Greenroyd v. Shelton et al

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
ALLYSON GREENROYD, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
vs. 	) 	Case No. CIV-25-1299-R
)
MICHELLE SHELTON, et al., 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
ORDER
Before the Court are the Motions to Dismiss filed by Defendants Michelle Shelton,
Christal Thompkins, Andrea Williams, Abigale Davis, and Cecil Boydston [Doc. Nos. 33,
34, 35, 36, 37]. Plaintiff Allyson Greenroyd, proceeding pro se, filed Responses [Doc. Nos.
38, 39, 40, 41, 42] and Defendants did not reply. The matter is now at issue.
BACKGROUND1
This action arises from circumstances related to the juvenile deprived case of
Plaintiff’s great-niece, L.W., in the District Court of Stephens County, Oklahoma. Doc.
No. 33, at pp. 9-10.2 L.W. was born addicted to drugs on or around May 31, 2025, and on
June 9, 2025, the Stephens County District Attorney’s petition for emergency custody of
1 When reviewing a motion to dismiss brought under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, the Court “take[s] the facts in the complaint as true . . . and [ ] views such
facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff[.]” Knellinger v. Young, 134 F.4th 1034,
1042 (10th Cir. 2025) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
2 While providing Plaintiff the full benefit of a liberal construction of her allegations and
filings due to her pro se status, the Court relies on the facts alleged in Defendants’ filings
to fill the gaps left by the Amended Complaint [Doc. No. 30]. Plaintiff does not dispute
Defendants’ factual statements.
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L.W. was granted. Id. The D.A. thereafter filed an allegedly ongoing juvenile deprived case
concerning L.W. Id. at p. 10. L.W.’s biological parents identified Plaintiff as a preferred
caregiver, and Defendant Michelle Shelton, a child welfare investigator for the Oklahoma
Department of Human Services, contacted Plaintiff regarding the potential kinship
placement of L.W with Plaintiff. Am. Compl., at pp. 1-2. Plaintiff agreed to a kinship
evaluation. Id. at p. 2. Defendant Christal Thompkins, a DHS child welfare specialist,
assessed Plaintiff’s home on June 16, 2025. Id. at pp. 1-2. The following day, Thompkins
verbally notified Plaintiff she would not receive placement of L.W. Id. at p. 2.
Plaintiff asserts that, in denying her consideration for the placement of L.W.,
Defendants Shelton, Thompkins, Andrea Williams (a DHS permanency worker), and
Abigale Davis (a DHS supervisor) relied on the alleged criminal history of another
occupant of Plaintiff’s household. Id. at pp. 1-2. However, Plaintiff asserts Defendants
improperly relied on (1) a criminal charge to which the other household member did not
plead guilty and (2) an offense that fell outside the applicable five-year exclusion period.
Id. at p. 2.
Plaintiff alleges that, prior to being excluded from placement consideration, she did
not receive, amongst other procedural protections, written factual findings, written notice
of denial, a written waiver eligibility notice, an administrative review procedure, or notice
or opportunity to respond. Id. at pp. 2-3. She requested written documentation of the denial
of her placement consideration between June 17 and September 22, 2025, but never
received one. Id. She alleges a written denial was not generated or issued until September
23, 2025, the day before a scheduled court hearing. Id. at p. 3. Plaintiff asserts the timing
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of the written denial deprived her of the chance to seek waiver review or to administratively
appeal the denial prior to the hearing. Id. Nevertheless, the presiding judge at the hearing
relied on the allegedly deficient denial when denying Plaintiff intervention and placement
consideration. Id. Plaintiff communicated her concerns regarding the generation and
presentation of the denial document, and asserts Defendant Cecil Boydston, the DHS
District Director, acknowledged no written denial had been issued prior to September 22.
Id. at pp. 1, 3. She asserts Boydston had authority to direct corrective action related to the
denial prior to the hearing but failed to do so. Id. at p. 3.
Plaintiff filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against the five DHS Defendants in both
their individual and official capacities, arguing some or all the Defendants violated her
Fourteenth Amendment Procedural Due Process and First Amendment rights. Defendants
move to dismiss each of her claims, either for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction or failure
to state a claim.
