Ojo et al v. Brew Vino LLC et al

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

AUTHENTIC

Case 1:20-cv-00661-JKM Document133 Filed 12/22/25 Page1of28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MYNECA Y. OJO, et al., : No. 1:20-CV-661
Plaintiffs : (Munley, J.)

Vv. : (Caraballo, M.J.)
BREW VINO LLC, et al.,
Defendants

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

I. Introduction

On April 20, 2020, plaintiffs Myneca Ojo and Karen Crosby
commenced this civil rights action against defendants Brew Vino LLC
(“Brew Vino”), Steven Chronister, Jordan Chronister, Marc Bower, and
Brian Polachek, alleging that they suffered racial and gender
discrimination at the Grandview Golf Course, a facility owned and
operated by Brew Vino in York County, Pennsylvania. Doc. 1. The next
day, plaintiffs Sandra Harrison and Carolyn Dow filed another civil
rights case based on similar allegations. Harrison v. Brew Vino, LLC,
No. 1:20-CV-666 (M.D. Pa. 2020). The Court consolidated both actions

into the instant case on January 28, 2022. Doc. 44.

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On May 16, 2023, the defendants moved for summary judgment.
Doc. 81. In a September 12, 2023, report, the Honorable Martin C.
Carlson recommended granting in part and denying in part the motion
for summary judgment, but noted that further briefing on the issue of
individual liability under Title 42, United States Code, Sections 1981
and 2000a may be warranted. Doc. 87 at 19n.4. The Honorable Sylvia
H. Rambo adopted the report and recommendation, but directed the
parties to file supplemental briefs on the issue of individual liability
under Sections 1981 and 2000a. Doc. 89. Following briefing, Docs. 91;
94, the supplemental motion for summary judgment by defendants
Steven Chronister, Bower, and Polachek! was referred to the
undersigned to issue this Report and Recommendation (“R&R”).

The defendants present two positions in their supplemental brief.
First, relying on precedents addressing Title VIJ of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, they contend that the individual defendants, as employees of
Brew Vino, cannot be held liable under Section 1981. Doc. 91 at 7-19.

Second, they assert that the individual defendants cannot be held liable

1 The defendants do not advance their supplemental motion on behalf of defendant
Jordan Chronister. See generally Doc. 91.

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under Section 2000a, because the statute offers only injunctive relief.
Id. at 19-20. Thus, as the individual defendants are employees who
have no authority to alter Brew Vino’s policies, they cannot provide the
requested remedy. Id. The plaintiffs aver that both statutes permit
individual liability. Doc. 94 at 11-12.

As set forth below, the defendants’ position on individual liability
under Section 1981 is unavailing for at least three reasons. First, the
Court of Appeals ruled that individual employees may be held liable
under Section 1981. Second, Supreme Court precedent and Section
1981’s legislative history shows that its application is not limited to the
employment context, and does not exclude individual liability. And
third, there remain disputed issues of material fact concerning the
precise details of the plaintiffs’ golf course memberships, and the roles
of the various individual defendants in alleged efforts to enforce or
revoke those contracts.

The defendants’ supplemental motion on the Section 2000a claim
is equally unavailing. Although the defendants are correct that the
statute does not provide for compensatory damages, injunctive relief

may nonetheless be awarded against individuals under the statute, as

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set forth in its plan language. Accordingly, the undersigned
respectfully recommends that the supplemental motion for summary
judgment be denied.

Il Background

After over five years of litigation, the parties and the Court are
familiar with this action’s factual and procedural histories, set forth
thoroughly in Judge Carlson’s Report and Recommendation. Doc. 87 at
3-9. The undersigned thus only recites the background germane to this
R&R, much of which remains in contention.

On April 21, 2018, the four plaintiffs and Sandra Thompson were
playing golf at the Grandview Golf Course. Doe. 84-3 at 3. All members
of the group were African American women with three-year
memberships at the golf course. Jd. During the golf outing, the
plaintiffs engaged in a series of acrimonious exchanges with Steven
Chronister and other Brew Vino personnel. As a general matter, the
plaintiffs aver that the defendants were motivated by discriminatory
biases; the defendants contend that they sought to speed up the

plaintiffs’ pace of play.

