Case Name in Social Security Case - Unavailable

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MICHAEL SHAVER, 	: Civil No. 1:25-CV-77
:
Plaintiff, 	:
:
v. 	:
: (Chief Magistrate Judge Bloom)
FRANK BISIGNANO, 	:
Commissioner of Social Security,1 	:
:
Defendant. 	:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. 	Introduction
Michael Shaver filed an application under Title II of the Social
Security Act for disability and disability insurance benefits on April 23,
2021.2 Following a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”),
the ALJ found that Shaver was not disabled from his alleged onset date
of September 23, 2019, through June 6, 2022, the date of the ALJ’s
decision. 3 	The Appeals Council denied review, and Shaver appealed the
1 	Frank 	Bisignano 	became 	the 	Commissioner 	of 	Social 	Security 	on
May 7, 2025. Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 	and 	42 	U.S.C. 	§ 	405(g), 	Bisignano 	is 	substituted 	as 	the
defendant in this suit.
2 Tr. 181-83.
3 Tr. 20-36.
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decision to the District Court. 4 	The Court remanded the matter back to
an ALJ for reconsideration.5 Shaver had another hearing before an ALJ,
and following that hearing, the ALJ published his decision finding that
Shaver was not disabled from his alleged onset date of disability of
September 23, 2019, through October 28, 2024, the date of that decision. 6
Shaver now appeals this decision, arguing that the ALJ’s decision
is not supported by substantial evidence. 	After a review of the record,
and mindful of the fact that substantial evidence “means only—‘such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion,’” 7 we conclude that substantial evidence supports
the ALJ’s findings in this case. 	Therefore, we will affirm the decision of
the Commissioner denying this claim.
II. 	Statement of Facts and of the Case
Michael Shaver filed for disability and disability insurance benefits,
alleging disability due to partial blindness in the right eye, strokes, high
4 Tr. 1-4.
5 Tr. 1867-68.
6 Tr. 1789-1806.
7
Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019).
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blood pressure and cholesterol, depression, a pelvic crush injury, injury
to his lower extremities, three cracked vertebrae in the lower back, right
side numbness, and chronic pain. 8 	Shaver was 43 years old at the time
of his alleged onset of disability, had at least a high school education, and
had no past relevant work. 9
The medical record regarding Shaver’s impairments 10 revealed that
in October of 2018, Shaver suffered a stroke causing mild residual right
sided numbness. 11 On July 15, 2019, Shaver presented to the emergency
department unresponsive with agonal breathing, ashen skin, central
cyanosis, and perpetual vomiting after working outside in the heat. 12
Shaver obtained an emergency head and neck CT, MRI, and EEG, which
revealed no new abnormalities. 13 The next day, Shaver reported negative
8 Tr. 224.
9 Tr. 1804.
10 Because Shaver’s appeal focuses on the ALJ’s treatment of evidence
related 	to 	his 	physical 	impairments, 	we 	will 	forego 	discussion 	and
analysis of Shaver’s mental health records and evaluations.
11 Tr. 495, 688, 690.
12 Tr. 845-49.
13 Tr. 848-49.
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symptoms altogether. 14 Treatment notes indicated the episode was likely
caused by dehydration. 15
On September 23, 2019, Shaver incurred a work-related injury
where he was pinned between the bucket and tire of a backhoe.16 	He
presented to the emergency department where pelvic X-rays and chest
and spine CTs revealed a bilateral superior and inferior pubic rami
fracture, a vertical fracture through the central sacrum and widening at
the left sacroiliac joint, and L4-L5 transverse process fractures.17 	An
MRI of the lumbar spine did not show cord compression or any new
injuries. 18 	Shaver underwent a percutaneous placement of a transsacral
transiliac screw and a left anterior column screw. 19 	He was prescribed
physical therapy sessions, which he attended from October of 2019 to
May of 2020.20 	Shaver’s progress was noted as fair and his tolerance to
14 Tr. 850.
15 Tr. 857.
16 Tr. 687-90.
17
Id.
18 Tr. 1716.
19 Tr. 700-01.
20 Tr. 750, 1741-81, 2629-2968.
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treatment was noted as good.21 	He was discharged due to a plateau in
progress. 22
At a January 2020 follow-up visit with Dr. J. Spence Reid, Shaver
reported significant pain throughout his pelvis but denied taking any
medications for relief. 23 	He claimed an inability to stand or walk for any
period of time. 24 	Physical examination showed obvious discomfort when
standing, a slow and bilaterally antalgic gait, tenderness to palpation
diffusely around the pelvic ring, and pain with the squeeze of the iliac
wings. 25 	X-rays of the pelvis showed intact hardware without signs of
loosening or displacement and continued healing at the fracture site. 26
Dr. Reid noted Shaver could be more aggressive in his rehabilitation and
directed him to transition to a work hardening program in physical
therapy. 27 	He further recommended taking Tylenol as needed.28
21 Tr. 2661, 2685, 2722, 2727, 2741, 2745, 2750, 2760, 2773, 2777.
22 Tr. 2637.
23 Tr. 633.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27 Tr. 634
28
Id.
