Hawley v. Salamon et al

1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ANTONIO HAWLEY, 	: 	Civil No. 3:23-CV-1434
:
Plaintiff 	:
:
v. 	: 	(Judge Munley)
:
WARDEN BOBBI JO SALAMON, 	:
et al., 	: 	(Magistrate Judge Carlson)
:
Defendants. 	:
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
I. 	Factual and Procedural Background
This inmate pro se civil rights action is currently proceeding on several
discrete legal claims. The plaintiff, Antonio Hawley, alleges that: (1) prison staff
violated his rights under the Fourth and Eighth Amendments when they conducted
strip searches of the plaintiff between March 5 and 7, 2023; (2) the conditions of his
confinement during March and April of 2023 at SCI Rockview violated his Eighth
Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment; and (3) these strip
searches and unsanitary cell placements were ordered in retaliation for Hawley’s
exercise of his right to grieve about conditions in the Restricted Housing Unit at the
prison.
The parties are now engaged in discovery and embroiled in some discovery
disputes, disputes which have inspired Hawley to file this motion to compel. (Doc.
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114). In this motion Hawley challenges the sufficiency of the following discovery
responses:
Hawley first requested:
The scope of federal the scope of federal court discovery is set forth in
rules 26 (b) (1), Fed. R. Civ. P: unless otherwise limited by court order
the scope of discovery is as follows: Parties may obtain discovery
regarding any nonprivileged [sic] matter that is relevant to any partys
[sic] claim or defense including the existence, description, nature,
custody, condition, & location of any documents, or other tangible
things & the identity & location of persons having knowledge of any
discoverable matter. For good cause, the Court may order discovery of
any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the action.
(Doc. 125 Exh. A, Request 2). Defendants responded to this request asserting that
the request is unclear, vague, and has multiple interpretations. (Id. Exh. B, Request
2).
Second, Hawley requested the camera footage from various dates while he
was housed in the RHU. (Id. Exh. A, Request 3). Defendants responded to the
request asserting that no responsive documents were discovered after a reasonable
investigation. (Id. Exh. B, Request 3). Hawley generally alleges that there should be
camera footage because he requested it be preserved. (Doc. 115, at ¶¶ 10-12).
Third, Hawley sought copies of all PREA complaints filed by inmates against
Defendants Jenks, Hershey, and Fry. (Id. Exh. A, Request 4). The Defendants
objected to this request, arguing that the records are irrelevant, confidential, and
Hawley’s possession of these records would violate prison policy.
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Fourth, Hawley sought a copy of DOC Policy 6.5.1. (Id. Exh. A, Request 5).
The Defendants have objected to this discovery request, citing confidentiality and
institutional security concerns.
Finally, Hawley sought “the names, titles, & duties of all staff members at
SCI-Rockview who have responsibility for responding to, investigating or deciding
inmate grievances.” (Id. Exh. C, Request 2). Defendants objected as this request
sought information outside the scope of discovery and was unduly burdensome. (Id.
Exh. D, Request 2).
With Hawley’s discovery demands framed in this fashion, this motion to
compel is fully briefed and is therefore ripe for resolution. Upon consideration of the
parties’ positions, for the reasons set forth below, will GRANT the motion, in that
we will direct the Defendants to submit any relevant staff misconduct reports relating
to the named defendants to the Court for in camera review. Otherwise, we will
DENY the motion.
II. 	Discussion
A. Guiding Principles
The parties’ discovery disputes are judged against familiar legal guideposts.
As we have observed when addressing similar discovery issues:
Rulings regarding the proper scope of discovery are matters consigned
to the court's discretion and judgment. A court's decisions regarding the
conduct of discovery will be disturbed only upon a showing of abuse of
that discretion. Marroquin-Manriquez v. I.N.S., 699 F.2d 129, 134 (3d
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Cir. 1983). This far-reaching discretion also extends to rulings by
United States Magistrate Judges on discovery matters. In this regard:
District courts provide magistrate judges with particularly
broad discretion in resolving discovery disputes. See
Farmers & Merchs. Nat'l Bank v. San Clemente Fin.
Group Sec., Inc., 174 F.R.D. 572, 585 (D.N.J. 1997).
