Case Name in Social Security Case - Unavailable

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
TRAVIS J. GRIEST, 	: Civil No. 1:25-CV-710
:
Plaintiff, 	:
:
v. 	:
: (Chief Magistrate Judge Bloom)
FRANK BISIGNANO, 	:
Commissioner of Social Security,1 	:
:
Defendant. 	:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. 	Introduction
Travis Griest filed an application under Title XVI of the Social
Security Act for supplemental security income on September 30, 2019.
Following a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), the
ALJ found that Griest was not disabled from the date of his application
through April 30, 2021, the date of the ALJ’s initial decision.2 	The
decision was remanded by this court for further consideration by the
1 	Frank Bisignano 	became the 	Commissioner of Social Security on
May 7, 2025. Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 	and 	42 U.S.C. 	§ 	405(g), 	Bisignano 	is 	substituted 	as the
defendant in this suit.
2 Tr. 31.
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ALJ.3 	Specifically, the ALJ was instructed to reconsider the record with
respect 	to 	the 	plaintiff’s 	ability 	to 	interact 	with 	others 	given 	his
documented history of mental health impairments and criminal conduct.4
The ALJ held a second hearing on March 6, 2024, and issued a
second 	unfavorable 	decision 	on 	March 	25, 	2024, 	denying 	Griest’s
application for benefits.5 	Griest now appeals this decision, arguing that
the ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence. 	After a
review of the record, and mindful of the fact that substantial evidence
“means only—‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion,’”6 we conclude that substantial
evidence supports the ALJ’s findings in this case. 	Therefore, we will
affirm the decision of the Commissioner denying this claim.
II. 	Statement of Facts and of the Case
Travis 	Griest 	filed 	for 	supplemental 	security 	income, 	alleging
disability due to a hernia and stomach issues.7 	Griest was 31 years old
3 Tr. 1301-26;
Travis G. v. Kijakazi, Civ. No. 1:22-CV-1015.
4
Id.
5 Tr. 1208-38, 1239-71.
6
Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019).
7 Tr. 74.
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at the time he filed his application, had a limited education, and had no
past relevant work.8
The administrative record in this case reveals that Griest suffered
from a host of mental health impairments9 beginning when he was a
child. 	Records from the Florida Civil Commitment Center (“FCCC”)
provided a summary of Griest’s mental health history, including that he
was 	in 	special 	classes 	in 	school 	with 	a 	designation 	of 	Severely
Emotionally Disturbed.10 	He reported he was suspended multiple times
and ultimately expelled after he brought a weapon to school.11 	Griest
further reported a history of substance abuse since he was 15 years old.12
Regarding his criminal conduct, the FCCC summary indicated that
Griest had committed his first sexual offense in 2004.13 	Several months
after 	his 	release 	from 	prison, 	he 	violated 	his 	probation 	when 	he
8 Tr. 1229.
9 Because Griest’s appeal focuses only on his mental health impairments,
we will forego a discussion of the records of his physical impairments.
10 Tr. 512.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id.
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trespassed on school grounds to make contact with his victim’s sister.14
Additionally, in 2011, Griest incurred another probation violation when
he 	made 	explicit 	sexual 	remarks 	to 	an 	11-year-old 	girl.15 	While
incarcerated in the Florida Department of Corrections (“DOC”), Griest
incurred 	multiple 	disciplinary 	violations 	“involving
antisocial/criminogenic 	behavior, 	aggression/violence, 	and 	1 	charge
involving sexual misconduct.”16 	When he was released from the DOC,
Griest was sent to the FCCC in May of 2015 for further treatment.17
Griest’s initial treatment plan at the FCCC indicated that he had
“limited 	insight 	into 	his 	deviant 	sexual 	behaviors” 	and 	required
psychotropic 	medications 	for 	his 	mental 	health 	impairments.18 	A
psychiatric evaluation in August of 2015 indicated that Griest had
previously been diagnosed with unspecific pedophilic disorder, alcohol
abuse 	disorder, 	and 	antisocial 	personality 	disorder.19 	Upon 	his
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18 Tr. 471.
