GREEN v. SUGARHOUSE HSP GAMING LP

1 printed pages contain little extracted OCR body text; searchable legal-body completeness has not been established for those pages.

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

Case 2:25-cv-02193-JFM Document 38 Filed 10/13/26 Page1of10

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

ROBERT GREEN : CIVIL ACTION
V. : NO. 25-2193

SUGARHOUSE HSP GAMING LP

MEMORANDUM

MURPHY, J. OCTOBER 13, 2026

In this employment-discrimination case, Robert Green alleges that Rivers Casino fired
him for impermissible reasons — his disability and corresponding need for medical leave.
Rivers denies this allegation. It says Rivers let Mr. Green take all the leave he requested,
provided that he gave proper contemporaneous notice consistent with company policy. The
reason that Mr. Green was fired, according to Rivers, is that he missed work several times
without giving proper notice of his need for leave. Because Rivers points to record evidence
supporting its version of events and Mr. Green does not, we grant Rivers’s motion for summary
judgment in full.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In 2015, Robert Green began working for Sugarhouse HSP Gaming LP (better known as
Rivers Casino) in its security department. DI 31-3 § 2. Mr. Green did well at Rivers,
transferring to the table games department after completing dealer school in 2016, before being
promoted to a supervisor role in 2021. Jd. 9] 3-4. In 2021, Mr. Green began to experience
health issues that required him to take intermittent Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA)
leave. Id. §§| 25-27. Rivers’s policies provided that when Mr. Green needed to take FMLA
leave, he had to notify both Rivers and its insurer, MetLife. Jd. 953,55. If Mr. Green failed to

tell MetLife about the leave, then Rivers counted the day as an absence. See id. 457. Rivers’s

AUTHENTICATED
U.S. GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION

GPO

2
attendance policy provided that if an employee recorded more than eight absences within a year
(with tardiness under 60 minutes counting as half an absence), he could be fired. Id. ¶¶ 32-39.
Mr. Green knew about this policy and generally had no issues providing proper notice.
During his tenure with Rivers, he notified MetLife of his FMLA absences approximately 80 to
100 times. DI 31-3 ¶¶ 51, 58. When Mr. Green provided notice to MetLife, MetLife would
promptly and routinely issue approval letters and Rivers would not record the reported days as
absences. Id. ¶¶ 63, 85. Mr. Green was also generally able to provide notice to Rivers without
issue, but he reports that on one occasion a manager, Dominic Montenero, told him, “Just come
on in to work, Rob. There’s nothing wrong. You should just, you know, stop playing around.”
Id. ¶ 144. Mr. Green does not recall the approximate date when that comment occurred. DI 31-4
at 186.1
Between April 22, 2023, and February 1, 2024, Mr. Green accrued 9.5 absences. DI 31-
3 ¶¶ 88-99. On February 14, 2024, Mr. Green, who regularly monitored his attendance record,
emailed a Rivers supervisor claiming that some of the recorded absences were FMLA days. Id.
¶¶ 49, 103. The supervisor and other management personnel reviewed the attendance records,
found no recorded FMLA absences from MetLife on the relevant days, and determined that Mr.
Green had exceeded the limit of permissible absences. Id. ¶ 105. Rivers then fired Mr. Green on
February 19, 2024. Id. ¶¶ 106-07. About a month later, Mr. Green called MetLife to report
FMLA leave on two of the days that were counted as absences, and MetLife issued approval
letters for those days. Id. ¶¶ 123-24.
In 2025, Mr. Green sued Rivers. His operative complaint alleges that Rivers violated the
1 We adopt the pagination of the CM/ECF filing system.
Case 2:25-cv-02193-JFM Document 38 Filed 10/13/26 Page 2 of 10

