Evans v. Cumberland County

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ANIA EVANS,
Plaintiff,
v.
CUMBERLAND COUNTY,
Defendant.
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Civil No. 1:24-CV-00646
Judge Jennifer P. Wilson
MEMORANDUM
It took Plaintiff, Ania Evans (“Evans”), nineteen months from the date she
filed her original complaint to realize that her complaint details a factual
background that has no basis in reality. She now seeks leave to file a second
amended complaint. The facts detailed in this proposed pleading hardly resemble
those in the original. For this reason and others, Defendant, Cumberland County
(“the County”), opposes Evans’s motion. Upon consideration of the parties’
arguments and the circumstances of this case, the court determines that amendment
is unwarranted. Therefore, Evans’s motion will be denied.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL B ACKGROUND
According to the original complaint, Evans began working for the County
Clerk’s Office as a clerk in 2019. (Doc. 1, ¶ 6.) Evans allegedly had difficulty
“concentrating, working, and caring for herself” due to her suffering chronic
migraines. (Id. ¶ 7.) Sometime between 2019 and 2022, Evans sought reasonable
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accommodations due to her condition, including “occasional telecommuting and
adjusted work hours.” (Id. ¶ 8.) The County allegedly provided these
accommodations “without issue.” (Id.) In August 2022, however, Evans’s
supervisor revoked approval of the accommodations and, subsequently, subjected
Evans to unwarranted adverse treatment due to her disability. (Id. ¶ 9.) This
adverse treatment allegedly included “increased workload, unjustified disciplinary
actions, and hostile treatment in the workplace.” (Id. ¶ 11.) Evans’s attempts to
address this alleged discriminatory treatment were fruitless. She allegedly
attempted to discuss the necessity of her accommodations with the County to no
avail. (Id. ¶ 10.) She also allegedly filed a formal complaint with the County’s
Human Resources Department, similarly to no avail. (Id. ¶ 12.) On December 1,
2022, the County terminated Evans’s employment “purportedly due to
performance issues.” (Id. ¶ 13.) Though, Evans claims that her employment was
terminated due to her disability, her requests for accommodation, and in retaliation
for her complaints. (Id.)
Evans’s proposed amended complaint tells an entirely different story.
According to that pleading, the events giving rise to Evans’s claims occurred
between May 2023 and July 2023.1 (Doc. 26-1, ¶¶ 12–15.) In May 2023, Evans
1 The proposed amended complaint does not allege when Evans started working for the County.
The County avers, based on Evans’s offer letter, that her employment began in May 2023. (Doc.
31, p. 4 (citing Doc. 31-4).)
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requested one accommodation, the ability to work remotely. (Id. ¶ 12–13.) She
sought this arrangement as an accommodation for her bipolar disorder. (Id. ¶ 13.)
The County allegedly denied Evans’s request on June 7, 2023. (Id.) This denial
allegedly led to a deterioration of Evans’s health that forced her to step away from
her job between June 20, 2023, and July 7, 2023. (Id. ¶ 15.) During this absence,
the County allegedly threatened Evans’s job and subjected her to unfair treatment,
both of which ultimately led to her constructive discharge.2 (Id. ¶ 16.)
Notwithstanding the entirely different factual averments in the two
complaints, Evans alleges the same types of disability-discrimination claims in
both the original complaint and the proposed amended complaint. She alleges a
disability-discrimination claim in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act
(“ADA”) and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (“PHRA”). (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 14–
15, 18–19; Doc. 26-1, ¶¶ 18–26, 50–56). She alleges a retaliation claim in
violation of the ADA and PHRA. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 16–17, 20–21; Doc. 26-1, ¶¶ 41–49,
57–63). And she alleges a failure-to-accommodate claim under the ADA. (Doc. 1,
¶ 15; Doc. 26-1, ¶¶ 27–40.)
Evans filed her original complaint on April 12, 2024. (Doc. 1.) The case
then sat dormant for about two months. Due to this inactivity, the court ordered
2 The proposed amended complaint does not allege when Evans’s employment with the County
ended.
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Evans to provide a status report by June 25, 2024. (Doc. 6.) She never did. On
August 16, 2024, the court issued an order to show cause as to why the case should
not be dismissed for failure to prosecute, Doc. 7, to which Evans timely responded,
Doc. 9. In that response, Evans’s previous counsel stated that the delay in
prosecuting this case was caused by “significant administrative turnover . . . of key
staff members” at counsel’s firm and “substantial issues with” the firm’s “calendar
system.” (Doc. 9, p. 1.) 3 The explanation was that these issues caused previous
counsel to miss deadlines and not properly track the service of the complaint. (Id.).
