5:26-cv-00318•Sanchez v. Warden Diamondback Correctional Facility
Gesamter Gesetzestext
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA GRACIELA LEYVA SANCHEZ, ) ) Petitioner, ) ) v. ) Case No. CIV-26-318-SLP ) WARDEN, Diamondback Correctional Facility, et al., ) ) ) Respondents. ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION Petitioner Graciela Leyva Sanchez, a noncitizen1 and Cuban national proceeding pro se, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”), Doc. 1, challenging under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 her detention by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). United States District Judge Scott L. Palk referred this matter to the undersigned Magistrate Judge in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)-(C). Doc. 3. The undersigned set an expedited briefing schedule, Doc. 8, and the Petition is at issue. On February 20, 2026, Petitioner also filed a Motion for Expedited Consideration. Doc. 6. For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends that the Court grant the Petition, Doc. 1, in part and order Respondents to provide Petitioner a bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within five business days or otherwise to release her if there is no hearing within that time. 1 Unless quoting, this Report and Recommendation “uses the term ‘noncitizen’ as equivalent to the statutory term ‘alien.’” Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U.S. 573, 578 n.2 (2020) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3)). Case 5:26-cv-00318-SLP Document 11 Filed 03/26/26 Page 1 of 11
2 The undersigned further recommends that the Court deny Petitioner’s Motion for Expedited Consideration as moot. I. Background Petitioner, a citizen of Cuba, entered the United States on May 12, 2022, without inspection or admission near San Luis, Arizona, and was taken into immigration custody. Pet. at 7; Resp. at 8. On May 14, 2022, ICE placed Petitioner into removal proceedings before the Immigration Court pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229a through the issuance of a Notice to Appear (“NTA”) and charged her with being inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) as someone who entered the United States without inspection. Doc. 1- 4 at 1 (May 2022 NTA). On May 14, 2022, Petitioner was released on an Order of Release on Recognizance pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226. Pet. at 7; Doc. 5 at 1; Doc. 1-3 (Order of Release on Recognizance). On May 3, 2023, Petitioner filed an application for asylum, which remains pending. Resp. at 8-9; Doc. 10-1 (Asylum Application). Petitioner alleges for four years she complied with the conditions of her release on recognizance. Pet. at 7; Doc. 5 at 1. She also alleges she suffers from a thyroid condition. Id. at 8; see also Doc. 1-5 (Medical Records). On January 10, 2026, ICE re-detained Petitioner during a scheduled ICE check-in. Pet. at 7; Doc. 5 at 1. ICE re-detained her pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Resp. at 1. On February 12, 2026, an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied Petitioner a bond hearing for lack of jurisdiction because IJs are subject to the binding precedent of Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I & N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025), which holds that those who entered the country without admission or parole are ineligible for a bond hearing. Pet. at 7; Doc. 5 at 1; Doc. Case 5:26-cv-00318-SLP Document 11 Filed 03/26/26 Page 2 of 11
3 1-2 (IJ’s Bond Denial). Respondents allege that on February 23, 2026, Petitioner filed another Bond Redetermination Request. Resp. at 9. Neither party has alleged a bond hearing has been scheduled. When Petitioner filed her Petition, she was detained at Diamondback Correctional Facility in Watonga, Oklahoma. Id. at 1. She remains detained there. See ICE Online Detainee Locator System, at https://locator.ice.gov/odls/#/results (last visited Mar. 26, 2026). II. Petitioner’s Claims Petitioner asserts four counts in her Petition. • Count I: Violation of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). Petitioner alleges her continued detention is unlawful and violates the INA because she has been denied any individualized review and had previously been released pursuant to § 1226 and should not now be subject to mandatory detention. Pet. at 7. • Count II: Violation of Due Process. Petitioner alleges her continued detention without an individualized bond hearing violates her right to due process. Id. • Count III: Serious Medical Condition Worsened by Detention. Petitioner alleges that since she has been detained her thyroid condition has worsened and her access to consistent, specialized medical care has been limited. Id. at 7-8. • Count IV: Denial of Meaningful Access to Counsel. Petitioner alleges that since her transfer to Diamondback Correctional Facility, she has been unable to communicate with her attorney, which interferes with the preparation of her immigration case. Id. at 8. She asks the Court to “order [her] immediate release from custody” or “in the alternative, order that [she] receive a prompt and individualized bond hearing before an immigration judge.” Id. (citation modified). Case 5:26-cv-00318-SLP Document 11 Filed 03/26/26 Page 3 of 11
