Colon-Marte v. Menges et al

1:25-cv-00509Pamd27.02.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MIGUEL A. COLON-MARTE, : No. 1:25-CV-509
:
Plaintiff : (Neary, J.)
:
v. : (Caraballo, M.J.)
:
LESLIE A. MARTINEZ-ARCE, :
et al., :
:
Defendants :
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
The undersigned respectfully recommends that the Court dismiss
Plaintiff Miguel Colon-Marte’s third amended complaint. Doc. 17. The
gravamen of that pleading, which invokes Title 42, United States Code,
Sections 1983 and 1985(3) for federal question jurisdiction, presents
Colon-Marte’s grievances concerning state custody proceedings
involving three private parties and two state court judges. Id. at 3–5.
The operative complaint lists five theories: (1) Fourteenth Amendment
violation of due process rights, under Section 1983; (2) Fourteenth
Amendment violation of equal protection, under Section 1983; (3) First
Amendment violation of religious freedom, under Section 1983; (4) civil
conspiracy to violate civil rights, under Section 1985(3); and (5) abuse of
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process and conflict of interest, both of which are state law claims
brought under supplemental jurisdiction, pursuant to Title 28, United
States Code, Section 1367. Id. at 6–15.
All pending claims warrant dismissal, as Colon-Marte has failed
to state a plausible claim for relief. Two abstention doctrines—Rooker-
Feldman and Younger—require that the Court abstain from exercising
jurisdiction over this matter. Even if the Court were to exercise its
jurisdiction, the Sections 1983 and 1985(3) claims against the two state
judges warrant dismissal due to judicial immunity. As for the three
private parties, all Sections 1983 theories against them should be
dismissed for Colon-Marte’s repeated failure to allege plausibly that
they were state actors. All Section 1985(3) causes of action also
warrant dismissal for his failure to present plausible claims for relief.
Further, with the dismissal of all federal claims, the Court should
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state
law claims.
As Colon-Marte’s attempt to cure those pleading deficiencies
through his third amended complaint fail, the undersigned recommends
that all pending claims be dismissed with prejudice for futility. Finally,
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the pending “emergency motion to vacate or enjoin enforcement of state
custody stipulation” (Doc. 21) warrants denial, as Colon-Marte’s claims
are not likely to succeed on the merits.
I. Background
On March 20, 2025, Colon-Marte, proceeding pro se, commenced
this action against the Honorable N. Christopher Menges, a York
County judge; Michael Lister, a lawyer working for MidPenn Legal
Services (“MidPenn”); and Leslie Martinez-Arce, Colon-Marte’s ex-
spouse and a MidPenn employee (collectively “the Defendants”). Doc. 1.
The original complaint lists Colon-Marte’s grievances concerning state
custody proceedings, which allegedly involved civil conspiracies and
constitutional violations. Id. Colon-Marte simultaneously applied for
and was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, Docs. 2; 6, with the
complaint’s service held in abeyance pending the Court’s screening
obligations. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (requiring sua sponte
dismissal when an action is “(i) frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief
against a defendant who is immune from such relief.”).
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On May 29, 2025, Colon-Marte filed what appeared to be three
different iterations of an amended complaint. Doc. 8. The pleadings
delisted Judge Menges and added MidPenn. Id. at 1, 6, 10. On
September 2, 2025, the undersigned construed the filing as a motion to
amend the original complaint, and granted it, pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 15. Doc. 11.
Subsequently, on September 18, 2025, Colon-Marte moved to
“supplement” his first amended complaint. Doc. 13. On October 10,
2025, the undersigned, having construed and reviewed the motion to
supplement (which delisted Lister, Martinez-Arce, and MidPenn; re-
added Judge Menges; and added the Honorable Michael W. Flannelly
and the Honorable Gregory Snyder, both York County judges) as Colon-
Marte’s second amended complaint, issued an Order that conducted a
preliminary review of his claims. Doc. 15. There, the undersigned
noted several pleading deficiencies in the second amended complaint.
Id. Of particular relevance were the apparent failure to overcome the
Rooker-Feldman and Younger doctrines, and the attempt to sue private
parties and state judges in his purported Section 1983 suit. Id. at 5–8.
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The undersigned also granted Colon-Marte “one last chance” to
amend his complaint, pursuant to Rule 15. Id. at 9–10. He complied,
and submitted his third amended complaint on October 15, 2025.
Doc. 17. The pleading re-added Martinez-Arce, Lister, and MidPenn;
and delisted Judge Flannelly as a defendant. Id. at 1.
The third amended complaint presents grievances concerning the
roles played by Martinez-Arce, Lister, MidPenn, and Judges Menges
and Snyder. Id. at 3–5. Martinez-Arce is accused of using MidPenn’s
resources to “misuse legal procedures to obtain advantage in the
parties’ domestic matters.” Id. at 3. Colon-Marte alleges that Lister is
a coworker of Martinez-Arce’s who represented her in the custody
proceedings and used MidPenn’s resources. Id. The pleading surmises
that MidPenn should be held liable because it “acted under color of
state law by permitting and supporting this conflicted representation,
failing to screen the employees involved, and using publicly funded
resources for a private dispute.” Id. at 3–4. Judge Menges “refused to
consider” Colon-Marte’s explanation that his children had to attend a
Jehovah’s Witness meeting, and ordered that the children be present at
their extracurricular activities instead. Id. at 4. As for Judge Snyder,
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Colon-Marte “was fined $100 for prioritizing his religious meeting
instead of the baseball event.” Id.