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The interactions began shortly after the plaintiffs finished the
first hole. Steven Chronister approached the plaintiffs twice and
initially told them to pick up their pace of play. Docs. 91 at 3; 84-3 at 6.
According to the plaintiffs, he introduced himself as the owner of the
golf course and eventually told them to leave, stating that he “would
refund their (golf cart) money and their memberships.” Docs. 84-5 at
37—40; 84-8 at 38; 84-12 at 6. After those initial interactions, the
precise nature of which remains in dispute, Steven Chronister called
emergency services to obtain police assistance. Doc. 87 at 5. During
that 911 call, he identified himself as the golf course manager. Doc. 84-
11. Officer Erika Eiker was dispatched to the golf course and rode ona
golf cart with defendant Polachek, the general manager of the golf
course, to speak with the plaintiffs. Docs. 84-7 at 12, 37-38; 87 at 5.
Once informed by Steven Chronister that police intervention was no
longer necessary, however, Kiker departed before interacting with the
plaintiffs. Docs. 84-7 at 12, 37-38; 87 at 5.

After the group finished playing the first nine holes, plaintiffs
Crosby, Harrison, and Dow departed. Doc. 91 at 3. Thompson and

plaintiff Ojo opted to continue, but first took a break. Jd. Before

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beginning the tenth hole, however, another incident ensued involving
the defendants. Although many details and motivations concerning the
circumstances of this encounter remain in dispute, portions were
recorded on video. Doc. 84-16.

All four of the individual defendants—Steven and Jordan
Chronister, Polachek, and Bower—were involved in this incident. Jd.;
Doc. 84-7 at 49-50. The video depicts Jordan Chronister and Bower
instructing Ojo and Thompson to leave the premises, with Steven
Chronister and Polachek in close vicinity. Doc. 84-16. Steven
Chronister and Bower reference calling the police a second time, and
Jordan Chronister states: “We asked you three times now to remove
yourself from the premises, you have yet to remove yourself.” Jd. In
this second call to 911, Steven Chronister advises the dispatcher that he
wants Ojo and Thompson “off the golf course.” Doc. 84-13. Jerry
Higgins, a deponent who played behind the plaintiffs’ group that day,
Doc. 84-1 at 2, testified to one of the defendants preventing Ojo and
Thompson from using their golf cart:

I saw the guys from the golf course came out and told them

that they were not going to play anymore golf. Somebody took
the key out of the cart. I’m not sure which of the other three

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guys that I don’t know that was, took the key out of the cart
so they couldn’t go anywhere.

Doc. 84-6 at 28.

Ojo testified that Steven Chronister said that he would “refund all
the ladies’ memberships,” and that Bower retrieved and presented a
prewritten single check. Doc. 84-15 at 56-58. Steven Chronister
testified that Polachek had possession of the checks. Doc. 84-7 at 120—
23. Ojo refused to accept the check, as she was “trying to preserve [her]
membership.” Doc. 84-15 at 59-60. After two police officers arrived,
Ojo and Thompson left the golf course. Docs. 83-8; 83-9.

Ill. Discussion

A. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate only when record materials,
including but not limited to, “the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Wishkin v. Potter, 476 F.3d 180, 184 (8d Cir. 2007); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a),
(c)(1)(A). In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact

exists, the court must view the evidence “in the light most favorable to

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the non-moving party and must make all reasonable inferences in that
party’s favor.” Wishkin, 476 F.3d at 184.

A factual dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). And a fact is
material only if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the
governing law....” Id. But “a complete failure of proof concerning an
essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all
other facts immaterial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323
(1986).

The movant “bears the initial responsibility of informing the
district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions
of [the record], . . . which it believes demonstrate the absence of a

cee

genuine issue of material fact.” Jd. “|T]he non-moving party must
[then] oppose the motion and, in doing so, may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of his pleadings’ but, instead, ‘must set forth

specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Bare

assertions, conclusory allegations, or suspicions will not suffice.”

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Jutrowski, 904 F.3d at 288-89 (quoting D.E. v. Cent. Dauphin Sch.
Dist., 765 F.3d 260, 268-69 (8d Cir. 2014)).