4 III. Standard of Review To obtain habeas corpus relief, Petitioner must show that she is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). “Challenges to immigration detention are properly brought directly through habeas.” Soberanes v. Comfort, 388 F.3d 1305, 1310 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687-88 (2001)). IV. Analysis A. The Court has jurisdiction to consider the Petition. Respondents first argue this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider Petitioner’s claims, based on 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(g) and 1252(b)(9). Resp. at 10-13. However, this Court has ruled the INA does not jurisdictionally bar a habeas claim like Petitioner’s because “such a claim does not arise from and is not directly connected to the commencement of removal proceedings, the adjudication of removability, or the execution of any removal order.” Gonzalez Cortes v. Holt, No. CIV-25-1176-SLP, 2026 WL 147435, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 20, 2026) (citation modified). The undersigned agrees with this Court’s previous finding that jurisdiction exists to consider Petitioner’s habeas challenges to detention. B. Section 1226(a) applies to Petitioner’s detention. The two sections of the INA at issue are 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225 and 1226. Section 1225(a)(1) describes an “applicant for admission” as “an alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States.” Id. § 1225(a)(1) (citation modified). Under § 1225(b)(2)(A), “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission Case 5:26-cv-00318-SLP Document 11 Filed 03/26/26 Page 4 of 11
5 is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding under section 1229a.” If Petitioner is an “applicant for admission” and “seeking admission” under § 1225(b)(2)(A), she is not entitled to a bond hearing. On the other hand, Section 1226(a) more generally authorizes detention of a noncitizen pending removal proceedings and entitles the noncitizen to a bond hearing. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 306 (“Federal regulations provide that aliens detained under § 1226(a) receive bond hearings at the outset of detention.”) (citing 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(d)(1), 1236.1(d)(1)). Petitioner argues her continued detention is unlawful and violates the INA because the IJ “denied bond solely on jurisdictional grounds.” Pet. at 7 (citation modified). She argues she was “denied any individualized review of [her] detention by holding that [she is] subject to mandatory detention.” Id. Petitioner also argues “DHS does not have authority to now treat [her] as subject to mandatory detention” because she had previously been released pursuant to § 1226. Id. Respondents contend Petitioner is an “applicant for admission” and properly detained under § 1225(b)(2)(A). Resp. at 1, 3. Further, Respondents claim (1) § 1225(b)(2)(A) is not limited to noncitizens “arriving” in the United States, (2) all applicants for admission who are not subject to expedited removal fall under § 1225(b)(2)(A), and (3) § 1226(a) is reserved for those who do not fall within the confines of § 1225(b)(2)(A). Resp. at 4-8. The undersigned has reviewed the statutory text, Congressional intent, legislative history, and § 1226(a)’s application for the past three decades, as well as numerous recent cases addressing this exact issue. For the reasons stated below, and adopting this Court’s Case 5:26-cv-00318-SLP Document 11 Filed 03/26/26 Page 5 of 11