Based on these allegations, the third amended complaint presents
five theories:
1. Count I: Fourteenth Amendment violation of due process
rights under Section 1983, against all Defendants;
2. Count II: Fourteenth Amendment violation of equal
protection under Section 1983, against all Defendants;
3. Count III: First Amendment violation of religious freedom
under Section 1983, against all Defendants;
4. Count IV: Civil conspiracy to violate civil rights under
Section 1985(3), against all Defendants; and
5. Count V: Abuse of process and conflict of interest, both of
which are state law claims, against Martinez-Arce, Lister,
and MidPenn.
Id. at 6–15.
Since this suit’s commencement, Colon-Marte has attempted on
four occasions to enlist the Court’s assistance in interfering with
ongoing state custody stipulation, through three motions for temporary
restraining orders, and the pending motion to vacate or enjoin.
Docs. 18; 21; 23; 25. The first motion, averring that Colon-Marte’s
minor son was undergoing a psychiatric treatment without the litigant’s
consent and that the state proceedings were involuntary and
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discriminatory, sought to “enjoin[] enforcement of a state-court custody
stipulation[.]” Doc. 18 at 2, 5–6. The second motion presented a similar
narrative, with the additional allegation of Martinez-Arce’s refusal to
cooperate hindering Colon-Marte’s work schedule. Doc. 23 at 3–6.
Likewise, in the third motion, Colon-Marte sought to “prevent non-
emergency psychiatric medication.” Doc. 25 at 2.
The Court denied all three motions for temporary restraining
order, and referred this action to the undersigned to issue this Report
and Recommendation (“R&R”), pursuant to Title 28, United States
Code, Section 636. Docs. 24; 26. On December 11, 2025, the Court
denied the first and second motions for temporary restraining orders.
Doc. 24. There, the Court determined that Colon-Marte is “[un]likely to
succeed on the merits,” as the purported defendants, all of whom are
either private parties or state judges, are not viable defendants for a
Section 1983 lawsuit. Id. at 2. Similarly, two days after the third
motion for temporary restraining order was filed, the Court denied that
motion on the same grounds. Doc. 26 at 1.
Colon-Marte’s remaining attempt at inducing federal interference
with the custody stipulation is the pending motion to vacate or enjoin
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enforcement of state custody stipulation. Doc. 21. As in the motions for
temporary restraining order, he contends that the custody proceedings
were coercive and unfair, and that maternal disagreement is interfering
with Colon-Marte’s employment obligations. Id. at 2–6.
Also relevant to this R&R are the exhibits attached to Colon-
Marte’s separate motion for clarification and limited discovery. Doc. 27.
At least four of those exhibits indicate that Colon-Marte has appealed a
state court judgment. See Docs. 27-2 (case information on appeal before
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania); 27-4 (per curiam order issued by
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, denying all outstanding motions); 27-5
(denying reconsideration motion); 27-7 (returning correspondence as
“additional documents [could not] be accepted . . .”).
II. Discussion
The undersigned recommends that the complaint be dismissed for
two reasons: Colon-Marte’s failure to (1) overcome abstention doctrines;
and (2) Colon-Marte’s failure to plead plausibly under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Also, the undersigned recommends that all
claims be dismissed with prejudice on abstention grounds or,
alternatively, futility. Finally, the pending motion to vacate or enjoin
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state custody stipulation should be denied for failure to establish
likelihood of the pending claims’ success.
A. The Court Should Abstain from This Action
The undersigned recommends dismissal, as the record shows that
this action runs afoul of at least two abstention rules; the Rooker-
Feldman and Younger doctrines. Since this action’s commencement,
Colon-Marte has sought to induce federal interference with a county
court custody order and proceedings. See, e.g., Docs. 1 at 4 (demanding
“injunctive relief to prevent” further grievances in state custody
proceedings); 17 at 5 (alleging that “state-court proceedings threaten
additional harm unless enjoined by this Court”); 18 at 2 (requesting
that the Court “enjoin[] enforcement of a state-court custody
stipulation”); 19 at 2 (admitting that Colon-Marte “seeks . . . federal
intervention . . . [of] coerced state court custody stipulation . . .”); 23 at 2
(“seek[ing] immediate federal intervention to prevent . . . [e]nforcement
of a coerced and unconstitutional stipulation . . .”). Though the
operative complaint and motions for injunctive relief try to frame Colon-
Marte’s grievances as constitutional issues, see, e.g., Doc. 17 at 1 (“good
faith to vindicate [constitutional] rights . . .”), the Court may sua sponte
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abstain from exercising its jurisdiction under the two abstention
doctrines. See Nesbit v. Gears Unlimited, Inc., 347 F.3d 72, 77 (3d Cir.
2003).
Article III of the Constitution of the United States confines federal
jurisdiction to certain “Cases” and “Controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III,
§ 2, cl. 1. Therefore, “[f]ederal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,”
wielding “only that power authorized by Constitution and statute.”
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)
(citations omitted). In other words, “subject matter jurisdiction is non-
waivable.” Nesbit, 347 F.3d at 77 (citing Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd.
of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 278 (1977)).
“[T]he court can raise sua sponte subject[ ]matter jurisdiction
concerns,” id., because “courts have an independent obligation to satisfy
themselves of jurisdiction if it is in doubt.” Id. at 76–77 (citing Healthy
City, 429 U.S. at 278). In reviewing subject matter jurisdiction under
Rule 12(b)(1), the Court “must take care not to reach the merits of a
case . . . .” Davis v. Wells Fargo, 824 F.3d 333, 348 (3d Cir. 2016)
(quotation omitted) (quoting CNA v. United States, 535 F.3d 132, 144
(3d Cir. 2008)). Relevant to these jurisdictional premises are two
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jurisprudential doctrines on federal abstention: the Rooker-Feldman
and Younger doctrines. See Lyman v. Phila. Ct. of Common Pleas,
2017 WL 2813228, at *4 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (“The Third Circuit has held
that federal claims arising out of state child custody proceedings may
implicate both the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and Younger abstention.”