When 	a 	magistrate 	judge's 	decision 	involves 	a
discretionary [discovery] matter ..., “courts in this district
have 	determined 	that 	the 	clearly 	erroneous 	standard
implicitly becomes an abuse of discretion standard.” Saldi
v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 224 F.R.D. 169, 174 (E.D.
Pa. 2004) (citing Scott Paper Co. v. United States, 943 F.
Supp. 501, 502 (E.D. Pa. 1996)). Under the standard, a
magistrate judge's discovery ruling “is entitled to great
deference and is reversible only for abuse of discretion.”
Kresefky v. Panasonic Commc'ns and Sys. Co., 169
F.R.D. 54, 64 (D.N.J. 1996); see also Hasbrouck v.
BankAmerica 	Hous. 	Servs., 	190 	F.R.D. 	42, 	44-45
(N.D.N.Y. 	1999) 	(holding 	that 	discovery 	rulings 	are
reviewed under abuse of discretion standard rather than de
novo standard); EEOC v. Mr. Gold, Inc., 223 F.R.D. 100,
102 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding that a magistrate judge's
resolution 	of 	discovery 	disputes 	deserves 	substantial
deference and should be reversed only if there is an abuse
of discretion).
Halsey v. Pfeiffer, No. 09-1138, 2010 WL 2735702, at *1 (D.N.J. Sept.
27, 2010).
The exercise of this discretion is guided, however, by certain basic
principles. At the outset, Rule 26(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure generally defines the scope of discovery permitted in a civil
action, prescribes certain limits to that discovery and provides as
follows:
(b) Discovery Scope and Limits.
(1) Scope in General. Unless otherwise limited by court
order, the scope of discovery is as follows: Parties may
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obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that
is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional
to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the
issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the
parties' relative access to relevant information, the parties'
resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the
issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed
discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Information within
this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence
to be discoverable.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b).
Thus, our discretion is limited in a number of significant ways by the
scope 	of 	Rule 	26 	itself, 	which 	provides 	for 	discovery 	of 	only
“nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense.”
Therefore, “[t]he Court's discretion in ruling on discovery issues is,
therefore, 	restricted 	to 	valid 	claims 	of 	relevance 	and 	privilege.”
Robinson v. Folino, No. 14-227, 2016 WL 4678340, at *2 (citing
Jackson v. Beard, No. 11-1431, 2014 WL 3868228, at *5 (M.D. Pa.
Aug. 6, 2014) (“[a]lthough the scope of relevance in discovery is far
broader than that allowed for evidentiary purposes, it is not without its
limits.... Courts will not permit discovery where a request is made in
bad faith, unduly burdensome, irrelevant to the general subject matter
of the action, or relates to confidential or privileged information”)).
Accordingly, at the outset it is clear that Rule 26's definition of that
which can be obtained through discovery reaches any nonprivileged
matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense, and valid claims
of relevance and privilege still cabin and restrict the court's discretion
in ruling on discovery issues. Furthermore, the scope of discovery
permitted by Rule 26 embraces all relevant information, a concept
which is not confined to admissible evidence but is also defined in the
following terms: “Information within this scope of discovery need not
be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
Rather, Rule 26 states that “[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding
any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or
defense.” This concept of relevance is tempered, however, by principles
of proportionality. Thus we are now enjoined to also consider whether
the specific discovery sought is “proportional to the needs of the case,
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considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the
amount 	in 	controversy, 	the 	parties' 	relative 	access 	to 	relevant
information, the parties' resources, the importance of the discovery in
resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed
discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). “Thus,
it has been said that the amended rule ‘restores the proportionality
factors to their original place in defining the scope of discovery.’ ”
Fassett v. Sears Holdings Corp., 319 F.R.D. 143, 150 (M.D. Pa. 2017)
(quoting Wertz v. GEA Heat Exchangers Inc., No. 1:14-CV-1991, 2015
WL 8959408, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 16, 2015)).
Lawson v. Love's Travel Stops & Country Stores, Inc., No. 1:17-CV-1266, 2020 WL
109654, at *2–3 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 9, 2020).
Further:
One other immutable factor governs the scope of discovery under Rule
26.