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In March of 2020, Shaver received a steroid and anesthetic injection
of the symphysis pubis joint after complaints of ongoing pain. 29 	He
continued to report pelvic pain and difficulty with functional mobility
over the next few months. 30 	Shaver underwent an independent medical
evaluation with Dr. Paul Horenstein in May of 2020. 31 	Dr. Horenstein
reviewed Shaver’s imaging which showed no loosening of hardware, no
evidence 	of 	hip 	joint 	space 	abnormalities, 	no 	hip 	arthritis 	or 	hip
subluxation 	bilaterally, 	healing 	fractures 	of 	both 	the 	superior 	and
inferior rami as well as hardware fixation, and no evidence of nonunion. 32
Physical examination revealed a Trendelenburg type gait favoring both
sides, good range of motion of both hips with flexion to 90 degrees with
pain complaints but no restrictions, 4/5 hip flexion strength bilaterally,
5/5 quad and hamstring strength, and 5/5 ankle dorsi and plantar flexion
29 Tr. 619.
30 Tr. 621, 635, 1543-56.
31 Tr. 1552-57.
32 Tr. 1554.
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strength. 33 	It was further noted that Shaver’s percutaneous incisions
over the left pelvis were healed.34
In 	August 	of 	2020, 	Shaver 	reported 	multiple 	falls 	given 	his
significant pain and lack of mobility. 35 	Dr. Reid noted Shaver appeared
in no acute distress, had difficulty when transitioning from sitting to
standing, had 5/5 strength with hip abduction and adduction, and had no
pain over the pubic symphysis. 36 	A pelvis X-ray revealed unchanged
alignment and hardware without complication. 37 	Dr. Reid approved
Shaver to return to work at a sedentary capacity.38
Two months later, Shaver reported pain throughout his left hip,
pelvis, and low back with any amount of weightbearing, ambulation,
standing, and sitting. 39 Physical examination revealed no acute distress,
33 Tr. 1555.
34
Id.
35 Tr. 604.
36
Id.
37 Tr. 610.
38 Tr. 605.
39 Tr. 611.
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an antalgic gait, intact range of motion, and somewhat limited range of
motion of the left hip due to pain.40
In November of 2021, Shaver was transported to the emergency
department after he was found unconscious on the floor of a public
bathroom from a suspected seizure.41 	Shaver reported noncompliance
with his medications given his financial circumstances. 42 	A brain CT
revealed normal white matter attenuation and no evidence of acute
ischemia. 43 	Shaver was prescribed 500 mg of Keppra and directed to
follow-up with neurology. 44
In 	March 	of 	2022, 	Shaver 	appeared 	at 	WellSpan 	Lebanon
Neurology with Dr. Robert Fuino for an evaluation of a tremor. 45 Shaver
reported concerns of Parkinson’s disease due to shaking in his upper
extremities when craftworking, cutting wood, and wood burning, causing
him to drop objects. 46 	He further reported constant numbness in his
40
Id.
41 Tr. 819-20, 823.
42 Tr. 829.
43 Tr. 836.
44 Tr. 834.
45 Tr. 1682.
46 Tr. 1682-83.
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hands making it difficult to write and carry objects.47 Dr. Fuino ruled out
Parkinson’s disease and indicated he did not see a tremor.48 	A few
months later, Shaver was diagnosed with mild essential tremor. 49
In May of 2022, an EMG of the upper extremities revealed chronic
bilateral median neuropathies at the wrists consistent with carpal tunnel
syndrome and chronic bilateral ulnar neuropathies at the elbows. 50
Shaver appeared for a neurology follow-up the next month where an
examination revealed no rest tremor, a minimal postural tremor and a
mild 	action 	tremor 	without 	dysmetria, 	no 	impairment 	of 	rapid
alternating movements, and normal muscle tone in upper extremities. 51
Shaver noted he experiences staring episodes when he does not take his
Keppra medication.52
In December of 2022, Shaver reported his symptoms as stable and
deferred 	additional 	medication 	management 	for 	his 	tremors. 53
47
Id.
48
Id.
