Case Name in Social Security Case - Unavailable

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
RYAN COPERTINO, 	: Civil No. 1:24-CV-1949
:
Plaintiff, 	:
:
v. 	:
: (Chief Magistrate Judge Bloom)
FRANK BISIGNANO, 	:
Commissioner of Social Security,1 	:
:
Defendant. 	:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. 	Introduction
Ryan Copertino filed an application under Titles II and XVI of the
Social Security Act for disability and disability insurance benefits and
supplemental security income on February 28, 2022. Following a hearing
before 	an 	Administrative 	Law 	Judge 	(“ALJ”), 	the 	ALJ 	found 	that
Copertino was not disabled from his alleged onset date of January 1,
2014, through February 5, 2024, the date of the ALJ’s decision.
1 	Frank 	Bisignano 	became 	the 	Commissioner 	of 	Social 	Security 	on
May 7, 2025. Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 	and 	42 	U.S.C. 	§ 	405(g), 	Bisignano 	is 	substituted 	as 	the
defendant in this suit.
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Copertino 	now 	appeals 	this 	decision, 	arguing 	that 	the 	ALJ’s
decision is not supported by substantial evidence. 	After a review of the
record, and mindful of the fact that substantial evidence “means only—
‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion,’” 2 we conclude that substantial evidence supports
the ALJ’s findings in this case. 	Therefore, we will affirm the decision of
the Commissioner denying this claim.
II. 	Statement of Facts and of the Case
Ryan 	Copertino 	filed 	for 	disability 	and 	disability 	insurance
benefits, as well as supplemental security income, alleging disability due
to anxiety, depression, and bipolar disorder. 3 Copertino was 17 years old
at the time of his alleged onset of disability, had at least a high school
education, and had no past relevant work. 4
The medical record regarding Copertino’s impairments5 revealed
that in April of 2015, Copertino presented at the Stony Brook University
2
Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019).
3 Tr. 55.
4 Tr. 29.
5 The record also contains Copertino’s school assessments for years prior
to his alleged onset of disability.
	See Tr. 327-71. 	While we have
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Hospital in New York after calling the police and expressing suicidal
ideations. 6 He reported being bullied by his peers at school and presented
with a laceration on his neck, which he admitted was due to cutting
himself 	with 	a 	kitchen 	knife. 7 	He 	further 	reported 	experiencing
depression for the past four to five months, which in part stemmed from
questioning his sexuality. 8 	However, it was noted that Copertino took
advanced placement classes in school, was a member of the track team,
and worked 20-25 hours per week at a grocery store.9
Two weeks later, Copertino was admitted the hospital after again
calling the police and voicing suicidal thoughts.10 	He reported increased
depression and anxiety, as well as transient plans to stab himself, to
hospital 	staff.11 	A 	psychiatric 	evaluation 	at 	this 	time 	noted 	that
Copertino was struggling with his sexual identity, which led him to
considered these records, because they predate the alleged disability
period by several years, we will forego a discussion of them.
6 Tr. 428.
7
Id.
8 Tr. 452.
9
Id.
10 Tr. 374.
11
Id.
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report himself to the police for “harassing” another student whom he
could not stop “obsessing” over.12 	A mental status examination revealed
cooperative behavior, coherent thought processes, a depressed mood,
impaired insight and judgment, and poor to fair impulse control. 13
When 	Copertino 	started 	college 	in 	October 	of 	2015, 	he 	began
services with the school’s counseling center.14 	His mental health intake
assessment noted that he experienced “obsessions about stupid things,”
which led to depression and frustration. 15 	A mental status examination
revealed cooperative but tense behavior, an anxious mood and restricted
affect, 	logical 	thought 	processes, 	normal 	speech, 	and 	moderately
impaired judgment. 16 	It was recommended that Copertino undergo a
psychiatric 	evaluation 	and 	individual 	counseling. 17 	The 	psychiatric
evaluation revealed that Copertino experienced depressive symptoms
including sleep, decreased concentration, and anger issues.18 	Copertino
12 Tr. 388.
13 Tr. 390.
14 Tr. 500.
15
Id.
16 Tr. 502.
17 Tr. 503.
18 Tr. 504-05.
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was 	diagnosed 	with 	autism 	spectrum 	disorder, 	anxiety, 	and
impulsiveness, and he was prescribed medication.19
At an initial counseling session in October of 2015, Copertino’s
counselor noted his history of obsessive thoughts that interfered with his
academic work. 20 	Copertino reported having several friends and no
conflicts with his peers.21 	On examination, his mood was “OK” and he
was mildly restless, and he exhibited limited insight and judgment. 22
Treatment notes from November indicate that Copertino was admitted
to a psychiatric unit for assessment due to his suicidal ideations, past
history of violence, drawings left in his residence hall, and inability to
cope with stressors. 23 	At a follow up visit, Copertino minimized the
reason for his hospital visit but agreed that he needed to continue taking
his medication. 24 	In December, prior to Copertino returning home for
19 Tr. 506.
20 Tr. 507.
21
Id.