“It is an obvious truism that a court should not enter an
order compelling a party to produce documents where the
documents do not exist.” Wells v. JPC Equestrian, Inc.,
No. 3:13-CV-2575, 2014 WL 5641305, at *4 (M.D. Pa.
Nov. 4, 2014). It is clear, therefore, that the court cannot
compel the production of things that do not exist. Nor can
the court compel the creation of evidence by parties who
attest that they do not possess the materials sought by an
adversary 	in 	litigation. 	See, 	e.g., 	AFSCME 	District
Council 47 Health and Welfare Fund v. Ortho-McNeil-
Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc., No. 08-5904, 2010 WL
5186088 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 21, 2010); Knauss v. Shannon,
No. 08-1698, 2009 WL 975251 (M.D. Pa. April 9, 2009).
See Lawson v. Love's Travel Stops & Country Stores, Inc.,
No. 1:17-CV-1266, 2019 WL 5622453, at *4 (M.D. Pa.
Oct. 31, 2019).
Lopez v. Wetzel, No. 3:21-CV-1819, 2024 WL 2055041, at *4 (M.D. Pa. May 6,
2024).
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In addition, there are factors unique to prison litigation that inform the
exercise of our discretion when addressing inmate discovery issues. In a prison
setting, inmate requests for information relating to security procedures can raise
profound security concerns, and implicate a legitimate governmental privilege, a
governmental privilege which acknowledges a governmental need to confidentiality
of certain data but recognizes that courts must balance the confidentiality of
governmental files against the rights of a civil rights litigant by considering:
(1) the extent to which disclosure will thwart governmental processes
by discouraging citizens from giving the government information; (2)
the impact upon persons who have given information of having their
identities 	disclosed; 	(3) 	the 	degree 	to 	which 	governmental 	self-
evaluation and consequent program improvement will be chilled by
disclosure; (4) whether the information sought is factual data or
evaluative summary; (5) whether the party seeking the discovery is an
actual or potential defendant in any criminal proceeding either pending
or reasonably likely to follow from the incident in question; (6) whether
the police investigation has been completed; (7) whether any intra-
departmental disciplinary proceedings have arisen or may arise from
the investigation; (8) whether the plaintiff’s suit is non-frivolous and
brought in good faith; (9) whether the information sought is available
through other discovery or from other sources; and (10) the importance
of the information sought to the plaintiffs case.
Torres v. Harris, No. 4:17-CV-1977, 2019 WL 265804, at *3–4 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 18,
2019) (quoting Frankenhauser v. Rizzo, 59 F.R.D. 339, 344 (E.D. Pa. 1973)).
Finally, it is clear that a party moving to compel discovery bears the initial
burden 	of 	proving 	the 	relevance 	of 	the 	requested 	information. Morrison 	v.
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Philadelphia Housing Auth., 203 F.R.D. 195, 196 (E.D. Pa. 2001). Once that initial
burden is met:
The party resisting the discovery has the burden to establish the lack of
relevance by demonstrating that the requested discovery (1) does not
come within the broad scope of relevance as defined under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 26(b)(1), or (2) is of such marginal relevance that the potential harm
occasioned by discovery would outweigh the ordinary presumption in
favor of broad disclosure.
In re Urethane Antitrust Litigation, 261 F.R.D. 570, 573 (D. Kan. 2009).
B. The Motion to Compel will be Denied in Part and Granted in Part
Guided by these legal tenets, with one exception discussed below, the
plaintiff’s motion to compel will be denied.
At the outset, we agree that no further response was required with respect to
Hawley’s request number 2 which simply parroted the language of the rules and
stated:
The scope of federal the scope of federal court discovery is set forth in
rules 26 (b) (1), Fed. R. Civ. P: unless otherwise limited by court order
the scope of discovery is as follows: Parties may obtain discovery
regarding any nonprivileged [sic] matter that is relevant to any partys
[sic] claim or defense including the existence, description, nature,
custody, condition, & location of any documents, or other tangible
things & the identity & location of persons having knowledge of any
discoverable matter. For good cause, the Court may order discovery of
any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the action.
(Doc. 125 Exh. A, Request 2).This request is nothing more than a restatement of the
law. As such, this discovery request does not require any further factual response.