(collecting cases))
The first rule, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, bars “cases brought
by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court
judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced
and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.”
Great W. Mining & Min. Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 166
(3d Cir. 2010) (quotation omitted) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi
Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)); see also Rooker v. Fid. Tr.
Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462
(1983). Put simply, federal district courts should refrain from claiming
“jurisdiction over suits that are essentially appeals from state-court
judgments,” Great W., 615 F.3d at 165, including ones concerning
custody proceedings. See, e.g., Walsh v. Walsh, 763 F. App’x 243, 245–
46 (3d Cir. 2019) (per curiam).
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The Rooker-Feldman doctrine has four requirements: (1) the
federal plaintiff must lose in a state-court judicial proceeding; (2) the
state-court judgment or decree must be rendered before the federal
action was filed; (3) the federal plaintiff must invite the review and
rejection of the state-court judgment; and (4) the federal plaintiff must
complain of injuries caused by the state-court judgment. Merritts v.
Richards, 62 F.4th 764, 774 (3d Cir. 2023) (first citing Exxon, 544 U.S.
at 284; and then citing Great W., 615 F.3d at 166).
Here, Rooker-Feldman is applicable. As a threshold matter, the
undersigned notes that the record, for all of Colon-Marte’s complaints
about the underlying custody proceedings, fails to clarify what part or
parts of those proceedings he challenges. See, e.g., Docs. 17 at 3 (“A
final [Protection-From-Abuse (“PFA”)] order dated July 30 2021”), 4
(“ruled in favor of Defendants . . . Plaintiff was fined $100”), 5
(“enforcing . . . orders”); 17-9 (Judge Snyder’s contempt order); 27-2
(case information on appeal before Supreme Court of Pennsylvania).
Despite this factual incompleteness, in any event, the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine applies here, to the extent Colon-Marte challenges
the orders alleged and offered as evidence. See, e.g., Docs. 17 at 3–5; 17-
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9. Such orders are final for purposes of the doctrine. See, e.g., Mikhail
v. Kahn, 991 F. Supp. 2d 596, 612 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (PFA); Rapisardi v.
N.J. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 273 F. App’x 182, 183 (3d Cir. 2008) (per
curiam) (fines); Boyce v. Dembe, 47 F. App’x 155, 159 (3d Cir. 2002)
(contempt). Thus, all four requisites are met: Colon-Marte lost in a
state proceeding, filed this federal suit after the state judgments were
entered, invites federal interference, and complains about judicial bias
underlying and harms arising out of the state judgment. See, e.g.,
Docs. 1; 8; 13; 17. Though Colon-Marte alleges constitutional violations,
since “a ruling that . . . due process rights were violated based on [state]
rulings would . . . require[] the District Court to find that the state court
judgment was erroneous,” Rooker-Feldman still applies. See Ludwig v.
Berks Cnty., 313 F. App’x 479, 481 (3d Cir. 2008) (per curiam); see also,
e.g., Mikhail, 991 F. Supp. 2d at 615 (holding that “alleged injuries
caused by . . . PFA orders” run afoul of Rook-Feldman).
Under the Younger doctrine, the second roadblock to this action,
“district courts must abstain from exercising jurisdiction over a
particular claim where resolution of that claim in federal court would
offend principles of comity by interfering with an ongoing state
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proceeding.” Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 670 (3d Cir. 2010) (per
curiam) (citing Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar
Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 437 (1982)); see also Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37
(1971).
The Younger doctrine has four requirements. The first three
prongs are: “(1) there are ongoing state proceedings that are judicial in
nature; (2) the state proceedings implicate important state interests;
and (3) the state proceedings afford an adequate opportunity to raise
the federal claims.” Id. (citation and footnote omitted). Finally, the
Court must be satisfied that the action falls within one of the three
following categories: “(1) ongoing state criminal prosecutions; (2) certain
civil enforcement proceedings; and (3) civil proceedings involving
certain orders uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ ability to
perform their judicial functions.” ACRA Turf Club, LLC v. Zanzuccki,
748 F.3d 127, 136–37 (3d Cir. 2014) (cleaned up).
Here, all Younger prongs are satisfied. First, there is an ongoing
custody proceeding. See Doc. 17-13 (documents indicating that custody
proceedings were ongoing when original complaint was filed). Also,
“[c]hild custody orders are temporary in nature and always subject to
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change[,]” and thus “must . . . be viewed as a whole, rather than as
individual, [discrete] hearings.” Mikhail, 991 F. Supp. 2d at 623 (first
and last alterations in original) (citations omitted). Second, the state
proceeding implicates Pennsylvania’s legitimate interest in its families’
relations. Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 435 (1979) (“Family relations
are a traditional area of state concern.”); see also Mikhail, 991 F. Supp.
2d at 623. Third, Colon-Marte “do[es] not appear unable to raise [his]
claims and obtain relief in the state proceedings.” See Wattie-Bey v.
Att’y. Gen.’s Off., 424 F. App’x 95, 97 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam); see
also Mikhail, 991 F. Supp. 2d at 629 (“There is no bar in custody
proceedings to a parent’s raising his federal constitutional rights. In
fact, Pennsylvania courts have entertained such claims in custody
cases.” (citations omitted)); Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 16
n.16 (1987) (declaring that plaintiff “cannot escape Younger abstention
by failing to assert its state remedies in a timely manner.” (citing
Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 607–09 (1975))). The fourth
predicate is also met, as “[c]hild custody proceedings fall into the third
category and are a strong candidate for Younger abstention.” Gok v.
United States, 2023 WL 4140827, *3 (E.D. Pa. 2023) (citations omitted).