19 Tr. 820.
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admission, Griest reported experiencing depression, and that he had a
good response to taking Zoloft in the past.20 A mental status examination
revealed a cooperative attitude, relaxed behavior, depressed mood, and
fair insight.21 	The facility provider prescribed him Zoloft.22
Notes from the FCCC indicate that in July, August, and September
of 	2015, 	Griest 	incurred 	institutional 	violations 	for 	possession 	of
pornography and other prohibited items, as well as inappropriate contact
with another resident.23 	It was noted that Griest had been cautioned to
disengage from contact with the other resident, which he ignored.24
Thus, Griest was put on a Behavior Contract and ultimately placed in
the Behavior Management Dormitory for his continued violations of the
contract.25 	Griest’s psychiatric treatment notes throughout 2015 and
into 2016 indicated poor to fair or limited insight and judgment and fair
attention and concentration at times, but his mental status examinations
20
Id.
21 Tr. 821.
22 Tr. 822.
23 Tr. 371, 376, 384.
24 Tr. 376.
25 Tr. 384, 476.
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were otherwise unremarkable, noting a euthymic mood, no memory
issues, and logical thought processes.26 Griest also participated in group
therapy.27
Griest’s 2016 psychiatric evaluation indicated that he was stable on
his medications.28 	A 	mental status examination 	revealed a mildly
depressed 	mood, 	a 	calm 	and 	cooperative 	attitude, 	logical 	thought
processes, and fair insight and judgment.29 The examiner noted Griest’s
motivation to work and help others as some of his assets and strengths.30
Throughout 2016 and 2017, Griest’s psychiatric treatment notes were
largely similar to the previous year, indicating fair insight and judgment
but otherwise unremarkable mental status findings.31 	An updated
treatment plan from November of 2017 indicated that Griest incurred
four behavioral management reports, had limited insight into his deviant
sexual behaviors, struggled to maintain boundaries with other residents,
26 Tr. 545-51.
27 Tr. 386, 396, 398-400, 404, 406, 410-13, 418-22, 426-28, 433-36, 441-45,
449-50, 452-53, 457-59.
28 Tr. 827.
29 Tr. 825-26.
30 Tr. 827.
31 Tr. 553-83.
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and demonstrated poor problem solving.32 	Griest was discharged from
FCCC in May of 2018, after a jury found that he no longer met the criteria
to be designated a sexually violent predator.33
In September of 2018, Griest underwent a mental status evaluation
with Christine Schuster, Psy.D.34 	Dr. Schuster noted that Griest’s
hygiene and grooming were inadequate, and he was easily distracted
during the evaluation.35 He reported that he stopped taking his Zoloft.36
Griest and his mother recounted his criminal history and history of
mental health impairments, including past suicide attempts and an
involuntary commitment after he put his hand through a window.37 	He
also reported attending church, living with roommates, and an ability to
take 	care 	of 	himself 	and 	perform 	household 	chores.38 	Griest 	was
32 Tr. 513.
33 Tr. 854.
34 Tr. 857-62.
35 Tr. 858.
36
Id.
37 Tr. 859. Dr. Schuster also noted that while discussing Griest’s criminal
history and conduct, both Griest and his mother minimized the offenses
and underlying conduct and exhibited the “propensity to view [Griest] in
a positive manner.” Tr. 860.
38
Id.
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unemployed and disclosed that he left his last employment after three
weeks in July of 2018.39 	He reported he worked as a dishwasher for six
years while he was incarcerated.40
A 	mental 	status 	evaluation 	revealed 	limited 	attention 	and
concentration, 	intact 	recent 	and 	remote 	memory, 	fair 	social 	skills,
impaired judgment and insight, and borderline intellectual functioning.41
His full-scale IQ was a 71.42 Dr. Schuster diagnosed him with borderline
intellectual 	functioning, 	ADHD, 	antisocial 	personality 	disorder, 	and
PTSD.43 	She opined that Griest’s impairments had a mild to moderate
impact on his activities of daily living, vocational performance, and
interpersonal interactions.44 	Griest underwent another examination in
October with Dr. David Carpenter, M.D., at which time it was noted his
mood was good, behavior was appropriate, speech was clear, and he
followed directions well.45 	Dr. Carpenter opined that Griest was “more
39 Tr. 860.
40
Id.