22 Tr. 508.
23 Tr. 509.
24 Tr. 511.
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break, his roommate joined his counseling session and reported concern
for Copertino’s behavior. 25
In April of 2016, Copertino reported a recently depressed mood and
suicidal ideation with a plan to jump off a bridge. 26 	While he did not
follow through with his plan, he jumped off a 15-foot ledge on campus at
the encouragement of his peers for attention.27 	He also reported at this
session that he was engaging in relationships online with individuals
who asked him to send “inappropriate pictures.”28 	A mental status
examination revealed cooperative behavior, a depressed mood, logical
thought processes, and ruminations about feeling abandoned. 29 	At his
next visit, he reported having gone to the bridge again after being bullied
by his peers who found out about his online relationships.30
Copertino continued therapy over the summer with a provider close
to his home, Dr. Siddiqi, at which time he reported he stopped his
25 Tr. 516.
26 Tr. 513.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29 Tr. 514.
30 Tr. 520.
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medication due to researching the possible side effects.31 	His mother
reported he was easy to anger and “more explosive” since stopping his
medications. 32 Dr. Siddiqi started him on Wellbutrin. 33 At his next visit,
Copertino reported feeling significantly better on the Wellbutrin, and
that he was working at Burger King. 34 	A mental status examination
revealed a cooperative attitude, appropriate mood, good attention, intact
thought processes, and good impulse control. 35
Copertino resumed counseling at college in September of 2016, at
which time he reported working almost full time at Burger King over the
summer and purchasing himself a car. 36 	He told his counselor that he
was living on campus with five other roommates, and that he continued
to engage in online relationships. 37 	In November, Copertino reported
improvement in his mood and severity of symptoms since starting a new
31 Tr. 498.
32
Id.
33 Tr. 499.
34 Tr. 496.
35
Id.
36 Tr. 527.
37
Id.
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medication. 38 	His examination revealed an anxious mood, restricted
affect, and mildly impaired judgment. 39 However, in January, Copertino
reported more ruminating thoughts, particularly about an incident in
which his family dog bit him while he was home. 40 	He also reported to
his counselor that he planned a trip to meet up with a man he met
online. 41 	Copertino’s end-of-semester treatment notes indicated that he
was returning home for the summer after experiencing episodes of
increased depression and ruminating thoughts regarding his family dog,
his grandfather becoming ill, and living at home over the summer. 42
Copertino returned to treatment with Dr. Siddiqi over the summer,
at which time he had an unremarkable mental status evaluation.43 	Dr.
Siddiqi noted that Copertino had good control of his anxiety with his
medications. 44 	But in June, Dr. Siddiqi’s notes indicated Copertino
38 Tr. 531.
39
Id.
40 Tr. 533.
41
Id.
42 Tr. 536-37.
43 Tr. 494.
44
Id.
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stopped taking his medications.45 Copertino reported in July that he was
moving to Pennsylvania with his parents and was consistently taking his
medications, which made him feel significantly better. 46 A mental status
examination at this visit was unremarkable.47
In September of 2017, Copertino presented to the counseling center
after a man he had been dating showed up unexpectedly on campus. 48
Copertino further reported “controlling” behavior by this individual.49 	A
mental status examination at this time revealed an anxious mood and
mildly 	impaired 	judgment 	but 	was 	otherwise 	unremarkable.50 	A
discharge summary from June of 2018 noted that Copertino’s treatment
goals were partially met, and that he was going to his parents’ house in
Pennsylvania for the summer. 51 	Copertino continued counseling in his
senior year, and treatment notes indicate he worked part time for Uber. 52
45 Tr. 492.
46 Tr. 490.
47
Id.
48 Tr. 602.
49
Id.
50 Tr. 603.
51 Tr. 669-70.
52 Tr. 677.
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The counseling discharge summary further noted that Copertino planned
to 	live 	in 	an 	apartment 	in 	Pennsylvania 	near 	his 	parents 	after
graduation.53
Copertino’s 	next 	documented 	visit 	for 	his 	mental 	health
impairments 	was 	in 	January 	of 	2022 	with 	Dr. 	John 	Harkless. 54
Copertino reported panic attacks and increasing difficulties. 55 	He began
counseling with Oasis Lifecare in April of 2022. 56 	Copertino complained
of 	panic 	attacks, 	mood 	swings, 	obsessive 	thoughts, 	and 	difficulty
sleeping. 57 	He also reported having been arrested for reckless driving in
2021.58 A mental status examination revealed an anxious affect, fair eye
contact, compulsions and obsessions, fair insight and judgment, and
intact attention and concentration. 59 	Copertino was diagnosed with
obsessive compulsive disorder and started on medications. 60 	At a follow
53
Id.
54 Tr. 722.
55
Id.
56 Tr. 734.
57
Id.
58 Tr. 735.
59 Tr. 736-37.
60 Tr. 737.
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up appointment in July, he reported daily anxiety and depression and
panic attacks two times per week.61 	He also reported hitting himself
when he was stressed or sad.62 Other than “fair” insight, judgement, and
impulse 	control, 	Copertino’s 	mental 	status 	examination 	was
unremarkable.63
Copertino underwent a mental status evaluation with Dr. Angela
Chiodo in August of 2022. 64 	Dr. Chiodo noted Copertino’s history of
hospitalizations and outpatient treatment, as well as his completion of
his college degree and his part-time employment as a banquet server. 65
Copertino 	reported 	experiencing 	crying 	spells, 	obsessive 	thoughts,
paranoia, and impulsive behavior. 66 	On examination, Copertino was
slightly 	anxious 	but 	had 	appropriate 	eye 	contact, 	coherent 	thought
processes, intact attention, concentration, and memory skills, and fair
insight and judgment.67 	Copertino reported an ability to perform self-
61 Tr. 731.
62
Id.