B. Individual Liability Under Section 1981

The parties dispute whether Section 1981 provides a statutory
vehicle to seek liability against individual employees of an entity. The
defendants contend that the statute is designed primarily to address
workplace discrimination, in which the employer (or its owner), not the
individual employee, is the proper defendant. Doc. 91 at 7-10. Outside
of the employment context, they aver, an employee cannot be liable
under Section 1981 unless in direct contractual privity with the
plaintiffs. Jd. at 7, 11-12. Thus, as is relevant here, any contractual
relationship between the plaintiffs and Brew Vino does not extend
liability to its individual employee defendants. Jd. at 11-15.

Those positions, however, run contrary to precedent, the plain
language of Section 1981, and its legislative history. Although there is
an apparent dearth of authority addressing the precise scenario here,
the plaintiffs are correct that the Court of Appeals unequivocally
deemed individual employees proper defendants under Section 1981.

See Al-Khazrayji v. Saint Francis Coll., 784 F.2d 505 (8d Cir. 1986). In

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Al-Khazrayjt, a professor levied racial discrimination charges against
both his college and individual members of the tenure committee. Id. at
508. After the “district court found that the individual defendants, who
are members of the tenure committee, are not the employers of plaintiff
and so cannot be sued under Section 1981,” the Court of Appeals
reversed. Id. at 518.

Noting that Section 1981 “is in the nature of a tort remedy,” the
Court of Appeals held that “[a]n individual, including a director, officer,
or agent of a corporation, may be liable [under Section 1981] for injuries
suffered by third parties because of his torts, regardless of whether he
acted on his own account or on behalf of the corporation. ... In
particular, directors, officers, and employees of a corporation may
become personally liable when they intentionally cause an infringement
of rights protected by Section 1981, regardless of whether the
corporation may also be held liable.” Jd. (emphases added). |

Thus, an employee may be liable for a discriminatory act or
omission if he or she: (1) was “personally involved in the
discrimination’; (2) “intentionally caused the [company] to infringe on

[the plaintiff]’s Section 1981 rights”; or (8) “authorized, directed, or

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participated in the alleged discriminatory conduct.” Jd. (citations
omitted). Under that precedent, the defendants’ emphasis that Steven
Chronister, Bower, and Polachek have no ownership interest in Brew
Vino, and contention that “there is no privity of contract between any of
the individual Defendants and any Plaintiff,” Doc. 91 at 7, does not
provide a cognizable eround to grant summary judgment.

The inquiry thus turns to whether Section 1981 claims are
tethered to employment scenarios. Although Al-Khazraji involved a
workplace setting, the Court of Appeals stated that “third parties” could
advance Section 1981 claims against individuals, 784 F.2d at 518; a
holding consistent with the plain language of the statute. Section 1981

provides:

(a) Statement of equal rights

All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall
have the same right in every State and Territory to make and
enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the
full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the
security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white
citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains,
penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to
no other.

(b) “Make and enforce contracts” defined

For purposes of this section, the term “make and enforce
contracts” includes the making, performance, modification,
and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all

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benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual
relationship.

(c) Protection against impairment
The rights protected by this section are protected against

impairment by nongovernmental discrimination and
impairment under color of State law.

42.U.S.C. § 1981(a)-(c).

Contrary to the defendants’ position, nothing in the plain
language of the statute limits or evinces a congressional intent to limit
its application to the employment context. And the Court should
refrain from reading any limitation or provision into a statute that does
not appear in its express language. See, e.g., Rotkiske v. Klemm,

589 U.S. 8, 14 (2019) (“Absent provisions cannot be supplied by the
courts. To do so is not a construction of a statute, but, in effect, an
enlargement of it by the court.” (cleaned up)); Iselin v. United States,
270 U.S. 245, 251 (1926) (“To supply omissions transcends the judicial
function.” (citations omitted)).

The defendants’ contrary position relies heavily on authorities
rooted in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which does not
provide for individual liability. Dict v. Commonwealth of Pa., 91 F.3d

542, 552 (3d Cir. 1996). They review the evolution of Title VII through

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precedential caselaw and excerpts from the 1991 amendment to the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, asserting that “the emphasis is on the
employer-employee relationship.” Doc. 91 at 7-10.

