Case Name in Social Security Case - Unavailable

Page 1 of 15
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
RACHEL REBECCA YOHN,
Plaintiff,
v.
FRANK BISIGNANO,
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
: 	NO. 1:25-CV-00543
:
: 	(BRANN, C.J.)
:
: 	(CAMONI, M.J.)
:
:
:
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff 	Rachel 	Yohn 	brought 	this 	action 	under 	42 	U.S.C.
§ 1383(c)(3), 	seeking 	judicial 	review 	of 	the 	final 	decision 	of 	the
Commissioner of Social Security denying her claim for disability benefits
under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act. Doc. 11-9 at 37.
Yohn argues that the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) erred by
failing to properly evaluate the opinions of certain medical professionals
in crafting her residual functional capacity. See Pl.’s Br., doc. 16 at 9, 14.
Because the ALJ’s determinations are supported by substantial evidence,
the undersigned respectfully recommends that the Court affirm the
decision of the Commissioner.
Case 1:25-cv-00543-MWB Document 20 Filed 01/30/26 Page 1 of 15

Page 2 of 15
I. 	BACKGROUND
A. 	Procedural History
On 	September 	11, 	2020, 	Yohn 	applied 	for 	disability 	benefits,
alleging disability beginning March 23, 2021. Transcript, doc. 11-3 at 3.
Following an initial denial, Yohn exhausted the administrative appeal
process and filed a prior action in this Court. See Yohn v. Kijakazi, No.
23-126, Complaint, doc. 1 (2023). In that prior action, the Commissioner
filed 	and 	the 	Court 	granted 	an 	unopposed 	motion 	for 	remand,
determining that further evaluation of Yohn’s claims was warranted. See
id., doc. 18 ¶ 3.
Pursuant to the Court’s remand order, an ALJ conducted a new
hearing and determined once again that Yohn was not disabled. Doc. 11-
9 at 19, 37. Yohn filed a request for review of the ALJ’s decision, which
the Appeals Council denied. Id. at 11. The ALJ’s decision, therefore,
became the final decision of the Commissioner. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Pending before this Court is Yohn’s action seeking judicial review of the
Commissioner’s decision. Complaint, Doc. 1. This case is fully briefed
(docs. 16, 18, 19) and ripe for resolution.
Case 1:25-cv-00543-MWB Document 20 Filed 01/30/26 Page 2 of 15

Page 3 of 15
B. 	The Disability Determination Process
To determine whether a claimant is disabled under the Social
Security Act, an ALJ applies a “five-step sequential evaluation process.”
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). The ALJ assesses whether the claimant:
1. 	has engaged in substantial gainful activity since the
onset of the alleged disability;
2. 	had a severe medically determinable impairment;
3. 	suffered from an impairment listed in the regulations as
presumptively disabling;
4. 	could return to his past work; and
5. 	could 	perform 	other 	available 	work 	in 	the 	national
economy.
See § 404.1520(a)(4)(i)–(v).
Between steps three and four, the ALJ also determines whether the
claimant’s residual functional capacity (RFC) allows the claimant to
continue his previous employment. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). RFC “is the most
[a claimant] can still do despite” impairments. § 404.1545(a)(1).
C. 	Issues on Appeal
After 	following 	the 	five-step 	sequential 	analysis, 	the 	ALJ
determined that Yohn “has not been under a disability” from “March 23,
2019, through the date of this decision.” Doc. 11-9 at 37. The ALJ found,
Case 1:25-cv-00543-MWB Document 20 Filed 01/30/26 Page 3 of 15