41 Tr. 860-61.
42 Tr. 862.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45 Tr. 865.
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limited by his psychiatric history and learning impairment than any
physical history or diagnosis.”46
In 	January 	of 	2020, 	Griest 	underwent 	another 	mental 	status
evaluation with Dr. Sarah Springer, Psy.D.47 Griest reported that he had
worked as a dishwasher for 30 days in 2019 but was fired for not being
able to meet the demands of the job.48 	He reported a learning disability
but denied any symptoms of depression, anxiety or mania, and stated
that he was only concerned about his inability to learn new things
quickly.49 	On examination, he had fluent speech, coherent and goal
directed 	thought 	processes, 	a 	euthymic 	mood, 	intact 	attention,
concentration, and memory, fair insight and judgment, and borderline
cognitive functioning.50 	He reported being able to perform household
chores and personal care, 	but 	that 	he 	had difficulty 	managing his
money.51 	Dr. Springer opined that Griest had moderate limitations in
46 Tr. 866.
47 Tr. 882-94.
48 Tr. 884.
49 Tr. 885.
50 Tr. 885-86.
51 Tr. 886.
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his ability to make complex work-related decisions, moderate limitations
in responding appropriately to usual work situations and changes in a
routine work setting, and no concentration, adaptation, or management
limitations or limitations in his interactions with others.52
Griest did not resume any sort of mental health treatment until
March of 2020, when he presented to Dr. Uchenna Uzoukwu, M.D.,
requesting 	outpatient 	treatment.53 	Griest 	reported 	overwhelming
anxiety and requested Zoloft, as it had helped him in the past.54 A mental
status examination revealed an “all right” mood, cooperative behavior,
fair 	attention 	and 	concentration, 	poor 	impulse 	control, 	and 	limited
insight and judgment.55 Dr. Uzoukwu prescribed Zoloft.56 Griest treated
with Dr. Uzoukwu monthly from March to August of 2020, during which
treatment notes indicated Griest did well on his medications, reported no
52 Tr. 888-89.
53 Tr. 896.
54
Id.
55 Tr. 897.
56
Id.
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depression or anxiety symptoms or inappropriate sexual behavior, and
his conditions remained stable.57
Griest’s next treatment records are from June of 2022 with Dr.
Andrew Newton, M.D., and indicate that Griest was experiencing anxiety
and anger outbursts.58 	He had a dysthymic mood; his concentration,
attention, 	memory, 	insight, 	and 	judgment 	were 	fair; 	his 	cognitive
functions were grossly intact; and he denied any psychotic symptoms.59
Dr. Newton continued his Zoloft and recommended he start individual
psychotherapy.60 	In July, Griest continued to exhibit poor impulse
control and anger.61 	Dr. Newton noted that Griest was tolerating his
medications well, and he was a low risk of self-harm and no harm to
others.62 	In August, Griest reported that he had an argument with his
therapist, who closed his case.63 	Treatment notes from Griest’s primary
care physician, Dr. Matthew Kraynak, D.O., indicated that in September,
57 Tr. 898, 907-12.
58 Tr. 1513.
59 Tr. 1514.
60
Id.
61 Tr. 1516.
62 Tr. 1517.
63 Tr. 1519.
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Griest 	reported 	doing 	well 	on 	his 	medications 	and 	that 	his 	major
depressive disorder and generalized anxiety disorder were stable.64
Griest 	began 	counseling 	at 	Recovery 	Counseling 	Services 	in
January of 2023, at which time he reported struggling with symptoms of
PTSD and severe depression.65 	On examination, Griest had fair eye
contact, agitated motor behavior, normal speech, an anxious mood, intact
memory, poor judgment, and fair insight and attention.66 In April, Griest
was placed back on Zoloft by his primary care provider and reported his
anxiety and depression were better.67 	At a follow up appointment in
June, Griest noted that he was having more physical issues, but that his
sleep and mood were good.68 	Griest discontinued counseling in August
after reporting that he was not sure where he would be living.69
From December 2023 to February 2024, Griest was incarcerated in
the Northumberland County Prison after being charged with sexual
64 Tr. 1676-77.
65 Tr. 1523.
66 Tr. 1530-31.
67 Tr. 1535, 1807.
68 Tr. 1537.
69 Tr. 1538.
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assault and harassment of his wife.70 	At his intake examination, Griest
exhibited good eye contact, pressured speech, normal mood and affect,
normal thought content, impulsive judgment, limited insight into his
situation and mental illness, and intact memory.71 Griest was placed on
suicide watch on intake and received mental health treatment while
incarcerated.72 	Notes from Griest’s mental health sick calls indicate that
he was diagnosed with impulse control disorder, cluster B personality
traits.73
It is against the backdrop of this record that an ALJ held a second
hearing on Griest’s disability application on March 6, 2024.74 Griest and
a Vocational Expert (“VE”) both appeared and testified at this hearing.75
Following this hearing, on March 24, 2024, the ALJ issued a decision
denying Griest’s application for disability benefits.76 	The ALJ first
concluded that Griest had not engaged in substantial gainful activity
70 Tr. 1845.
71 Tr. 1847-48.
72 Tr. 1850-80.
73 Tr. 1914.
74 Tr. 1239-71.
75
Id.