LEGAL STANDARDS
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins.
Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). To hear a given case, a federal court must possess
subject-matter jurisdiction. Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639 (2009).
A motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) takes
one of two forms: (1) a facial attack; or (2) a factual attack. Baker v. USD 229 Blue Valley,
979 F.3d 866, 872 (10th Cir. 2020). “A facial attack assumes the allegations in the
complaint are true and argues they fail to establish jurisdiction,” whereas, “[a] factual
attack goes beyond the allegations in the complaint and adduces evidence to contest
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jurisdiction.” Id. (citation omitted). Defendants’ 12(b)(1) Motion takes the form of a facial
attack because it assumes allegations in the Complaint are true and does not challenge the
facts upon which subject-matter jurisdiction depends by offering evidence. See Paper,
Allied-Indus., Chem. & Energy Workers Int’l Union v. Cont’l Carbon Co., 428 F.3d 1285,
1292 (10th Cir. 2005). Thus, the Court accepts the allegations in the Complaint as true. Id.
Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper when a complaint fails “to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). “To survive a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion, the complaint ‘must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Brown v. City of Tulsa, 124 F.4th 1251, 1263
(10th Cir. 2025) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). And while the Court
“must accept the truth of all properly alleged facts and draw all reasonable inferences in
the plaintiff’s favor, the plaintiff still ‘must nudge the claim across the line from
conceivable or speculative to plausible.’” Id. (quoting Brooks v. Mentor Worldwide LLC,
985 F.3d 1272, 1281 (10th Cir. 2021)). “Mere ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action’ will not suffice.” Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
Where, as here, a litigant is proceeding pro se, the “pleadings are to be construed
liberally.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). But it is not “the proper
function of the district court to assume the role of advocate for the pro se litigant.” Id. “The
broad reading of the plaintiff’s complaint does not relieve the plaintiff of the burden of
alleging sufficient facts on which a recognized legal claim could be based.” Id.
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DISCUSSION
I. 	The Eleventh Amendment and Younger Abstention
Defendants argue Plaintiff’s claims against them in their official capacities are
essentially claims against the State of Oklahoma and its agency, DHS, and thus are
jurisdictionally barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The Eleventh Amendment, with
certain exceptions, prohibits citizens from filing suit against a state, an arm of the state, or
a state official in her official capacity. Ruiz v. McDonnell, 299 F.3d 1173, 1180 (10th Cir.
2002); Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991) (citations omitted) (“Suits against state
officials in their official capacity [] should be treated as suits against the State. . . . [T]he
only immunities available to the defendant in an official-capacity action are those that the
governmental entity possesses.”). “DHS is an ‘arm’ of the State of Oklahoma.” Miller v.
Okla. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., No. CIV-22-507-D, 2022 WL 16541217, at *2 (Oct. 28, 2022)
(citing McKinney v. State of Okla., Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 925 F.2d 363, 365 (10th Cir.
1991)) (holding the Eleventh Amendment barred plaintiff from seeking monetary damages
from DHS). Plaintiff does not dispute that her official capacity claims, to the extent they
seek monetary damages, are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Accordingly, to the extent
Plaintiff asserts claims for monetary relief against the Defendants in their official
capacities, such claims are DISMISSED for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.3
3 Defendants also assert Plaintiff’s official capacity claims are subject to dismissal under
Rule 12(b)(6) because the Defendants are not “persons” under § 1983. Section 1983
provides for a federal cause of action against persons who, under color of state law, deprive
others of their federally protected rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “But a [§ 1983] suit against a
state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a
suit against the official’s office.” Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989)
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But Plaintiff also seeks prospective relief against Defendants in their official
capacities, and argues such claims fall within the Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)
exception. “[U]nder the Ex parte Young doctrine, ‘the Eleventh Amendment generally does
not bar a suit against a state official in federal court which seeks only prospective equitable
relief for violations of federal law, even if the state is immune.’” Muscogee (Creek) Nation
v. Okla. Tax. Comm’n, No. 09-CV-285-TCK-TLW, 2009 WL 10695365, at *3 (N.D. Okla.
