Slager et al v. Woodloch Spa Resort, LP et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
TODD SLAGER, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
WOODLOCH SPA RESORT, LP, et
al.,
Defendants.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:24-CV-0796
(SAPORITO, J.)
MEMORANDUM
On May 14, 2024, the plaintiffs, Todd Slager and his wife Aileen
Glynn, filed this action against the defendants for Mr. Slager’s injuries
when “he slipped, fell and was thrown to the ground” at the defendants’
premises, the Woodloch Pines Resort. (Doc. 1, ¶ 10). The plaintiffs bring
claims of negligence against the defendants. (
Id.). Now before the Court
is the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 14). The parties
have briefed the motion (Docs. 17―22) and it is now ripe for review.
I. 	Background
The facts offered by the defendants in consideration of their motion
for summary judgment are limited (Doc. 14-1), and the facts contested by
the plaintiff are equally as limited. (Doc. 18). Indeed, the parties only
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agree 	that 	on 	November 15, 	2022, 	Mr. 	Slager was residing 	at 	the
Woodloch Pine Resort in one of its cabins. During that day, Mr. Slager left
the cabin in the morning to attend a conference for work, during which it
had begun to snow. Mr. Slager arrived back at the cabin around 6:15 p.m.
At some point, Mr. Slager left the cabin to retrieve something from his
car and slipped on a snow-covered driveway, throwing him to the ground.
As a result, Mr. Slager suffered fractures in his right ankle and leg due
to that fall, and underwent surgeries to insert and remove a hardware in
his ankle. He testifies that since his accident, he cannot walk long
distances, and he cannot “do anything physical around the house.” (Doc.
14-1, ¶ 12).
Beyond that factual record, it appears that all other underlying
facts are disputed by the parties. For example, while there is no dispute
that it had been snowing the day of the fall and that the Woodloch Pines
Resort cabin’s driveway was covered with snow, the parties dispute the
following: (1) whether snow previously existed on the driveway the
morning of the fall; (2) when the snowfall started on the date of the injury;
(3) how long the snowfall lasted on the date of the injury; (4) whether the
snow had stopped falling at the time of Mr. Slager’s fall; and (5) how much
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snow had fallen in that time. Moreover, while there is no dispute that Mr.
Slager fell, the parties dispute the characterization of Mr. Slager’s fall.
The defendants believe that the plaintiff slipped and fell on the snow
itself due to icy conditions of the weather, while the plaintiffs contend
that Mr. Slager fell because the snow covered up a change in elevation in
the driveway which was negligently maintained.
The defendants’ motion for summary judgment, based upon the
hills and ridges doctrine, relies on both the impact of the snowfall and
the categorization of Mr. Slager’s injury.
II. 	Legal Standard
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure dictates summary
judgment should only be granted if “there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” only if it might affect the outcome
of the case.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A
dispute of material fact is “genuine” only if the evidence “is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.”
Id. at
248. In deciding a summary judgment motion, all inferences “should be
drawn in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and where the
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non-moving party’s evidence contradicts the movant’s, then the non-
movant’s must be taken as true.”
Pastore v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pa., 24 F.3d
508, 512 (3d Cir. 1994).
Parties seeking summary judgment bear “the initial responsibility
of 	informing 	the 	district 	court 	of 	the 	basis 	for 	its 	motion,” 	and
demonstrating the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact.
Celotext
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the movant makes such a
showing, the non-movant must set forth specific facts, supported by the
record, 	demonstrating 	that 	“the 	evidence 	presents 	a 	sufficient
disagreement to require submission to the jury.”
Anderson, 477 U.S. at
251–52. A court must first determine if the moving party has made
prima
facie showing that it is entitled to summary judgment when evaluating
such a motion.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a);
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 331. Only
once that
prima facie showing has been made does the burden shift to the
nonmoving party to demonstrate the existence of a genuine dispute of
material fact.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a);
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 331.
Parties may cite to “particular parts of materials in the record,
including 	depositions, 	documents, 	electronically 	stored 	information,
affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for the
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purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers or other
materials.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). “An affidavit or declaration used to
support or oppose a motion must be made on personal knowledge, set out
facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or
declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c)(4). “Although evidence may be considered in a form which is
inadmissible at trial, the content of the evidence must be capable of
admission at trial.”