76 Tr. 1208-38
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since September 30, 2019, the date of Griest’s application.77 At Step 2 of
the sequential analysis that governs disability claims, the ALJ found that
Griest suffered from the following severe mental health impairments:
borderline intellectual functioning; learning disorder; attention deficit
hyperactivity 	disorder 	(“ADHD”); 	bipolar 	disorder; 	major 	depressive
disorder; 	generalized 	anxiety 	disorder; 	adjustment 	disorder 	with
depressed 	mood; 	antisocial 	personality 	disorder 	with 	related
psychopathy; 	pedophiliac 	disorder; 	post-traumatic 	stress 	disorder
(“PTSD”); 	panic 	disorder; 	and 	impulse 	control 	disorder, 	cluster 	B
personality traits.78 	At Step 3, the ALJ concluded that none of these
impairments met or equaled the severity of a listed impairment under
the Commissioner’s regulations.79
Specifically, in considering the listings, the ALJ found that Griest
suffered 	from 	a 	marked 	limitation 	in 	interacting 	with 	others, 	and
moderate 	limitations 	in 	the 	remaining 	paragraph 	“B” 	criteria—
understanding, remembering, and applying information; concentrating,
77 Tr. 1213.
78 Tr. 1214.
79 Tr. 1215-20.
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persisting, and maintaining pace; and adapting or managing oneself.80
Regarding his limitations in interacting with others, the ALJ considered
evidence of Griest’s prior incarcerations, criminal history and related
conduct, prior educational and behavioral difficulties, and more recent
mental health treatment.81 	The ALJ also considered Griest’s testimony,
as well as the consulting and examining physicians’ opinions regarding
Griest’s abilities in this area, which all found, at most, a moderate
limitation in this area of functioning.82
Between Steps 3 and 4, the ALJ then concluded that Griest:
[H]a[d] the residual functional capacity to perform medium
work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(c) with the following
limitations: [ . . .] he is limited to occupations that require the
claimant to understand, remember, and carry out simple
instructions, 	and 	make 	simple 	work-related 	decisions.
Additionally, he is limited to occupations that require the
claimant to deal with occasional changes in a routine work
setting. Also, he is limited to occupations which require no
interaction with members of the general public. Further, after
an initial training period to learn the job, the claimant is
limited to occupations which require no more than occasional
interaction with supervisors and coworkers. Lastly, he is
limited to occupations which require no prolonged reading for
content 	and 	comprehension, 	or 	complex 	mathematical
80
Id.
81 Tr. 1217.
82
Id.
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calculations such as cashier or teller work.83
In 	reaching 	this 	RFC 	determination, 	the 	ALJ 	considered 	the
objective medical record detailed above, the medical opinion evidence,
and Griest’s reported symptoms. 	With respect to the medical opinion
evidence, 	the 	ALJ 	considered 	the 	opinions 	of 	the 	state 	agency
consultants, 	Drs. 	Gold 	and 	Cannon, 	and 	found 	them 	partially
persuasive.84 These providers found moderate limitations in the areas of
mental functioning, which the ALJ found was generally supported by the
longitudinal record.85 	However, to account for Griest’s records of anger,
impulse control, mood swings, and his criminal history, the ALJ found a
marked limitation in interacting with others and included limitations to
no interactions with the public and only occasional interactions with
supervisors and coworkers.86
The ALJ also considered Dr. Springer’s January 2020 opinion and
found it partially persuasive.87 	The ALJ noted that Springer’s mild to
83 Tr. 1220-21.
84 Tr. 1227-28.
85 Tr. 1227.
86 Tr. 1227-28.
87 Tr. 1228.
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moderate findings were mostly consistent with the record, but that the
record 	supported 	additional 	limitations 	in 	the 	claimant’s 	ability 	to
interact with others.88 	She reached a similar conclusion with respect to
Dr. Schuster’s September 2018 opinion, finding it partially persuasive
and noting that the moderate limitations were mostly consistent with the
record 	but 	accounting 	for 	additional 	limitations 	in 	interpersonal
interactions.89 	Finally, the ALJ found Dr. Carpenter’s October 2018
opinion 	that 	Griest 	was 	limited 	due 	to 	his 	learning 	disability 	and
psychiatric history not persuasive, as she reasoned Dr. Carpenter did not
examine any psychiatric records and based this opinion solely on Griest’s
subjective complaints.90
With respect to Griest’s symptoms, the ALJ found that Griest’s
statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of
his impairments were not entirely consistent with the medical evidence.91
At Griest’s first hearing, he testified that he left his last employment as
88
Id.