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Likewise, to the extent that Hawley requests the camera footage from various
dates while he was housed in the RHU, the defendants have stated that this footage
no longer exists. Since “a court should not enter an order compelling a party to
produce documents where the documents do not exist,” Wells v. JPC Equestrian,
Inc., No. 3:13-CV-2575, 2014 WL 5641305, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 4, 2014), we will
remind the Defendants of their ongoing duty to supplement discovery but will deny
the motion to compel that which cannot be found. However, we enter this discovery
directive without prejudice to Hawley seeking a spoliation inference at trial, if
appropriate.
Hawley’s request for production of DOC security policies like DOC Policy
6.5.1 will also be denied. Inmate access to these sensitive security procedures
presents a grave threat to institutional security. Accordingly,
[N]umerous 	federal 	courts 	in 	Pennsylvania 	have 	sustained 	the
Department of Corrections' objections to wholesale release of the
procedures 	manual 	to 	policy 	6.5.1 	and 	6.3.1, 	and 	have 	denied
substantially similar motions to compel filed by other inmates. See,
e.g., Houser v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., Civ. A. 13-cv-1068, 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 21254, at *11-12, 2015 WL 757552 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 23, 2015)
(finding that to permit inmate access to 6.5.1's confidential internal
working procedures for staff dealing with Security Level 5 RHU
inmates would create a “substantial security risk”); Whitney v. Wetzel,
Civ. A. No. 2:12-cv-1623, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155226, at *4-5,
2013 WL 5513481 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 31, 2014) (finding that policy 6.5.1
“is 	a 	privileged 	and 	confidential 	document 	that 	addresses 	the
administration of Security Level 5 Housing Units.”); Spencer v.
Collins, 2013 WL 5176747, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 12, 2013) (finding
defendants' safety and security concerns about releasing the 6.5.1
manual outweighed the plaintiff's interest in its production); Mikell v.
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Moore, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29675, at *22-24 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 5,
2013) (refusing to compel production of sections of 6.3.1 and 6.5.1
relating to double celling inmates); Huertas v. Beard, No. 101-, 2012
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105631, 2012 WL 3096430, at *3 (W.D. Pa. July 30,
2012); Bailey v. McMahon, No.1:CV-07-2238, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
52211, 2012 WL 1246147, at *7 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 12, 2012) (denying
motion 	to 	compel 	production 	of 	DC-ADM 	6.5.1, 	agreeing 	with
Department of Corrections' assertion that its interest in confidentiality
and institutional security outweighed plaintiff's interest in reviewing the
manuals); Victor v Lawler, Civ. A. No. 3:08-CV-1374, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 53133, 2011 WL 1884616 (M.D. Pa. May 18, 2011) (“[We find
that release of policy manuals [6.3.1 and 6.5.1] themselves would
undermine institutional security.”).
Mercaldo v. Wetzel, No. 1:13-CV-1139, 2016 WL 5851958, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 6,
2016).
Finally, we turn to Hawley’s request for copies of all PREA complaints filed
by inmates against Defendants Jenks, Hershey, and Fry and his demand for
production of: “the names, titles, & duties of all staff members at SCI-Rockview
who 	have 	responsibility 	for 	responding 	to, 	investigating 	or 	deciding 	inmate
grievances.” (Id. Exh. C, Request 2). With one narrow exception, these requests will
be denied since:
These are precisely the kinds of sweeping, generalized and overly broad
discovery requests judges in the Middle District of Pennsylvania have
rejected as being not only overly broad, but unduly infringing upon the
privacy interests of other inmates who may have sought to grieve
unrelated issues that they had with staff. See, e.g., Montanez v. Tritt,
Civ. No. 3:14-CV-1362, 2016 WL 3035310, at *4 (M.D. Pa. May 26,
2016) (denying motion to compel production of incident reports,
grievances and other documents involving other inmates where they
were found to be “overly broad, irrelevant, confidential, [and to] bear
no sufficient connection to this case, and raise obvious privacy and
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security issues.”) (Mariani, J.); Lofton v. Wetzel, Civ. No. 1:12-CV-
1133, 2015 WL 5761918, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 9, 2015) (Conner, C.J.)
