Reaves v. Rossman et al

1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
NYHEIM REAVES, 	: 	CIVIL NO. 3:21-CV-1282
:
Plaintiff, 	: 	(Judge Saporito)
:
v. 	:
: 	(Magistrate Judge Carlson)
JENNIFER ROSSMAN, et al., 	:
:
Defendants. 	:
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
I. 	Background
In the instant case we are called upon to consider whether we should take the
extraordinary step of appointing a guardian ad litem for the pro se prisoner plaintiff,
Nyheim Reaves. This issue comes before us in an unusual factual context. Nyhiem
Reaves undoubtedly struggles with a number of chronic mental health conditions
including depression, PTSD and ADHD. His current legal claims, at bottom, assert
that 	the 	conditions 	of 	his 	confinement 	have 	exacerbated 	these 	emotional
impairments. We have previously attempted to find counsel to aid Reaves in the
presentation of his claims, but without success. We are now asked whether Reaves’
condition is so severe that the appointment of a legal guardian in warranted in this
case. We must consider this question against a factual backdrop where Reaves has
previously been deemed mentally competent.
By way of background, Reaves, acting pro se, has litigated this case since July
Case 3:21-cv-01282-JFS-MCC Document 163 Filed 01/05/26 Page 1 of 11

2
of 2021, albeit often with the assistance of an inmate writ writer. Currently, this case
is proceeding forward on due process and Eighth Amendment claims relating to what
Reaves alleges was an excessively prolonged two and one half year period of solitary
confinement which has exacerbated his existing mental health symptoms. (Doc.
114). We previously sought volunteer counsel to assist Reaves in the presentation of
this claim in June of 2024, but to no avail; no counsel was willing and prepared to
undertake this case. (Docs. 119, 122).
Reaves’ remaining claims have moved forward into discovery. In the course
of this discovery, on October 20, 2025, we received correspondence from defense
counsel which reported as follows:
On October 20, 2025, undersigned counsel for Defendants attempted to
take the deposition of Mr. Reaves. Prior to this deposition, Mr. Reaves
informed undersigned counsel that he was not able to competently
testify at the deposition due to his medication. Undersigned counsel
conducted a very short deposition to place the matter on the record.
During this question and answer session, Mr. Reaves indicated that his
medication would prevent him from providing truthful testimony and
he did not know whether he would be able to provide truthful testimony
while taking the medication due to the side effects he was experiencing.
Mr. Reaves indicated that the medication caused him to be drowsy and
have a difficulty in comprehending questions. Based on the answers to
undersigned counsel’s questions, undersigned did not proceed with the
deposition due to the competency concerns. Counsel for Defendants is
hoping for guidance from the Court on how to proceed due to the
competency concerns of the Plaintiff.
(Doc. 153).
Given these expressed competence concerns, we initiated a process designed
Case 3:21-cv-01282-JFS-MCC Document 163 Filed 01/05/26 Page 2 of 11

3
to ascertain whether Reaves’ mental impairments warranted the appointment of a
guardian ad litem for the plaintiff. As part of this process, on November 26, 2025,
we entered an order prescribing the following procedure for addressing this question:
In order to determine whether Reaves is entitled to relief under Rule
17(c), on or before November 19, 2025, the plaintiff shall submit any
argument, information or evidence from an appropriate court of record
or a relevant public agency indicating that he had been adjudicated
incompetent, or submit any verifiable evidence from a mental health
professional demonstrating that he is being or has been treated for
mental illness of the type that would render him legally incompetent.
Such evidence may be submitted with a request that it be filed under
seal in order to protect the plaintiff’s privacy.
On or before December 3, 2025, the Department of Corrections,
through defense counsel, may respond and submit under seal any
evidence, information or argument it possesses relevant to the issue of
the plaintiff’s mental competence.
(Doc. 158).
We have now received these submissions. The parties’ filings provide us with
insights into Reaves’ chronic mental health problems from two different time
frames. Yet while they differ in their temporal scope, the mental health records we
have received share several common elements. They contain similar diagnoses;
consistently corroborate Reaves’ ongoing emotional impairments; but generally
describe Reaves as mentally competent.
For his part, Reaves indicated that he has been designated as a seriously
mental ill inmate by the Department of Corrections since 2018. (Doc. 159). Reaves
also provided a June 2021 report which assessed his competence in connection with
Case 3:21-cv-01282-JFS-MCC Document 163 Filed 01/05/26 Page 3 of 11