89 Tr. 1228-29.
90 Tr. 1226.
91 Tr. 1222.
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a dishwasher in 2019 because he could not understand what people were
telling him to do.92 However, he reported working as a dishwasher while
incarcerated with no issues.93 	At the second hearing, when asked why
he could not work, Griest stated: “it’s not that I can’t interact with others;
it’s just I won’t understand what anybody’s asking me or wanting me to
do.”94 	He 	reported 	difficulties 	concentrating, 	staying 	focused, 	and
understanding, and stated that he believed he had the functionality of a
10-year-old.95
The ALJ ultimately found Griest’s testimony to be inconsistent with
the objective clinical findings.96 The ALJ recounted the objective medical
evidence, 	including 	normal 	and 	abnormal 	mental 	status 	findings,
Griest’s periods of incarceration and the conduct underlying his criminal
history, 	and 	the 	medical 	examinations 	in 	the 	record.97 	She 	also
considered Griest’s activities of daily living, which included his ability to
92 Tr. 51-52.
93 Tr. 52-53.
94 Tr. 1256.
95 Tr. 1258, 1260.
96 Tr. 1222-26.
97 Tr. 1223-26.
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perform personal care, household chores, 	shop in 	stores, 	read, 	and
manage social media.98 	Ultimately, while the ALJ acknowledged that
Griest had some limitations performing these activities, she concluded
that Griest was not as limited as he alleged.99
Having made these findings, the ALJ found at Step 4 that Griest
had no past relevant work but found at Step 5 that he could perform the
occupations of a floor waxer and hand packager.100 Accordingly, the ALJ
found that Griest had not met the stringent standard prescribed for
disability benefits and denied his claim.101
This appeal followed. 	On appeal, Griest argues that the ALJ’s
decision is not supported by substantial evidence because she failed to
find Griest
per se disabled at Step 3, insisting that he meets Listing
12.08. This case is fully briefed and is therefore ripe for resolution. For
the 	reasons 	set 	forth 	below, 	we 	will 	affirm 	the 	decision 	of 	the
Commissioner.
98 Tr. 1225-26.
99 Tr. 1226.
100 Tr. 1229-30.
101 Tr. 1231.
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III. 	Discussion
A. Substantial Evidence Review – the Role of this Court
This Court’s review of the Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits
is limited to the question of whether the findings of the final decision-
maker 	are 	supported 	by 	substantial 	evidence 	in 	the 	record.102
Substantial evidence “does not mean a large or considerable amount of
evidence, but rather such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”103 	Substantial evidence
means less than a preponderance of the evidence but more than a mere
scintilla.104
A single piece of evidence is not substantial evidence if the ALJ
“ignores, 	or 	fails 	to 	resolve, 	a 	conflict 	created 	by 	countervailing
evidence.”105 	However, where there has been an adequately developed
102
See 42 U.S.C. §405(g);
Johnson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 529 F.3d 198,
200 (3d Cir. 2008);
Ficca v. Astrue, 901 F. Supp. 2d 533, 536 (M.D. Pa.
2012).
103
Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988).
104
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971).
105
Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1064 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting
Kent v.
Schweiker, 	710 	F.2d 	110, 	114 	(3d 	Cir. 	1983)) 	(internal 	quotations
omitted).
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factual record, substantial evidence may be “something less than the
weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two inconsistent
conclusions from the evidence does not prevent [the ALJ’s decision] from
being supported by substantial evidence.”106 	The court must “scrutinize
the record as a whole” to determine if the decision is supported by
substantial evidence.107
The Supreme Court has explained the limited scope of our review,
noting 	that 	“[substantial 	evidence] 	means—and 	means 	only—‘such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.’”108 	Under this standard, we must look to the
existing 	administrative 	record 	to 	determine 	if 	there 	is 	“‘sufficient
evidence’ to support the agency’s factual determinations.”109 	Thus, the
question before us is not whether the claimant is disabled, but rather
whether the Commissioner’s finding that he or she is not disabled is
106
Consolo v. Fed. Maritime Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966).
107
Leslie v. Barnhart, 304 F. Supp.2d 623, 627 (M.D. Pa. 2003).