63 Tr. 732.
64 Tr. 745-49.
65 Tr. 745.
66 Tr. 746.
67 Tr. 747.
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care, household chores, socialize with family, and work four days per
week. 68 In a medical source statement, Dr. Chiodo opined that Copertino
had mild limitations in interacting with others.69
Copertino 	continued 	to 	treat 	at 	Oasis 	for 	counseling, 	and 	in
September of 2022, he reported being fired from his hotel job for being in
the 	restroom 	obsessively 	checking 	the 	market 	on 	his 	phone.70 	In
November, 	Copertino’s 	medications 	were 	increased, 	as 	he 	was 	still
experiencing 	anxiety 	and 	anxious 	thoughts, 	but 	these 	symptoms
improved at a December visit. 71 	Mental status examinations from this
time note an anxious and depressed mood, fair insight and judgement,
obsessive thought tendencies, good eye contact, normal attention and
concentration, and intact memory skills. 72
Treatment notes from January through July of 2023 indicate that
Copertino 	continued 	to 	suffer 	from 	some 	symptoms 	of 	anxiety 	and
depression, 	such 	as 	changes 	in 	mood 	and 	obsessive 	or 	ruminating
68 Tr. 748.
69 Tr. 750-51.
70 Tr. 827.
71 Tr. 818-22.
72 Tr. 819, 822.
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thoughts. 73 	During this time, he was working part time with DoorDash,
which he reported caused him less anxiety because he had no boss.74 	He
was 	also 	living 	on 	his 	own 	in 	an 	apartment.75 	Mental 	status
examinations during this time showed an improvement in Copertino’s
mood, insight, judgment, and anxiety.76
It is against the backdrop of this record that an ALJ held a hearing
on Copertino’s disability application on November 30, 2023.77 	Copertino
and a Vocational Expert both appeared and testified at this hearing. 78
Following this hearing, on February 5, 2024, the ALJ issued a decision
denying Copertino’s application for disability benefits. 79 	The ALJ first
concluded that Copertino had not engaged in substantial gainful activity
since his alleged onset date of January 1, 2014.80 	At Step 2 of the
sequential analysis that governs disability claims, the ALJ found that
73 Tr. 867-85.
74 Tr. 870, 879, 885.
75 Tr. 882, 885.
76 Tr. 867-85.
77 Tr. 36-53.
78
Id.
79 Tr. 14-35.
80 Tr. 19-20.
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Copertino suffered from severe impairments of bipolar disorder, anxiety
disorder, depressive disorder, and obsessive compulsive disorder.81 	At
Step 3, the ALJ concluded that none of these impairments met or equaled
the 	severity 	of 	a 	listed 	impairment 	under 	the 	Commissioner’s
regulations. 82 Specifically, the ALJ found that Copertino experienced, at
most, mild to moderate limitations in the four broad areas of mental
functioning. 83
Between Steps 3 and 4, the ALJ then concluded that Copertino:
[H]a[d] the residual functional capacity to perform a full
range of work at all exertional levels but with the following
nonexertional 	limitations: 	The 	claimant 	requires 	a 	work
environment with no greater than a moderate noise level. The
claimant cannot perform occupational driving. The claimant
can tolerate occasional interactions with supervisors. The
claimant can tolerate occasional interactions with coworkers,
but no work on mandated teams. The claimant can tolerate
incidental interactions with the public, such as those which
would occur when passing someone in a hallway or sharing an
elevator, 	but 	the 	claimant 	cannot 	have 	direct 	customer
service-related positions. The claimant can carry out simple
instructions. 	The 	claimant 	cannot 	perform 	fast-paced
assembly line type of work or hourly quota work, but can
sustain 	a 	flexible 	and 	goal 	oriented 	pace. 	The 	claimant
requires a low stress work environment, defined as only
81 Tr. 20.
82 Tr. 20-22.
83 Tr. 21-22.
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occasional 	decision-making 	and 	occasional 	changes 	in 	a
routine 	work 	setting, 	where 	changes 	are 	introduced
gradually. In addition to customary breaks, the claimant
would be off task 5-10% of the workday on a regular basis. 84
In 	reaching 	this 	RFC 	determination, 	the 	ALJ 	considered 	the
objective medical record detailed above, the medical opinion evidence,
and Copertino’s reported symptoms. With respect to the medical opinion
evidence, the ALJ considered the opinions of state agency consultants Dr.