49 Tr. 2480.
50 Tr. 2323.
51 Tr. 2321.
52 Tr. 2320.
53 Tr. 2314-16.
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Treatment 	notes 	documented 	a 	normal 	gait 	and 	movement 	of 	all
extremities spontaneously without issue.54 	An updated brain MRI and
EEG were ordered, which displayed no evidence of epileptiform activity
or electrographic seizure, snoring with associated bradycardia, no acute
intracranial 	findings, 	and 	mild 	white 	matter 	disease 	of 	chronic
microvascular ischemia. 55
In February of 2023, Shaver presented to WellSpan Cardiology for
a follow-up visit with complaints of shortness of breath, chest pain, and
fatigue. 56 Treatment notes indicated an elevated BMI and an intolerance
to CPAP. 57 A sleep study was performed, which documented a total sleep
time of 342.6 minutes with a normal sleep efficiency. 58 	Shaver was
diagnosed with obstructive sleep apnea and a trial of BiPAP therapy was
recommended. 59
54 Tr. 2317.
55 Tr. 2313, 2305.
56 Tr. 3111.
57 Tr. 3113.
58 Tr. 2069.
59 Tr. 2068.
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In March of 2023, Shaver received a Boston scientific loop recorder
to 	address 	his 	recurrent 	strokes.60 	Treatment 	notes 	indicated 	no
significant findings of A-fib in the months following the procedure and
that 	Shaver 	remained 	asymptomatic. 61 	As 	to 	his 	seizures, 	Shaver
remained 	asymptomatic 	without 	any 	residual 	seizure 	activity 	after
focusing on medication compliance.62 He further denied headaches, chest
pain/palpitations, 	dizziness/lightheadedness, 	numbness/tingling, 	gait
instability/balance issues, and any other additional complaints. 63
It is against the backdrop of this record that an ALJ held a hearing
on Shaver’s disability application on October 15, 2024.64 	Shaver and a
Vocational 	Expert 	both 	appeared 	and 	testified 	at 	this 	hearing. 65
Following this hearing, on October 28, 2024, the ALJ issued a decision
denying Shaver’s application for disability benefits. 66 	The ALJ first
concluded that Shaver had not engaged in substantial gainful activity
60 Tr. 2170.
61 Tr. 2258, 2263.
62 Tr. 2258-59, 2263-64.
63 Tr. 2260, 2264.
64 Tr. 1814-32.
65
Id.
66 Tr. 1789-1806.
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since his alleged onset date of September 23, 2019.67 	At Step 2 of the
sequential analysis that governs disability claims, the ALJ found that
Shaver suffered from severe impairments of degenerative disc disease,
obesity, residual effects of cerebral vascular incident, fracture of pelvis,
and seizure disorder.68 	At Step 3, the ALJ concluded that none of these
impairments met or equaled the severity of a listed impairment under
the Commissioner’s regulations.69
Between Steps 3 and 4, the ALJ then concluded that Shaver:
[H]a[d] the residual functional capacity to perform light work
as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except can stand and/or
walk four hours in an eight-hour workday; can occasionally
perform postural movement except never use ladders, ropes,
or scaffolds; must avoid concentrated exposure to extreme
cold, loud noise, vibrations, fumes, odors, dust, gases, and
poor 	ventilation; 	and 	avoid 	even 	moderate 	exposure 	to
dangerous machinery and unprotected heights. 70
In 	reaching 	his 	RFC 	determination, 	the 	ALJ 	considered 	the
objective medical record detailed above, the medical opinion evidence,
and Shaver’s reported symptoms. 	With respect to the medical opinion
67 Tr. 1791.
68 Tr. 1792-94.
69 Tr. 1794-95.
70 Tr. 1795.
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evidence, the ALJ considered the opinions on record. 	The ALJ was
persuaded by the opinions of Drs. Horenstein and Lelwellyn Raymundo
to the extent they suggest Shaver can perform light work with the
limitations stated above.71 	The ALJ reasoned that these opinions were
supported by “citation to recovery from stroke and pelvis crush injury,
medication control of seizures, and examination finding of walking with
and without a cane, five out of five strength in the upper extremities, and
decrease in lower extremity strength.”72 	The ALJ further found the
opinions 	were 	consistent 	with 	the 	longitudinal 	objective 	clinical
findings. 73
The ALJ was partially persuaded by the opinion of Daniel Chege,
NP. 74 	The ALJ found Mr. Chege’s opinion that the use of a cane was
medically necessary unpersuasive given Mr. Chege’s own examination
findings and the objective medical record showing Shaver’s ability to
71 Tr. 80-85, 1552-57, 1801-02.
72 Tr. 1801.
73
Id.
74 Tr. 1802.
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walk and stand without a cane, along with the fact that no treatment
provider prescribed a cane.75
The ALJ was not persuaded by the opinions of Dr. Vinicius Ladeira
Craveiro, Katrina Karnas, PT, Dr. Joanna Deleo, Dr. Kent L. Wagner,
Dr. Anthony Galdieri, and Dr. Hong Park. 76 Dr. Craveiro and Ms. Karnas
opined that Shaver could return to a full range of sedentary work. 77
Similarly, Dr. Deleo opined that Shaver was limited to sedentary work
with lifting and/or carrying ten pounds occasionally and frequently and
standing and/or walking two hours and needing to use a cane.78 	Dr.