(“It is apparent that [the plaintiff's] requests for ‘any and all’ records of
inspection, and ‘all’ incident reports and grievances are a grossly
overstated fishing expedition. [His] request for incident reports and
grievances regarding other inmates raises obvious privacy and security
issues, and the relevance of such information is questionable at best.”);
Sloan v. Murray, No. 3:11-CV-994, 2013 WL 5551162, at *4 (M.D. Pa.
Oct. 8, 2013) (Caputo, J.) (denying motion to compel grievance
responses that concerned other inmates, citing DOC policy prohibiting
inmates from receiving information about one another); Torres v.
Clark, Civ. No. 1:10-CV-1323, 2011 WL 4898168, at *2-3 (M.D. Pa.
Oct. 13, 2011) (Caldwell, J.) (denying motion to compel inmate request
for discovery of 27-months of grievances about a specific cell block,
finding it to be overly broad, burdensome, and potentially implicating
privacy interests of other inmates); McDowell v. Litz, Civ. No. 1:CV-
08-1453, 2009 WL 2058712, at *3 (M.D. Pa. July 10, 2009) (Rambo,
J.) (finding requests for discovery of grievances filed by non-party
inmates to be “overbroad and overly burdensome” and agreeing with
the defendants' “concerns about accessing private information with
respect to other inmates' grievances.”); Callaham v. Mataloni, Civ. No.
4:CV-06-1109, 2009 WL 1363368, at *3-4 (M.D. Pa. May 14, 2009)
(Jones, J.) (denying motion to compel, inter alia, grievances relating to
medical treatment of other inmates, citing privacy concerns); cf. Banks
v. Beard, Civ. No. 3:CV-10-1480, 2013 WL 3773837, at *5 (M.D. Pa.
July 17, 2013) (Munley, J.) (denying motion to compel account
statements for other inmates despite plaintiff's claim of relevance).
Allen v. Eckard, No. 1:17-CV-996, 2019 WL 1099001, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 8,
2019).
Therefore, to the extent that Hawley seeks wholesale disclosures of 	“the
names, titles, & duties of all staff members at SCI-Rockview who have responsibility
for responding to, investigating or deciding inmate grievances” the motion to compel
is denied. However, to the extent that Hawley advances a more narrowly tailored
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request for records of sexual assault allegations relating to named defendants in this
case, if any PREA documentation reveals a finding of misconduct by any of the
named defendants, that information will be provided to the court for its in camera
review. We will follow this course recognizing that this narrow class of prison
records may contain arguably discoverable factual material. In charting this path, we
reconcile the interests of inmate-plaintiff and corrections officials by rejecting
broadly framed requests for access to prison records, see Paluch v. Dawson, No. 06–
1751, 2007 WL 4375937, *4–5 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 12, 2007), while conducting an in
camera review of those records which may be relevant to more narrowly tailored
discovery demands. Paluch v. Dawson, No. 06–175, 2008 WL 2785638, *3 (M.D.
Pa. July 17, 2008). See Torres v. Harris, No. 4:17-CV-1977, 2019 WL 265804, at
*5 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 18, 2019).
An appropriate order follows.
/s/ Martin C. Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge
DATED: December 9, 2025
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ANTONIO HAWLEY, 	: 	Civil No. 3:23-CV-1434
:
Plaintiff 	:
:
v. 	: 	(Judge Munley)
:
WARDEN BOBBI JO SALAMON, 	:
et al., 	: 	(Magistrate Judge Carlson)
:
Defendants. 	:
ORDER
AND 	NOW, 	this 	9 th day 	of 	December 	2025, 	in 	accordance 	with 	the
accompanying Memorandum, IT IS ORDERED that the plaintiff’s motion to compel
(Doc. 114) is DENIED, with one exception: if any PREA documentation reveals a
finding of misconduct by any of the named defendants, that information will be
provided to the court for its in camera review on or before January 6, 2026. If no
such responsive material exists, the Defendants will file a notice confirming that
there are no responsive records.
/s/ Martin C. Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge
Case 3:23-cv-01434-JKM-MCC Document 139 Filed 12/09/25 Page 13 of 13