Bender v. Norfolk S. Corp., 994 F. Supp. 2d 593, 599
(M.D. Pa. 2014);
see also Pamintuan v. Nanticoke Mem’l Hosp., 192 F.3d
378, 387 n.13 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting that it is not proper, on summary
judgment, to consider evidence that is not admissible at trial).
III. 	Discussion
The defendants move for summary judgment under the “hills and
ridges” doctrine. (Doc. 14-2, at 5).
Generally, 	Pennsylvania 	law 	does 	not 	impose 	an
absolute duty on property owners to keep their premises
and abutting sidewalks completely free of snow and ice
at all times. Under the hills and ridges doctrine, owners
and occupiers are shielded from liability for “generally
slippery conditions resulting from ice and snow” where
the owner or occupier “has not permitted ice and snow
to unreasonably accumulate in ridges or elevations” that
remain 	for 	an 	unreasonable 	amount 	of 	time. 	Such
protection is extended to owners and occupiers because
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“to require that one’s walks be always free of ice and
snow would be to impose an impossible burden in view
of the climactic conditions in this hemisphere.”
Beck v. Holly Tree Homeowners Ass’n, 689 F. Supp. 2d 756, 762 (E.D. Pa.
2010) (citations omitted). To recover under the hills and ridges doctrine,
a plaintiff must prove:
(1) that snow and ice had accumulated on the sidewalk
[or parking lot] in ridges or elevations of such size and
character 	as 	to 	unreasonably 	obstruct 	travel 	and
constitute a danger to pedestrians travelling thereon; (2)
that the property owner had notice, either actual or
construction, of the existence of such condition; [and] (3)
that it was the dangerous accumulation of snow and ice
which caused the plaintiff to fall. Absent proof of
all such
facts, plaintiff has no basis for recovery.
Rinaldi v. Levine, 176 A.2d 623, 625–26 (Pa. 1962) (emphasis in original).
The defendants argue that the hills and ridges doctrine applies because
Mr. Slager slipped and fell on the snow due to the icy conditions brought
by that day’s snowfall. Therefore, the defendants contend that because
the plaintiffs cannot satisfy all three elements to recover under the hills
and ridges doctrine, the Court must grant their motion for summary
judgment. (Doc. 14-2, at 7). But at this stage, we need not analyze
whether the plaintiffs have satisfied all factors for recovery under the
doctrine. Based on the facts and evidence of record, viewed in the light
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most favorable to the non-moving plaintiffs, we find that the plaintiffs
have adduced sufficient evidence to demonstrate genuine disputes of
material facts as to whether the “hills and ridges” doctrine applies in this
case, thus preventing the granting of summary judgment.
The defendants’ application of the hills and ridges doctrine is
dependent on their categorization of Mr. Slager’s injury. The defendants
contend that “[t]he undisputed facts demonstrate that Mr. Slager slipped
on a snow-covered driveway during an active snowstorm.” (
Id., at 2). The
defendants note Mr. Slager’s own admission that he was “[w]alking to
[his] vehicle in [his] driveway and slipped on snow” (Doc. 14-1, ¶ 8) in
support for their assertion and cite their expert weather report that snow
was falling, and had been falling for hours, when Mr. Slager slipped. (Doc.
14-2, at 8). The plaintiffs argue, however, that Mr. Slager did not slip due
to icy conditions of the snowstorm but rather injured himself when
stepping off the ridge of the defendants’ driveway that was improperly
maintained 	and 	repaired. 	(Doc. 	17, 	at 	2). 	While 	the 	plaintiffs
acknowledge that the driveway was snow-covered, they argue that the
inadequate conditions of the driveway, rather than the snow, caused Mr.
Slager’s injury and they have cited their own expert report indicating
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that the drop-off between the shoulder interface along the driveway
“exposed pedestrians like Todd Slager to an unreasonable risk of falling
due to inadequate maintenance.” (Doc. 17, at 2). Therefore, there remains
a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Mr. Slager slipped due
to icy conditions of the snowfall or whether Mr. Slager fell due to the
inadequate foundation of the driveway. Factual issues, such as those
presented in this case, are better left for the jury. The defendants’ motion
for summary judgement premised on the application of the hills and
ridges doctrine will be denied.
IV. 	Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the defendants’ motion for summary
judgment will be denied.
An appropriate order follows.
Dated: January 9, 2026
	s/Joseph F. Saporito, Jr.
JOSEPH F. SAPORITO, JR.
United States District Judge
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