6 reasoning in Lopez v. Corecivic Cimmaron Corr. Facility, No. CIV-25-1175-SLP, 2026 WL 165490, at *3-7 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 21, 2026), the undersigned recommends the Court grant the Petition in part to the extent Petitioner seeks a bond hearing under § 1226(a). First, the INA limits the scope of the term “seeking admission” in § 1225(b)(2)(A) so that section does not apply to noncitizens living in the United States when detained. Section 1225(b)(2)(A) “only applies when a noncitizen ‘applicant for admission’ is actively ‘seeking admission’ into the United States.” Valdez v. Holt, No. CIV-25-1250-R, 2025 WL 3709021, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 22, 2025). If all “applicants for admission” are also “seeking admission,” then § 1225(b)(2)(A)’s inclusion of the phrase “seeking admission” would be redundant and superfluous. Lopez, 2026 WL 165490, at *4. The undersigned best understands mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) to apply to arriving noncitizens actively seeking admission at or near the border or port of entry—not those like Petitioner who have resided in the United States for years and were not arrested when trying to cross the border. In addition, the legislative history and recent amendment of § 1226 indicate that section applies to noncitizens who previously entered without inspection and were residing in the United States when apprehended. Notably, after passage of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, the Department of Justice explained that “despite being applicants for admission, aliens who are present without having been admitted or paroled . . . will be eligible for bond and bond redetermination.” Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens; Conduct of Removal Proceedings; Asylum Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10323 (Mar. 6, 1997) (citation Case 5:26-cv-00318-SLP Document 11 Filed 03/26/26 Page 6 of 11
7 modified). Further, Congress’ recent amendment to § 1226 mandating detention for certain criminal noncitizens renders Respondents’ interpretation of § 1225(b)(2)(A) superfluous. Finally, this Court, Chief Judge DeGiusti, Judge Jones, Judge Russell, Judge Heaton, and myriad district courts have recently applied § 1226(a) to govern detention of noncitizens like Petitioner.2 See Norboev v. Lyons, No. CIV-26-107-SLP, 2026 WL 497800, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 23, 2026) (finding § 1226(a) governs a similarly situated petitioner’s detention and “join[ing] the decision reached by the vast majority of district courts in this judicial district, in district courts within the Tenth Circuit and across the country to have addressed the same issues as those raised by Petitioner”). This Court has found the plain language, legislative history, and past immigration practices all support a finding that “Petitioner’s detention is not governed by §1225(b)(2).” Lopez, 2026 WL 165490, at *7. The undersigned agrees with this Court’s reasoning, the majority of Judges in this District, and the great weight of authority to conclude Petitioner falls within the confines of § 1226(a), and not § 1225(b)(2)(A).3 This conclusion is also in accord with the 2 See, e.g., Lopez, 2026 WL 165490, at *7; Ramirez Rojas v. Noem, No. CIV-25-1236-HE, 2026 WL 94641, at *1 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 13, 2026); Valdez, 2025 WL 3709021, at *3; Colin v. Holt, CIV-25-1189-D, 2025 WL 3645176, at *5 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 16, 2025); Urbina Garcia v. Holt, No. CIV-25-1225-J, 2025 WL 3516071, at *4 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 8, 2025). Two Judges in the District have applied § 1225(b)(2)(A). See Gutierrez Sosa v. Holt, No. CIV-25-1257-PRW, 2026 WL 36344, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 6, 2026) (finding “§ 1225 unambiguously applies to” a similarly situated petitioner); Alvarado Montoya v. Holt, No. CIV-25-01231-JD, 2025 WL 3733302, at *12 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 26, 2025) (finding “§ 1225 unambiguously deems [p]etitioner an ‘applicant for admission’ who is ‘seeking admission’”). 3 This conclusion is further supported by the fact Petitioner was detained and later released on her own recognizance under § 1226 in May 2022. Pet. at 7; Doc. 1-3; see, e.g., Bello Case 5:26-cv-00318-SLP Document 11 Filed 03/26/26 Page 7 of 11
8 Seventh Circuit, which rejected the statutory interpretation of § 1225(b)(2) as urged by Respondents. See Castañon-Nava v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 161 F.4th 1048, 1061 (7th Cir. 2025). But see Avila v. Bondi, No. 25-3248, --- F.4th ----, 2026 WL 819258, at *3-6 (8th Cir. Mar. 25, 2026) (agreeing with Respondents’ interpretation); Buenrostro- Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494, 501-08 (5th Cir. 2026) (same). Accordingly, the undersigned recommends the Court apply § 1226(a) to govern Petitioner’s current detention. The Court should grant the Petition in part and order Respondents to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under § 1226(a) before a neutral IJ within five business days or otherwise release her if he does not have a lawful bond hearing within that period. C. The Court should decline to address Petitioner’s remaining claims. Petitioner also argues (1) her continued detention without a bond hearing violates her rights to due process, (2) her medical condition