3
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) (Count I), the FMLA (Count II), and the Philadelphia
Fair Practices Ordinance (PFPO) (Count III). DI 25 at 6-11. For each count, Mr. Green alleges
both direct violations of the statutes and unlawful retaliation for conduct protected by them. Id.
¶¶ 47, 56, 66.
II. 	MOTION AT ISSUE
Following discovery, Rivers moved for summary judgment on all of Mr. Green’s claims.
DI 31. As to the FMLA interference claim, Rivers argues that it permitted Mr. Green to take
FMLA leave whenever he provided proper notice and that applicable regulations expressly
provide that he was not entitled to take leave absent that notice. DI 31-5 at 11-13 (citing 29
C.F.R. §§ 825.302(c)-(d), 825.303(c)). As to Mr. Green’s ADA and PFPO claims, Rivers argues
that they fail because (1) Mr. Green was not qualified for his job given his failure to comply with
the attendance policy, and (2) even if Mr. Green were qualified, his failure to comply with the
policy provided a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for Rivers to fire him. Id. at 18-22. As
to the retaliation claims, Rivers again argues that it fired Mr. Green for his failure to comply with
the attendance policy, not in retaliation for his engaging in conduct protected by the ADA,
PFPO, or FMLA. Id. at 16-17, 22-24.
Mr. Green opposes summary judgment on all counts. As to FMLA interference, Mr.
Green argues that Rivers interfered with his ability to take FMLA leave when Mr. Montenero
told him to “stop playing around.” DI 32 at 14. As to ADA and PFPO disability discrimination,
Mr. Green argues (1) that he was qualified for his position because he was capable of other
essential job functions besides complying with the attendance policy, and (2) that his failure to
comply with the attendance policy is not a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for his firing
because the policy is “unlawful when applied to a disabled employee without considering the
Case 2:25-cv-02193-JFM Document 38 Filed 10/13/26 Page 3 of 10

4
possibility of reasonable accommodations.” DI 32 at 8-10. As to retaliation under the FMLA,
the ADA, and the PFPO, Mr. Green argues that the fact he was fired shortly after asking for
clarification on whether his FMLA leave was properly recorded shows a causal connection
between his protected conduct and an adverse employment action. Id. at 12-13. Mr. Green
further argues that Rivers’s non-retaliatory justification for the firing — his failure to comply
with the attendance policy — was pretext for retaliation against him for asking about his FMLA
days being counted as absences. DI 32 at 15.
III. 	LEGAL STANDARDS
We grant summary judgment when the movant demonstrates “that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact” such that they are “entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” when it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the
governing law . . . .” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute over
a material fact is “genuine” where there is evidence that could allow a reasonable jury to side
with the non-movant as to that fact. See id. “When considering whether there exist genuine
issues of material fact, the court is required to examine the evidence of record in the light most
favorable to the party opposing summary judgment, and resolve all reasonable inferences in that
party’s favor.” Wishkin v. Potter, 476 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Stewart v. Rutgers,
The State Univ., 120 F.3d 426, 431 (3d Cir. 1997)). But once the movant identifies the parts of
the record that it believes demonstrate its entitlement to summary judgment, the non-moving
party must come forward with evidence to create a genuine dispute — “bare assertions,
conclusory allegations or suspicions” are not enough. Fireman’s Ins. Co. of Newark v.
DuFresne, 676 F.2d 965, 969 (3d Cir. 1982).
Case 2:25-cv-02193-JFM Document 38 Filed 10/13/26 Page 4 of 10

5
IV. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	We grant summary judgment on Mr. Green’s ADA and PFPO claims.
ADA & PFPO Discrimination. Where, as here, there is no direct evidence of disability
discrimination, ADA and PFPO discrimination claims are governed by the three-step McDonnell
Douglas burden-shifting framework. Walton v. Mental Health Ass’n of Se. Pa., 168 F.3d 661,
668 (3d Cir. 1999); Ransom-Ellison v. Childrens Hosp. of Philadelphia, 826 F. Supp. 3d 616,
624-25 (E.D. Pa. 2026). First, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination by
“proving by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) he belongs to a protected class; (2) he was
qualified for the position; (3) he was dismissed despite being qualified; and (4) he was ultimately
replaced by a person sufficiently outside the protected class to create an inference of
discrimination.” Walton, 168 F.3d at 668 (citation modified). Once the plaintiff establishes a
prima facie case, “the burden of production shifts to the employer to articulate some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the” adverse employment action. Id. (citation omitted). If the
employer proffers such a reason, “the plaintiff must point to some evidence, direct or
circumstantial, from which a fact finder could reasonably either (1) disbelieve the employer’s
articulated legitimate reasons; or (2) believe that an invidious discriminatory reason was more
likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the employer’s action.” Id. (citation
omitted).
Here, even assuming that Mr. Green made out a prima facie case, summary judgment is
appropriate because there is no genuine dispute that Rivers fired him for a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason. Rivers’s proffered reason for firing Mr. Green is that he exceeded the
number of allowable absences in violation of the attendance policy. DI 31-5 at 20. Mr. Green
Case 2:25-cv-02193-JFM Document 38 Filed 10/13/26 Page 5 of 10