Aug. 10, 2009) (quoting J.B. ex rel. Hart v. Valdez, 186 F.3d 1280, 1286 (10th Cir. 1999)).4
Defendants do not dispute or discuss the exception for prospective relief under the Eleventh
Amendment. But even if this exception applies, Younger abstention doctrine dictates this
Court should decline to consider any of Plaintiff’s claims.
The Younger abstention doctrine “‘provides that a federal court must abstain from
deciding a case otherwise within the scope of its jurisdiction in certain instances in which
the prospect of undue interference with state proceedings counsels against federal relief.’”
Travelers Cas. Ins. Co. of Am. v. A-Quality Auto Sales, Inc., 98 F.4th 1307, 1317 (10th Cir.
2024) (quoting Elna Sefcovic, LLC v. TEP Rocky Mountain, LLC, 953 F.3d 660, 669-70
(10th Cir. 2020)) (quotation marks omitted). However, the doctrine only applies when “the
(citation omitted). Thus, at least to the extent a plaintiff seeks money damages, “neither a
State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.” Id. at
71, 71 n.10 (citations omitted). Plaintiff does not dispute that her official capacity claims,
to the extent they seek monetary damages, fail because Defendants cannot be considered
“persons” under § 1983 in that context. Thus, her claims against Defendants in their official
capacities seeking monetary damages are also subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).
4 See also Will, 491 U.S. at 71 n.10 (quoting Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n.14
(1985)) (“Of course a state official in his or her official capacity, when sued for injunctive
relief, would be a person under § 1983 because ‘official capacity actions for prospective
relief are not treated as actions against the State.’”).
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state proceeding falls into one of the following [Sprint] categories: ‘(1) state criminal
prosecutions, (2) civil enforcement proceedings that take on a quasi-criminal shape, and
(3) civil proceedings involving certain orders that are uniquely in furtherance of the state
courts’ ability to perform their judicial function.’” Id. (quoting Graff v. Aberdeen
Enterprizes, II, Inc., 65 F.4th 500, 522 (10th Cir. 2023)); (also citing Sprint Commc’ns, Inc.
v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 79 (2013)) (brackets omitted).
If the state proceeding falls into one of the Sprint categories outlined above, then a
federal court must abstain from hearing the case when the following conditions are met:
(1) there is an ongoing state criminal, civil, or administrative proceeding, (2)
the state court provides an adequate forum to hear the claims raised in the
federal complaint, and (3) the state proceedings involve important state
interests, matters which traditionally look to state law for their resolution or
implicate separately articulated state policies.
Chapman v. Oklahoma, 472 F.3d 747, 749 (10th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). “When these
conditions are met, the application of Younger is mandatory.” Morkel v. Davis, 513 F.
App’x 724, 727 (10th Cir. 2013) (unpublished) (citing Weitzel v. Div. of Occupational &
Pro. Licensing of the Dep’t of Com., 240 F.3d 871, 875 (10th Cir. 2001)).
The state proceedings cited by Plaintiff—namely the juvenile deprived case
involving the custody of J.W. (JD-25-4)—fit into a Sprint category. Specifically, the state
juvenile deprived proceeding is “a ‘pending civil proceeding[ ] involving’ a domestic-
relations proceeding that is ‘uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform
their judicial functions.’” Wright v. Okla. Cnty., No. CIV-20-346-JD, 2020 WL 8335672,
at *8 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 31, 2020) (quoting Sprint, 571 U.S. at 78) (analyzing the Sprint
categories and applying Younger to an on-going state divorce proceeding). And as noted
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by then-Judge Neil Gorsuch in Wyttenbach v. Parrish, 496 F. App’x 796 (10th Cir. 2012)
(unpublished), “[f]ederal courts have long disclaimed responsibility for domestic relations
cases, leaving the power to issue and enforce ‘divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees’
to the states.” Wyttenbach, 496 F. App’x at 796 (quoting Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504
U.S. 689, 703 (1992)). The Tenth Circuit and “other circuits have consistently applied
Younger to child custody cases.” Morkel, 513 F. App’x at 728 (collecting cases). So the
Court finds that the child custody proceeding forming the basis of Plaintiff’s Complaint
fits into a Sprint category sufficient to trigger a Younger analysis.