Upon review of this response, the court determined that good cause existed
to extend the deadline to serve the complaint. (Doc. 10.) Evans successfully
served the complaint on September 16, 2024. (Doc. 14, p. 1.) The County filed an
answer on October 4, 2024. (Doc. 12.) Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff’s current
counsel was substituted for her previous counsel. (Doc. 13.)
On February 3, 2025, this case was randomly selected for a mandatory
referral to court-annexed mediation pursuant to Standing Order 04-3. (Doc. 15, p.
2.) Mediator Joseph Barrett subsequently reported on March 12, 2025, that
mediation did not result in a settlement. (Doc. 22.)
Following mediation, the court convened a telephonic status conference to
set a case management schedule. The court memorialized the deadlines set during
3 For ease of reference, the court uses the page numbers from the CM/ECF header.
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that conference in a case management order. (Doc. 25.) Particularly relevant here,
the court set November 14, 2025, as the deadline to amend the complaint. (Id.)
On that day, Evans filed the instant motion for leave to amend the complaint,
followed by a brief in support. (Docs. 26 & 29.) The County responded, in turn,
with a brief in opposition. (Doc. 31.) Evans did not file a reply brief. The court
stayed the case management deadlines pending resolution of Evans’s motion.
(Doc. 30.) The motion is now ripe for review.
J URISDICTION
The court has subject matter jurisdiction over Evans’s federal claims,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and her state law claims, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367. Venue is proper in this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).
S TANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(1) allows plaintiffs to amend their
complaint as a matter of course within 21 days of serving it or the earlier of
defendant’s service of a responsive pleading or certain Rule 12 motions. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 15(a)(1). Outside those time periods, “a party may amend its pleading only
with the opposing party's written consent or the court's leave.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
15(a)(2). The decision to grant leave is “committed to the District Court’s sound
discretion.” Cureton v. NCAA, 252 F.3d 267, 276 (3d Cir. 2001).
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In exercising this discretion, the court must heed Rule 15’s mandate that
leave should be freely given. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). Even so,
this “directive in favor of amendment,” Mullin v. Balicki, 875 F.3d 140, 150 (3d
Cir. 2017), is not without its limits. A court may reasonably deny leave to amend
“based on” the so-called Foman factors: “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive
on the part of the movant; repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments
previously allowed; prejudice to the opposing party; and futility.” Id. at 149;
accord Foman, 371 U.S. at 182. Of these factors, “prejudice to the non-moving
party is the touchstone for the denial of an amendment.” Lorenz v. CSX Corp., 1
F.3d 1406, 1413–14 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting Cornell & Co. v. Occupational Safety
& Health Review Comm’n, 573 F.2d 820, 823 (3d Cir. 1978)).
DISCUSSION
The County argues that three Foman factors justify denying Evans’s motion.
It argues that (1) amendment would be futile; (2) Evans’s request was unduly
delayed; and (3) allowing the amendment would prejudice the County. The court
considers each factor in turn.
A. Futility
An amendment is futile if “the complaint, as amended, would fail to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted.” Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 115
(3d Cir. 2000). In assessing this factor, the court “applies the same standard of
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legal sufficiency as applies under Rule 12(b)(6).” In re Burlington Coat Factory
Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1434 (3d Cir. 1997). One reason amendment could be
futile is if the amended complaint would be unable to survive a “motion to dismiss
on the basis of the statute of limitations.” Garvin v. City of Philadelphia, 354 F.3d
215, 222 (3d Cir. 2003). This is the reason upon which the County relies.
Specifically, the County argues that Evans’s claims, as amended, would be time-
barred for being filed more than 90 days after she received her EEOC right-to-sue
letter. 4 (Doc. 31, p. 13.)
Under federal law, a plaintiff must file an ADA discrimination claim in
federal court within 90 days of receipt of an EEOC right-to-sue letter. Percival v.
Zimmerman, No. 24-2232, 2025 WL 1604502, at *2 (3d Cir. June 6, 2025) (citing
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)). This 90-day period represents a “strict statute of
limitations.” Id. at *3; accord Burgh v. Borough Council of Montrose, 251 F.3d
465, 470 (3d Cir. 2001). It is undisputed that Evans received her EEOC right-to-
sue letter on January 17, 2024. (Doc. 31-1, p. 1.) Evans did not move to amend
her complaint until November 14, 2025, long after the 90-day limitations period
expired.
4 The County does not argue that Evans’s PHRA claims would be untimely, so the court will not
consider this point. In any event, amendment still would be unwarranted even if Evans’s PHRA
claims did not face the same timeliness problem her federal claims do. That is because, as
articulated below, additional factors warrant denial of Evans’s motion for leave to amend.