4
some pending criminal charges. (Doc. 159-1). That report concluded that Reaves
suffered from a major depressive disorder, PTSD, and ADHD since 2018. (Id.) He
was deemed to suffer from significant interference with executive functioning,
severe anxiety and moderately severe depression. However, in this criminal context,
Reaves was ultimately deemed mentally competent and capable of entering a plea
of guilty, but mentally ill. (Id.)
The Department of Corrections, in turn, has submitted some 76 pages of
contemporaneous mental health treatment describing Reaves’ current condition,
which we are filing under seal in this case. In general terms, these records reveal that
Reaves has been diagnosed with major depression, PTSD, adult anti-social behavior
disorder, and chronic drug use disorders. He has a history of some suicide attempts,
although current treatment notes suggest that he is not presently experiencing
suicidal ideation. He is actively undergoing mental health treatment within the prison
system consisting of psychotropic and mood stabilizing medications. Reaves has
been deemed competent to give informed consent to this medication and has, in fact,
provided informed consent. Reaves also participates in individual or group therapy
and is encouraged to learn and practice coping skills as well as engaging in positive
interactions with peers and staff.
While contemporaneous mental health assessments have noted instances of
guarded and paranoid behavior on Reaves’ part, along with some unrealistic thinking
Case 3:21-cv-01282-JFS-MCC Document 163 Filed 01/05/26 Page 4 of 11

5
as it related to his prospects for parole, for the most part the current clinical record
is largely unremarkable. Staff consistently report that Reaves displays fair judgment
and insight; has normal attention; is oriented within normal limits; and has logical
thought processes and normal thought content.
It is against this clinical backdrop that we consider whether appointment of a
guardian ad litem for Reaves is necessary in this case.
II. 	Discussion
A. Appointment of Guardian Ad Litem, Guiding Principles.
Rule 17(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure guides us in considering
these competency concerns identified by the parties relating to a pro se litigant and
provides that: “A minor or an incompetent person who does not have a duly
appointed representative may sue by a next friend or by a guardian ad litem. The
court must appoint a guardian ad litem--or issue another appropriate order--to protect
a minor or incompetent person who is unrepresented in an action.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
17 (c). Decisions regarding the appointment of a guardian ad litem in federal court
rest in the sound discretion of the court and will not be set aside absent an abuse of
that discretion. Powell v. Symons, 680 F.3d 301, 306 (3d Cir. 2012). Nonetheless,
the exercise of this discretion is guided by several fundamental, overarching
principles.
In order to determine whether appointment of a guardian 	ad litem 	is
Case 3:21-cv-01282-JFS-MCC Document 163 Filed 01/05/26 Page 5 of 11

6
appropriate in a given case we must first assess whether Reaves is incompetent since
“[t]he obligation imposed by the final sentence of Rule 17(c)—the duty to ‘appoint’
or ‘make such other order’—arises after a determination of incompetency.” Ferrelli
v. River Manor Health Care Ctr., 323 F.3d 196, 201 (2d Cir. 2003). Further, while a
pro se litigant is not required to file a formal motion to trigger an inquiry into his or
her mental competence, Id. at 202 n. 4, if we “were presented with evidence from an
appropriate court of record or a relevant public agency indicating that the party had
been adjudicated incompetent, or if the court received verifiable evidence from a
mental health professional demonstrating that the party is being or has been treated
for mental illness of the type that would render him or her legally incompetent,” then
it would seem that relief under Rule 17 (c) would be appropriate. Id. at 201.
As for the substantive standards which guide this competency evaluation, as
the Third Circuit has observed:
[I]t is the federal district court's obligation to issue an appropriate order
“to protect a minor or incompetent person who is unrepresented in an
action.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 17(c)(2). This court has yet to set forth the factors
that warrant sua sponte inquiry into a litigant's capacity to sue or be
sued 	under 	Rule 	17(c) 	and 	the 	Rule 	itself 	does 	not 	offer 	any
commentary. However, the Second Circuit has set forth a well-reasoned
standard that has been adopted elsewhere and that we adopt under the
circumstances here. In Ferrelli v. River Manor Health Care Center, 323
F.3d 196, 201 (2d Cir.2003), that Court concluded that a district court
need not inquire sua sponte into a pro se plaintiff's mental competence
based on a litigant's bizarre behavior alone, even if such behavior may
suggest mental incapacity. That is an important limiting factor as to the
application of Rule 17. The federal courts are flooded with pro se
litigants with fanciful notions of their rights and deprivations. We
Case 3:21-cv-01282-JFS-MCC Document 163 Filed 01/05/26 Page 6 of 11