First, Defendant represents, and Plaintiff does not dispute, that the juvenile deprived
case is ongoing in Stephens County. Second, Plaintiff has not alleged, and does not argue,
that Oklahoma “state courts are an inadequate forum for raising her constitutional claims .
. . . [Furthermore,] [s]tate courts are generally equally [as] capable of enforcing federal
constitutional rights as federal courts.” Id. (citing Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden
State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 431 (1982)). Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing “state
law prevents her from presenting her federal claims in the state proceedings,” but she has
failed to do so. Id. at 728-29 (citation omitted). In fact, she only states that Younger doesn’t
apply because she is asserting independent claims5 for constitutional violations by the
5 The Court questions this characterization. Plaintiff does not explicitly ask this Court to
declare as void or improperly decided the state court’s denial of consideration of Plaintiff
for placement of L.W. However, Plaintiff does ask the Court to provide prospective
injunctive relief in the form of written notice of kinship placement denials, a meaningful
opportunity for administrative review prior to court reliance, prohibition of reliance upon
materially inaccurate or unauthorized criminal history information, and correction of
inaccurate records relied on in the denial of Plaintiff’s consideration. This implicates the
concern that, were the Court to afford Plaintiff her requested relief, Plaintiff could then
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Defendants—not because state law prevents her from raising these issues or because
Oklahoma state courts are incapable of hearing her claims. Finally, “the resolution of child
custody matters has been acknowledged as an important state interest.” Id. at 729 (citation
omitted); see also Morrow v. Winslow, 94 F.3d 1386, 1393 (10th Cir. 1996) (citation and
quotations omitted) (finding abstention was appropriate and stating “adoption and child
custody proceedings are an especially delicate subject of state policy” and a “traditional
area of state concern”). Because Plaintiff’s claims focus on actions taken by DHS and other
state and county entities affecting those proceedings, the final Younger condition is
satisfied. Finding all three Younger conditions met, and no extraordinary circumstances
present, the Court is required to abstain from hearing Plaintiff’s claims to the extent the
state-court proceedings are ongoing.
But even if Younger does not apply, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to “include sufficient
factual allegations to state a claim for” First or Fourteenth Amendment violations. Abu-
Fakher v. Bode, 175 Fed. App’x 179, 181 (10th Cir. 2006) (unpublished).
II. 	Plaintiff’s Claims Do Not Pass Rule 12(b)(6) Muster.
a. Fourteenth Amendment Procedural Due Process
Plaintiff alleges Oklahoma law and DHS policy establish a state-created entitlement
to procedural safeguards governing kinship placement evaluations such as written notice
of her denial for kinship consideration and its underlying factual basis, waiver eligibility
“take [her] federal judgment to the state court and attempt to enjoin, interfere with, or use
the judgment for its purported preclusive effect in the state proceedings.” Wright, 2020 WL
8335672, at *7 (quoting D.L. v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 497, 392 F.3d 1223, 1228 (10th Cir.
2004)).
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notice, and administrative review procedures. She states Defendants Shelton, Thompkins,
Williams, and Davis denied her these procedural safeguards and Defendant Boydston
failed to correct such deficiencies before a court could rely on DHS’s denial of Plaintiff for
placement of L.W.
“To state a claim for relief in an action brought under § 1983, [Plaintiff] must
establish that [she was] deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United
States, and that the alleged deprivation was committed under color of state law.” Am. Mfrs.
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999). The Tenth Circuit uses a “‘two-step
inquiry in determining whether an individual’s procedural-due-process rights were
violated: (1) Did the individual possess a protected property interest to which due process
protection was applicable? (2) Was the individual afforded an appropriate level of
process?’” Camuglia v. City of Albuquerque, 448 F.3d 1214, 1219 (10th Cir. 2006)
(quoting Clark v. City of Draper, 168 F.3d 1185, 1189 (10th Cir. 1999)) (brackets omitted).