Page 4 of 15
at step two, that Yohn suffers from the following severe impairments:
“degenerative disc disease, osteoarthritis, obesity, fibromyalgia, seizures
disorder, 	migraine 	headaches, 	asthma, 	obstructive 	sleep 	apnea,
adjustment disorder, depression, anxiety, and PTSD.” Id. at 21-22. Most
relevant to Yohn’s appeal is the ALJ’s RFC determination. Doc. 16 at 9,
14. At the RFC stage, the ALJ found that Yohn has the capacity:
[T]o perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and
416.967(b) except stand and/or walk for four hours, occasional
postural movements except never ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, avoid
concentrated 	exposure 	to 	temperature 	extremes, 	wetness,
humidity, 	vibration, 	fumes, 	odors, 	dusts, 	gases, 	and 	poor
ventilation, 	avoid 	all 	exposure 	to 	dangerous 	machinery 	and
unprotected heights, and work that is limited to simple and routine
tasks, involving only simple, work-related decisions, and with few,
if any, work place changes.
Doc. 11-9 at 24.
Yohn raises two issues, challenging the ALJ’s RFC determination:
(1) whether the ALJ failed to properly evaluate the opinions of nurse
practitioner Hammon and Doctors Kneifati, Jonas, and Long; and (2)
whether Jonas and Long’s opinions that Yohn is limited to “short, simple
instructions” and “simple instructions” conflict with the jobs that the ALJ
identified that Yohn could perform, which require a reasoning level of
two. Doc. 16 at 9, 14.
Case 1:25-cv-00543-MWB Document 20 Filed 01/30/26 Page 4 of 15

Page 5 of 15
Because 	the 	ALJ 	“did 	weave 	supportability 	and 	consistency
throughout [his] analysis of which doctors were persuasive,” Zaborowski
v. Commissioner of Social Security, 115 F.4th 637, 639 (3d Cir. 2024), and
the limitation to “simple instructions” does not conflict with a reasoning
level two job, the undersigned recommends that the Court, adhering to
the deferential standard of review outlined below, affirm the decision of
the Commissioner.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
In reviewing the Commissioner’s final decision denying a claimant’s
application for benefits, the Court is limited to determining whether the
findings 	of 	the 	final 	decision-maker 	are 	supported 	by 	substantial
evidence 	in 	the 	record. See 42 	U.S.C. 	§ 1383(c)(3) 	(incorporating 42
U.S.C. § 405(g) by reference); Johnson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 529 F.3d
198, 200 (3d Cir. 2008); Ficca v. Astrue, 901 F. Supp. 2d 533, 536 (M.D.
Pa. 2012). Under the substantial-evidence standard, a court examines an
existing administrative record and asks whether it contains sufficient
evidence 	to 	support 	the 	agency’s 	factual 	determinations. 	Biestek 	v.
Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 102 (2019). Substantial evidence does not mean a
large or considerable amount of evidence, but rather “such relevant
Case 1:25-cv-00543-MWB Document 20 Filed 01/30/26 Page 5 of 15

Page 6 of 15
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Id. at 103; see also Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565
(1988). Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance of the evidence
but more than a mere scintilla. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401
(1971). A single piece of evidence is not substantial evidence if the ALJ
ignores countervailing evidence or fails to resolve a conflict created by
the evidence. Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1064 (3d Cir. 1993). In an
adequately developed factual record, however, substantial evidence may
be “something less than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of
drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent
[the 	ALJ’s 	decision] 	from 	being 	supported 	by 	substantial
evidence.” Consolo v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966). “In
determining if the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial
evidence the court must scrutinize the record as a whole.” Leslie v.
Barnhart, 304 F. Supp. 2d 623, 627 (M.D. Pa. 2003). In reviewing the
record for substantial evidence, “[n]either the district court nor [the Third
Circuit] is empowered to weigh the evidence or substitute its conclusions
for those of the fact-finder.” Williams, 970 F.2d at 1182. To reverse the
ALJ’s findings and decision, the Court “must find that the evidence not
Case 1:25-cv-00543-MWB Document 20 Filed 01/30/26 Page 6 of 15