Wagner opined that Shaver could sit, stand, and walk two hours in an
eight hour day, needed a cane to stand and walk, needed to miss more
than four days per month, and could rarely lift less than ten pounds. 79
The ALJ concluded these opinions were not supported by their own
examination findings, and were inconsistent with the treatment records
which 	showed 	“walking 	and 	standing 	without 	assistance, 	normal
75
Id.
76 Tr. 1802-03.
77 Tr. 1550, 1785, 1802.
78 Tr. 70-72.
79 Tr. 779-83.
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strength in the upper extremities, normal use of upper extremities, . . .
improved functioning after recovery from injury[,]” and “an ability to lift
twenty-two pounds from floor to knuckle, and to standing and walking
fifty-five minutes at one time without difficulty.” 80 	The ALJ was not
persuaded by the opinions of Drs. Galdieri and Park because their
opinions that the evidence was insufficient to determine severity and
functional limitations did not constitute medical opinions. 81
With respect to Shaver’s symptoms, the ALJ found that Shaver’s
statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of
his impairments were not entirely consistent with the medical evidence.82
Shaver 	testified 	he 	experiences 	recurrent 	seizures 	and 	strokes, 	is
encroached on the left side, cannot walk without a cane or walker, is
partially blind in the right eye, can only sit or stand for ten minutes at a
time, and has numbness and shaking.83 	He claimed his daily lower back
and side pain prevents him from sleeping and that he typically sits on
80 Tr. 1802-03.
81 Tr. 1803, 1862-63.
82 Tr. 1796-98.
83 Tr. 1818-20.
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the couch for roughly five hours per day. 84 Shaver further claimed he has
difficulty dressing himself, shaving, and showering. 85 	As to completing
household chores, Shaver testified that he cooks simple meals, cleans,
does laundry, and mows the grass with a riding lawn mower.86
The ALJ ultimately found Shaver’s testimony to be inconsistent
with the objective clinical findings. 87 	The ALJ recounted the objective
evidence during the alleged disability period, including unremarkable
MRI imaging of the spine, radiographic studies of the hip, and EEG
findings. 88 	The ALJ also noted examination findings of good range of
motion and sensation in all extremities, normal reflexes and pulse rates
in 	the 	lower 	extremities, 	controllable 	pain 	with 	over 	the 	counter
medication, full strength with hip abduction and adduction, stability
with right-sided symptoms, normal cardiac and pulmonary functioning. 89
Moreover, the ALJ recognized that Shaver was not consistently observed
84 Tr. 1818-19, 1822.
85 Tr. 1823, 1825.
86 Tr. 1825-27.
87 Tr. 1796.
88 Tr. 1797-98.
89 Tr. 1797-1800.
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with a cane and that he was not medically prescribed one.90 	Ultimately,
the ALJ concluded Shaver was not as limited as he alleged.
Having made these findings, the ALJ found at Step 4 that Shaver
had no relevant past work but found at Step 5 that he could perform the
occupations 	of 	a 	telephone 	information 	clerk, 	polisher, 	and 	table
worker. 91 	Accordingly, the ALJ found that Shaver had not met the
stringent standard prescribed for disability benefits and denied his
claim. 92
This appeal followed. 	On appeal, Shaver argues that the ALJ’s
decision is not supported by substantial evidence. 	This case is fully
briefed and is therefore ripe for resolution. 	For the reasons set forth
below, we will affirm the decision of the Commissioner.
III. 	Discussion
A. Substantial Evidence Review – the Role of this Court
This Court’s review of the Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits
is limited to the question of whether the findings of the final decision-
90 Tr. 1798, 1800.
91 Tr. 1804-05.
92 Tr. 1805.
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maker are supported by substantial evidence in the record. 93 	Substantial
evidence “does not mean a large or considerable amount of evidence, but
rather such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.” 94 	Substantial evidence means less
than a preponderance of the evidence but more than a mere scintilla.95
A single piece of evidence is not substantial evidence if the ALJ
“ignores, 	or 	fails 	to 	resolve, 	a 	conflict 	created 	by 	countervailing
evidence.”96 	However, where there has been an adequately developed
factual record, substantial evidence may be “something less than the
weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two inconsistent
conclusions from the evidence does not prevent [the ALJ’s decision] from
being supported by substantial evidence.” 97 	The court must “scrutinize
93
See 42 U.S.C. §405(g);
Johnson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 529 F.3d 198,
200 (3d Cir. 2008);
Ficca v. Astrue, 901 F. Supp. 2d 533, 536 (M.D. Pa.
2012).
94
Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988).
95
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971).
96
Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1064 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting
Kent v.
