Richey v. ABM Education Services LLC et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
JENNIFER RICHEY, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. CIV-25-189-G
)
ABM EDUCATION SERVICES, LLC, )
and SUPERINTENDENT MID-DEL )
PUBLIC SCHOOLS, )
)
Defendants. )
ORDER
Now before the Court is Plaintiff Jennifer Richey’s Motion for Recusal (Doc. No.
39), seeking the undersigned’s recusal in this action. Plaintiff alleges that the undersigned
has a conflict of interest and has engaged in unfair treatment in Plaintiff’s cases. See id.
I. Background
In October of 2023, Plaintiff filed an employment-discrimination complaint against
the same two defendants named herein. After Plaintiff failed to effect service upon the
defendants, the undersigned dismissed the matter without prejudice pursuant to Rule 4(m)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Richey v. Am. Bldg. Maintenance, No. CIV-
23-915-G, 2024 WL 3273276, at *1-2 (W.D. Okla. May 30, 2024).
Plaintiff appealed, and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that the
Court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the case. See Richey v. Am. Bldg.
Maintenance, No. 24-6127, 2025 WL 304293, at *2 (10th Cir. Jan. 27, 2025) (“Richey did
not show good cause for her failure to timely serve the defendants.”).
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On February 12, 2025, Plaintiff filed the instant action, again bringing her
employment-discrimination claims against the two defendants. See Compl. (Doc. No. 1);
see also Doc. No. 35. Both defendants have filed Motions to Dismiss (Doc. Nos. 10, 19).
II. Plaintiff’s Motion for Recusal
“Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself
in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 455(a). Accordingly, “a judge has a continuing duty to recuse before, during, or, in some
circumstances, after a proceeding, if the judge concludes that sufficient factual grounds
exist to cause an objective observer reasonably to question the judge’s impartiality.”
United States v. Cooley, 1 F.3d 985, 992 (10th Cir. 1993). “The test . . . is whether a
reasonable person, knowing all the relevant facts, would harbor doubts about the judge’s
impartiality.” Id. at 993 (internal quotation marks omitted). “The standard is purely
objective.” Id. Matters that “will not ordinarily satisfy the requirements for
disqualification under § 455(a)” include “[r]umor, speculation, beliefs, conclusions,
innuendo, suspicion, opinion, and similar non-factual matters,” and “prior rulings in the
proceeding, or another proceeding, solely because they were adverse.” Id. at 993-94.
Liberally construing Plaintiff’s Motion and related submissions, Plaintiff argues that
recusal is required due to the undersigned’s dismissal of her prior lawsuit despite Plaintiff
having been in the right. But § 455(a) “is not intended to give litigants a veto power over
sitting judges, or a vehicle for obtaining a judge of their choice,” and “must not be so
broadly construed that it becomes, in effect, presumptive, so that recusal is mandated upon
the merest unsubstantiated suggestion of personal bias or prejudice.” Id. at 993 (internal
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quotation marks omitted). A recusal motion is not a proper “avenue to attack adverse
rulings” made against a litigant. Glass v. Pfeffer, 849 F.2d 1261, 1228 (10th Cir. 1988);
accord Cooley, 1 F.3d at 994.
Plaintiff also appears to argue that recusal is proper because the Court has not ruled
on the pending Motions to Dismiss or addressed certain other submissions. It is well
established, however, that “[d]elays or omissions by a judge . . . are not grounds for
disqualification.” Aspinall v. United States, 984 F.2d 355, 357 (10th Cir. 1993).
Taken singly or together, Plaintiff’s grounds for recusal do not establish a
reasonable factual basis for an objective person to reasonably doubt or question the
impartiality of the undersigned. Cf. Cooley, 1 F.3d at 994 (“[T]here is as much obligation
for a judge not to recuse when there is no occasion for him to do so as there is for him to
do so when there is.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion for Recusal (Doc. No. 39) is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 3rd day of March, 2026.
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