Title VII, however, is distinct from Section 1981, insofar as it does
not provide for individual liability, and is explicitly limited to the
employment context. The enforcement provisions of Title VII target
“unlawful employment practices,” and its definitional section revolves
around employer-employee relationships. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e,
2000e-2 to -38, 2000e-5. By contrast, the Supreme Court deemed Section
1981 a statute that, “on its face[,] relates primarily to racial
discrimination in the making and enforcement of contracts”; and did not
confirm it to serve as an additional “federal remedy against
discrimination in private employment on the basis of race” until 1975.
Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 456-60 (1975).

That expansion of Section 1981’s ambit demonstrates its initial
application to contractual scenarios extraneous to the workplace
setting; a holding consistent with legislative history. The Civil Rights
Act of 1866—the precursor to Section 1981—contained none of the

limitations urged by the defendants, providing that:

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all... citizens, of every race and color, ... shall have the same

right, in every State and Territory in the United States, to

make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give

evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey

real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all

laws and proceedings for the security of person and property,

as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like

punishment, pains, and penalties....
Act of April 9, 1866, 39 Cong. Ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27. The purpose of this
statute was, as stated by its title, “[t]o protect all Persons in the United
States in their Civil Rights, and furnish the Means of their
Vindication.” Id. That statutory text, echoed by its modern successor,
fails to evince any congressional intent to limit Section 1981 liability to
employment cases, or to exclude individuals from liability.

Over a century later, Congress expanded the Civil Rights Acts of
1866 and 1964 through the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Civil Rights Act of
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071. The 1991 statute reinforced
the 1866 act by adding subsections (b) and (c) to Section 1981, and by
authorizing individuals to recover compensatory and punitive damages
in Title VII cases of intentional discrimination in the employment
context. Id., 105 Stat. at 1071-72.

Although the 1991 amendment was designed to expand civil rights

remedies in the employment context, it did not cabin Section 1981 to

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those circumstances, as the defendants suggest. Indeed, legislative
materials concerning the 1991 amendment show otherwise. A House of
Representatives report on the Civil Rights Act of 1991 emphasized
Section 1981’s focus on contractual privity, stating:

.. section 1981 is not an employment statute at all. Rather,
the section is a broad civil rights statute passed by Congress
shortly after the Civil War to prevent racial discrimination in
the making and enforcement of contracts. It has been applied
to numerous factual situations, including jury service, voting
rights, access to country clubs, admissions to schools and
hospitals, automobile franchises, licensing requirements, and
rental housing. Indeed, it was not until the early 1970s, a
hundred years after enactment, that the courts judicially
decided that the law even applied to private-sector
employment discrimination.

H.R. Rep. No. 102-40), at 146 (1991) (emphases added). That
congressional recognition of Section 1981’s applicability to scenarios
beyond the employment context—and to the country club settings
relevant here—directly refutes the defendants’ interpretation.
Indeed, although the challenges raised here were not at issue,
several cases corroborate the use of Section 1981 in those varied
contexts. See, e.g., Burns v. SeaWorld Parks & Ent., Inc., 2024 WL
1660514, at *8-14 (E.D. Pa. 2024) (individual employees accused of

depriving plaintiffs of contractual “right not to be discriminated against

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on... basis of race at Sesame Place”); Shumate v. Twin Tier Hosp.,
LLC, 655 F. Supp. 2d 521, 528, 532 (M.D. Pa. 2009) (denying individual
employee’s motion to dismiss allegations of racial discrimination in
making and enforcement of hotel reservation contract); Paterson v.
Guttman, 2000 WL 799320, at *5 (6th Cir. 2000) (reversing summary
judgment in favor of defendants, including individual employees, in case
involving racial discrimination in real estate contracts).

Thus, the Section 1981 inquiry here remains focused on whether
the plaintiffs had contractual privity with Brew Vino, and the
individual defendants’ alleged roles in infringing on those contractual
rights. “Privity of contract refers to the status of parties who are
entitled to sue on a particular contract.” IOENGINE, LLC v. PayPal
Holdings., Inc., 607 F. Supp. 3d 464, 518 (D. Del. 2022). Here, the
parties do not dispute that this action involves contracts; namely, the
plaintiffs’ three-year memberships for the Grandview Golf Course.
Docs. 88 at 8; 83-6; 84-2 at 2.

