Khalid v. Ali

1:25-cv-00202Pamd15.01.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Case 1:25-cv-00202-KMN Document 10 Filed 01/15/26 Page 1 of 12
Case 1:25-cv-00202-KMN Document 10 Filed 01/15/26 Page 2 of 12
Case 1:25-cv-00202-KMN Document 10 Filed 01/15/26 Page 3 of 12
Case 1:25-cv-00202-KMN Document 10 Filed 01/15/26 Page 4 of 12
Case 1:25-cv-00202-KMN Document 10 Filed 01/15/26 Page 5 of 12
Case 1:25-cv-00202-KMN Document 10 Filed 01/15/26 Page 6 of 12
Case 1:25-cv-00202-KMN Document 10 Filed 01/15/26 Page 7 of 12
Case 1:25-cv-00202-KMN Document 10 Filed 01/15/26 Page 8 of 12
Case 1:25-cv-00202-KMN Document 10 Filed 01/15/26 Page 9 of 12
Case 1:25-cv-00202-KMN Document 10 Filed 01/15/26 Page 10 of 12
Case 1:25-cv-00202-KMN Document 10 Filed 01/15/26 Page 11 of 12
Case 1:25-cv-00202-KMN Document 10 Filed 01/15/26 Page 12 of 12

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

Case 1:25-cv-00202-KMN Documenti0- Filed 01/15/26 Page 1 of 12

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

IRAM KHALID, : No. 1:25-CV-202
Plaintiff : (Neary, J.)
v. : (Caraballo, M.J.)
DAWAR ALT, :
Defendant

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

The undersigned recommends that the Court dismiss with
prejudice Plaintiff Iram Khalid’s complaint. Doc. 1. The gravamen of
that pleading instrument rests on abuses presumably committed by
Defendant Dawar Ali’s family. Id. at 2-5. As the complaint is based on
domestic conflict issues involving Khalid’s spouse! and in-laws, it
neither establishes federal jurisdiction nor otherwise presents
cognizable federal claims. As Khalid has not availed herself of the
opportunity to cure those deficiencies, the undersigned respectfully

recommends that the complaint be dismissed with prejudice for futility.

1 Though the complaint fails to specify the relationship between the parties, the
undersigned construes the pleading as alleging that Ali is Khalid’s husband. See
Rivera v. Monko, 37 F.4th 909, 914 (3d Cir. 2022) (pro se complaints are construed
liberally); see also Doc. 1-1 at 1 (stating that the first name of Khalid’s spouse is
“Dawar’).

Case 1:25-cv-00202-KMN Documenti0- Filed 01/15/26 Page 2 of 12

IL. Background

On February 3, 2025, Khalid, proceeding pro se, commenced this
action against Ali. Doc. 1. The complaint presents a narrative listing
Khalid’s grievances involving mostly unidentified entities (repeatedly
referred to as “they,” presumably “husbands relatives”), including:
“taking money on [Khalid’s] name”; “using [her] social security” and
other personal information; “keep[ing] busy [her] in kitchen and home
cleaning stuff’; preventing her from “tak[ing] care of [her] kids” and
driving; threatening to “buried [her] in this house” and “harm [her]
family in Pakistan”; “punish[ing] [her] daughter and tell[ing] her I will
through [the daughter] in the creek backside of our house”; and
“demanding money ... from [her] and [her] parents” and “shout[ing] on
[her] and [her] kids and beat [them]” if Khalid or her family refuses. Id.
at 2-5. Khalid also states that her situation involves fraud, and that
she reported her circumstances to the police. Id. at 3-4.

Khalid simultaneously applied for and was granted leave to
proceed in forma pauperis, with the complaint’s service held in

abeyance pending the Court’s screening obligations. Docs. 2; 4; see

Case 1:25-cv-00202-KMN Documenti0- Filed 01/15/26 Page 3 of 12

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (requiring sua sponte dismissal when an
action “fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted... .”).
On July 15, 2025, the undersigned, after a preliminary review of
the complaint, issued a screening order. Doc. 5. There, the undersigned
explained that the complaint: (1) does not appear to establish federal
jurisdiction, as federal courts lack jurisdiction over domestic violence
matters; (2) falls short of the plausibility standard established by
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), as Khalid fails to identify the

laws under which she brings this action and merely presents her

grievances without legal authorities or supporting allegations; and (8)

fails to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(b), which

requires that a pleading be presented in numbered paragraphs. Id.

The undersigned, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
15(a), afforded Khalid 21 days to file an amended complaint, or to file a
notice of her intent to stand on the initial complaint. Jd. at 3-4. Khalid
has done neither to date. The undersigned construes Khalid’s inaction
as her intent to stand on the initial complaint, and accordingly proceeds

with screening that instrument.

Case 1:25-cv-00202-KMN Documenti10- Filed 01/15/26 Page 4 of 12

II. Discussion

The undersigned recommends that the complaint be dismissed for
two reasons: (1) the lack of federal jurisdiction over this action; and (2)
Khalid’s failure to meet the Rule 12(b)(6) plausibility standard. The
undersigned also recommends that the dismissal be with prejudice for
futility.

A. Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction

The complaint, which appears to rely on allegations concerning
domestic abuse and fraud committed by Ali’s family, fails to establish
federal jurisdiction over this action, and thus warrants dismissal.

Article ITI of the Constitution of the United States confines federal
jurisdiction to certain “Cases” and “Controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III,
§ 2, cl. 1. Thus, federal courts have “limited jurisdiction,” wielding “only
that power authorized by Constitution and statute.” Kokkonen v.
Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (citations
omitted). That is, “subject matter jurisdiction is non-waivable.” Nesbit
v. Gears Unlimited, Inc., 347 F.3d 72, 77 (8d Cir. 2008) (citing Mt.

Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 278 (1977).

Case 1:25-cv-00202-KMN Document10- Filed 01/15/26 Page 5 of 12

“lT]he court can raise sua sponte subject| |matter jurisdiction
concerns,” id., because “courts have an independent obligation to satisfy
themselves of jurisdiction if it is in doubt.” Jd. at 76-77 (citing Healthy
City, 429 U.S. at 278). In addressing subject matter jurisdiction under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), the Court “must take care not
to reach the merits of acase....” Davis v. Wells Fargo, 824 F.3d 333,
348 (8d Cir. 2016) (quotation omitted) (quoting CNA v. United States,
535 F.3d 132, 144 (8d Cir. 2008)). A dismissal is mandatory “[i]f the
court determines at any time that it lacks subject| ]matter jurisdiction.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(8).

Here, neither of Khalid’s premises establish federal jurisdiction
over this action. Regarding domestic matters, it is axiomatic that “[t]he
whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and
child, belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws of the United
States.” Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703 (1992) (quotation
omitted) (quoting In re Burrus, 186 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890)). Thus, a
county court is a more appropriate forum to entertain Khalid’s domestic

disputes. See id.

Case 1:25-cv-00202-KMN Documenti10- Filed 01/15/26 Page 6 of 12

As for potential fraud and identity theft crimes, Khalid, a private
individual, lacks the authority to enforce a federal criminal statute—in
a civil action, no less. Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 64 (1986)
(collecting cases establishing that civil parties cannot “compel the State
to enforce [a criminal statute] ... because a private citizen lacks a
judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of
another.” (quotation omitted)). Moreover, Khalid has reportedly
brought these matters to the attention of law enforcement officials.

Doc. 1 at 3 (“I go to the police station because they are taking money on
my name on (May or June) that was time I was in Pakistan.”).

Thus, the lack of subject matter jurisdiction alone warrants this
action’s dismissal. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(8); Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S.
at 703; Diamond, 476 U.S. at 64.

B. Failure to Meet Plausibility Standard

In addition to its jurisdictional defects, the complaint fails to state
a federal cognizable claim from both legal and factual perspectives.
This pleading failure constitutes another reason for dismissal.

The Court has a statutory duty to conduct a preliminary review of

the complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Among the statutory

Case 1:25-cv-00202-KMN Documenti10- Filed 01/15/26 Page 7 of 12

erounds for an action’s dismissal is its “fail[ure] to state a claim on
which relief may be granted.” Jd. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(Gii). That language
mirrors the provision of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which
permit dismissal of a complaint on motion of a party, and thus is subject
to a similar analysis. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Schreane v. Seana, 506 F.
App’x 120, 122 (8d Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (citing Allah v. Seiverling,
229 F.3d 220, 223 (8d Cir. 2000)).

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.” Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780,
786 (8d Cir. 2016) (quotation omitted) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (“A pleading that states
a claim for relief must contain a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”).

The Court of Appeals employs a three-step inquiry when
determining a complaint’s sufficiency under Rule 12(b)(6). Santiago v.
Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (8d Cir. 2010); see, e.g., Lutz v.
Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, 49 F.4th 328, 328 (8d Cir. 2022);

Connelly, 809 F.3d at 787. First, the reviewing court “tak[es] note of the

Case 1:25-cv-00202-KMN Documenti10- Filed 01/15/26 Page 8 of 12

elements [the] plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Connelly, 809 F.3d
at 787 (second alteration in original) (quotation omitted) (quoting [gbal,
556 U.S. at 675). The second phase is to “identify allegations that,
‘because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the
assumption of truth.” Jd. (first quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; and then
citing Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.8d 212, 224 (8d Cir. 2011)).
Finally, “[w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, [the]
court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they
plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Jd. (alterations in
original) (quotation omitted) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). This last
step is done “in the light most favorable to [the plaintiff].” Kedra v.
Schroeter, 876 F.3d 424, 434 (8d Cir. 2017) (alteration in original)
(quotation omitted) (quoting Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d
224, 228, 230 (8d Cir. 2008)). “If, after completing this process, the
complaint alleges ‘enough fact[s] to raise a reasonable expectation that
discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary elements of a claim,
then it plausibly pleads a claim.” Lutz, 49 F.4th at 328 (alteration in

original) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2009)).

