Tang v. Grant

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
HOA VAN TANG, 	)
)
Petitioner, 	)
)
v. 	) 	Case No. CIV-25-1468-J
)
SCARLET GRANT, 	)
)
Respondent. 	)
ORDER
Petitioner, proceeding pro se, filed a petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241
[Doc. No. 1]. United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement filed a Response in Opposition
to the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus [Doc. No. 8].1 Petitioner filed a reply [Doc. No. 11].2
The matter was referred to United States Magistrate Judge Shon T. Erwin who entered a Report
and Recommendation [Doc. No. 9] recommending that (1) the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
be granted to the extent it requests habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, (2) Respondent release
Petitioner from custody immediately, subject to an appropriate Order of Supervision, and
(3) Respondent submit a declaration pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 affirming that Petitioner has
been released from custody. 	The parties were advised of their right to object to the Report and
1 	The named Respondent has not been consistent in the record. 	Although the Petition names
Scarlet Grant—Warden of Cimarron Correctional Facility—the Response was submitted by ICE
because the Warden’s interests “are contractually derivative of the federal Respondent’s interests”
[Doc. No. 7]. Whether the named Respondent is Scarlet Grant or ICE does not materially alter the
Court’s analysis.
2 Before filing the reply, Petitioner moved for an extension of time to file the reply [Doc. No. 10].
Because the Court adopts the Report and Recommendation, the Court DENIES the Motion for
Extension of Time [Doc. No. 10] as MOOT.
Case 5:25-cv-01468-J Document 13 Filed 02/06/26 Page 1 of 4

2
Recommendation by February 4, 2026. 	Respondent filed an objection [Doc. No. 12] which
triggers de novo review.
Petitioner’s indefinite detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) violates Petitioner’s Fifth
Amendment due process rights, pursuant to Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001).3 	In
Zadvydas, the Supreme Court concluded that “once removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable,
continued detention is no longer authorized by statute.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699. The Supreme
Court further found:
After this 6-month removal period, once the alien provides good
reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in
the reasonably foreseeable future, the Government must respond
with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing. And for detention to
remain reasonable, as the period of prior postremoval confinement
grows, 	what 	counts 	as 	the 	“reasonably 	foreseeable 	future”
conversely would have to shrink.
Id. at 701.
In the Report and Recommendation, Judge Erwin finds that Petitioner has met his burden
of providing good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the
reasonably foreseeable future and that Respondent has not rebutted Petitioner’s showing. In the
objection, Respondent asserts that Judge Erwin’s finding overvalues Petitioner’s historic non-
removal and improperly discounts evidence of changed circumstances such as increased removals
to Vietnam in 2025.
Having reviewed the court file, the Court concurs with Judge Erwin’s finding. 	It is
undisputed that Petitioner has been detained over six months. 	Additionally, based upon the
3 In the Report and Recommendation, Judge Erwin declines to address Petitioner’s other requests
for relief, including Petitioner’s allegations that his re-detention was in violation of ICE’s own
regulations. Because the Court is adopting Judge Erwin’s conclusion that Petitioner’s indefinite
detention violates his Fifth Amendment due process rights, the Court declines to address
Petitioner’s remaining claims or requests for relief.
Case 5:25-cv-01468-J Document 13 Filed 02/06/26 Page 2 of 4

3
information obtained in both Petitioner’s prior attempted removal and the current attempted
removal, Petitioner has provided good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of
removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. 	It is undisputed that Petitioner was previously
granted a withholding of removal [Doc. No. 1] and was released under an Order of Supervision at
two different times [Doc. Nos. 1, 8]. Petitioner has noted no change in circumstances since he was
first released and that he has demonstrated to ICE’s satisfaction that there is no significant
likelihood of his removal in the reasonably foreseeable future [Doc. No. 1].
Respondent attempts to rebut this showing by relying on a generalized, statistical increase
in removal efforts to Vietnam in 2025 as evidence of a “repatriation pipeline” and that Petitioner’s
removal is, therefore, likely in the reasonably foreseeable future [Doc. No. 12]. 	Respondent,
however, has not identified any individualized efforts with respect to Petitioner’s removal. 	For
example, no future hearings are scheduled for Petitioner, and Respondent has not offered evidence
that travel documents have been requested or issued for Petitioner [Doc. No. 9].4
Finally, in the Response [Doc. No. 8], Respondent devotes three sentences to argue that
Petitioner’s claims are barred because this Court lacks jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) over
claims “arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to . . . execute removal orders.”
In support, Respondent cites Tazu v. Atty’ Gen., 975 F.3d 292, 300–01 (3d Cir. 2020), to argue
that re-detention following revocation of supervision is a paradigmatic example of an action taken
to execute a removal order [Doc. No. 8]. However, Tazu explicitly recognizes that § 1252(g) “does
4 The Court acknowledges the “inartful” reference to an individual named “Nguyen” rather than
Petitioner in the Declaration from Deportation Officer Micheal Thompson [Doc. Nos. 11–12]. In
the Objection, ICE invites the Court to grant ICE the opportunity to correct the clerical name error.
The Court declines the invitation, however, because a correction of the name would not alter the
Court’s analysis.
Case 5:25-cv-01468-J Document 13 Filed 02/06/26 Page 3 of 4

4
not sweep broadly” because it reaches only the specific actions included in the statute. Tazu, 975
F.3d at 296. 	Tazu is also distinguishable because the Government in that case obtained the
individual’s travel documents before re-detaining him and the individual sought a stay of his
removal in addition to habeas relief. Id. at 295. Moreover, this Court has previously found that
§ 1252(g) does not strip this Court of jurisdiction. E.g., Medina-Herrera v. Noem, No. CIV-25-
1203-J, 2025 WL 3460946, at *1–2 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 2, 2025).
Accordingly, the Court ADOPTS the Report and Recommendation [Doc. No. 9], GRANTS
Petitioner’s Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus to the extent it requests habeas relief under
28 U.S.C. § 2241 [Doc. No. 1], DENIES Petitioner’s motion for extension of time [Doc. No. 10]
as MOOT, ORDERS Petitioner be released from custody immediately, subject to an appropriate
Order of Supervision,5 and ORDERS United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement to
submit a declaration pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 affirming that Petitioner has been released from
custody.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 6th day of February, 2026.
5 8 C.F.R. § 241.5 governs the issuance and conditions of orders of supervision.
Case 5:25-cv-01468-J Document 13 Filed 02/06/26 Page 4 of 4