Kennedy and Dr. Urbanowicz. 85 	Dr. Kennedy found that Copertino had
moderate 	limitations 	in 	his 	ability 	to 	maintain 	concentration,
persistence, and pace, and manage himself, and a marked limitation in
interacting with others. 86 She further opined that Copertino could follow
simple instructions (
i.e., perform one and two step tasks), and that he can
perform simple, routine, repetitive tasks in a stable environment. 87 	The
ALJ found this opinion only partially persuasive. 88 	Specifically, the ALJ
reasoned 	that 	Dr. 	Kennedy’s 	marked limitation 	in 	interacting 	with
84 Tr. 22.
85 Tr. 27-28.
86 Tr. 58.
87 Tr. 61.
88 Tr. 27-28.
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others 	was 	internally 	inconsistent 	with 	her 	later 	conclusion 	that
Copertino could appropriately interact with coworkers, supervisors, and
the 	general 	public. 89 	The 	ALJ 	further 	found 	that 	Dr. 	Kennedy’s
limitations to simple, routine, repetitive tasks was inconsistent with her
findings that Copertino had no memory limitations.90
The ALJ found Dr. Urbanowicz’s opinion to be of limited persuasive
value. 91 	Dr. Urbanowicz found that Copertino experienced mild to
moderate limitations in the areas of social functioning, and that he was
“able to meet basic mental demands on a sustained basis[.]”92 	The ALJ
explained that Dr. Urbanowicz “offered no support for how, precisely, the
claimant was able to meet basic mental demands for work activity despite
his impairments.”93 	Further, although Dr. Urbanowicz relied partially
on Dr. Kennedy’s assessment, she failed to explain what parts of Dr.
Kennedy’s opinion were consistent with her own findings. 94
89 Tr. 27.
90
Id.
91 Tr. 28.
92 Tr. 79, 82.
93 Tr. 28.
94
Id.
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The 	ALJ 	also 	considered 	the 	opinion 	of 	the 	independent
consultative examiner, Dr. Chiodo, and found her opinion to be of limited
persuasive value.95 While the ALJ noted that Dr. Chiodo’s findings were
supported by her one-time examination, the ALJ further noted that the
longitudinal 	objective 	evidence 	showed 	more 	significant 	functioning
limitations that “are highly inconsistent with Dr. Chiod[o]’s opinion that
the claimant experienced no limitation in memory, concentration, or
adaptive functioning.”96
With 	respect 	to 	Copertino’s 	symptoms, 	the 	ALJ 	found 	that
Copertino’s 	statements 	concerning 	the 	intensity, 	persistence, 	and
limiting effects of his impairments were not entirely consistent with the
medical evidence. 97 	Copertino testified that at the time of the hearing,
he was 27 years old, lived alone in an apartment, and had completed his
bachelor’s degree.98 	He was also working part-time with DoorDash two-
to-three 	days 	per 	week. 99 	Copertino 	testified 	that 	his 	compulsive
95 Tr. 28-29.
96 Tr. 29.
97 Tr. 30.
98 Tr. 42.
99 Tr. 43.
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thoughts distract him, which prevented him from working full-time.100
He further reported experiencing panic attacks, sensitivity to noise,
difficulty focusing, and crying spells.101 	Copertino completed his college
degree, during which time he lived on campus with others. 102 He testified
that he could complete most household chores without assistance.103
The ALJ ultimately found Copertino’s testimony to be inconsistent
with the objective clinical findings. 104 	The ALJ recounted the objective
evidence during the alleged disability period, including unremarkable
examination findings of adequate attention and concentration, normal
insight and judgment, coherent thought processes, and normal memory
activity. 105 	The ALJ also noted evidence that Copertino was able to
interact with others in various settings, complete a college degree, and
work various part-time jobs during the relevant period.106 	Ultimately,
the ALJ concluded that Copertino was not as limited as he alleged.
100 Tr. 45.
101 Tr. 45, 48-49.
102 Tr. 42, 46.
103 Tr. 47-48.
104 Tr. 24.
105 Tr. 24.
106 Tr. 24-27.
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Having 	made 	these 	findings, 	the 	ALJ 	found 	at 	Step 	4 	that
Copertino had no relevant past work but found at Step 5 that he could
perform the occupations of a night cleaner, dishwasher, and laundry
worker. 107 	Accordingly, the ALJ found that Copertino had not met the
stringent standard prescribed for disability benefits and denied his
claim. 108
This appeal followed. 	On appeal, Copertino argues that the ALJ’s
RFC limitations, as well as his consideration of the medical opinions and
Copertino’s 	subjective 	symptoms, 	is 	not 	supported 	by 	substantial
evidence. 	This case is fully briefed and is therefore ripe for resolution.
For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm the decision of the
Commissioner.
III. 	Discussion
A. Substantial Evidence Review – the Role of this Court
This Court’s review of the Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits
is limited to the question of whether the findings of the final decision-
107 Tr. 30.
108
Id.
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maker 	are 	supported 	by 	substantial 	evidence 	in 	the 	record. 109
Substantial evidence “does not mean a large or considerable amount of
evidence, but rather such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”110 	Substantial evidence
means less than a preponderance of the evidence but more than a mere
scintilla.111
A single piece of evidence is not substantial evidence if the ALJ
“ignores, 	or 	fails 	to 	resolve, 	a 	conflict 	created 	by 	countervailing
evidence.”112 	However, where there has been an adequately developed
factual record, substantial evidence may be “something less than the
weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two inconsistent
conclusions from the evidence does not prevent [the ALJ’s decision] from
being supported by substantial evidence.” 113 	The court must “scrutinize
109
See 42 U.S.C. §405(g);
Johnson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 529 F.3d 198,
200 (3d Cir. 2008);
Ficca v. Astrue, 901 F. Supp. 2d 533, 536 (M.D. Pa.