Beyond those contractual agreements, the record is replete with
outstanding disputes of fact material to evaluating whether any of the

defendants allegedly were (1) “personally involved in the

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discrimination”; (2) “intentionally caused the [company] to infringe on
[the plaintiff]’s Section 1981 rights”; or (3) “authorized, directed, or
participated in the alleged discriminatory conduct.” See Al-Khazraji,
784 F.2d at 518. Thus, based on the parties’ briefs and record, the
undersigned cannot recommend summary judgment for any individual
defendant for at least three reasons.

First, the record does not reflect sufficient information concerning
the terms of the plaintiffs’ membership agreements to permit an
accurate determination of the precise scope and nature of the
contractual relationships. Although the record contains the plaintiffs’
membership agreements and obligation to abide by corresponding
course rules, Docs. 83-5; 83-6, other material details remain unknown.
This includes the amounts and timing of the plaintiffs’ payments, the
rights conferred by membership, and the defendants’ authority to
enforce or rescind the memberships (including whether that authority
was contingent on each defendant’s particular role in Brew Vino). All of
those details bear on whether any of the defendants infringed on the

plaintiffs’ Section 1981 rights.

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Second, the record evinces multiple disputed instances that relate
directly to the “performance, modification, and termination of contracts,
and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of
the contractual relationship,” 1.e., the very purpose of Section 1981.

42. U.S.C. § 1981(b). The plaintiffs allege that Steven Chronister urged
them to speed up their pace of play, ordered them to leave the golf
course, and offered to refund their memberships. Docs. 91 at 3; 84-3 at
6; 84-5 at 37-40; 84-8 at 33; 84-12 at 6. Likewise, Steven Chronister,
Jordan Chronister, and Bower instructed plaintiff Ojo to leave the golf
course, confirmed a succession of such demands, and summoned police
assistance to that end on multiple occasions. Docs. 84-7 at 49-50; 84-
16.

Further, a witness testified that an unspecified defendant
removed the key from Ojo’s golf cart to prevent further golfing, and
there remains uncertainty over whether Steven Chronister, Bower,
Polachek, or some combination of the men, possessed or offered a check
to refund the plaintiffs’ memberships. Docs. 84-6 at 23; 84-7 at 120-23;
84-15 at 56-58. Regardless, Ojo allegedly refused to accept a check, in

an attempt to preserve her membership. Doc. 84-15 at 59-60.

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Although the precise details and motivations surrounding those various
interactions remain heavily in dispute, none of the parties appear to
contest that all plaintiffs departed the golf course before completing
their scheduled round of golf. In other words, the ultimate result of the
events of April 21, 2018, is that the plaintiffs were barred from enjoying
the presumptive privileges of their golf course memberships.

Third, the defendants have not met their burden of establishing
that Bower and Polachek had insufficient personal involvement to
trigger Section 1981 liability. Their contentions that “Bower and
Polachek had no direct interaction with any plaintiff’ and “were not
involved in anyway with the alleged dispute,” Doc. 91 at 6, 12, are not
accurate characterizations of the record. The video provided by the
plaintiffs shows Bower speaking directly to Ojo and Thompson, and
instructing them to leave the golf course, with Polachek in close
vicinity. Doc. 84-16. There remains uncertainty over whether, Bower,
Polachek, or any other person was the individual responsible for
allegedly removing the key from Ojo’s and Thompson’s golf cart, as

witnessed by Higgins. Doc. 84-6 at 23.

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Moreover, the parties offer no clarity concerning whether Bower or
Polachek retrieved, possessed, or presented a membership refund check
to Ojo. Docs. 84-7 at 120-28; 84-15 at 56-58. And neither party has
offered any record evidence addressing whether the check pertained
solely to Ojo’s membership or to all plaintiffs, with Ojo testifying that
Steven Chronister said that he would “refund all the ladies’
memberships.” Doc. 84-15 at 56-58. On the current record, a factfinder
may be tasked with determining whether either Bower or Polachek was
personally involved with procuring a check that refunded some or all of
the plaintiffs’ memberships, and thus had personally involvement with
an attempt to terminate a contractual relationship.