Page 7 of 15
only 	supports 	[a 	contrary] 	conclusion 	but 	compels 	it.” 	Immigr. 	&
Naturalization Serv. v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 n.1 (1992).
The question before the Court, therefore, is not whether Yohn is
disabled, but whether the Commissioner’s finding that Yohn is not
disabled is supported by substantial evidence and was reached based
upon a correct application of the relevant law. See Arnold v. Colvin, No.
12-2417, 2014 WL 940205, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 2014) (“[I]t has been
held 	that 	an 	ALJ’s 	errors 	of 	law 	denote 	a 	lack 	of 	substantial
evidence.”); Burton 	v. 	Schweiker, 	512 	F. 	Supp. 	913, 	914 	(W.D. 	Pa.
1981) (“The [Commissioner]’s determination as to the status of a claim
requires the correct application of the law to the facts.”); see also Wright
v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 675, 678 (3d Cir. 1990) (noting that the scope of
review on legal matters is plenary); Ficca, 901 F. Supp. 2d at 536 (“[T]he
court 	has 	plenary 	review 	of 	all 	legal 	issues 	decided 	by 	the
Commissioner.”). In determining that question, the Court must evaluate
whether the ALJ’s decision meets the burden of articulation necessary to
enable judicial review; that is, the ALJ must articulate the reasons for
his decision beyond stating bare conclusions. Burnett v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 220 F.3d 112, 119 (3d Cir. 2000).
Case 1:25-cv-00543-MWB Document 20 Filed 01/30/26 Page 7 of 15

Page 8 of 15
III. 	ANALYSIS
Yohn 	disputes 	how 	the 	ALJ 	evaluated 	the 	persuasiveness 	of
medical opinions. Doc. 16 at 9, 14. Specifically, Yohn asserts that the ALJ
failed to explain his reasoning. Id. Moreover, Yohn contends that the ALJ
failed to account for two doctors’ RFC findings that limited Yohn to
“short, 	simple 	instructions” 	and 	“simple 	instructions,” 	which, 	Yohn
argues, conflict with the reasoning level two jobs that the ALJ found for
Yohn. Id. at 15.
A. 	The 	ALJ’s 	RFC 	determination 	is 	supported 	by
substantial evidence.
The ALJ’s burden of articulation is not high. The ALJ “may consider
many factors yet base a decision on just one or two.” Zaborowski, 115
F.4th at 639. The ALJ need only explain the “dispositive reasons for their
decisions, not everything else that they considered.” Id. “[I]n most cases,
a sentence or short paragraph would probably suffice.” Cotter v. Harris,
650 F.2d 481, 482 (3d Cir. 1981). The ALJ here satisfied his burden.
1. 	Nurse Hammon and Dr. Kneifati’s medical opinions.
First, Yohn argues that the ALJ failed to evaluate the medical
opinions of Nurse Practitioner Karena Hammon and Dr. Ahmed Kneifati,
resulting in a flawed RFC. Doc. 16 at 9. But the ALJ clearly explained
Case 1:25-cv-00543-MWB Document 20 Filed 01/30/26 Page 8 of 15

Page 9 of 15
that Nurse Hammon and Dr. Kneifati’s opinions limiting the claimant to
less than the full range of sedentary work are not supported by the
claimant’s overall presentation at the consultative examinations. Doc.
11-9 at 32, 34. Nurse Hammon and Dr. Kneifati’s evaluations, as the ALJ
cited, revealed that Yohn had a range of normal findings in her joints,
reflexes, senses, and strength. Id., citing Exs. B9F, B12F; id. at 34 (noting
that Yohn presented with stable joints, normal reflexes, and full strength
in lower extremities). The ALJ explained this internal consistency to
support 	his 	conclusion 	that 	Hammon 	and 	Kneifati’s 	opined 	RFC
limitation on sitting was unwarranted. “There was no need to say more
than that.” Zaborowski, 115 F.4th at 640; see also, Swank v. O’Malley,
No. 23-1244, 2024 WL 4858586, at *10 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 21, 2024) (finding
no error in an ALJ’s analysis of the consistency factor where the ALJ
noted 	that 	a 	claimant’s 	treating 	source’s 	opinion 	was 	internally
inconsistent and was at odds with many treatment notes); 	see also
Solberg v. O’Malley, No. 23-2639, 2024 WL 1943328, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Apr.
30, 2024) (finding an ALJ’s consistency assessment, which determined a
medical 	opinion 	unpersuasive 	because 	it 	was 	inconsistent 	with 	the
source’s own treatment notes, “well-reasoned and adequate”).
Case 1:25-cv-00543-MWB Document 20 Filed 01/30/26 Page 9 of 15