2012).
110
Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988).
111
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971).
112
Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1064 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting
Kent v.
Schweiker, 	710 	F.2d 	110, 	114 	(3d 	Cir. 	1983)) 	(internal 	quotations
omitted).
113
Consolo v. Fed. Maritime Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966).
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the record as a whole” to determine if the decision is supported by
substantial evidence. 114
The Supreme Court has explained the limited scope of our review,
noting 	that 	“[substantial 	evidence] 	means—and 	means 	only—‘such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.’”115 	Under this standard, we must look to the
existing 	administrative 	record 	to 	determine 	if 	there 	is 	“‘sufficient
evidence’ to support the agency’s factual determinations.” 116 	Thus, the
question before us is not whether the claimant is disabled, but rather
whether the Commissioner’s finding that he or she is not disabled is
supported 	by 	substantial 	evidence 	and 	was 	based 	upon 	a 	correct
application of the law. 117
114
Leslie v. Barnhart, 304 F. Supp.2d 623, 627 (M.D. Pa. 2003).
115
Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1154 (quoting
Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB,
305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).
116
Id.
117
See Arnold v. Colvin, No. 3:12-CV-02417, 2014 WL 940205, at *1 (M.D.
Pa. Mar. 11, 2014) (“[I]t has been held that an ALJ’s errors of law denote
a 	lack 	of 	substantial 	evidence”) 	(alterations 	omitted);
	Burton 	v.
Schweiker, 512 F. Supp. 913, 914 (W.D. Pa. 1981) (“The Secretary’s
determination as to the status of a claim requires the correct application
of the law to the facts”);
see also Wright v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 675, 678
(3d Cir. 1990) (noting that the scope of review on legal matters is
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When conducting this review, we must remain mindful that “we
must not substitute our own judgment for that of the fact finder.” 118
Thus, we cannot re-weigh the evidence. Instead, we must determine
whether there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s findings. 	In
doing so, we must also determine whether the ALJ’s decision meets the
burden of articulation necessary to enable judicial review; that is, the
ALJ must articulate the reasons for his decision. 119 This does not require
the ALJ to use “magic” words, but rather the ALJ must discuss the
evidence and explain the reasoning behind his or her decision with more
than just conclusory statements. 120 	Ultimately, the ALJ’s decision must
be accompanied by “a clear and satisfactory explication of the basis on
which it rests.”121
B. Initial Burdens of Proof, Persuasion, and Articulation for the ALJ
plenary);
Ficca, 901 F. Supp. 2d at 536 (“[T]he court has plenary review
of all legal issues . . . .”).
118
Zirnsak v. Colvin, 777 F.3d 607, 611 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing
Rutherford
v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 552 (3d Cir. 2005)).
119
Burnett v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 220 F.3d 112, 119 (3d Cir.
2000).
120
See Diaz v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 577 F.3d 500, 504 (3d Cir. 2009)
(citations omitted).
121
Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 704 (3d Cir. 1981).
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To receive disability benefits under the Social Security Act, a
claimant must show that he or she is unable to “engage in any substantial
gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or
mental impairment which can be expected to result in death, or which
has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less
than 12 months.” 122 	This requires a claimant to show a severe physical
or mental impairment that precludes him or her from engaging in
previous work or “any other substantial gainful work which exists in the
national economy.” 123 	To receive benefits under Title II of the Social
Security Act, a claimant must show that he or she is under retirement
age, contributed to the insurance program, and became disabled prior to
the date on which he or she was last insured.124
In 	making 	this 	determination, 	the 	ALJ 	follows 	a 	five-step
evaluation. 125 	The 	ALJ 	must 	sequentially 	determine 	whether 	the
122 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(1)(A); 42 U.S.C. §1382c(a)(3)(A);
see also 20 C.F.R.
§§404.1505(a), 416.905(a).
123 	42 	U.S.C. 	§423(d)(2)(A); 	42 	U.S.C. 	§1382c(a)(3)(B); 	20 	C.F.R.
§§404.1505(a), 416.905(a).
124 42 U.S.C. §423(a); 20 C.F.R. §404.131(a).
125 20 C.F.R. §§404.1520(a), 416.920(a).
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claimant: (1) is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) has a severe
impairment; (3) has a severe impairment that meets or equals a listed
impairment; (4) is able to do his or her past relevant work; and (5) is able
to do any other work, considering 	his or her age, education, work
experience and residual functional capacity (“RFC”).126
Between Steps 3 and 4, the ALJ must also determine the claimant’s
residual functional capacity (RFC). 	RFC is defined as “that which an
individual is still able to do despite the limitations caused by his or her
impairment(s).”127 In making this assessment, the ALJ must consider all
the claimant’s medically determinable impairments, including any non-
severe impairments identified by the ALJ at step two of his or her
analysis. 128 	Our review of the ALJ’s determination of the plaintiff’s RFC
is deferential, and that determination will not be set aside if it is
supported by substantial evidence. 129
12620 C.F.R. §§404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4).
127
Burnett, 220 F.3d at 121 (citations omitted);
see also 20 C.F.R. §
404.1545(a)(1).