108
Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1154 (quoting
Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB,
305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).
109
Id.
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supported 	by 	substantial 	evidence 	and 	was 	based 	upon 	a 	correct
application of the law.110
When conducting this review, we must remain mindful that “we
must not substitute our own judgment for that of the fact finder.”111
Thus, we cannot re-weigh the evidence. Instead, we must determine
whether there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s findings. 	In
doing so, we must also determine whether the ALJ’s decision meets the
burden of articulation necessary to enable judicial review; that is, the
ALJ must articulate the reasons for his decision.112 This does not require
the ALJ to use “magic” words, but rather the ALJ must discuss the
evidence and explain the reasoning behind his or her decision with more
110
See Arnold v. Colvin, No. 3:12-CV-02417, 2014 WL 940205, at *1 (M.D.
Pa. Mar. 11, 2014) (“[I]t has been held that an ALJ’s errors of law denote
a 	lack 	of 	substantial 	evidence”) 	(alterations 	omitted);
	Burton 	v.
Schweiker, 512 F. Supp. 913, 914 (W.D. Pa. 1981) (“The Secretary’s
determination as to the status of a claim requires the correct application
of the law to the facts”);
see also Wright v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 675, 678
(3d Cir. 1990) (noting that the scope of review on legal matters is
plenary);
Ficca, 901 F. Supp. 2d at 536 (“[T]he court has plenary review
of all legal issues . . . .”).
111
Zirnsak v. Colvin, 777 F.3d 607, 611 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing
Rutherford
v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 552 (3d Cir. 2005)).
112
Burnett v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 220 F.3d 112, 119 (3d Cir.
2000).
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than just conclusory statements.113 	Ultimately, the ALJ’s decision must
be accompanied by “a clear and satisfactory explication of the basis on
which it rests.”114
B. Initial Burdens of Proof, Persuasion, and Articulation for the ALJ
To receive disability benefits under the Social Security Act, a
claimant must show that he or she is unable to “engage in any substantial
gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or
mental impairment which can be expected to result in death, or which
has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less
than 12 months.”115 	This requires a claimant to show a severe physical
or mental impairment that precludes him or her from engaging in
previous work or “any other substantial gainful work which exists in the
national economy.”116 	To receive benefits under Title II of the Social
Security Act, a claimant must show that he or she is under retirement
113
See Diaz v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 577 F.3d 500, 504 (3d Cir. 2009)
(citations omitted).
114
Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 704 (3d Cir. 1981).
115 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(1)(A); 42 U.S.C. §1382c(a)(3)(A);
see also 20 C.F.R.
§§404.1505(a), 416.905(a).
116 	42 	U.S.C. 	§423(d)(2)(A); 	42 	U.S.C. 	§1382c(a)(3)(B); 	20 	C.F.R.
§§404.1505(a), 416.905(a).
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age, contributed to the insurance program, and became disabled prior to
the date on which he or she was last insured.117
In 	making 	this 	determination, 	the 	ALJ 	follows 	a 	five-step
evaluation.118 	The 	ALJ 	must 	sequentially 	determine 	whether 	the
claimant: (1) is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) has a severe
impairment; (3) has a severe impairment that meets or equals a listed
impairment; (4) is able to do his or her past relevant work; and (5) is able
to do any other work, 	considering his or her age, education, 	work
experience and residual functional capacity (“RFC”).119
Between Steps 3 and 4, the ALJ must also determine the claimant’s
residual functional capacity (RFC). 	RFC is defined as “that which an
individual is still able to do despite the limitations caused by his or her
impairment(s).”120 In making this assessment, the ALJ must consider all
the claimant’s medically determinable impairments, including any non-
severe impairments identified by the ALJ at step two of his or her
117 42 U.S.C. §423(a); 20 C.F.R. §404.131(a).
118 20 C.F.R. §§404.1520(a), 416.920(a).
119 20 C.F.R. §§404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4).
120
Burnett, 220 F.3d at 121 (citations omitted);
see also 20 C.F.R. §
404.1545(a)(1).