Schweiker, 	710 	F.2d 	110, 	114 	(3d 	Cir. 	1983)) 	(internal 	quotations
omitted).
97
Consolo v. Fed. Maritime Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966).
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the record as a whole” to determine if the decision is supported by
substantial evidence. 98
The Supreme Court has explained the limited scope of our review,
noting 	that 	“[substantial 	evidence] 	means—and 	means 	only—‘such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.’”99 	Under this standard, we must look to the
existing 	administrative 	record 	to 	determine 	if 	there 	is 	“‘sufficient
evidence’ to support the agency’s factual determinations.” 100 	Thus, the
question before us is not whether the claimant is disabled, but rather
whether the Commissioner’s finding that he or she is not disabled is
supported 	by 	substantial 	evidence 	and 	was 	based 	upon 	a 	correct
application of the law. 101
98
Leslie v. Barnhart, 304 F. Supp.2d 623, 627 (M.D. Pa. 2003).
99
Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1154 (quoting
Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB,
305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).
100
Id.
101
See Arnold v. Colvin, No. 3:12-CV-02417, 2014 WL 940205, at *1 (M.D.
Pa. Mar. 11, 2014) (“[I]t has been held that an ALJ’s errors of law denote
a 	lack 	of 	substantial 	evidence”) 	(alterations 	omitted);
	Burton 	v.
Schweiker, 512 F. Supp. 913, 914 (W.D. Pa. 1981) (“The Secretary’s
determination as to the status of a claim requires the correct application
of the law to the facts”);
see also Wright v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 675, 678
(3d Cir. 1990) (noting that the scope of review on legal matters is
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When conducting this review, we must remain mindful that “we
must not substitute our own judgment for that of the fact finder.” 102
Thus, we cannot re-weigh the evidence. Instead, we must determine
whether there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s findings. 	In
doing so, we must also determine whether the ALJ’s decision meets the
burden of articulation necessary to enable judicial review; that is, the
ALJ must articulate the reasons for his decision. 103 This does not require
the ALJ to use “magic” words, but rather the ALJ must discuss the
evidence and explain the reasoning behind his or her decision with more
than just conclusory statements. 104 	Ultimately, the ALJ’s decision must
be accompanied by “a clear and satisfactory explication of the basis on
which it rests.”105
plenary);
Ficca, 901 F. Supp. 2d at 536 (“[T]he court has plenary review
of all legal issues . . . .”).
102
Zirnsak v. Colvin, 777 F.3d 607, 611 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing
Rutherford
v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 552 (3d Cir. 2005)).
103
Burnett v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 220 F.3d 112, 119 (3d Cir.
2000).
104
See Diaz v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 577 F.3d 500, 504 (3d Cir. 2009)
(citations omitted).
105
Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 704 (3d Cir. 1981).
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B. Initial Burdens of Proof, Persuasion, and Articulation for the ALJ
To receive disability benefits under the Social Security Act, a
claimant must show that he or she is unable to “engage in any substantial
gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or
mental impairment which can be expected to result in death, or which
has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less
than 12 months.” 106 	This requires a claimant to show a severe physical
or mental impairment that precludes him or her from engaging in
previous work or “any other substantial gainful work which exists in the
national economy.” 107 	To receive benefits under Title II of the Social
Security Act, a claimant must show that he or she is under retirement
age, contributed to the insurance program, and became disabled prior to
the date on which he or she was last insured.108
106 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(1)(A); 42 U.S.C. §1382c(a)(3)(A);
see also 20 C.F.R.
§§404.1505(a), 416.905(a).
107 	42 	U.S.C. 	§423(d)(2)(A); 	42 	U.S.C. 	§1382c(a)(3)(B); 	20 	C.F.R.
§§404.1505(a), 416.905(a).
108 42 U.S.C. §423(a); 20 C.F.R. §404.131(a).
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In 	making 	this 	determination, 	the 	ALJ 	follows 	a 	five-step
evaluation. 109 	The 	ALJ 	must 	sequentially 	determine 	whether 	the
claimant: (1) is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) has a severe
impairment; (3) has a severe impairment that meets or equals a listed
impairment; (4) is able to do his or her past relevant work; and (5) is able
to do any other work, considering 	his or her age, education, work
experience and residual functional capacity (“RFC”).110
Between Steps 3 and 4, the ALJ must also determine the claimant’s
residual functional capacity (RFC). 	RFC is defined as “that which an
individual is still able to do despite the limitations caused by his or her
impairment(s).”111 In making this assessment, the ALJ must consider all
the claimant’s medically determinable impairments, including any non-
severe impairments identified by the ALJ at step two of his or her
analysis. 112 	Our review of the ALJ’s determination of the plaintiff’s RFC
109 20 C.F.R. §§404.1520(a), 416.920(a).