6
does not dispute that he exceeded the total number of allowable absences. DI 32 at 9-10. He
does not claim that he provided timely notice to MetLife for any of the days marked as absences,
such that they should have been counted as FMLA leave. Id. Nor does he argue that Rivers’s
proffered attendance-policy-non-compliance reason is pretextual. Id. Instead, he argues that
non-compliance with the attendance policy cannot be a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason
because the policy “is unlawful when applied to a disabled employee without considering the
possibility of reasonable accommodations.” Id. at 10.
We are not persuaded. Mr. Green points to no record evidence suggesting that his
disability prevented him from complying with the attendance policy’s notice requirement
without accommodation. See generally DI 32. To the contrary, the record shows that Mr. Green
was capable of notifying MetLife without an accommodation; he did so on 80 to 100 occasions.
DI 31-3 ¶ 58. Moreover, even if there were evidence that Mr. Green’s health issues prevented
him from providing notice to MetLife without accommodation, Rivers’s policy would still not be
unlawful as applied to Mr. Green because there is no evidence that Mr. Green ever indicated to
Rivers that he needed an accommodation from the notice requirement. See Taylor v.
Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 317 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting an employer’s duty to engage
in the interactive process to determine reasonable accommodations is triggered by “proper
notice”). While there may be hypothetical situations in which a strict application of the notice
requirement could violate the ADA or PFPO — such as if an employee’s disability prevented
them from providing timely notice and Rivers refused to provide a reasonable accommodation
— there is no evidence that would warrant such a finding here.
ADA & PFPO Retaliation. Like ADA and PFPO discrimination claims, ADA and PFPO
Case 2:25-cv-02193-JFM Document 38 Filed 10/13/26 Page 6 of 10

7
retaliation claims are governed by McDonnell Douglas in the absence of direct evidence.
Canada v. Samuel Grossi & Sons, Inc., 49 F.4th 340, 346 (3d Cir. 2022); Ransom-Ellison, 826 F.
Supp. 3d at 624-25. At step one, an employee must establish a prima facie case by showing that
(1) he was engaged in protected activity, (2) his employer took adverse action after or at the
same time as that activity, and (3) there is a causal connection between the activity and the
adverse action. Samuel Grossi & Sons, Inc., 49 F.4th at 346. At step two, the employer must
proffer a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the adverse action. Id. Then at step three, the
burden shifts “back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the employer’s proffered explanation was
false, and that retaliation was the real reason for the adverse employment action.” Id. (citation
modified).
We can again assume without deciding that Mr. Green has established a prima facie case
because there is no genuine dispute that Rivers fired him for a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason:
Mr. Green’s non-compliance with the attendance policy. Mr. Green’s only response to this
proffered reason is that the policy “is unlawful when applied to disabled employees.” DI 32 at
13. We are not persuaded for the reasons discussed above with respect to his disability
discrimination claims.
B. 	We grant summary judgment on Mr. Green’s FMLA claims.
FMLA Interference. To establish an FMLA interference claim, an employee must show
that “(1) he or she was an eligible employee under the FMLA; (2) the defendant was an
employer subject to the FMLA’s requirements; (3) the plaintiff was entitled to FMLA leave; (4)
the plaintiff gave notice to the defendant of his or her intention to take FMLA leave; and (5) the
plaintiff was denied benefits to which he or she was entitled under the FMLA.” Ross v. Gilhuly,
Case 2:25-cv-02193-JFM Document 38 Filed 10/13/26 Page 7 of 10