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analysis.121 Our review of the ALJ’s determination of the plaintiff’s RFC
is deferential, and that determination will not be set aside if it is
supported by substantial evidence.122
The claimant bears the burden at Steps 1 through 4 to show a
medically 	determinable 	impairment 	that 	prevents 	him 	or 	her 	from
engaging in any past relevant work.123 	If met, the burden then shifts to
the Commissioner to show at Step 5 that there are jobs in significant
numbers 	in 	the 	national 	economy 	that 	the 	claimant 	can 	perform
consistent 	with 	the 	claimant’s 	RFC, 	age, 	education, 	and 	work
experience.124
With 	respect 	to 	the 	RFC 	determination, 	courts 	have 	followed
different paths when considering the impact of medical opinion evidence
on this determination. 	While some courts emphasize the necessity of
medical opinion evidence to craft a claimant’s RFC, other courts have
taken the approach that “[t]here is no legal requirement that a physician
121 20 C.F.R. §§404.1545(a)(2), 416.945(a)(2).
122
Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113, 129 (3d Cir. 2002).
123
Mason, 994 F.2d at 1064.
124 20 C.F.R. §§404.1512(f), 416.912(f);
Mason, 994 F.2d at 1064.
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have made the particular findings that an ALJ adopts in the course of
determining an RFC.”125 	Additionally, in cases that involve no credible
medical opinion evidence, courts have held that “the proposition that an
ALJ must always base his RFC on a medical opinion from a physician is
misguided.”126
Given these differing approaches, we must evaluate the factual
context 	underlying 	an 	ALJ’s 	decision. 	Cases 	that 	emphasize 	the
importance of medical opinion support for an RFC assessment typically
arise in the factual setting where well-supported medical sources have
found limitations to support a disability claim, but an ALJ has rejected
the medical opinion based upon an assessment of other evidence.127
These cases simply restate the notion that medical opinions are entitled
to careful consideration when making a disability determination. On the
other hand, when no medical opinion supports a disability finding or
when an ALJ relies upon other evidence to fashion an RFC, courts have
125
Titterington v. Barnhart, 174 F. App’x 6, 11 (3d Cir. 2006);
see also
Biller v. Acting Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 962 F. Supp. 2d 761, 778–79 (W.D.
Pa. 2013).
126
Cummings v. Colvin, 129 F. Supp. 3d 209, 214–15 (W.D. Pa. 2015).
127
Biller, 962 F. Supp. 2d at 778–79.
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routinely sustained the ALJ’s exercise of independent judgment based
upon all the facts and evidence.128 	Ultimately, it is our task to
determine, 	considering 	the 	entire 	record, 	whether 	the 	RFC
determination is supported by substantial evidence.129
C. Standards Governing Step 3 of the Sequential Analysis
At Step 3 of this sequential analysis, the ALJ is required to
determine 	whether 	a 	claimant’s 	impairments 	or 	combination 	of
impairments are so severe that they are
per se disabling, entitling the
claimant to benefits. 	As part of this analysis, the ALJ must determine
whether a claimant’s alleged impairment is equivalent to one or more
listed 	impairments, 	commonly 	referred 	to 	as 	listings, 	that 	are
acknowledged to be so severe as to preclude the claimant from working.130
Thus, if a claimant’s impairment meets or equals one of the listed
impairments, the claimant is considered
per se disabled and is awarded
128
See Titterington, 174 F. App’x 6;
Cummings, 129 F. Supp. 3d at 214–
15.
129
Burns, 312 F.3d 113.
130 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iii); 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, App. 1;
Burnett, 220 F.3d 112, 119.
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benefits.131 	The 	claimant 	bears 	the 	burden 	of 	presenting “medical
findings equivalent in severity to
all the criteria for the one most similar
impairment.”132 	An impairment that meets or equals only some of the
criteria for a listed impairment will not be sufficient.133
This Step 3 determination is a medical determination. Accordingly,
the claimant must present medical evidence or a medical opinion showing
that his or her impairment meets or equals a listing. However, the ALJ
is not required to accept a physician’s opinion if the opinion is not
supported by objective medical evidence.134 	The ALJ is responsible for
identifying the relevant listed impairments, given that it is it is “the
ALJ’s duty to investigate the facts and develop the arguments both for
and against granting benefits.”135
131 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(d);
Burnett, 220 F.3d at 119.
132
	Sullivan 	v. 	Zebley, 	493 	U.S. 	521, 	531 	(1990) 	(citing 	20 	C.F.R.
§416.920(d); SSR 83-19 at 91).
133
Id.
134
See Schwartz v. Halter, 134 F. Supp. 2d 640, 659 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
135
Burnett, 220 F.3d at 120 n.2.
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D. The ALJ’s Decision is Supported by Substantial Evidence.
Our review of the ALJ’s decision denying an application for benefits
is significantly deferential. Our task is simply to determine whether the
ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record; that is
“only— ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.’”136 	Judged against this deferential
standard of review, we conclude that substantial evidence supported the
ALJ’s decision in this case.