11020 C.F.R. §§404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4).
111
Burnett, 220 F.3d at 121 (citations omitted);
see also 20 C.F.R. §
404.1545(a)(1).
112 20 C.F.R. §§404.1545(a)(2), 416.945(a)(2).
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is deferential, and that determination will not be set aside if it is
supported by substantial evidence. 113
The claimant bears the burden at Steps 1 through 4 to show a
medically 	determinable 	impairment 	that 	prevents 	him 	or 	her 	from
engaging in any past relevant work. 114 	If met, the burden then shifts to
the Commissioner to show at Step 5 that there are jobs in significant
numbers 	in 	the 	national 	economy 	that 	the 	claimant 	can 	perform
consistent 	with 	the 	claimant’s 	RFC, 	age, 	education, 	and 	work
experience. 115
With 	respect 	to 	the 	RFC 	determination, 	courts 	have 	followed
different paths when considering the impact of medical opinion evidence
on this determination. 	While some courts emphasize the necessity of
medical opinion evidence to craft a claimant’s RFC, other courts have
taken the approach that “[t]here is no legal requirement that a physician
have made the particular findings that an ALJ adopts in the course of
113
Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113, 129 (3d Cir. 2002).
114
Mason, 994 F.2d at 1064.
115 20 C.F.R. §§404.1512(f), 416.912(f);
Mason, 994 F.2d at 1064.
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determining an RFC.” 116 	Additionally, in cases that involve no credible
medical opinion evidence, courts have held that “the proposition that an
ALJ must always base his RFC on a medical opinion from a physician is
misguided.” 117
Given these differing approaches, we must evaluate the factual
context 	underlying 	an 	ALJ’s 	decision. 	Cases 	that 	emphasize 	the
importance of medical opinion support for an RFC assessment typically
arise in the factual setting where well-supported medical sources have
found limitations to support a disability claim, but an ALJ has rejected
the medical opinion based upon an assessment of other evidence. 118
These cases simply restate the notion that medical opinions are entitled
to careful consideration when making a disability determination. On the
other hand, when no medical opinion supports a disability finding or
when an ALJ relies upon other evidence to fashion an RFC, courts have
routinely sustained the ALJ’s exercise of independent judgment based
116
Titterington v. Barnhart, 174 F. App’x 6, 11 (3d Cir. 2006);
see also
Biller v. Acting Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 962 F. Supp. 2d 761, 778–79 (W.D.
Pa. 2013).
117
Cummings v. Colvin, 129 F. Supp. 3d 209, 214–15 (W.D. Pa. 2015).
118
Biller, 962 F. Supp. 2d at 778–79.
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upon all the facts and evidence.119 	Ultimately, it is our task to
determine, 	considering 	the 	entire 	record, 	whether 	the 	RFC
determination is supported by substantial evidence. 120
C. Legal 	Benchmarks 	for 	the 	ALJ’s 	Assessment 	of 	a 	Claimant’s
Alleged Symptoms
When evaluating lay testimony regarding a claimant’s reported
degree 	of 	pain 	and 	disability, 	the 	ALJ 	must 	make 	credibility
determinations. 121 	Our review of those determinations is deferential. 122
However, it is incumbent upon the ALJ to “specifically identify and
explain what evidence he found not credible and why he found it not
credible.” 123 	An ALJ should give great weight to a claimant’s testimony
“only when it is supported by competent medical evidence.” 124 	As the
Third Circuit has noted, while “statements of the individual concerning
119
See Titterington, 174 F. App’x 6;
Cummings, 129 F. Supp. 3d at 214–
15.
120
Burns, 312 F.3d 113.
121
See Diaz, 577 F.3d at 506.
122
Id.
123
Zirnsak v. Colvin, 777 F.3d 607, 612 (3d Cir. 2014) (citations omitted).
124
	McKean v. Colvin, 150 F. Supp. 3d 406, 415–16 (M.D. Pa. 2015)
(citations omitted).
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his or her symptoms must be carefully considered, the ALJ is not required
to credit them.”125
The Social Security Rulings and Regulations provide a framework
for evaluating the severity of a claimant’s reported symptoms.126 	Thus,
the ALJ must follow a two-step process: first, the ALJ must determine
whether a medically determinable impairment could cause the symptoms
alleged; 	and 	second, 	the 	ALJ 	must 	evaluate 	the 	alleged 	symptoms
considering the entire administrative record.127
Symptoms such as pain or fatigue will be considered to affect a
claimant’s ability to perform work activities only if medical signs or
laboratory findings establish the presence of a medically determinable
impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the alleged
symptoms. 128 	During the second step of this assessment, the ALJ must
determine whether the claimant’s statements regarding the intensity,
125
Chandler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 363 (3d. Cir. 2011)
(referencing 20 C.F.R. §404.1529(a) (“statements about your pain or other
symptoms will not alone establish that you are disabled”).