128 20 C.F.R. §§404.1545(a)(2), 416.945(a)(2).
129
Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113, 129 (3d Cir. 2002).
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The claimant bears the burden at Steps 1 through 4 to show a
medically 	determinable 	impairment 	that 	prevents 	him 	or 	her 	from
engaging in any past relevant work. 130 	If met, the burden then shifts to
the Commissioner to show at Step 5 that there are jobs in significant
numbers 	in 	the 	national 	economy 	that 	the 	claimant 	can 	perform
consistent 	with 	the 	claimant’s 	RFC, 	age, 	education, 	and 	work
experience. 131
With 	respect 	to 	the 	RFC 	determination, 	courts 	have 	followed
different paths when considering the impact of medical opinion evidence
on this determination. 	While some courts emphasize the necessity of
medical opinion evidence to craft a claimant’s RFC, other courts have
taken the approach that “[t]here is no legal requirement that a physician
have made the particular findings that an ALJ adopts in the course of
determining an RFC.” 132 	Additionally, in cases that involve no credible
medical opinion evidence, courts have held that “the proposition that an
130
Mason, 994 F.2d at 1064.
131 20 C.F.R. §§404.1512(f), 416.912(f);
Mason, 994 F.2d at 1064.
132
Titterington v. Barnhart, 174 F. App’x 6, 11 (3d Cir. 2006);
see also
Biller v. Acting Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 962 F. Supp. 2d 761, 778–79 (W.D.
Pa. 2013).
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ALJ must always base his RFC on a medical opinion from a physician is
misguided.” 133
Given these differing approaches, we must evaluate the factual
context 	underlying 	an 	ALJ’s 	decision. 	Cases 	that 	emphasize 	the
importance of medical opinion support for an RFC assessment typically
arise in the factual setting where well-supported medical sources have
found limitations to support a disability claim, but an ALJ has rejected
the medical opinion based upon an assessment of other evidence. 134
These cases simply restate the notion that medical opinions are entitled
to careful consideration when making a disability determination. On the
other hand, when no medical opinion supports a disability finding or
when an ALJ relies upon other evidence to fashion an RFC, courts have
routinely sustained the ALJ’s exercise of independent judgment based
upon all the facts and evidence.135 	Ultimately, it is our task to
133
Cummings v. Colvin, 129 F. Supp. 3d 209, 214–15 (W.D. Pa. 2015).
134
Biller, 962 F. Supp. 2d at 778–79.
135
See Titterington, 174 F. App’x 6;
Cummings, 129 F. Supp. 3d at 214–
15.
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determine, 	considering 	the 	entire 	record, 	whether 	the 	RFC
determination is supported by substantial evidence. 136
C. Legal Benchmarks for the ALJ’s Assessment of Medical Opinions
For applications filed after March of 2017, the regulations require
ALJs to consider several factors to determine the persuasiveness of a
medical 	opinion: 	supportability, 	consistency, 	relationship 	with 	the
claimant, 	specialization, 	and 	other 	factors 	tending 	to 	support 	or
contradict a medical opinion. 137 	Supportability and consistency are the
two most important factors, and an ALJ must explain how these factors
were considered in his or her written decision. 138 	Supportability means
“[t]he 	more 	relevant 	the 	objective 	medical 	evidence 	and 	supporting
explanations . . . are to support his or her medical opinion(s) . . . . the
more persuasive the medical opinions . . . will be.”139 	The consistency
136
Burns, 312 F.3d 113.
137 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c).
138 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(b)(2), 416.920c(b)(2);
Blackman v. Kijakazi,
615 F. Supp. 3d 308, 316 (E.D. Pa. 2022).
139 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(c)(1), 416.920c(c)(1).
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factor focuses on how consistent the opinion is “with the evidence from
other medical sources and nonmedical sources.”140
While there is an undeniable medical aspect to the evaluation of
medical opinions, it is well settled that “[t]he ALJ – not treating or
examining physicians or State agency consultants – must make the
ultimate disability and RFC determinations.” 141 	When confronted with
several medical opinions, the ALJ can choose to credit certain opinions
over others but “cannot reject evidence for no reason or for the wrong
reason.” 142 Further, the ALJ can credit parts of an opinion without giving
credit to the whole opinion and may formulate a claimant’s RFC based
on different parts of different medical opinions, so long as the rationale
behind the decision is adequately articulated. 143 	On the other hand, in
cases 	where 	no 	medical 	opinion 	credibly 	supports 	the 	claimant’s
allegations, “the proposition that an ALJ must always base his RFC on a
medical opinion from a physician is misguided.” 144
140 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(c)(2), 416.920c(c)(2).
141
Chandler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 361 (3d Cir. 2011).
142
Mason, 994 F.2d at 1066.
143
See Durden v. Colvin, 191 F. Supp. 3d 429, 455 (M.D. Pa. 2016).
144
Cummings, 129 F. Supp. 3d at 214–15.