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Even if all predicates are met, abstention is inapplicable if the
plaintiff pleads one of the two named exceptions: “(1) the state
proceedings are being undertaken in bad faith or for purposes of
harassment[;] or (2) some other extraordinary circumstances exist, such
as proceedings pursuant to a flagrantly unconstitutional statute, such
that deference to the state proceeding will present a significant and
immediate potential for irreparable harm to the federal interests
asserted.” Schall v. Joyce, 885 F.2d 101, 106 (3d Cir. 1989) (first citing
Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 435; and then citing Younger, 401 U.S. at 49–50,
53–54).
Colon-Marte’s pleading instrument does not meet either of those
exceptions. First, while Colon-Marte has repeatedly alleged bias and
bad faith on the Defendants’ part, the relevant averments are
conclusory. For example, Colon-Marte avers, without supporting
allegations, that “[j]udicial rulings . . . repeatedly . . . favored the
MidPenn-connected litigant without fair consideration of the record,”
and that “[t]his disparate treatment was not the result of lawful judicial
discretion but of bias[.]” Doc. 17 at 9. Similarly, the third amended
complaint concludes without supporting premises that “[t]he adverse
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court rulings, contempt sanction, and reputational harm . . . were direct
consequences of his adherence to his religious beliefs and his refusal to
compromise worship obligations . . . .” Id. at 11. “A plaintiff seeking to
avoid Younger must affirmatively demonstrate the justification for
application of an exception; thus, mere conclusory allegations of bias are
insufficient to overcome Younger abstention.” Mikhail, 991 F. Supp. 2d
at 630 (cleaned up); see also, e.g., Gok, 2023 WL 4140827, at *4. As for
the second exception, Colon-Marte failed to allege an extraordinary
circumstance that warrants federal interference. Domestic custody
disputes are, unfortunately, commonplace, and do not present a
compelling federal interest.
In sum, the Rooker-Feldman and Younger doctrines advise
abstention. This outcome comports with Third Circuit decisions that
abstained from hearing actions arising out of state family matters
under one or both of the doctrines. See, e.g., Ludwig, 313 F. App’x at
481 (Rooker-Feldman); Mikhail v. Kahn, 572 F. App’x 68 (3d Cir. 2014)
(per curiam) (Younger); Gok, 2023 WL 4140827, at *1–4 (Rooker-
Feldman and Younger); Lyman, 2017 WL 2813228, at *3–6 (same). The
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undersigned thus recommends that the Court abstain from exercising
federal jurisdiction, and dismiss this case.
B. All Pending Federal Claims Warrant Dismissal
Alternatively, even if the Court were to consider this case on its
merits, the undersigned recommends that all pending federal claims be
dismissed for failure to state viable theories for relief. Despite being
advised of his pleading deficiencies when afforded leave to amend,
Doc. 15 at 6–7, Colon-Marte persisted in naming as defendants three
private parties (Martinez-Arce, Lister, and MidPenn) and two York
County judges (Judges Menges and Snyder) in the third amended
complaint. Doc. 17 at 2.
Colon-Marte surmises that Martinez-Arce is a state actor because
she “us[ed] her employment connections and public resources to gain
preferential treatment in court.” Id. at 7. Colon-Marte also contends
that Lister is a state actor as he used “MidPenn’s state-funded
infrastructure to prepare pleadings, contact court staff, and influence
proceedings adverse to” him. Id. As for MidPenn, Colon-Marte asserts
that it is a “publicly funded legal-aid entity operating under
Pennsylvania law[]” that “allowed [Lister] to represent [Martinez-Arce]
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in a private custody dispute,” thus “engag[ing] in state action[.]” Id.
Judges Menges and Snyder face general accusations of due process
deprivations. Id. These five defendants, Colon-Marte concludes, “acted
with malicious intent” to deprive him of his constitutional and parental
rights, and thus should be held liable under Section 1985(3). Id. at 12–
14.
None of these conclusory averments comply with the pleading
requirements of Rule 12(b)(6). And the Court has a statutory duty to
conduct a preliminary review of the amended complaint for any
“fail[ure] to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” See
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). That language mirrors the provision of
Rule 12(b)(6), which permits dismissal of a complaint on motion of a
party, and thus is subject to a similar analysis. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6);
Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App’x 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012) (per curiam)
(citing Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000)).
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.” Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780,
786 (3d Cir. 2016) (quotation omitted) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
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662, 678 (2009)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (“A pleading that states
a claim for relief must contain a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”).
The Court of Appeals employs a three-step inquiry when
determining a complaint’s sufficiency under Rule 12(b)(6). Santiago v.
Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010); see, e.g., Lutz v.
Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, 49 F.4th 323, 328 (3d Cir. 2022);
Connelly, 809 F.3d at 787. First, the reviewing court “tak[es] note of the
elements [the] plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Connelly, 809 F.3d
at 787 (second alteration in original) (quotation omitted) (quoting Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 675). The second phase is to “identify allegations that,
‘because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the
assumption of truth.’” Id. (first quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; and then
citing Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 224 (3d Cir. 2011)).
Finally, “[w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, [the]
court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they
plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. (alterations in
original) (quotation omitted) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). This last
step is done “in the light most favorable to [the plaintiff].” Kedra v.
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Schroeter, 876 F.3d 424, 434 (3d Cir. 2017) (alteration in original)
(quotation omitted) (quoting Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d
224, 228, 230 (3d Cir. 2008)). “If, after completing this process, the
complaint alleges ‘enough fact[s] to raise a reasonable expectation that
discovery will reveal evidence of’ the necessary elements of a claim,
then it plausibly pleads a claim.” Lutz, 49 F.4th at 328 (alteration in
original) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2009)).
For the reasons set forth below, each federal claim advanced by
Colon-Marte fails under that standard.
