
or 	recommendations 	made 	by 	the 	magistrate 	judge. 	The 	judge,
however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or
where required by law, and may consider the record developed before
the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis
of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall
witnesses, 	or 	recommit 	the 	matter 	to 	the 	magistrate 	judge 	with
instructions.
Submitted this 21 st day of January 2026.
S/ Martin C. Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge
Case 3:24-cv-01748-JKM-MCC Document 169 Filed 01/21/26 Page 21 of 21

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