has been worsened by her detention, and (3) she is denied meaningful access to counsel. Pet. at 7-8. If the Court grants Petitioner’s requested relief for a bond hearing under § 1226(a), the undersigned recommends the Court decline to decide the merits of the due process claim based on her continued detention. See, e.g., Colin v. Holt, CIV-25-1189-D, 2025 WL 3645176, at *6 n.3 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 16, 2025) (declining to decide the merits of Petitioner’s due process claim when granting a bond hearing pursuant to § 1226(a)). Chacon v. Hermosillo, No. 25-CV-02299, 2025 WL 3562666, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 12, 2025) (finding petitioner’s prior release under § 1226 indicates he “was—and continues to be—subject to discretionary detention under § 1226”). Case 5:26-cv-00318-SLP Document 11 Filed 03/26/26 Page 8 of 11
9 Further, the Court need not address Petitioner’s claims relating to her medical condition and access to counsel as they are outside the scope of this Court’s habeas review.4 She seeks “immediate release from custody” or “a prompt and individualized bond hearing before an immigration judge,” Pet. at 8, but no relief specifically related to her alleged medical condition or limited access to counsel. Petitioner appears to raise these concerns primarily to expedite these proceedings. A petitioner who challenges “the fact or duration” of her confinement and seeks release from ICE custody must bring a § 2241 habeas petition, but a detainee’s challenge to the conditions of her confinement must be brought through a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Palma-Salazar v. Davis, 677 F.3d 1031, 1035 (10th Cir. 2012). As such, Petitioner’s allegations related to her medical condition and access to counsel are not properly raised in this Petition. See, e.g., Onuwa v. Field Off. Dir., No. 26-2403, 2026 WL 772435, at *3 (D.N.J. Mar. 19, 2026) (“Petitioner’s medical claim is therefore dismissed without prejudice to Petitioner reraising his claim in an appropriate civil rights proceeding.”); Ndou v. Noem, No. 26-CV-220, 2026 WL 686564, at *4 (D.N.M. Mar. 11, 2026) (finding an immigration habeas petitioner’s “claims related to conditions of confinement are properly raised under a civil rights action, not a habeas corpus petition”). 4 Petitioner proceeds pro se in this action. The undersigned presumes her allegation about access to counsel relates to her immigration attorney before the Immigration Court. See Doc. 1-2 at 2 (referencing Petitioner’s immigration counsel before the Immigration Court). Case 5:26-cv-00318-SLP Document 11 Filed 03/26/26 Page 9 of 11
10 D. Petitioner’s Motion for Expedited Consideration. On February 20, 2026, Petitioner filed a Motion for Expedited Consideration, requesting that the Court expedite consideration of her Petition considering her medical condition and previous compliance with ICE reporting requirements. Doc. 6. Consistent with similar habeas petitions for immigration detainees, the undersigned ordered an expedited briefing schedule and has shortened the period for objections. See Doc. 8; infra Section V. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends the Court DENY as moot Petitioner’s Motion for Expedited Consideration. V. Recommendation and Notice of Right to Object For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends that the Court GRANT in part the Petition for habeas relief by ordering Respondents to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within five business days or otherwise release Petitioner if he has not received a lawful bond hearing within that period. The undersigned further recommends the Court order Respondents to certify compliance by filing a status report within seven business days of the Court’s order. The parties are advised of their right to object to this Report and Recommendation. See 28 U.S.C. § 636. Any objection must be filed not later than April 2, 2026. See id. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). If a party wishes to respond to the other party’s objections, such response must be filed not later than April 7, 2026. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Failure to object timely waives the right to appellate review of the factual and legal issues addressed in this Report and Recommendation. See Moore v. United States, 950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991). Case 5:26-cv-00318-SLP Document 11 Filed 03/26/26 Page 10 of 11
11 This Report and Recommendation disposes of all issues referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge in this matter. ENTERED this 26 th day of March, 2026. Case 5:26-cv-00318-SLP Document 11 Filed 03/26/26 Page 11 of 11
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