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D. Legal 	Benchmarks 	for 	the 	ALJ’s 	Assessment 	of 	a 	Claimant’s
Alleged Symptoms
When evaluating lay testimony regarding a claimant’s reported
degree 	of 	pain 	and 	disability, 	the 	ALJ 	must 	make 	credibility
determinations. 145 	Our review of those determinations is deferential. 146
However, it is incumbent upon the ALJ to “specifically identify and
explain what evidence he found not credible and why he found it not
credible.” 147 	An ALJ should give great weight to a claimant’s testimony
“only when it is supported by competent medical evidence.” 148 	As the
Third Circuit has noted, while “statements of the individual concerning
his or her symptoms must be carefully considered, the ALJ is not required
to credit them.”149
145
See Diaz v. Comm’r, 577 F.3d 500, 506 (3d Cir. 2009).
146
Id.
147
Zirnsak v. Colvin, 777 F.3d 607, 612 (3d Cir. 2014) (citations omitted).
148
	McKean v. Colvin, 150 F. Supp. 3d 406, 415–16 (M.D. Pa. 2015)
(citations omitted).
149
Chandler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 363 (3d. Cir. 2011)
(referencing 20 C.F.R. §404.1529(a) (“statements about your pain or other
symptoms will not alone establish that you are disabled”).
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The Social Security Rulings and Regulations provide a framework
for evaluating the severity of a claimant’s reported symptoms. 150 	Thus,
the ALJ must follow a two-step process: first, the ALJ must determine
whether a medically determinable impairment could cause the symptoms
alleged; 	and 	second, 	the 	ALJ 	must 	evaluate 	the 	alleged 	symptoms
considering the entire administrative record.151
Symptoms such as pain or fatigue will be considered to affect a
claimant’s ability to perform work activities only if medical signs or
laboratory findings establish the presence of a medically determinable
impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the alleged
symptoms. 152 	During the second step of this assessment, the ALJ must
determine whether the claimant’s statements regarding the intensity,
persistence, or limiting effects of his or her symptoms are substantiated
considering the entire case record. 153 This includes, but is not limited to,
medical 	signs 	and 	laboratory 	findings; 	diagnoses; 	medical 	opinions
150 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529, 416.929; SSR 16–3p.
151 SSR 16-3p.
152 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(b), 416.929(b); SSR 16–3p.
153 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c), 416.929(c); SSR 16–3p.
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provided by treating or examining sources and other medical sources; and
information regarding the claimant’s symptoms and how they affect his
or her ability to work. 154
The Social Security Administration recognizes that individuals
may be limited by their symptoms to a greater or lesser extent than other
individuals with the same medical impairments, signs, and laboratory
findings. 155 	Thus, to assist in the evaluation of a claimant’s subjective
symptoms, the Social Security Regulations set forth seven factors that
may be relevant to the assessment of the claimant’s alleged symptoms. 156
These 	factors 	include: 	the 	claimant’s 	daily 	activities; 	the 	“location,
duration, frequency, and intensity” of the claimant’s pain or symptoms;
the type, dosage, and effectiveness of medications; treatment other than
medications; 	and 	other 	factors 	regarding 	the 	claimant’s 	functional
limitations. 157
154
Id.
155 SSR 16-3p.
156 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3), 416.929(c)(3).
157
Id.
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E. The ALJ’s Decision is Supported by Substantial Evidence.
Our review of the ALJ’s decision denying an application for benefits
is significantly deferential. Our task is simply to determine whether the
ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record; that is
“only— ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.’”158 	Judged against this deferential
standard of review, we conclude that substantial evidence supported the
ALJ’s decision in this case.
Copertino first argues that the ALJ erred in failing to include Dr.
Kennedy’s limitation to one-to-two-step tasks in the RFC. 159 	He asserts
that the failure to include this limitation or explain its absence requires
a remand. 160 	While the ALJ found Dr. Kennedy’s opinion only partially
persuasive, the ALJ did include a limitation to simple instructions in the
RFC, although did not use the precise words “one-to-two-step tasks.” 161
Accordingly, the plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ failed to address this
158
Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1154.
159 Doc. 14 at 6.
160
Id.
161 Tr. 22, 27.
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limitation is belied by the RFC that actually included the limitation to
simple instructions.
The plaintiff also contends that such a limitation is inconsistent
with the jobs identified by the Vocational Expert because two of the three
jobs require a reasoning level of 2, and a limitation to simple instructions
conflicts with reasoning level 2 jobs. 162 	It is true that two of the jobs
identified by the Vocational Expert—dishwasher and laundry worker—
require reasoning level 2.163 	However, a limitation to one- or two-step
tasks can (but does not always) preclude jobs requiring reasoning level
two, as such jobs require that an individual be able to carry out “detailed
but uninvolved written or oral instructions.” 164 	Moreover, the third job
162 Doc. 14 at 8-9.
163
	See 	Dishwasher, 	DOT 	318.687-010, 	1991 	WL 	672755; 	Laundry
Worker, DOT 302.685-010, 1991 WL 672657.
164 See
Cowher v. O’Malley, 2024 WL 3161865, at *9-10 (W.D. Pa. June
24, 2024);
see also Leach v. Kijakazi, 70 F.4th 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 2023)
(“A level-two job with ‘detailed but uninvolved . . . instructions’ could
require an employee to follow lengthy simple instructions. On the present
record, then, we cannot determine whether the level-two jobs identified
by 	the 	vocational 	expert 	require 	only 	short, 	simple 	instructions.”);
Thomas v. Berryhill, 916 F.3d 307, 314 (4th Cir. 2019) (“We believe that
Thomas, being limited to short, simple instructions, may not be able to
carry out detailed but uninvolved instructions.”).