Steven Chronister, moreover, confirmed that Polachek, as general
manager of the golf course, was the defendant who interacted directly
with the responding police officers on both occasions; first driving
Officer Kiker on a olf cart to find the plaintiffs after the dispute at the
second hole, and later interacting with the responding officers when
they spoke with Ojo and Thompson after the ninth hole. Doc. 84-7 at
12, 37-38, 68-69. Polacheck’s potential liability under Section 1981

does not hinge on whether he directly interacted with the plaintiffs on

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either occasion. Rather, the inquiry, which remains shrouded in
uncertainty, concerns whether he caused or participated in an
infringement of the plaintiffs rights. See Al-Khazraji, 784 F.2d at 518.

Based on that record, the defendants have failed to carry their
burden to show the absence of disputed issues of material fact
warranting summary judgment. Accordingly, the undersigned
recommends dismissing the supplemental motion for judgement on the
Section 1981 claim by defendants Steven Chronister, Bower, and
Polachek.

C. Individual Liability Under Section 2000a

The defendants contend that Section 2000a does not provide for
individual liability, because the statute offers only injunctive relief.
Doc. 91 at 19-20. They do not offer any authority for this proposition.
Rather, they contend that because Steven Chronister, Bower, and
Polachek are employees, they cannot provide injunctive relief; in other
words, because they cannot fulfill the remedy, they are exempted from
liability. That reasoning does not prevail.

Section 2000a provides that a civil rights plaintiff seeking

remedies for discrimination or segregation under the statute may

21

ere
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institute “a civil action for preventive relief, including an application for
a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order, or other order.”
A2 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(a). The plaintiffs do not contest that Section 2000a
does not provide for compensatory damages, and the Court of Appeals
recognized that the statute “does not authorize money damages.”
Hartman v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 650 F. App’x 89, 92 (8d Cir. 2016)
(citing Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968)).
Although the undersigned has not identified any precedent that
directly addresses the defendants’ contention, claims under Section
2000a against individual defendants have proceeded in other courts.
See, e.g., Sherman v. Kasotakis, 314 F. Supp. 2d 848, 876-80, 885-86
(N.D. Iowa 2004) (enjoining individual “agents, managers, employees,
... successors|,| and assigns...from... discrimination against any
consumer... based on that consumer’s race . . .”); see also Datto v.
Harrison, 664 F. Supp. 2d 472, 491-92 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (holding that
Section 2000a “allow[s] suits for injunctive relief against ‘persons.”’).
Moreover, nothing in the plain language of Section 2000a’s enforcement

provisions limits liability to entities. Rather, the statute provides in

relevant part:

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Whenever any person has engaged or there are reasonable
grounds to believe that any person is about to engage in any
act or practice prohibited by section 2000a—2 of this title, a
civil action for preventive relief, including an application for
a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order, or
other order, may be instituted by the person aggrieved ....

42.U.8S.C. § 2000a-3(a).

Thus, the focus of the statute is on providing a right of action
when any person engages or is expected to engage in prohibited conduct.
Congress could have, but did not, include any limitation on the
potential targets of that commensurate action, and the Court will not
insert nonexistent language into a statute. See Rotkiske, 589 U.S. at 14.
Likewise, Section 2000a prohibits interfering with a person’s rights and
privileges under the statue:

No person shall (a) withhold, deny, or attempt to withhold or

deny, or deprive or attempt to deprive any person of any right

or privilege secured by section 2000a or 2000a—1 of this title,

or (b) intimidate, threaten, or coerce, or attempt to intimidate,

threaten, or coerce any person with the purpose of interfering

with any right or privilege secured by section 2000a or 2000a—

1 of this title, or (c) punish or attempt to punish any person

for exercising or attempting to exercise any right or privilege

secured by section 2000a or 2000a—1 of this title.

42. U.S.C. § 2000a-2. Again, the focus remains on the actions of a person

giving rise to liability, with no language limiting an associated right of

action to entities. And it remains difficult to discern how a statutory

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provision that targets individual acts of interference could be
effectuated by limiting injunctive relief to the offender’s employer,
instead of the offender itself.