8
755 F.3d 185, 191-92 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Johnson v. Cmty. Coll. of Allegheny County, 566
F. Supp. 2d 405, 446 (W.D. Pa. 2008)). Rivers argues that there is no genuine dispute that Mr.
Green received all the leave to which he was entitled because Rivers let him take leave whenever
he provided proper notice. DI 31-5 at 14. Mr. Green counters there is a genuine dispute whether
he was given all the required leave because he “testified that sometimes he would call out of
work and attempt to use an FMLA day only to be told by Defendant’s day shift supervisor,
Dominic Montenero, to ‘stop playing around.’” DI 32 at 14.
We agree with Rivers. Mr. Green points to no evidence that Mr. Montenero’s remark led
to him attending work when he was entitled to FMLA leave or to FMLA days being improperly
marked as absences. See generally DI 32. Further, Mr. Green stated in his deposition that he did
not know the approximate date when Mr. Montenero was “giving [him] a hard time about [his]
FMLA absence.” DI 31-4 at 186. Without supporting evidence showing any specific days on
which he was unable to take leave, Mr. Green’s “vague testimony” about Mr. Montenero’s
purported interference is insufficient to defeat summary judgment. See Gaddis v. Brandywine
Senior Care, Inc., 2019 WL 4384139, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 11, 2019).
FMLA Retaliation. As with the ADA and PFPO claims, Mr. Green’s FMLA retaliation
claims are governed by the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. See Lichtenstein v.
U. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., 691 F.3d 294, 302 (3d Cir. 2012). At the summary judgment stage,
the prima facie case requires the employee to point to record evidence showing “(a) [the]
invocation of an FMLA right, (b) termination, and (c) causation.” Id. The latter two steps — the
legitimate non-retaliatory reason and pretext — are materially the same as in the ADA and PFPO
context. See id.; supra. As with ADA and PFPO claims, we will assume without deciding that
Case 2:25-cv-02193-JFM Document 38 Filed 10/13/26 Page 8 of 10

9
Mr. Green has made out a prima facie case, and grant summary judgment based on Rivers’s
legitimate non-discriminatory reason that Mr. Green failed to comply with the attendance policy.
Mr. Green resists summary judgment on FMLA retaliation on two grounds, neither of
which is persuasive. First, he argues that “evidence in the record” discussed in the ADA/PFPO
section of his opposition shows Rivers’s stated reason is pretextual. DI 32 at 14-15. But the
ADA/PFPO section of Mr. Green’s opposition does not discuss pretext at all. DI 32 at 7-13.
Second, Mr. Green asserts (without citation) that “the only reason Defendant started looking
into/calculating Plaintiff’s attendance credits was because Plaintiff was questioning if they were
being tracked correctly,” which he claims demonstrates pretext. DI 32 at 15. But Mr. Green’s
unsupported assertion of Rivers’s reasons for looking into his attendance cannot create a genuine
dispute of fact without citation to any record evidence. And even if Mr. Green could provide
record support for this contention, it would not show the policy violation is pretext for
retaliation. It is not retaliation to fire someone for a legitimate policy violation just because the
causal chain leading to the discovery of that violation involved protected activity; rather, the
firing or other adverse employment action must be motivated at least in part by the protected
activity. See Lichtenstein, 691 F.3d at 302.
V. 	CONCLUSION
Because Rivers has identified a legitimate non-discriminatory and non-retaliatory reason
for firing Mr. Green, and because Mr. Green has identified no record evidence that would allow
a reasonable jury to conclude that reason is pretextual, we will grant summary judgment to
Rivers on Mr. Green’s ADA (Count I), FMLA (Count II), and PFPO (Count III) claims. With all
claims against Rivers dismissed, we will direct the Clerk of Court to close this case. An
Case 2:25-cv-02193-JFM Document 38 Filed 10/13/26 Page 9 of 10

Case 2:25-cv-02193-JFM Document 38 Filed 10/13/26 Page 10 of 10

appropriate order will follow.

10