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identified by the Vocational Expert—night cleaner—requires reasoning
level 1, which would comport with a simple instructions limitation. 165
Accordingly, in our view, given that the ALJ identified a reasoning
level 1 job that Copertino could perform, any error in the ALJ’s RFC
analysis 	regarding 	simple 	instructions 	limitation, 	as 	well 	as 	the
identification of reasoning level 2 jobs, is harmless. 	Social Security
appeals are subject to harmless error analysis. 166 	Under the harmless
error analysis, a remand is warranted only if the error “prejudices a
party's ‘substantial rights’ ”; that is, if the error “likely affects the
outcome of the proceeding [.]”167 	The claimant bears the burden of
proving an error is harmful. 168 	Here, Copertino asserts that the night
cleaner job is inconsistent with the ALJ’s limitation to only incidental
interaction with the public. 169 	But at the hearing, the Vocational Expert
identified this job as one that someone with the plaintiff’s limitations—
165
See Cleaner, Housekeeping, DOT 323.687-014, 1991 WL 672783.
166 See
Holloman v. Comm'r Soc. Sec., 639 F. App’x 810, 814 (3d Cir.
2016).
167
Hyer v. Colvin, 72 F. Supp. 3d 479, 494 (D. Del. 2014).
168
Id.
169 Doc. 14 at 9.
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including only incidental interaction with the public—could perform. 170
Indeed, “[the Commissioner can [] rely on testimony from a VE to meet
its step-five evidentiary burden.”171 	And the plaintiff’s counsel did not
object to the qualifications of the vocational expert at the administrative
hearing. 	Thus, the plaintiff’s belated contention that the night cleaner
job appears to conflict with the RFC’s limitations is unavailing, fails to
show a harmful error in the RFC determination, and does not require a
remand.
Copertino 	also 	contends 	that 	the 	ALJ 	erred 	in 	assessing 	his
subjective testimony, in that the ALJ appeared to rely on objective
findings 	of 	“no 	acute 	distress,” 	the 	scarcity 	of 	records 	related 	to
Copertino’s mental health, findings that Copertino was “stable,” and
factors such as Copertino’s ability to obtain a college degree.172 	First, as
to the plaintiff’s contention that the ALJ erred by remarking that there
was 	“minimal 	objective 	evidence” 	of 	Copertino’s 	impairments, 	this
170 Tr. 51.
171
Zirnsak v. Colvin, 777 F.3d 607, 616 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing 20 C.F.R. §
404.1566(e)).
172 Doc 14 at 13-17.
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36
contention is simply incorrect. While the ALJ did remark that there was
minimal objective evidence “pertaining to the claimant’s medical status
during 2019, 2020, and 2021[,]” the ALJ thoroughly recounted and
examined all of the mental health evidence contained in the record from
the alleged onset date through 2023. 173 	Moreover, the ALJ was entitled
to consider objective findings in the record and did not solely rely on
findings of “no acute distress” or that Copertino’s impairments were
“stable.” 	The ALJ’s decision consistently noted findings of impaired
insight 	and 	judgment 	and 	varying 	moods 	throughout 	the 	alleged
disability period, but contrasted these findings with others such as logical
thought processes, normal speech activity, cooperative behavior, intact
attention and concentration, and intact memory skills, among others. 174
Thus, the contention that the ALJ solely relied on findings of “no acute
distress” and stability is plainly contradicted by the ALJ’s decision.
Further, the ALJ was entitled to consider evidence showing that
the plaintiff was able to obtain a college degree and work various part
173 Tr. 24-29.
174
Id.
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time 	jobs 	during 	the 	relevant 	period. 	Contrary 	to 	the 	plaintiff’s
arguments, the ALJ considered Copertino’s testimony that he struggled
with his coursework at school but ultimately concluded that there was
evidence in the record to contradict Copertino’s allegations of disabling
impairments. 	Thus, while Copertino challenges the ALJ’s credibility
determination, 	we 	are 	not 	permitted 	at 	this 	stage 	to 	reweigh 	the
evidence, and instead must simply determine whether the ALJ’s decision
was supported by “substantial evidence.” 175 	Here, we conclude that the
ALJ’s consideration of Copertino’s subjective symptoms is supported by
substantial evidence.
Given that the ALJ considered all the evidence and adequately
explained the decision for including or discounting certain limitations as
established 	by 	the 	evidence, 	we 	find 	no 	error 	with 	the 	decision.
Therefore, under the deferential standard of review that applies to
appeals of Social Security disability determinations, we conclude that
substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s evaluation of this case, and this
decision will be affirmed.
175
Chandler, 667 F.3d at 359;
Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1154.
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IV. 	Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Commissioner in this
case will be affirmed, and the plaintiff’s appeal denied.
An appropriate order follows.
Submitted this 17th day of February 2026.
s/ Daryl F. Bloom
Daryl F. Bloom
Chief United States Magistrate Judge
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