This interpretation is corroborated by a provision of Section 2000a
that explicitly authorizes the Attorney General to file a complaint and
obtain injunctive relief against individuals who are responsible for a
pattern or practice of discrimination or segregation:

Whenever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to
believe that any person or group of persons is engaged in a
pattern or practice of resistance to the full enjoyment of any
of the rights secured by this subchapter, and that the pattern
or practice is of such a nature and is intended to deny the full
exercise of the rights herein described, the Attorney General
may bring a civil action in the appropriate district court of the
United States by filing with it a complaint (1) signed by him
(or in his absence the Acting Attorney General), (2) setting
forth facts pertaining to such pattern or practice, and (8)
requesting such preventive relief, including an application for
@ permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order or
other order against the person or persons responsible for such
pattern or practice, as he deems necessary to insure the full
enjoyment of the rights herein described.

Id. § 2000a-5(a) (emphases added). In consideration of those statutory
provisions, and the apparent dearth of authority supporting the
defendants’ contention, summary judgment on the Section 2000a claims

is not warranted as a matter of law.

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To the extent the defendants aver that Steven Chronister, Bower,
and Polachek, as factual matters, cannot provide the injunctive relief
requested, there remain disputed issues of material fact. The
defendants contend that the three defendants were mere employees;
that is, they had no ownership interest in Brew Vino, and thus were
“not in a position to make policy to alter allegedly discriminatory
conduct.” Doc. 91 at 8, 16. The defendants do not, however, offer or
identify any evidence of record detailing their precise roles, or
explaining the scope of their authority. A review of the record does not
engender further clarity. |

First, Steven Chronister testified that he was part of the golf
course management team, and that he potentially identified himself as
an owner to the police. Doc. 84-7 at 35-36. A review of his first 911 call
reveals that he identified himself as the golf course manager, Doc. 84-
11, while Officer Kiker believed that he identified himself as an owner
in person. Doc. 88-8 at 22. Jordan Chronister, inconsistently, labeled
Steven Chronister a consultant and “an employee for janitorial services”
at different times. Doc. 84-20 at 11, 55. Second, both Steven

Chronister and Jordan Chronister testified that Polachek was the

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general manager of the golf course, which Polacheck corroborated.
Docs. 83-4 at 4; 84-20 at 7-8; 84-7 at 12. The parties do not appear to
dispute that Bower was an employee.

Neither party, however, has offered record evidence that permits
the Court to determine whether any of those individuals have the
authority to provide the requested injunctive relief. As set forth above,
Steven Chronister, Bower, and Polachek all engaged in activities
indicating that they were empowered to enforce golf course rules,
summon the police on behalf of the golf course, instruct members to
vacate the premises, and revoke and refund memberships, regardless of
their official titles. Whether that apparently expansive authority
extends to promulgating or enforcing anti-discrimination policies
remains an open, and disputed, question of material fact.

Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that the Court deny
summary judgment on the Section 2000a claims against Steven
Chronister, Bower, and Polachek.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, it is RECOMMENDED that the

supplemental motion for summary judgment (Doc. 81) be DENIED as

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to all pending claims under Sections 1981 and 2000a against
defendants Steven Chronister, Marc Bower, and Brian Polachek.
All parties are further placed on notice that, pursuant to Local

Rule 72.3:

Any party may object to a magistrate judge’s proposed

findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or
matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 686 (b)(1)(B) or making a
| recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a
| habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being
served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk
| of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties,
written objections which shall specifically identify the
portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report
to which objection is made and the basis for such objections.
The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall
apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those
portions of the report or specified proposed findings or
recommendations to which objection is made and may accept,
reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or
recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge,
however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her
discretion or where required by law, and may consider the
record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or
her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge
may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or
recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with
instructions.

M.D. Pa. L. R. 72.3. The failure to file timely objections to the foregoing
R&R may constitute a waiver of any appellate rights. See Nara v.

Frank, 488 F.3d 187, 194 (3d Cir. 2007).

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Date: December 22, 2025 S/ Phillip J. Caraballo
Phillip J. Caraballo
United States Magistrate Judge

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