7
cannot expect district judges to do any more than undertake a duty of
inquiry as to whether there may be a viable basis to invoke Rule 17.
That duty of inquiry involves a determination of whether there is
verifiable evidence of incompetence. . . . .
With regard to the question of whether there is verifiable evidence of
incompetence, the Ferrelli Court concluded that a district court would
likely abuse its discretion if it failed to consider whether Rule 17(c)
applied “[i]f a court were presented with evidence from an appropriate
court of record or a relevant public agency indicating that the party had
been adjudicated incompetent, or if the court received verifiable
evidence from a mental health professional demonstrating that the party
is being or has been treated for mental illness of the type that would
render him or her legally incompetent.” Id. We also agree with the
Fourth Circuit in Hudnall v. Sellner, 800 F.2d 377, 385 (4th Cir.1986),
that bizarre behavior alone is insufficient to trigger a mandatory inquiry
into a litigant's competency but “if there has been a legal adjudication
of incompetence and that is brought to the court's attention, the Rule's
provision is brought into play.” The Ferrelli Court noted that it was
“mindful of the need to protect the rights of the mentally incompetent,”
but at the same time “in light of the volume of pro se filings in [the
Second] Circuit,” it could not “disregard the potential burden on court
administration associated with conducting frequent inquiries into pro se
litigants' mental competency.” 323 F.3d at 201. We share the same
concern. It follows that the district court must satisfy its duty of inquiry
before it proceeds to determine if Rule 17 applies.
Powell v. Symons, 680 F.3d 301, 307 (3d Cir. 2012).
Subsequently the Court of Appeals provided further guidance regarding what
type of evidence satisfies the evidentiary burden of showing a litigant’s mental
incompetence, the touchstone for appointment of a guardian ad litem. As the Court
explained:
A court's obligation under Rule 17 to appoint a guardian for an
incompetent person is mandatory. Powell v. Symons, 680 F.3d 301, 303
(3d Cir. 2012). A district court must invoke Rule 17 sua sponte and
Case 3:21-cv-01282-JFS-MCC Document 163 Filed 01/05/26 Page 7 of 11

8
consider whether to appoint a representative for an incompetent person
when there is “verifiable evidence of incompetence.” 4 Id. at 307.
Verifiable evidence of incompetence includes (1) “evidence from an
appropriate court of record or a relevant public agency indicating that
the party had been adjudicated incompetent,” or (2) “evidence from a
mental health professional demonstrating that the party is being or has
been treated for mental illness of the type that would render him or her
legally incompetent.” Id. (quoting Ferrelli v. River Manor Health Care
Ctr., 	323 	F.3d 	196, 	201 	(2d 	Cir. 	2003)). 	Therefore, 	anecdotal
information or layperson opinions do not constitute verifiable evidence.
Mondelli v. Berkeley Heights Nursing & Rehab. Ctr., 1 F.4th 145, 149 (3d Cir.
2021).
B. Appointment of a Guardian Ad Litem is Not Necessary Here.
Bound by these legal guideposts, we conclude that appointment of a guardian
ad litem for Reaves is not necessary in this case. Turning to the threshold question
we must address—namely, whether there has been a sufficient showing of mental
incompetence on Reaves part to justify appointment of a guardian ad litem under
Rule 17—we find that the evidence demonstrates that Reaves is mentally ill but does
not support a finding of mental incompetence. On this score we have been enjoined
to look to two categories of proof to make this determination: (1) evidence from an
appropriate court of record or a relevant public agency indicating that the party had
been adjudicated incompetent, or (2) evidence from a mental health professional
demonstrating that the party is being or has been treated for mental illness of the
type that would render him or her legally incompetent. Id.
We are presented with neither type of proof in this case. At the outset, this
Case 3:21-cv-01282-JFS-MCC Document 163 Filed 01/05/26 Page 8 of 11