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Therefore, Evans’s proposed amended complaint will be timely only if it
relates back to the original under Rule 15(c). Spicer v. Villanova Univ., No. 06-cv-
1411, 2006 WL 3486465, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 1, 2006); Bernstein v. Nat’l Liberty
Int’l Corp., 407 F. Supp. 709, 713 (E.D. Pa. 1976); see Anderson v. Bondex Int’l,
Inc., 552 F. App’x 153, 156 (3d Cir. 2014) (“Where a claim is barred by the statute
of limitations, amendment is only permitted if the proposed amended complaint
‘relates back to the date of the original pleading’ pursuant to Rule 15(c).”). The
only provision of Rule 15(c) that is applicable here is Rule 15(c)(1)(B). That rule
states, “[a]n amendment to a pleading relates back to the date of the original
pleading when . . . the amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the
conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out—or attempted to be set out—in the
original pleading.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(B).
Applying this provision “entails a ‘search for a common core of operative
facts in the two pleadings.’” Glover v. FDIC, 698 F.3d 139, 145 (3d Cir. 2012)
(quoting Bensel v. Allied Pilots Ass’n, 387 F.3d 298, 310 (3d Cir. 2004)). The
primary purpose of this search is to determine whether the non-movant had “fair
notice of the general fact situation and the legal theory upon which the amending
party proceeds.” Id. at 146 (quoting Bensel, 387 F.3d at 310). So, for instance, an
amended pleading will relate back if it “restate[s] the original claim with greater
particularity or amplif[ies] the factual circumstances surrounding the pertinent
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conduct, transaction or occurrence in the preceding pleading.” Anderson, 552 F.
App’x at 157 (quoting Bensel, 387 F.3d at 310). Conversely, an amendment will
not relate back “when it asserts a new ground for relief supported by facts that
differ in both time and type from those the original pleading set forth.” Wirt v.
Bon-Ton Stores, Inc., 134 F. Supp. 3d 852, 859 (M.D. Pa. 2015) (quoting Mayle v.
Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 650 (2005)).
Applying these principles, the court cannot conclude that the complaint and
proposed amended complaint share a common core of operative facts. The set of
operative facts in each is wholly dissimilar from the other. The differences touch
upon virtually every important topic of this case: (1) the time period when Evans
worked for the County; (2) the duration of Evans’s employment; (3) Evans’s
claimed disability; (4) the accommodations Evans sought; (5) the County’s
response to Evans’s accommodations request; (6) Evans’s response to perceived
discrimination; and (7) the nature of Evans’s employment termination. These
differences do not represent an attempt to clarify or expand upon previous
allegations; they represent a complete disavowal of the previous allegations. The
court has little difficulty concluding that the proposed amended complaint’s facts
“differ in both time and type from those the original pleading set forth.” Mayle,
545 U.S. at 650.
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Under these circumstances, Evans’s proposed amended complaint does not
satisfy Rule 15(c)(1)(B) and does not relate back to the date of her original
complaint. Given this, amendment would be futile, because the ADA claims
contained in Evans’s proposed amended complaint would be time-barred.
B. Undue Delay
The thrust of the undue-delay analysis is considering “the movant’s reasons
for not amending sooner.” Cureton, 252 F.3d at 273. Indeed, the court must
consider what caused the “gap between when amendment bec[ame] possible and
when it [wa]s actually sought.” Mullin, 875 F.3d at 151. A delay between those
two points in time is “undue” when it “is protracted and unjustified.” Id.
Evans provides no reason—and the court cannot think of one—as to why the
information included in the proposed amended complaint could not have been
included in the original complaint. The purpose of amending the pleading is to
correct the basic factual allegations of the case. It is beyond belief that Evans
would not have known these basic facts when she filed her original complaint. For
example, Evans had to have known before this case started what her claimed
disability was, what her dates of employment were, and how she came to leave the
County’s employment. These are the fundamental facts that compelled Evans to
file a federal lawsuit.
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Ultimately, then, Evans could have and should have amended her complaint
as soon as she filed it. Instead, it took her 19 months to do so. The duration of this
delay alone is troubling. Courts in this circuit have found delays of shorter
duration to be undue. In re EP Liquidation, LLC, 583 B.R. 304, 317–18 (Bankr. D.
Del. 2018) (thirteen months); College v. Synergis Educ. Inc., No. 14-cv-06966,
2015 WL 9474654, at *2–3 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 29, 2015) (five to seven months);
Zeigenfuse v. Kemp Assocs., Inc., No. 14-cv-05954, 2015 WL 7568259, at *3–4
(E.D. Pa. Nov. 25, 2015) (three months); Williams v. Cost-U-Less, Inc., No. 2011-
cv-025, 2014 WL 2993667, at *4–5 (D.V.I. July 3, 2014) (seventeen months);
Peele v. City of Philadelphia, No. 08-cv-4661, 2010 WL 11707364, at *1 n.1 (E.D.