126 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529, 416.929; SSR 16–3p.
127 SSR 16-3p.
128 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(b), 416.929(b); SSR 16–3p.
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persistence, or limiting effects of his or her symptoms are substantiated
considering the entire case record. 129 This includes, but is not limited to,
medical 	signs 	and 	laboratory 	findings; 	diagnoses; 	medical 	opinions
provided by treating or examining sources and other medical sources; and
information regarding the claimant’s symptoms and how they affect his
or her ability to work. 130
The Social Security Administration recognizes that individuals
may be limited by their symptoms to a greater or lesser extent than other
individuals with the same medical impairments, signs, and laboratory
findings. 131 	Thus, to assist in the evaluation of a claimant’s subjective
symptoms, the Social Security Regulations set forth seven factors that
may be relevant to the assessment of the claimant’s alleged symptoms. 132
These 	factors 	include: 	the 	claimant’s 	daily 	activities; 	the 	“location,
duration, frequency, and intensity” of the claimant’s pain or symptoms;
the type, dosage, and effectiveness of medications; treatment other than
129 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c), 416.929(c); SSR 16–3p.
130
Id.
131 SSR 16-3p.
132 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3), 416.929(c)(3).
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medications; 	and 	other 	factors 	regarding 	the 	claimant’s 	functional
limitations. 133
D. The ALJ’s Decision is Supported by Substantial Evidence.
Our review of the ALJ’s decision denying an application for benefits
is significantly deferential. Our task is simply to determine whether the
ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record; that is
“only— ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.’”134 	Judged against this deferential
standard of review, we conclude that substantial evidence supported the
ALJ’s decision in this case.
Shaver first argues that the ALJ failed to identify a significant
number of jobs that he can perform. 135 The ALJ found that Shaver could
perform three occupations: telephone information clerk (DOT 237.367-
046), 	polisher 	(DOT 	713.684-018), 	and 	table 	worker 	(DOT 	739.687-
182).136 	Shaver claims the job of a telephone information clerk is
133
Id.
134
Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1154.
135 Doc. 16 at 7-9.
136 Tr. 1804-05.
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outdated, the job of a table worker is not included in the Occupational
Information Network (“O*NET”), and the job of a polisher has only 6,000
existing jobs.137
Specifically, Shaver relies on
Feeley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. 138 in
arguing 	that 	a 	telephone 	information 	clerk 	is 	outdated 	due 	to
technological advances. 139 	While the nonbinding caselaw recognized the
“quaint” nature of the job, it further noted that the job still remains, and
that remand is not appropriate where only “one of three job categories is
questionable.”140 	Accordingly, we find this argument without merit.
Shaver also relies on O*NET in alleging that the job of a table
worker is not sufficient. He claims the job is not included in O*NET nor
is there an O*NET equivalent job.141 However, courts in our circuit “have
been hesitant to reject the testimony of Vocational Experts relying upon
the DOT in favor of the descriptions on O*NET, given the fact that ‘Social
Security Ruling 00-4P sets forth that the relevant inquiry is whether VE
137 Doc. 16 at 7-9.
138 No. 1404970, 2015 WL 3505512, at *10 (D.N.J. June 3, 2015).
139 Doc. 16 at 7-8.
140
Feeley, 2015 WL 3505512, at *10-11.
141 Doc. 16 at 8.
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testimony is consistent with the DOT.’”142 	“[T]he regulations simply do
not require a [Vocational Expert’s] testimony to be consistent with
O*Net.”143 We agree with this body of caselaw and conclude that the ALJ
fulfilled his requirement under the controlling regulations.
As to the job of a polisher, “there is no precise estimate for what
constitutes ‘significant numbers’ of jobs under the Social Security Act.” 144
Moreover, such determination is not made by viewing the number of
available positions for an individual job.145 Here, the ALJ identified three
jobs that collectively provide 21,000 jobs nationally. 146 	We find this
satisfies the Commissioner’s requirement to identify jobs that exist in
significant numbers in the national economy.147
Shaver also challenges the ALJ’s RFC findings, arguing the ALJ
failed to address his need to lie down during the day. 	In support of this
142
Pollock v. O’Malley, No. 1:22-cv-1856, 2024 WL 4803530, at *19 (M.D.
Pa. Nov. 15, 2024) (collecting cases).
143
Id. at *20.
144
Young v. Astrue, 519 F. App’x 769, 772 (3d Cir. 2013).
145
See id.
146 Tr. 1805.
147
See Young, 519 F. App’x at 772 (finding that 20,000 available jobs
sufficient to establish work exists in significant numbers).