Page 10 of 15
Yohn, however, argues that the ALJ overlooked positive findings.
Doc. 16 at 10 (tenderness and restriction in motion); id. at 12 (gait and
ability to rise from seated position). But the ALJ did not overlook these
findings. Doc. 11-9 at 32 (“She requires the use of a cane to ambulate”);
id. at 30 (“She was unable to walk without the use of a walker but was
able to get on and off the exam table and rise from a chair without
difficulty.”). For both medical opinions, the ALJ acknowledged that Yohn
used a cane to help stabilize her gait, but found that, upon examination,
she presented with normal findings. See id. at 32, 34. The ALJ weighed
the evidence, including the positive findings that Yohn notes, and made
a 	determination. 	Accordingly, 	the 	ALJ’s 	RFC 	determination 	was
supported by substantial evidence. Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d 1178,
1186-87 (3d Cir. 1992) (“[The ALJ] has an obligation to weigh the medical
evidence 	and 	make 	choices 	between 	conflicting 	medical 	evidence.”);
Consolo, 383 U.S. at 620 (noting that substantial evidence may be
“something less than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of
drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent
[the ALJ’s decision] from being supported by substantial evidence.”).
Case 1:25-cv-00543-MWB Document 20 Filed 01/30/26 Page 10 of 15

Page 11 of 15
2. 	Drs. Jonas and Long’s evaluations.
The ALJ also adequately explained his consideration of Drs. Jonas
and Long’s evaluations. Doc. 11-9 at 33. The ALJ found that “the record
as a whole,” “shows that the claimant has no more than a mild limitation
in her ability to understand, remember, or apply information, as set forth
above, with her subsequent treatment notes showing overall stable
findings in terms of cognition and overall presentation.” Id., citing Exs.
B36F and B39F.
Although Yohn argues that the ALJ failed to add that Dr. Jonas
found Yohn’s stress tolerance to be limited, doc. 16 at 14, and that the
ALJ identified parts, “but not all of” Dr. Jonas’s RFC, Yohn’s Reply Br.,
doc. 19 at 1, the ALJ need only explain “the dispositive reasons for their
decisions, not everything else that they considered.” Zaborowski, 115
F.4th at 639; Zirnsak v. Colvin, 777 F.3d 607, 615 (3d Cir. 2014) (noting
the 	ALJ’s 	wide 	discretion 	in 	choosing 	to 	include 	or 	not 	include 	a
limitation); Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 42 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[W]e
do not expect the ALJ to make reference to every relevant treatment note
in a case where the claimant . . . has voluminous medical records[.]”).
Case 1:25-cv-00543-MWB Document 20 Filed 01/30/26 Page 11 of 15