9
case is decidedly unlike Powell v. Symons, 680 F.3d 301 (3d Cir. 2012), where the
prisoner plaintiff had been adjudicated mentally incompetent in a criminal case.
Quite the contrary, in this case, Reaves’ own submissions reveal that he has been
found mentally ill, but competent. Thus, we do not have evidence from an
appropriate court of record or a relevant public agency indicating that the party had
been adjudicated incompetent.
Nor are we presented with evidence from a mental health professional
demonstrating that Reaves is being or has been treated for mental illness of the type
that would render him legally incompetent. Instead, Reaves’ contemporaneous
treatment history confirms that he is mentally ill, but competent. For example, these
treatment notes indicate that Reaves displays fair judgment and insight; has normal
attention; is oriented within normal limits; and has logical thought processes and
normal thought content. Reaves is also deemed to be capable of providing informed
consent for mental health treatment and has done so.
On these facts, it simply cannot be said that Reaves displays the type of
profound mental incompetence which is a prerequisite for appointment of a guardian
ad litem under Rule 17. Therefore, we are constrained to deny this request. We reach
this conclusion with some reservations since Reaves—a mentally ill inmate—
undoubtedly faces significant hurdles in advancing legal claims based upon the
alleged exacerbation of his emotional impairments due to prolonged solitary
Case 3:21-cv-01282-JFS-MCC Document 163 Filed 01/05/26 Page 9 of 11

10
confinement. However, we are also confronted with the stark reality that what
Reaves really needs to advance these claims is an attorney trial advocate, rather than
a guardian ad litem. Yet, despite our best efforts to secure volunteer counsel for the
plaintiff in 2024 there were no attorneys available to step forward at that time and
assist Reaves on a pro bono basis. Moreover, we lack to authority to compel counsel
to participate in this civil litigation since pro se “litigants have no statutory right to
appointed counsel.” Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 153 (3d Cir. 1993).
Simply stated, this case presents a dilemma: How do we endeavor to ensure
that a mentally ill, but competent, pro se prisoner plaintiff is afforded a fair
opportunity to present legal claims relating the impact of solitary confinement upon
his mental health in a legal setting where these is no statutory right to counsel?
Acknowledging that the law provides no perfect answers to this question and
conceding that the appointment of a guardian ad litem is unwarranted, we will appeal
to the professionalism of the pro bono bar and make a second, and final, request that
counsel volunteer to assist Reaves in this case.
An appropriate order follows.
III. 	Order
AND NOW this 5 th day of January 2026, IT IS ORDERED as follows:
First, to the extent that Reaves seeks the appointment of a guardian ad litem
pursuant to Rule 17, this request is DENIED.
Case 3:21-cv-01282-JFS-MCC Document 163 Filed 01/05/26 Page 10 of 11

11
Second, construing Reaves’ pleadings as a second request for appointment of
counsel, and acting out of an abundance of caution, we conditionally GRANT this
request, provided that a member of the Pro Bono panel of the Middle District of
Pennsylvania Chapter of the Federal Bar Association agrees to volunteer to represent
Plaintiff. Plaintiff is advised that locating pro bono counsel may take some time; he
will be notified in writing of the results of the search for counsel as soon as possible.
The Pro Bono Coordinator for Middle District of Pennsylvania Chapter of the
Federal Bar Association shall report to the Court on the progress of identifying pro
bono counsel on or before February 5, 2026. If the court is unsuccessful in its efforts
to locate pro bono counsel to represent Plaintiff, he shall proceed pro se, and this
order conditionally granting the motion for appointment of counsel will be vacated.
A copy of this order will be served upon the Pro Bono Coordinator for Middle
District of Pennsylvania Chapter of the Federal Bar Association.
S/Martin C. Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge
Case 3:21-cv-01282-JFS-MCC Document 163 Filed 01/05/26 Page 11 of 11