Defendant argues Plaintiff lacks a protected liberty or property interest in being a
foster care placement and thus has failed to allege a due process violation. Plaintiff
contends she is not claiming a generalized right to foster placement but rather a state-
created entitlement to the mandatory procedures of the kinship placement process.
“[W]hen state law creates a mandatory procedure but does not guarantee a particular
substantive outcome, it does not confer a protective liberty interest.” Elwell v. Byers, 699
F.3d 1208, 1214 (10th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). “[T]he protected interests are
substantive rights, not rights to procedure.” Elliott v. Martinez, 675 F.3d 1241, 1245 (10th
Cir. 2012). “‘Thus, an entitlement to nothing but procedure cannot be the basis for a liberty
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or property interest.’” Clark v. Okla. Pardon & Parole Bd., No. 21-6079, 2022 WL 130000,
at *2 (10th Cir. Jan. 14, 2022) (unpublished) (quoting Elliott, 675 F.3d at 1245). Plaintiff
herself admits she is not claiming a “unilateral expectation of placement” but rather an
“entitlement to . . . required procedural safeguards.” Plaintiff does not assert that she has a
constitutional interest in becoming a foster parent, or that properly carried-out state kinship
placement procedures would have mandated the placement of L.W. with her. She is
asserting only a right to procedure, not a right to a particular substantive outcome.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants for violation of her 14th Amendment
rights (Claim One) are therefore subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).
b. Fourteenth-Amendment Stigma-Plus Due Process
Plaintiff asserts Defendants Shelton, Williams, and Davis committed a Stigma-Plus
Due Process violation by relying on inaccurate criminal history information as a basis for
denial of her consideration for kinship placement of L.W., and that the state court relied on
this false report when denying her standing and placement consideration. Under the stigma-
plus theory, “governmental defamation, coupled with an alteration in legal status, violates
a liberty interest that triggers procedural due process protection.” Brown v. Montoya, 662
F.3d 1152, 1167 (10th Cir. 2011). To succeed on a stigma-plus claim, a plaintiff must show:
(1) the government made a statement about him or her that is sufficiently
derogatory to injure his or her reputation, that is capable of being proved
false, and that he or she asserts is false, and (2) the plaintiff experienced some
governmentally imposed burden that “significantly altered [his or] her status
as a matter of state law.”
Gwinn v. Awmiller, 354 F.3d 1211, 1216 (10th Cir. 2004) (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S.
693, 710-11 (1976)).
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But with respect to government defamation, “‘intra-government dissemination [of
a defamatory statement], by itself, falls short of the Supreme Court’s notion of
publication.’” Sky Harbor Air Serv., Inc. v. Reams, 491 F. App’x 875, 886 (10th Cir. 2012)
(unpublished) (quoting Asbill v. Hous. Auth. of Choctaw Nation, 726 F.2d 1499, 1503 (10th
Cir. 1984)). To the extent Plaintiff asserts communication of the allegedly false report
between DHS officials was defamatory, it simply cannot be considered published for
Fourteenth Amendment purposes. See Alcorn v. La Barge, WY, 784 F. App’x 614, 619-20
(10th Cir. 2019) (unpublished) (finding internal communications of the same unit of
government, such as a state, city, or agency, are not published for Fourteenth Amendment
purposes, and applying such a rule to communications between a municipal government
and a state agency or between units of government (e.g., between a city and county or a
state and its sub-units)).
With respect to the filing of the written denial in the juvenile-deprived case, such a
communication falls under Oklahoma’s litigation privilege.6 See Springer v. Richardson
Law Firm, 239 P.3d 473, 475 (Okla. Civ. App. 2010) (quoting Samson Inv. Co. v.
Chevaillier, 988 P.2d 327, 329-30 (Okla. 1999)) (“The ‘litigation privilege’ . . . ‘accords
attorneys, parties, jurors and witnesses immunity for comments or writings made during
the course of or preliminary to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings.’ . . . It applies
‘regardless of whether [the communications] are true or false.’”). Plaintiff represents that
the DHS officials generated the report prior to and for the purpose of the juvenile-deprived
6 Plaintiff does not dispute, and indeed does not address at all, Defendant’s assertions that
such a report is privileged.