1. Claims Against the Judicial Defendants
As a preliminary matter, all pending federal claims against
Judges Menges and Snyder warrant dismissal, as Colon-Marte fails to
advance plausible allegations that may pierce the absolute immunity
afforded to judicial officers. A judicial officer generally “is immune from
a suit” for actions taken in judicial capacity. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S.
9, 9–10 (1991) (per curiam) (collecting cases). “A judge will not be
deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done
maliciously, or was in excess of his authority[.]” Stump v. Sparkman,
435 U.S. 349, 356–57 (1978). Allegations of an improper motive fails to
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defeat that immunity. See Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 227 (1988)
(citation omitted). Absolute judicial immunity does not, however,
extend to nonjudicial acts, or judicial acts done “in the complete absence
of all jurisdiction.” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11–12 (citations omitted).
Here, the underlying allegations fail to suggest that the gravamen
of the complaint falls under either exception. Colon-Marte’s basic
premise is that Judges Menges and Snyder “acted with malicious
intent” in depriving him of his constitutional, parental rights. Doc. 17
at 7, 13. This conclusory accusation of improper motive—which is
insufficient to overcome judicial immunity in any event, Forrester,
484 U.S. at 227—does not alter the premise of Colon-Marte’s grievances
being the judicial acts performed by Judges Menges and Snyder in the
underlying custody proceedings. Doc. 17 at 4. And nothing in the third
amended complaint can be construed as a claim that the two state
judicial officers lacked jurisdiction to take those actions.
Therefore, because the third mended complaint’s allegations do
not plausibly overcome the judicial immunity afforded to Judges
Menges and Snyder, the undersigned recommends dismissal of all
pending federal claims (denial of due process, denial of equal protection,
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23
denial of religious freedom, and Section 1985(3) claims, in Counts I–IV
of the third amended complaint) against them. See, e.g., Cook v. City of
Phila., 846 F. App’x 161, 163–64 (3d Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (summarily
affirming dismissals of Sections 1983 and 1985(3) claims against state
judge); Thornton v. Hens-Greco, 629 F. App’x 251, 253–54 (3d Cir. 2015)
(per curiam) (same).
2. Section 1983 Claims Against Private Actors
The undersigned recommends that all Section 1983 claims against
defendants Martinez-Arce, Lister, and MidPenn be dismissed, as Colon-
Marte has not pleaded that they qualify as state actors. Section 1983
provides that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 “is not a source of substantive rights but
rather a mechanism to vindicate rights afforded by the Constitution or
a federal statute.” Black v. Montgomery Cnty., 835 F.3d 358, 364 (3d
Cir. 2016) (citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)).
Case 1:25-cv-00509-KMN Document 29 Filed 02/27/26 Page 23 of 41
24
Thus, “the basic cause of action requires that a § 1983 plaintiff
prove two essential elements: (1) that the conduct complained of was
committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) that the
conduct deprived the plaintiff of rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Schneyder v.
Smith, 653 F.3d 313, 319 (3d Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). “A person
may be found to be a state actor when (1) he is a state official, (2) ‘he
has acted together with or has obtained significant aid from state
officials,’ or (3) his conduct is, by its nature, chargeable to the state.”
Angelico v. Lehigh Valley Hosp., Inc., 184 F.3d 268, 277 (3d Cir. 1999)
(quoting Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982)).
Here, the allegations in the third amended complaint do not
identify MidPenn, Martinez-Arce, and Lister as state actors. Regarding
MidPenn, the third amended complaint identifies it as a “publicly
funded non-profit legal-aid organization operating under state
authority.” Doc. 17 at 3. Federal courts, however, have “consistently
held that law firms and legal aid societies are not state actors for
purposes of § 1983.” Graham v. Moon Lodge Chips Corp., 2024 WL
3275960, at *4 (E.D. Pa. 2024) (collecting cases).
Case 1:25-cv-00509-KMN Document 29 Filed 02/27/26 Page 24 of 41
25
Colon-Marte’s conclusory allegations that MidPenn operated
under state authority and was “authorized by the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania to provide civil legal assistance,” and “acted under color of
state law[,]” Doc. 17 at 3–4, do not present sufficiently plausible
averments to convey potential liability under Section 1983. Colon-
Marte “fails to allege any facts under which the Court could plausibly
hold that [MidPenn] was a state actor due to the representation of a
private client” in a custody proceeding. See Kosiba v. Thomas Jefferson
Univ. Hosp., 2023 WL 6143967, at *3 (E.D. Pa. 2023).
As for Martinez-Arce, mere use of “employment connections” and
other “resources” that she gained through her employment at
MidPenn—a nonstate actor—would not lead to Section 1983 liability.
See Graham, 2024 WL 3275960, at *4. Colon-Marte’s conclusory
allegations do not establish the contrary. See Connelly, 809 F.3d at 787.
Finally, Lister, whom Colon-Marte surmises is a state actor
because he used MidPenn’s “state-funded resources to represent
Martinez-Arce,” Doc. 17 at 2, is not liable under Section 1983 by means
of his employment with a legal aid society. As the United States
Supreme Court has periodically clarified, “a lawyer representing a
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26
client is not[] . . . a state actor ‘under color of state law’ within the
meaning of § 1983.” Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318 (1981)
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983) (discussing public defenders and collecting
cases). This means that lawyers generally do not qualify as state actors
under Section 1983, whose purpose “is to deter state actors from using
. . . their authority to deprive individuals of their federally guaranteed
rights and to provide relief to victims if such deterrence fails.” Wyatt v.
Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992). “Without a limit such as this, private
parties could face constitutional litigation whenever they seek to rely on
some state rule governing their interactions with the community
surrounding them.” Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937.
Therefore, a valid Section 1983 claim against a private lawyer
must allege “some action that is ‘fairly attributable’ to the state.”