Page 12 of 15
Yohn also argues that the ALJ’s consistency analysis fails to show
how 	the 	ALJ 	considered 	consistency. 	Doc. 	16 	at 	14. 	But 	the 	ALJ
undoubtedly explained that Dr. Jonas’s and Dr. Long’s opinions are “not
consistent with the record as a whole,” and noted the “subsequent
treatment notes showing overall stable findings in terms of cognition and
overall presentation.” Doc. 11-9, citing Exs. B36F, B39F. To articulate
consistency, an ALJ “need not reiterate the magic words ‘support’ and
‘consistent’ for each doctor.” Zaborowski, 115 F.4th at 639. The ALJ need
only “weave supportability and consistency throughout her analysis of
which doctors were persuasive.” Id. The ALJ here did just that. The
undersigned, therefore, finds that the ALJ’s RFC determination, taking
into consideration Dr. Jonas’s and Dr. Long’s opinions, is supported by
substantial 	evidence. 	Id. 	(finding 	an 	ALJ’s 	consistency 	articulation
sufficient where the ALJ explained how the opinions “fit with other
evidence”).
B. 	RFC and Reasoning Level
Yohn 	also 	argues 	that 	there 	is 	a 	conflict 	between 	the 	RFC
limitations that Dr. Jonas and Dr. Long found and the reasoning level
Case 1:25-cv-00543-MWB Document 20 Filed 01/30/26 Page 12 of 15

Page 13 of 15
two jobs that the ALJ identified for Yohn. Doc. 16 at 15; Doc. 19 at 2. The
undersigned finds no error.
The ALJ determined that Dr. Jonas’s and Dr. Long’s asserted
limitations point to Yohn’s “intact ability to perform simple and routine
tasks.” Doc. 11-9 at 33. Thus, the ALJ limited Yohn to performing “work
that 	is 	limited 	to 	simple 	and 	routine 	tasks,” 	in 	his 	ultimate 	RFC
determination. Id. at 24.
Although a claimant who is limited to “very short and simple
instructions” or “short and simple instructions” cannot perform jobs
identified at reasoning level two, a claimant such as Yohn, who is only
limited to “simple instructions,” can. Money v. Barnhart, 91 F. App’x 210,
215 (3d Cir. 2004) (concluding that working at reasoning level two would
not contradict the mandate that work be simple, routine, and repetitive);
see also Lawrence v. Saul, 941 F.3d 140, 143 (4th Cir. 2019) (finding no
conflict between an RFC to carry out simple instructions and jobs that
require reasoning level two). Because the ALJ determined that Yohn is
“limited to simple and routine tasks,” Doc. 11-9 at 24, not “very short” or
“short 	and 	simple” 	instructions, 	the 	ALJ’s 	RFC 	limitation 	and 	the
reasoning level two jobs identified do not conflict.
Case 1:25-cv-00543-MWB Document 20 Filed 01/30/26 Page 13 of 15

Page 14 of 15
On 	the 	whole, 	the 	ALJ’s 	decision 	is 	supported 	by 	substantial
evidence, and should be affirmed.
IV. 	RECOMMENDATION
Accordingly, the undersigned respectfully recommends that:
(1) 	The decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying
Yohn’s benefits under the Social Security Act be AFFIRMED;
and
(2) 	The Clerk of Court be DIRECTED to CLOSE this case.
An appropriate order follows.
The parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule
72.3:
Any 	party 	may 	object 	to 	a 	magistrate 	judge’s 	proposed
findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter
described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation
for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition
within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof.
Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the
magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall
specifically 	identify 	the 	portions 	of 	the 	proposed 	findings,
recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis
for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local
Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination
of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or
recommendations to which objection is made and may accept,
reject, 	or 	modify, 	in 	whole 	or 	in 	part, 	the 	findings 	or
recommendations 	made 	by 	the 	magistrate 	judge. 	The 	judge,
however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion
or where required by law, and may consider the record developed
before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination
on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further
Case 1:25-cv-00543-MWB Document 20 Filed 01/30/26 Page 14 of 15

Page 15 of 15
evidence, 	recall 	witnesses, 	or 	recommit 	the 	matter 	to 	the
magistrate judge with instructions.
Date: January 30, 2026 	s/Sean A. Camoni
Sean A. Camoni
United States Magistrate Judge
Case 1:25-cv-00543-MWB Document 20 Filed 01/30/26 Page 15 of 15