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proceedings in Stephens County District Court. It would thus appear such a report is
privileged and cannot be considered defamatory for the purposes of Plaintiff’s stigma-plus
claim. Accordingly, and without persuasive argument or authority to the contrary,
Plaintiff’s stigma-plus due process claims (Claim Three) are DISMISSED.
III. First Amendment Retaliation
Plaintiff also alleges a First Amendment Retaliation claim against Defendants
Williams and Davis.
Government retaliation against a plaintiff for exercising his or her First
Amendment rights may be shown by proving the following elements: (1) that
the plaintiff was engaged in constitutionally protected activity; (2) that the
defendant’s actions caused the plaintiff to suffer an injury that would chill a
person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that activity; and
(3) that the defendant’s adverse action was substantially motivated as a
response to the plaintiff’s exercise of constitutionally protected conduct. Id.
(quotations omitted).
Shero v. City of Grove, 510 F.3d 1196, 1203 (10th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). Plaintiff
claims she was engaged in the constitutionally protected activity of petitioning the
government for redress. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . .
abridging . . . the right of the people . . . to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.”). Plaintiff appears to claim her right to petition was violated by Defendants’
continued refusal to provide her with procedural safeguards after she requested
documentation and review of the placement denial.
“‘The right to petition allows citizens to express their ideas, hopes, and concerns to
their government and their elected representatives.’” Nunley v. Goldey, No. 23-6164, 2024
WL 2014307, at *2 (10th Cir. May 7, 2024) (unpublished) (quoting Santa Fe All. for Pub.
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Health & Safety v. City of Santa Fe, 993 F.3d 802, 819 (10th Cir. 2021)) (internal quotation
marks omitted). “But the Supreme Court has recognized that the First Amendment does
not obligate the government to consider, respond to, or grant any relief on a citizen’s
petition for redress of grievances.” Id. (citing Smith v. Ark. State Highway Emps., Local
1315, 441 U.S. 463, 465 (1979)). See also HRH, LLC v. Teton Cnty., No. 18-CV-104-SWS,
2020 WL 13430352, at *4 (D. Wyo. Feb. 13, 2020) (noting the county did not prevent the
plaintiff from filing a zoning application and stating the right to petition did not confer a
right “to have the government expeditiously process or approve its application once filed”);
Santa Fe All., 993 F.3d at 819 (quotation omitted) (“But the text of the First Amendment
does not speak in terms of successful petitioning—it speaks simply of the right of the
people . . . to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”). Assuming Plaintiff’s
requests for documentation and review were petitions to the government, she has not
asserted that she was prevented from filing these requests or airing these complaints, but
only that despite those petitions, the Defendants continued to refuse to provide her the
requested procedures. “[T]he case law uniformly rejects the contention that the First
Amendment guarantees any success when petitioning,” thus “rendering [Plaintiff’s] claim
frivolous.” Id. (citation omitted). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s First Amendment Retaliation
claims are subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).
IV. Supervisory Liability
Plaintiff also brings a supervisory liability claim against Boydston, arguing he knew
she had been denied procedural safeguards, could have directed corrective action, and yet
failed to intervene, contributing directly to the alleged constitutional violations. “‘To
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impose § 1983 liability [on a supervisor,] the plaintiff first ha[s] to establish the
supervisor’s subordinates violated the [C]onstitution.’” Burke v. Regalado, 935 F.3d 960,
993-94 (10th Cir. 2019) (quoting Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d 1185, 1194-95 (10th Cir.
2010)). As discussed above, Plaintiff has failed to plead any of Defendant Boydston’s
alleged subordinates violated either her First or Fourteenth Amendment rights.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s supervisory liability claim against Defendant Boydston is subject
to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the Motions to Dismiss [Doc. Nos. 33, 34, 35, 36, 37] are GRANTED.
This action is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 1st day of July, 2026.
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