Angelico, 184 F.3d at 277 (quoting Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937). “To do this,
[the plaintiff] must show (1) that the attorney defendant[’s] acts were
‘the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule
of conduct imposed by the state or by a person for whom the State is
responsible’ and (2) that the attorney defendant[] may fairly be said to
be [a] state actor[].” Id. (quoting Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937). An example
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27
of a right, privilege, or rule of conduct for the first prong would be a
state statute that provides authority over the plaintiff for the aggrieved
act. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937; Repoli v. Cuoco, 316 F. App’x 188, 190–91
(3d Cir. 2009) (per curiam). As for the second requirement, “[a] person
may be found to be a state actor when (1) he is a state official, (2) ‘he
has acted together with or has obtained significant aid from state
officials,’ or (3) his conduct is, by its nature, chargeable to the state.”
Angelico, 184 F.3d at 277 (quoting Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937).
Here, Colon-Marte’s theories against Lister necessarily fail.
Colon-Marte merely pleads that Lister was a state actor because the
attorney used MidPenn’s resources in representing Martinez-Arce.
Doc. 17 at 7. This conclusory premise establishes neither that the
representation in custody proceedings “was committed by a person
acting under color of state law,” Schneyder, 653 F.3d at 319 (citations
omitted); that the act was an exercise of a state-proscribed act,
privilege, or rule of conduct; nor that the conduct provides an
alternative ground to conclude that Lister was a state actor.
As Colon-Marte’s conclusory premises regarding Martinez-Arce,
Lister, and MidPenn do not establish that any of them can be deemed a
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28
state actor for Section 1983 purposes, the undersigned recommends that
all pending Section 1983 claims (denial of due process, denial of equal
protection, and denial of religious freedom, in Counts I–III of the third
amended complaint) against the three defendants be dismissed.
3. Section 1985(3) Conspiracy Claims
Colon-Marte also failed to plead a viable Section 1985(3) civil
rights conspiracy claim against Martinez-Arce, Lister, and MidPenn.
Like Section 1983, Section 1985(3) “does not . . . create any substantive
rights; rather, it serves only as a vehicle for vindicating federal rights
and privileges which have been defined elsewhere.” Brown v. Philip
Morris Inc., 250 F.3d 789, 805 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Great Am. Fed. Sav.
& Loan Ass’n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 376 (1979)). The statute
provides that:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire . . .
for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any
person . . . of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal
privileges and immunities under the laws; or for the purpose
of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any
State or Territory from giving or securing to all persons within
such State or Territory the equal protection of the laws; . . . in
any case of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more
persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act in
furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another
is . . . deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege
of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured or
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29
deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages
occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or
more of the conspirators.
42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). Thus, pleading a valid Section 1985(3) claim must
allege four elements: “(1) a conspiracy; (2) for the purpose of depriving,
either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal
protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the
laws; and (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; (4) whereby a
person is . . . deprived of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United
States.” Farber v. City of Paterson, 440 F.3d 131, 134 (3d Cir. 2006)
(quotation omitted) (first quoting United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners
v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 828–29 (1983); and then citing Griffin v.
Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102–03 (1971)). In pleading those elements,
“a plaintiff must allege conspiracy with some particularity.” Goodson v.
Maggi, 797 F. Supp. 2d 624, 639 (W.D. Pa. 2011) (first citing Bieros v.
Nicola, 860 F. Supp. 223, 225 (E.D. Pa. 1994); and then citing
Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intel. & Coordination Unit,
507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993)).
Regarding the first element (“a conspiracy”), “specific allegations
of an agreement to carry out the alleged chain of events is essential[.]”
Case 1:25-cv-00509-KMN Document 29 Filed 02/27/26 Page 29 of 41
30
Rosembert v. Borough of E. Lansdowne, 14 F. Supp. 3d 631, 648 (E.D.
Pa. 2014) (quotation omitted) (quoting Spencer v. Steinman, 968 F.
Supp. 1011, 1020 (E.D. Pa. 1997)). That is, “[i]t is not enough that the
end result of the parties’ independent conduct caused plaintiff harm or
even that the alleged perpetrators of the harm acted in conscious
parallelism.” Id. (quoting Spencer, 968 F. Supp. at 1020). Also
necessary are allegations advancing the “supporting facts that tend to
show an unlawful agreement.” Callaway v. Small, 5576 F. Supp. 3d
232, 249 (D.N.J. 2021) (quotation omitted) (first quoting Suber v.
Guinta, 902 F. Supp. 2d 591, 608 (E.D. Pa. 2012); and then citing
Rosembert, 14 F. Supp. 3d at 648). Such facts include “the conduct
violating plaintiff[’s] rights, the time and place of these actions, and the
people responsible . . . .” Rosembert, 14 F. Supp. 3d at 648 (quotation
omitted) (first quoting DeJohn v. Temple Univ., 2006 WL 2623274, at *5
(E.D. Pa. 2006); and then citing Boddorff v. Publicker Indus., Inc., 488
F. Supp. 1107, 1112 (E.D. Pa. 1980)).
Notably, Section 1985(3) jurisprudence recognizes two types of
conspiracies: ones involving at least one governmental party, and ones
involving only nongovernmental conspirators. See Brown, 250 F.3d at
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31
805–06. The latter variant protects only two federal rights: “the right to
be free from involuntary servitude[,] and the right to interstate travel.”