Griest contends that the ALJ should have found him disabled at
Step 3 because he meets Listing 12.08. 	Listing 12.08 requires that a
claimant provide evidence of both “A” and “B” criteria as follows:
12.08 Personality and impulse-control disorders (see 12.00B7)
satisfied by A and B:
A. Medical documentation of a pervasive pattern of one or
more of the following:
1. Distrust and suspiciousness of others;
2. Detachment from social relationships;
3. Disregard for and violation of the rights of others;
4. Instability of interpersonal relationships;
5. Excessive emotionality and attention seeking;
6. Feelings of inadequacy;
136
Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1154.
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7. Excessive need to be taken care of;
8. Preoccupation with perfectionism and orderliness; or
9. 	Recurrent, 	impulsive, 	aggressive 	behavioral
outbursts.
AND
B. Extreme limitation of one, or marked limitation of two, of
the following areas of mental functioning (see 12.00F):
1. Understand, remember, or apply information (see
12.00E1).
2. Interact with others (see 12.00E2).
3. Concentrate, persist, or maintain pace (see 12.00E3).
4. Adapt or manage oneself (see 12.00E4).137
Here, Griest contends that he meets the listing because his medical
records establish several of the paragraph “A” criteria, including feelings
of 	inadequacy, 	excessive 	need 	to 	be 	taken 	care 	of, 	and 	recurrent,
impulsive, aggressive behavioral outbursts.138 	But Griest does no more
than summarize his history of mental health treatment to include several
hospitalizations 	and 	treatment 	for 	impulse 	control 	disorder 	while
incarcerated.139 Griest does not point to any specific medical records that
establish one or more of the paragraph “A” criteria for the listing. But as
137 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 12.08.
138 Doc. 11 at 8-9.
139
Id.
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we will explain below, even if the record evidence established the “A”
criteria, Griest fails to show that he meets the “B” criteria, and therefore,
satisfies the listing.
Griest contends that the medical evidence establishes an extreme
limitation in interacting with others, which would satisfy the listing’s “B”
criteria.140 He argues in a conclusory fashion that his inability to interact
with others was “the basis of his incarceration” and thus, establishes an
extreme limitation.141 	Additionally, Griest appears to argue that the
medical opinion evidence establishes such a limitation.142 	But none of
the medical opinions of record found such extreme limitations. 	In fact,
the medical opinions found, at most, a moderate limitation in Griest’s
ability to interact with others.143 	These medical opinions considered
140 Doc. 11 at 9-10.
141
Id. at 9.
142
Id. at 10-12.
143
See Tr. 78-83, 93-99, 862, 888-89. 	We note that Griest summarily
argues 	these 	opinions 	and 	the 	medical 	evidence 	establish 	extreme
limitations in other areas of functioning. Doc. 11 at 12. 	However, this
argument appears undeveloped. Moreover, it is clear that these opinions,
which found moderate limitations in the areas of mental functioning, do
not support extreme limitations in these areas, and Griest provides no
evidence to establish otherwise.
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Griest’s 	history 	of 	incarceration 	and 	mental 	health 	treatment.144
Moreover, the ALJ noted Griest’s testimony and function report, which
indicated that he had gotten along with his employer when he worked,
and that he had no problem interacting with others.145
The ALJ, in considering Griest’s criminal history and history of
mental health impairments, accounted for greater limitations in this
area than the medical opinions, as she limited Griest to no interaction
with the public and only occasional interaction with supervisors and
coworkers to account for a marked limitation in this area.146 	The ALJ
adequately explained her reasoning for such a limitation, and further, for
her determination that Griest did not meet a listing. Accordingly, we find
no error with the ALJ’s Step 3 determination.
Given that the ALJ considered all the evidence and adequately
explained the decision for including or discounting certain limitations as
established 	by 	the 	evidence, 	we 	find 	no 	error 	with 	the 	decision.
Therefore, under the deferential standard of review that applies to
144
Id.
145 Tr. 1221-22, 1225.
146 Tr. 1217, 1227-29.
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appeals of Social Security disability determinations, we conclude that
substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s evaluation of this case, and this
decision will be affirmed.
IV. 	Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Commissioner in this
case will be affirmed, and the plaintiff’s appeal denied.
An appropriate order follows.
Submitted this 4th day of March 2026.
s/ Daryl F. Bloom
Daryl F. Bloom
Chief United States Magistrate Judge
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