Pa. Mar. 5, 2010) (nine months).
Even more troubling, however, is the fact that Evans offers no explanation
for why it took her so long to seek leave to amend. This silence “is especially
conspicuous given that the factual foundation for [her] claim[s] was long-known,”
McCarthy v. Komori Am. Corp., 200 F.R.D. 507, 508 (E.D. Pa. 2001), and that she
has exhibited a pattern of dilatoriness in prosecuting this lawsuit. The most Evans
provides in her brief is the conclusory statement that “there is no . . . undue delay .
. . present.” (Doc. 29, p. 4.) Without any explanation for her conduct, the court
must conclude that Evans’s 19-month delay in seeking leave to amend is undue.
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C. Prejudice
The prejudice factor focuses on the hardships the non-movant would suffer
if an amendment were permitted. Cureton, 252 F.3d at 273. The analysis
considers “whether allowing an amendment would result in,” among other
prejudicial outcomes, “additional discovery, cost, and preparation to defend against
new facts or new theories.” Id. Several considerations are material here.
On the one hand, the County credibly explains that permitting Evans’s
proposed amendment would require it to engage in a fair amount of additional
discovery. (Doc. 31, pp. 11–12.) Specifically, this discovery would be necessary
for the County to explore the factual bases for Evans’s new theory of constructive
discharge, id. at 11, and her bipolar disorder, see id. at 12. The County also
credibly avers that it would need to engage an expert to opine on Evans’s bipolar
disorder, which would be accompanied by expert discovery. (Id. at 12.) These are
not insignificant endeavors, and the County credibly asserts that it would
essentially need to relitigate this matter due to the substantial changes to the facts
giving rise to Evans’s claims. (Doc. 31, p. 12.) Such drastic changes support a
finding of prejudice. See Luciani v. City of Philadelphia, 643 F. App’x 109, 111–
12 (3d Cir. 2016) (“[W]e have found previously that changing the legal and factual
basis of a claim can create undue prejudice.”); Cornell, 573 F.2d at 824 (finding
prejudice when “the legal and factual matters in dispute changed drastically”).
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On the other hand, the court recognizes that “the need for additional
discovery does not conclusively establish prejudice.” Dole v. Arco Chem. Co., 921
F.2d 484, 488 (3d Cir. 1990). Moreover, the County does not explain how “it was
unfairly disadvantaged or deprived of the opportunity to present facts or evidence
which it would have offered had the ... amendments been timely.” Betchel v.
Robinson, 886 F.2d 644, 652 (3d Cir. 1989) (quoting Heyl & Patterson Int’l, Inc. v.
F.D. Rich Hous. of V.I., Inc., 663 F.2d 419, 426 (3d Cir. 1981). Thus, there is no
basis for the court to conclude that the County would not fairly be able to litigate
this case moving forward.5
Even considering these mitigating factors, however, the court finds that the
additional costs of relitigating this case establish prejudice that weighs in favor of
denying Evans’s motion. This prejudice was entirely avoidable. Had Evans and
her former counsel filed an accurate complaint, the County could have focused its
discovery on the actual facts of this case. It also could have avoided expending
resources on mediation that was premised on inaccurate facts. It is inexplicable
and perplexing how the original complaint could have been filed at all given its
plentiful and patent inaccuracies. Evans should have reviewed the complaint for
5 The fact that Evans filed her motion to amend about six-and-a-half weeks before the fact
discovery deadline does not definitively establish prejudice, since that deadline could be
extended. Williams v. City of York, No. 1:15-cv-0493, 2016 WL 2610007, at *6 (M.D. Pa. May
6, 2016).
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accuracy before her former counsel filed it. Her former counsel should have
ensured that “the factual contentions [in the complaint] have evidentiary support or
. . . will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further
investigation or discovery.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(3). This is basic due diligence
that both Evans and her former counsel at best overlooked or at worst disregarded.
The costs of these failures should not now be passed on to the County after it has
spent nearly two years litigating this case in good faith.
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CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the futility of amendment, Evans’s undue delay in seeking
leave to amend, and the prejudice that amendment would cause the County all
weigh against allowing the filing of the proposed amended complaint. Therefore,
the court will deny Evans’s motion for leave to amend. An appropriate order will
issue.
s/Jennifer P. Wilson
JENNIFER P. WILSON
United States District Judge
Middle District of Pennsylvania
Dated: March 16, 2026
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