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argument, Shaver points to record evidence that he contends supports
abnormal physical findings. 	However, the ALJ explicitly considered
Shaver’s testimony, including that he has difficulty sleeping and naps
once or twice daily, but found that Shaver was not as limited as he
alleged. 148 	In doing so, the ALJ recounted the medical evidence, which
did not support a finding of significant fatigue during the day resulting
in a need to nap.149 	While Shaver seemingly challenges the ALJ’s
credibility determination, we are not permitted at this stage to reweigh
the evidence, and instead must simply determine whether the ALJ’s
decision was supported by “substantial evidence.” 150 	Here, we conclude
that the ALJ’s RFC findings is supported by substantial evidence.
Shaver further challenges the ALJ’s assessment of his obesity in
accordance with SSR 19-2p. 151 	The Third Circuit has explained that the
ALJ need not “use particular language or adhere to a particular format
in conducting his analysis” of a claimant’s obesity.152 	Rather, so long as
148 Tr. 1796.
149 Tr. 1800.
150
Chandler, 667 F.3d at 359;
Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1154.
151 Doc. 16 at 11-15.
152
Diaz, 577 F.3d at 504 (citations omitted).
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32
the ALJ “meaningfully consider[s] the effect of a claimant’s obesity,
individually and in combination with her impairments, on her workplace
function at step three and at every subsequent step[,]” a remand is not
required. 153 Here, the ALJ acknowledged obesity as a severe impairment
and discussed this impairment at Step 3, explicitly noting that he
considered SSR 19-2p regarding the claimant’s obesity and any impact it
has on his co-existing impairments in determining whether it met or
medically equaled a listing.154 	In determining Shaver’s RFC, the ALJ
recounted 	the 	medical 	records 	that 	documented 	Shaver’s 	obesity,
referring to Shaver’s BMI during the relevant period.155 	This evidence
was discussed in conjunction with the claimant’s physical examination
findings, both normal and abnormal.156 	Shaver fails to point to evidence
showing that his obesity had more than a minimal effect on his abilities,
and 	instead 	generally 	refers 	to 	his 	physical 	impairments 	and 	his
153
Id. at 504;
see Woodson v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 661 F. App’x 762, 765 (3d
Cir. 2016);
Cooper v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 563 F. App’x 904, 911 (3d Cir.
2014).
154 Tr. 1792, 1795.
155 Tr. 1797-98
156 Tr. 1796-1801.
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33
complaints that his pain was worse with prolonged sitting, standing, and
walking. But as we have noted, the ALJ explained why he found Shaver’s
testimony not entirely consistent with the medical evidence. Ultimately,
we conclude that the ALJ’s assessment of Shaver’s obesity is supported
by substantial evidence.
Shaver also contends that the ALJ erred in assessing his subjective
testimony, in that the ALJ ignored his “qualifications” as to how he
carried out daily activities.157 	However, the ALJ recounted the medical
evidence, which included both abnormal and objectively unremarkable
physical 	findings 	during 	the 	relevant 	period. 	He 	discussed 	these
objective findings, coupled with Shaver’s activities of daily living, his
testimony, and the fact that he improved with treatment. The ALJ
ultimately 	determined 	that 	Shaver’s 	“admitted 	abilities 	provided
support, in part, for the residual functional capacity set forth above and
are 	quite 	inconsistent 	with 	the 	claimant’s 	allegations 	of 	totally
debilitating impairments.” 158
157 Doc. 16 at 16-19.
158 Tr. 1800-01.
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Lastly, Shaver argues the ALJ erred in failing to consider his
consistent work history because it constituted favorable evidence that
required consideration. 159 	While the ALJ did not discuss the claimant’s
work history, Shaver fails to identify how prejudice inured from such
alleged error. 	Social Security appeals are subject to harmless error
analysis. 160 	Under the harmless error analysis, a remand is warranted
only if the error “prejudices a party’s ‘substantial rights’”; that is, if the
error “likely affects the outcome of the proceeding, . . .”161 	Shaver’s
argument fails to demonstrate prejudice occurred, and so, even assuming
arguendo that it was an error, we hold now it was harmless.
Given that the ALJ considered all the evidence and adequately
explained the decision for including or discounting certain limitations as
established 	by 	the 	evidence, 	we 	find 	no 	error 	with 	the 	decision.
Therefore, under the deferential standard of review that applies to
appeals of Social Security disability determinations, we conclude that
159 Doc. 16 at 19-20.
160
See Holloman v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 639 F. App’x 810, 814 (3d Cir.
2016).
161
Hyer v. Colvin, 72 F. Supp. 3d 479, 494 (D. Del. 2014).
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substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s evaluation of this case, and this
decision will be affirmed.
IV. 	Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Commissioner in this
case will be affirmed, and the plaintiff’s appeal denied.
An appropriate order follows.
Submitted this 3rd day of March 2026.
s/ Daryl F. Bloom
Daryl F. Bloom
Chief United States Magistrate Judge
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