Id. at 805 (citations omitted). This distinction recognizes that the
Section 1985(3) “was not intended to provide a federal remedy for ‘all
tortious, conspiratorial interferences with the rights of others,’ or to be
a ‘general federal tort law.’” Farber, 440 F.3d at 135 (quoting Griffin,
403 U.S. at 91) (summarizing Section 1985(3)’s legislative history).
Here, the third amended complaint lacks a cognizable statement
of relief under Section 1985(3). As a threshold matter, the third
amended complaint neglects to specify whether the alleged conspiracy is
purely private or involves governmental actors. To the extent the
alleged conspiracy involves only nongovernmental conspirators, the
claim must be dismissed, as Colon-Marte’s custody dispute does not
involve any infringement on his rights to be free from involuntary
servitude, or to interstate travel. Brown, 250 F.3d at 805.
The allegations in the third amended complaint also do not aver a
conspiracy involving government actors. The pleading identifies
Martinez-Arce, Lister, and MidPenn—all of whom, as set forth above,
are private actors—as the conspirators who “entered into an agreement
Case 1:25-cv-00509-KMN Document 29 Filed 02/27/26 Page 31 of 41
32
to use state judicial processes to retaliate against [Colon-Marte] and
deprive him of his constitutional rights.” The only references to any
state actors lies in the allegation that Judges Menges and Snyder (who,
in any event, are immune from this suit) “participated in the
furtherance of this conspiracy by enforcing orders and sanctions that
they knew or should have known were the product of a conflicted and
biased legal process.” Doc. 17 at 12–13. Those averments, however, fall
short of pleading that the two judges formed, joined, or knew of the
object of the alleged conspiracy. The third amended complaint avers
neither the chain of requisite events, the agreement to carry out such
acts, the incidents that tend to show the agreement, nor the time and
place of those actions, with the requisite particularity. See Rosembert,
14 F. Supp. 3d at 648; Goodson, 797 F. Supp. 2d at 639. Absent
plausible allegations of that nature, the conspiracy claim cannot
proceed.
Moreover, Colon-Marte’s conspiracy allegations against Martinez-
Arce, Lister, and MidPenn alone do not meet the plausibility pleading
standard. His third amended complaint avers that Martinez-Arce,
Lister, and MidPenn agreed “to use state judicial processes to retaliate
Case 1:25-cv-00509-KMN Document 29 Filed 02/27/26 Page 32 of 41
33
against [him] and deprive him of his constitutional rights,” and that the
agreement was based on “malicious intent.” Doc. 17 at 12–13. Such
conclusory, “formulaic” recitation is insufficient to establish the second
element of the claim. See, e.g., Lasche v. New Jersey, 2022 WL 604025,
at *7 (3d Cir. 2022); Rosembert, 14 F. Supp. 3d at 648; Goodson, 797 F.
Supp. 2d at 639.
Therefore, as Colon-Marte advances a conspiracy claim against
only nonstate actors, and his allegations lack plausibility, the
undersigned recommends that the Section 1985(3) claims against all
defendants be dismissed.
C. The Court Should Decline to Exercise Supplemental
Jurisdiction over the Remaining State Law Claims
The undersigned also recommends that the Court decline to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims
of abuse of process and conflict of interest, as the Court lacks any
federal basis to exercise jurisdiction over this action. “[I]n any civil
action of which the [federal] district courts have original jurisdiction,”
the Court “ha[s] supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are
so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that
Case 1:25-cv-00509-KMN Document 29 Filed 02/27/26 Page 33 of 41
34
they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the
United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
A corollary is that, if “the claim over which the district court has
original jurisdiction is dismissed before trial, the district court must
decline . . . the pendent state claims[,] unless considerations of judicial
economy, convenience, and fairness to the parties provide a[] . . .
justification for doing so.” Borough of W. Mifflin v. Lancaster, 45 F.3d
780, 788 (3d Cir. 1995) (emphasis added) (citations omitted); 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(c)(3). In this analysis, “[t]he fact that some investment of time
has already been made does not foreclose a district court judge from
exercising discretion in favor of not hearing a pendent state claim.”
Shaffer v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs. of Albert Gallatin Area Sch. Dist., 687 F.2d
718, 723 (3d Cir. 1982) (citations omitted).
Here, the Court should decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims, as all pending federal
claims warrant dismissal for the reasons set forth above. “There is no
reason [Colon-Marte] cannot refile his state claims in Pennsylvania
state court, and, therefore, he cannot show such prejudice as is
necessary to require this Court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.”
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35
See Mikhail, 991 F. Supp. 2d at 666. Nor has he shown an
“extraordinary circumstance[]” that advises to the contrary. See Shaffer
v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs. of Albert Gallatin Area Sch. Dist., 730 F.2d 910, 912
(3d Cir. 1984) (citation and quotation omitted). Therefore, the
undersigned recommends that the Court dismiss without prejudice all
pending state law claims.
D. Leave to Amend Should Be Denied
Further, the undersigned recommends that all federal claims in
the third amended complaint be dismissed with prejudice on abstention
grounds or, alternatively, for futility. Despite filing six different
iterations of his complaint, Colon-Marte was unable to correct his
jurisdictional and pleading deficiencies.
After determining that a claim falls short of the plausibility
standard, “a district court should generally permit a curative
amendment, unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile.”
Lutz, 49 F.4th at 328 (quotation and citation omitted); Fed. R. Civ. P.
15(a)(2). The Court “must provide the plaintiff with this opportunity
even if the plaintiff does not seek leave to amend,” and “inform the
plaintiff that he or she has leave to amend the complaint within a set
Case 1:25-cv-00509-KMN Document 29 Filed 02/27/26 Page 35 of 41
36
period of time.” Phillips, 515 F.3d at 245 (first citing Alston v. Parker,
363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004); and then citing Grayson v. Mayview
State Hops., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002)).
The five-factor analysis articulated in Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S.