Case 1:25-cv-00202-KMN Documenti0- Filed 01/15/26 Page 9 of 12

Here, Khalid’s complaint does not pass muster under that Rule
12(b)(6) analysis. The pleading instrument details Khalid’s grievances
without discernible legal theories or plausible allegations, leaving the
Court unable to determine whether she asserts cognizable federal
claims against Ali. See Connelly, 809 F.3d at 786. At no point in the
complaint does Khalid reference what laws serve as the bases for her
complaint.

Relatedly, though Khalid alleges, somewhat vaguely, that her
“husbands relatives” have verbally abused her, she fails to explain her
relationships to those third-party relatives, the operative time periods,
and the precise nature of their actions that led her to seek federal aid.
Absent that factual content, Khalid does not meet the mandates of Rule
12. See Duran v. Welfare Reform Act Cong., 2016 WL 1135517, at *1
(D.N.J. 2016) (discussing Rule 8(a) requirement and “who, what, when,
where|,] and how’ of the events at issue” (citation omitted)).

While “[c]omplaints filed by pro se litigants, . . . are liberally
construed,” such pleadings “must still ‘allege sufficient facts ... to
support a claim.” Rivera, 37 F.4th at 914 (first citing Erickson v.

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam); and then quoting Mala v.

Case 1:25-cv-00202-KMN Documenti10- Filed 01/15/26 Page 10 of 12

Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (8d Cir. 2018) (citation
omitted)). That is, mere “[c]onclusory allegations of liability are
insufficient.” Garrett v. Wexford Health, 938 F.3d 69, 92 (8d Cir. 2019)
(citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678); see also Krouse v. Am. Sterilizer Co.,
126 F.3d 494, 499 n.1 (8d Cir. 1997) “Although a complaint’s
allegations are to be construed favorably to the pleader, . . . [the Court]
will not read causes of action into a complaint ... .” (citation omitted)).

Therefore, as the complaint stands now, this action cannot proceed
beyond the screening review stage. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The
undersigned thus must recommend that this action be dismissed. See
Fed. Rs. Civ. P. 8(a), 12(b)(6); Rivera, 37 F.4th at 914; Garrett, 938 F.3d
at 92: Duran, 2016 WL 1135517, at *1.

C. No Further Amendment Should Be Granted

Finally, the undersigned recommends that Khalid’s complaint be
dismissed with prejudice, as providing any further leave to amend
would be futile. By the Order of July 15, 2025, the undersigned
prophylactically afforded Khalid leave to amend and remedy the same,
specifically delineated deficiencies in her complaint summarized here.

Khalid did not avail herself of that opportunity.

10

Case 1:25-cv-00202-KMN Documenti10- Filed 01/15/26 Page 11 of 12

Thus, Khalid has “provided no basis for the district court to
proceed with hfer] case[,]” and “then failed to comply with an explicit
order to ... fil[e] an amended complaint,” even though she was afforded
that opportunity, pursuant to Rule 15. See Azubuko v. Bell Natl Org.,
243 F. App’x 728, 729 (8d Cir. 2007) (per curiam). “When a litigant’s
conduct makes adjudication of the case impossible,” “[a] district court
has the authority to dismiss a suit” with prejudice and without the
analysis set forth in Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863
(8d Cir. 1984). Azuwbuko, 243 F. App’x at 729 (citations omitted).

As Khalid failed to file an amended pleading that corrected any of
the critical flaws in her complaint identified by the undersigned,
offering her future leave to amend would be futile. The undersigned
thus concludes that dismissal with prejudice is warranted. See id.

III. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, it is RECOMMENDED that:

1. The complaint (Doc. 1) be DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE; and

2. The Clerk’s Office be DIRECTED to TERMINATE Dawar

Ali as the defendant and CLOSE this case.

11

Case 1:25-cv-00202-KMN Documenti10- Filed 01/15/26 Page 12 of 12

Khalid is also placed on notice that, pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:

Any party may object to a magistrate judge’s proposed
findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or
matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 686 (b)(1)(B) or making a
recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a
habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being
served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk
of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties,
written objections which shall specifically identify the
portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report
to which objection is made and the basis for such objections.
The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall
apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those
portions of the report or specified proposed findings or
recommendations to which objection is made and may accept,
reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or
recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge,
however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her
discretion or where required by law, and may consider the
record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or
her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge
may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or
recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with
instructions.

M.D. Pa. L. R. 72.8. Failure to file timely objections to the foregoing
Report and Recommendation may constitute a waiver of any appellate

rights. See Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187, 194 (8d Cir. 2007).

Date: January 15, 2026 s/ Phillip J. Caraballo
Phillip J. Caraballo
United States Magistrate Judge

12

Setzen Sie Ihre Recherche in ChatGPT oder Claude fort

Verbinden Sie Omnilex, um den Rechtskorpus über Ihren KI-Assistenten zu durchsuchen.