178 (1962), governs amendments of pleadings. Id. at 182; see, e.g.,
Great W. Mining & Min. Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 174
(3d Cir. 2010); In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410,
1434 (3d Cir. 1997) (citations omitted). The five factors are: (1) “undue
delay,” (2) “bad faith or dilatory motive,” (3) “repeated failure to cure
deficiencies by amendments previously allowed,” (4) “undue prejudice to
the [nonmovant] by virtue of allowance of the amendment,” and (5)
“futility of [the] amendment.” Foman, 371 U.S. at 182. These five
factors are not exhaustive. See id. “[T]he grant or denial of an
opportunity to amend is within the discretion of the District Court.” Id.
Here, the undersigned notified Colon-Marte of the jurisdictional
and pleading deficiencies in his second amended complaints, and
provided him an opportunity to correct those flaws. Doc. 15. Indeed,
Colon-Marte confirmed receiving that notification when submitting the
live complaint, positing that it “establishes federal jurisdiction and
Case 1:25-cv-00509-KMN Document 29 Filed 02/27/26 Page 36 of 41
37
addresses all deficiencies identified by the Magistrate Judge in
Document 15, including jurisdictional, abstention, and state-action
issues . . . .” Doc. 17 at 1. But, as set forth above, Colon-Marte fails to
establish that the abstention rules are inapplicable and that he
presents cognizable claims for relief under Sections 1983 and 1985(3).
Thus, affording Colon-Marte another opportunity to replead would be
an exercise in futility.
“[F]utility is implicated when [an] amendment fails to cure a
deficiency in the original complaint or fails to state a claim on which
relief can be granted.” K.K-M v. N.J. Dep’t of Educ., 2020 WL 6817506,
at *7 (D.N.J. 2020) (citing Jablonski v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc.,
863 F.2d 289, 292 (3d Cir. 1988)). As Colon-Marte did not, in his third
amended complaint, correct any of the critical flaws that were identified
by the undersigned, and his Section 1985(3) claims are invalid as a
matter of law, the undersigned concludes that all federal claims
warrant dismissal with prejudice for futility.
E. The Motion to Vacate or Enjoin Should Be Denied
Finally, the undersigned recommends that the pending motion to
vacate or enjoin enforcement of a state custody stipulation be denied
Case 1:25-cv-00509-KMN Document 29 Filed 02/27/26 Page 37 of 41
38
without prejudice. The motion requests that the Court vacate or enjoin
enforcement of the state court custody stipulation “pending full federal
review,” enjoin the Defendants and their agents from providing
psychiatric treatment to Colon-Marte’s minor son, and enjoin
interference with Colon-Marte’s custodial schedule. Doc. 21 at 6. The
premise for these extraordinary requests is that the custody stipulation
is “void for lack of due process,” “judicial bias and conflict,” and
“irreparable harm[.]” Id. at 4–5.
“The standard for granting a preliminary injunction . . . is the
same as that for issuing a TRO.” Cerro Fabricated Prods. LLC v.
Solanick, 300 F. Supp. 3d 632, 646 n.5 (M.D. Pa. 2018) (first citing
Pileggi v. Aichele, 843 F. Supp. 2d 584, 592 (E.D. Pa. 2012); and then
citing Bieros v. Nicola, 857 F. Supp. 445, 446 (E.D. Pa. 1994)). A
movant seeking a preliminary injunction must show that: “(1) he is
likely to succeed on the merits, (2) he will suffer irreparable harm
without preliminary relief, (3) the balance of equities favors an
injunction, and (4) an injunction is in the public interest.” Veterans
Guardian VA Claim Consulting LLC v. Platkin, 133 F.4th 213, 218 (3d
Cir. 2025) (citing Winter v. NRDC, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)).
Case 1:25-cv-00509-KMN Document 29 Filed 02/27/26 Page 38 of 41
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“[A] likelihood of success on the merits means only a ‘reasonable
probability’ of success—odds that are ‘significantly better than
negligible but not necessarily more likely than not.’” Id. (quoting Reilly
v. City of Harrisburg, 858 F.3d 173, 176, 179 (3d Cir. 2017)). The
movant bears the burden of establishing this prong. Id. As already
determined by the Court, Docs. 24; 26, and set forth above, this motion
is unlikely to succeed on the merits and thus should be denied.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, it is RECOMMENDED that:
1. All pending federal claims under Title 42, United States
Code, Sections 1983 and 1985(3) be DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE;
2. The remaining state law claims for abuse of process and
conflict of interest be DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE;
3. The pending motion to vacate or enjoin enforcement of state
custody stipulation (Doc. 21) be DENIED WITH
PREJUDICE; and
Case 1:25-cv-00509-KMN Document 29 Filed 02/27/26 Page 39 of 41
40
4. The Clerk’s Office be DIRECTED to TERMINATE all
pending defendants and CLOSE this case.
Colon-Marte is also placed on notice that, pursuant to Local Rule
72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge’s proposed
findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or
matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a
recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a
habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being
served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk
of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties,
written objections which shall specifically identify the
portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report
to which objection is made and the basis for such objections.
The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall
apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those
portions of the report or specified proposed findings or
recommendations to which objection is made and may accept,
reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or
recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge,
however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her
discretion or where required by law, and may consider the
record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or
her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge
may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or
recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with
instructions.
M.D. Pa. L. R. 72.3. Failure to file timely objections to the foregoing
R&R may constitute a waiver of any appellate rights. See Nara v.
Frank, 488 F.3d 187, 194 (3d Cir. 2007).
Case 1:25-cv-00509-KMN Document 29 Filed 02/27/26 Page 40 of 41
41
Date: February 27, 2026 s/ Phillip J. Caraballo
Phillip J. Caraballo
United States Magistrate Judge
Case 1:25-cv-00509-KMN Document 29 Filed 02/27/26 Page 41 of 41

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